Dear Fellows, I am starting this thread to post opinions, research reports, videos and other material (except news items) regarding middle east uprising.

you can help by posting the relevant material however the rule must be strictly followed - the rule is "only relevant, factual and well researched material should be posted and no merely copy past please."

To judge whether an article is worthy to be posted here, one must read it first.

Western paradox over Arabian revolutions
Ishtiaq Ahmad
Weekly Pulse
25-31 March 2011

As soon as Arab streets and squares started to produce popular revolutions early this year, the United States and its European allies, which have long supported North African and Middle Eastern dictatorships, had to make a critical choice: that of adapting to the new political reality of the region and supporting the forces of democracy. There was, indeed, visible reluctance on their part to abandon the dictatorial rulers—with the French standing by Ben Ali of Tunisia until the very last moment, and the United States likewise preferring smooth democratic transition under Mubarak. In the end, however, what the people in the two countries wanted prevailed, and two of the staunchest pro-Western rulers were ousted from power.
If there was a lesson for Western powers to learn from Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions, it was that when people in authoritarian countries come out in streets and squares to demand their due political, economic and social rights—and are willing even to risk their lives for the purpose—it is prudent to support them rather than their suppressive rulers and regimes. Therefore are, of course, realistic concerns or pragmatic interests, revolving largely over ensuring Israeli security in a hostile Middle East or securing oil supplies from the region, which compel the United States and other Western countries to practice extreme caution amid volatile political situations in the region.

Double Standards

For the same reason, the current US-led Western approach towards radical political change underway in the Arab world continues to display double standards—which are most visible in the form of forceful implementation of a no fly zone over Libya largely in support of armed rebels, in contrast to a pathetically lacklustre attitude towards populist, largely non-violent uprisings in Yemen and Bahrain.

As for the causes of Arabian revolutions and the means of their relative success in Tunisia and Egypt, there is general understanding about the population at large in Arabia being politically disenfranchised, economically disempowered and socially suppressed; and a powerful combination of youth and technology fuelling the revolutionary process. The same factors hold true for Yemen and Bahrain at present and will for other authoritarian regimes of the region, which may face youth-led democratic protests with similar intensity in near future.

Yemen and Bahrain are strategically significant for the United States and its Western allies. Yemen under the leadership of President Ali Abdullah Saleh has been a valuable asset in combating al-Qaeda. The United States has a naval base in Bahrain, which also hosts the US Fifth Fleet. Bahrain is ruled by the minority Sunni dynasty of King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa, while the country’s majority population is Shiite.

However, as widespread youth-led protests in the two countries and the violent state responses to them in recent weeks suggest, both of these long-standing authoritarian regimes and their rulers have lost political legitimacy to rule, at least in the eyes of their respective majority populations. If a similar argument in the case of Libya can justify the passage of two UN Security Council resolutions in quick row, and the imposition of a no fly zone over the country in a manner that may go beyond the UN mandate itself, then why is the crisis the two Gulf states being allowed to conflagrate to the extent of even jeopardising long-standing realistic and pragmatic Western interests?

That Bahrain’s majority population is Shiite does not mean that a future representative regime and leadership of the country, as a natural outcome of the current popular revolt, should in any way endanger such Western interests. What the clerical order in Iran has done to its majority population, subjugating their due political, economic and social rights and making them hostage to a relentless pursuit of conflict with the US-led West, is clearly understood by the masses of Bahrain and populations of the Gulf.

Inaction in Gulf

Therefore, just for the fear of revolutionary Iran making inroads in the region, the peaceful protestors of Bahrain do not deserve to be treated differently than the armed rebels of Libya. Likewise in Yemen, the dawn of democracy may actually turn out to be the ultimate antidote to al-Qaeda’s terrorist agenda. As the duality of Western dealing with revolts in the region gets amplified, with one standard of toughness for Libya and the other standard of leniency towards Yemen and Bahrain, the long-term crisis for American or Western policy in the region will become acute.

This is especially true when nothing is said by Washington, London and Paris about the recent deployment of troops from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in Bahrain as part of security cooperation among Gulf Cooperation Countries (GCC). It is understandable that that the principal aim of this intervention is not to protect “important government installations” but to crush the populist uprising in the country and preserve the despotic rule by al Khalifa dynasty.

The perceived fear from the domino effect of Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions to succeed in Yemen and Bahrain is that it may potentially unseat the House of the Sauds in next-door Saudi Arabia, where King Abdullah has thus far prevented major upsurge by announcing a host of economic incentives while simultaneously threatening severe crackdown. But who can foresee whether current winds of political change in the wider Middle East and North Africa, including Syria, Algeria, Sudan and Morocco, will not have their natural culmination in the overthrow of the Saudi royalty.

It is a unique dynasty in the region which has monopolised political power with the help of literalist Wahhabi Islamic ideology and provides the last refuge to dictators in exile, from Edi Amin of Uganda to Ben Ali of Tunisia. And, obviously, while Bahrain and Yemen do not have oil and obtain their status as strategically significant countries for having an American naval base and combating al-Qaeda, respectively, the Saudi significance for the United States in particular and the West in general essentially lies in it being the world’s largest possessor and exporter of oil.

What the fall of authoritarian regimes in Bahrain and Yemen could possibly do is to pave the way for the demise of the current dynastic rule in Saudi Arabia, or perhaps in some other countries of the Persian Gulf region. There may be short-term jolts to the perceived or real interests of the United States or its Western allies in the region—with reference, for instance, to determining the price and supply of oil, or renewed populist support for a just and fair resolution of the Palestinian issue. But, then, it is better to prepare for or bear such consequences of democratization in the region, rather than continuing to support stagnant Arabian regimes and leaders and, by default, contributing to growing rage among Arab masses against the United States and the West.

Exceeding UN Mandate

Like many of his counterparts in the Middle East and North Africa, Col Muammar Gaddafi, beyond any doubt, epitomises nothing but stagnation. But his removal from power is an issue that should be left to the Libyan people alone. The UN Security Council resolution 1979, in essence, is about preventing Gaddafi forces from undertaking a large-scale massacre of innocent civilians—a probability that could not be ruled out in Benghazi, if the UN resolution had not come into force to make the no fly zone an effective deterrent against such massacre.

Resolution 1979 was neither intended to overthrow Gaddafi nor divide Libya into rebel-held east, where the country’s oil is, and Gaddafi-controlled West, where most of its population resides. It was solely for the sake of protecting innocent civilians in Libya that the Arab League had requested for the creation of a no fly zone over the country. However, as it seemingly turns out, its principal implementers—the French, the British and the Americans—may be exceeding the mandate of the resolution in carrying out air strikes over questionable targets, even reportedly arming the rebels via Egyptian border. Such controversial approach may in the end lead to Gaddafi’s overthrow with consequent political anarchy as well as division of the country along tribal and geographical lines.

It is unsurprising, therefore, that the very representative Arabian entity, the Arab League, which called for the creation of a non-fly zone in the first instance is now critical of the way it is being implemented by Western powers. Secretary-General Amr Moussa recently criticised them by saying, "What happened in Libya is different from the intended aim of imposing the no-fly zone. We want to protect civilians, not the bombing of more civilians.”

The repercussions of whatever outcome the no fly zone, especially its implementation beyond the mandate of the Security Council resolution, has in Libya in coming weeks or months would have to be borne largely by European countries bordering the Mediterranean, the Italians and the French, in the shape of refugee influx or illegal immigrants.

The reason why France, Italy and, perhaps, Britain are so proactive about the Libyan mission may be because of the perceived opportunity to avenge past acts of terrorism sponsored by the Gaddafi regime (for Britain, the 1988 Lockerbie disaster especially). Or they may simply be eying upon the huge oil reserves in eastern Libya, expecting the oil supply on more favorable terms or better contractual terms for the respective oil companies—without any strings attached, as has been the case in dealing with Libya under Gaddafi.

They may be doing so for doing away once and for all with the discomfort of dealing with a terror-prone despot in power for the last 42 years. After all, memories are still afresh of former British premier Tony Blair visiting Gaddafi in Tripoli to secure a trade deal for British Petroleum. Even French President Nicolas Sarkozy not long ago stood shoulder to shoulder with Gaddafi in Elysee Palace in Paris. However, this was the time when the Libya leader had demonstrated his willingness to conduct peacefully with the outside world, loading a ship with all of the country’s nukes and sending it straight to the United States, for instance.

Tackling the Dilemma

For now, the United States has acted wisely to let the aerial intervention in Libya be commanded by its European allies, as Washington’s deep and uncertain engagement in an unstable Iraq and an insurgency-ridden Afghanistan leaves no scope for it to lead yet another intervention in a Muslim country. But the Obama Administration has to go further than this, and ensure that its European partners enforcing the no fly zone over Libya do not exceed the limitations imposed by the UN Security Council resolutions 1973.

That the world body is empowered only to manage challenges of peace and security in the world is a principal that must be upheld by all of its member-states, big or small. There is no global consensus yet about any UN-mandated humanitarian intervention to affect political change within particular countries, including overthrowing its leaders in the guise of supporting democracy.

However, there are a host of other steps that the international community in general and the United States in particular can take to influence stable democratic change in countries experiencing political turmoil. At present, we see two extremes of international response—of which one is supporting the armed rebels, as visible in the case of Libya and another altogether looking acts of suppression by dictatorial regimes and their regional supporters, as is the case with Yemen and Libya.

On the issue of democracy in the Arab or Muslim countries of the Middle East and North Africa, the practice of any selective approach—one that accentuates the long-held view among their masses of double standards practiced by America and the West—will have untenable consequences not just for the region but for the international powers having a rational stake in its stability.

The Western dilemma of supporting dictatorial regimes and rulers in the region can be addressed more effectively only through a proactive, universalistic Western approach of supporting youth-led democratization trends in the countries concerned. In Egypt, for instance, it may only be a matter of time when Tahrir Square is again filled with non-violent protestors—led by the very youth activists who recently refused to meet US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton—if the cosmetic constitutional reforms do not meet the genuine political, economic and social expectations of the country’s restive youth.

The recently held referendum in Egypt is believed to be supportive of the two established parties, the National Democratic Party of the former president and the much feared Islamist group, the Muslim Brotherhood. If the outcome of elections to be held later this year on the basis of the constitutional reforms approved in the referendum is in the shape of these very parties capturing most parliamentary seats, then the fundamental issues of the country, which forced its people to revolt, will remain unsettled.

Whether it is Egypt, or, for that matter, any other North African or Middle Eastern country experiencing radical political change now or likely to move on the same path in coming weeks or months, despotism has been such a long-standing force that it will be sometime before democratic institutions and traditions and fully established and operative. The Western adjustment process with the emerging democratic reality of the region will likewise take sometime and entail many difficulties.

However, the preference for the outside world, especially the West, should be to make sure that the overall democratization process in the Arab world evolves smoothly in consonance with the due desires of masses in individual countries. If that happens, there is no reason why the consequent political environment in the region will not be conducive enough for meeting Israel’s legitimate security interests, serving genuine commercial needs of the Western world and, above all, reducing the current appeal for and clout of al-Qaeda and other extremist-terrorist forces across the Muslim world.




Source: Ishtiaq Ahmad : Item Display

__________________
Ahmad Shakeel Babar
.
"If you really want to achieve something the whole universe conspires for you to get your dream realized."

Making Sense of Libya and Bahrain

Tanvir Ahmad Khan

Libya and Bahrain need a special focus in the panoramic spread of protest movements in the Arab lands. The dynamics at work in them are dissimilar but portend future developments of great strategic import. In both cases, the assertion of people power has brought outside engagement. In Libya’s case, the United Nations’ resolution 1973 barely masks the international community’s resolve to bring about a regime change. In Bahrain, the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have invoked collective security and sent limited contingents to help the Government.

In Libya, the ‘Arab spring’ has had a distinctive hue of its own. The uprising in eastern Libya was, from the beginning, an armed revolt aimed at bringing down Muammar Qaddafi. Very early on, it sought a no-fly zone to neutralise his military advantage. The western media and then the western governments quickly built up a grim narrative of Qaddafi brutalizing his own people. After an initial hesitation, President Obama and most of the European leaders demanded that he steps down forthwith.

The ‘international community’ was never prepared to countenance the defeat of the rebel National Council, a parallel government in eastern Libya. President Sarkozy, who wants to project Paris as a bastion of western power, was the first to recognise this Council and France carried out the first air strike against a Libyan target. Britain and United States followed with a crippling rain of Tomahawk cruise missiles on the night of March 19.

The over-zealous western interest in the Libyan crisis, doubtless, belongs partially to the saga of oil, blood and sand. Libya has about 3.5 % of global oil reserves; its proven reserves stand at 46.5 billion barrels. Many western analysts concede that the present military campaign aims at controlling, Iraq-style, the production, distribution and pricing of Libyan oil. The Western rapprochement with Qaddafi began in 2003 when he brought back western oil companies and ended abruptly when the otherwise fawning European politicians saw in the uprising a unique opportunity to overthrow him.

There is no gainsaying that Qaddafi’s defiant response to the initial protest precipitated the civil war that opened the door to “humanitarian intervention”. The Libyan crisis was shaped by Muammar Qaddafi’s unusual personality, rivalries of the three major tribes including his own and his brand of democracy that subordinated a modern nation state to the culture of a mega tribe of which he was the chief. He had achieved much including a per capita income of $ 12000/- for his people but, tethered to his unique philosophy, the Libyan state remained in denial of the new forces emerging in a rapidly urbanizing society.

The broad terms of the U.N resolution authorizing the use of force to ‘protect’ the people are being implemented as a mandate to destroy the Qaddafi regime. The western airpower is already decimating his command and control centres and other military installations; one can only hope that the economic infrastructure survives. This may enable the “rebels” to recover the towns recently lost to Qaddafi loyalists and make a bid for the capital. The ‘unintended consequence’ would, be that Libya is left with tribal guerilla formations engaged in a protracted nightmarish conflict across a vast land.

Bahrain is a small island endowed with enormous geopolitical importance. Political developments in it can alter the regional balance of forces. It is home to the U.S Fifth Fleet that projects power over a huge body of water. Bahrain’s main fault line is supposed to be a tussle between a Shiite majority and the Sunni ruling Al-Khalifa family. This is an oversimplification as the opposition parties such as Al-Wefaq traditionally seek redistribution of power between the monarchy and parliament. In fact, King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa began his reign by bringing a healing touch to the sectarian tendencies that marred politics in 1990s. Crown Prince Sheik Salman bin Hamad Al-Khalifa is a strong voice today for further reforms. In economic terms, Shiite villages do need to be mainstreamed into Manama’s prosperity.

Political parties, assorted intellectuals, lawyers and youth called for a demonstration on February 14 ostensibly to celebrate Bahrain’s National Action Charter and the King did not object. They upped the ante by turning the landmark Pearl Roundabout of Manama into a local Tahrir Square, an enduring encampment. The majority still spoke of constitutional monarchy but some extremists from the Shiite party Wafa, Haq and the left -leaning Sunni Waad parties, tried to inject republicanism into the movement. On 17th February, four persons died during a night time operation by the security forces to disperse the Pearl Roundabout camp. Persistent efforts to revive it resulted in the demolition of this landmark by the security forces on March 18.

The United States has continued to play up the Iranian threat to the region. Recently, it concluded agreements for military sales worth $ 123 billion with Saudi Arabia, U.A.E, Kuwait and Oman. These contracts include 84 F-15 Jets, 70 Apache gunships and 72 Blackhawk helicopters. Defence Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen visited Bahrain during the recent unrest and ‘sources’ revealed that there was “much talk about Iran”. The fact of the matter is that only a miniscule section in Bahrain’s Shiite population is interested in Iran’s political influence. Arguably, Iran would welcome a shift of power to the Shiite majority if Bahrain becomes a constitutional monarchy; it will be consistent with Iranian policy towards Iraq and Lebanon. There is, however, little evidence of Iran’s interference in the current political strife.

Against this backdrop of internal and external factors, the GCC acted on March 14 with a Saudi contingent turning the spectacular King Fahd causeway into a strategic highway. Next day, the King declared emergency for three months though he has since reiterated his resolve to continue reforms. The GCC commitment to Bahrain’s stability may strengthen moderate elements in the opposition and thus promote a peaceful solution. This could help Bahrain avoid the instability that seems to be Libya’s fate at present.

(tanvir.a.khan@gmail.com
The writer is based in Pakistan. He is a former Foreign Secretary, and has served as Pakistan’s ambassador to various states including the Russian Federation, France, Iran and Bangladesh. His most recent appointment was as Director General of the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad.)

__________________
Ahmad Shakeel Babar
.
"If you really want to achieve something the whole universe conspires for you to get your dream realized."

The case of Saudi Arabia is so different from that of Pakistan’s or even Egypt’s. With tons of money to go around, it has been far easier for the government to buy loyalties and deliver basics such that there are no chants for democracy. But when both Bahrain and Yemen, neighbouring countries in which Saudi Arabia is keenly involved, have erupted in shouts of Al-shaab urid iskat al-nizam (the people want the end of the regime), and when Facebook, YouTube and Twitter have made the world a much smaller place, how long can the Saudi regime maintain its iron hold is questionable. When astute bloggers like Ahmed alOmran of saudijeans.org speak for the reform-minded youth, what Arab News says becomes far less relevant.

Although in the past Saudis may have been placated with stipends and subsidies, with a growing population and a high unemployment rate, it may be difficult to sustain such policies of seeming benevolence and better to adopt more meritocratic methods. Families of missing people abducted by Saudi security forces have legitimate grievances as do those who suffer from a lack of infrastructure, as in the case of the flooding in Jeddah. Add to that the corruption of the upper echelons which cannot even be mentioned by the press and there is much to protest. By interfering in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia will give its own disgruntled Shia population more reason to mistrust their government. In the event that the protests of Qatif and Hofuf catch on, the Saudi monarchy will have no option but to turn to the West for help, just as the Bahraini emir has done.

__________________
Ahmad Shakeel Babar
.
"If you really want to achieve something the whole universe conspires for you to get your dream realized."

Jirga

Topic: Revolt in Arab world and the war against terrorism...

__________________
Ahmad Shakeel Babar
.
"If you really want to achieve something the whole universe conspires for you to get your dream realized."

A Nobel prizewinner’s voyage of discovery
Mar 24th 2011 | from the print edition


WHEN he collected his Nobel peace prize from Oslo in December 2009, Barack Obama acknowledged the oddity of receiving such an honour while commanding the American-led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. He also made it plain that the use of force might be justified on humanitarian grounds—as, in his view, it had been in the Balkans in the 1990s. To that extent, at least, he had prepared the ground for Libya. It has nonetheless come as a shock to many Americans to find themselves plunged so abruptly into a new war in an Arab country. How did that peaceable Mr Obama get them into this?

From the very beginning of his presidency Mr Obama had little choice but to run an active policy in the Middle East. He needed to extricate American forces from Iraq (the better to prosecute the war in Afghanistan); he faced the continuing challenge of Iran’s suspected nuclear-weapons programme; he had to carry on the fight against al-Qaeda; and, like many presidents, he inherited an explosive stalemate in Palestine. But to these pressing practical demands he added a broader aspiration: repairing the damage done by George Bush’s reaction to the attacks of September 11th 2001 on America’s relations with the Muslim world, especially with the Arabs.

In June 2009 Mr Obama gave voice to the aspiration in a speech in Cairo, where he was the guest of the then dictator, Hosni Mubarak. He told his eager audience that he was seeking “a new beginning” based on “mutual interest and mutual respect”. He also spoke at length about democracy, and the controversy generated by America’s push for it in the wake of the Iraq war. Mr Obama’s argument was that “no system of government can or should be imposed upon one nation by any other”. America did not presume to know what was best for everyone. But that did not lessen his commitment “to governments that reflect the will of the people”.

Since those two speeches, a strange thing has happened. The practical problems Mr Obama inherited in the Middle East have proved obstinately hard to resolve. In the meantime, however, the abstract issues he raised in Oslo and Cairo have thrust themselves to centre-stage. The Arab awakening has demanded rapid decisions about whether to support or abandon friendly autocrats such as Mr Mubarak. And in Libya Mr Obama has had to rush in double-quick time through a real-life version of his Oslo argument: that America sometimes has to use force on humanitarian grounds.

Lovely in the spring

The early part of the Arab awakening was simplest for Mr Obama. Some Americans construed the people-power revolution that toppled Mr Mubarak in February as a blow to the United States; but if Mr Obama shared these qualms, he hid them well. “Egypt will never be the same,” he said, implying that it would be better.

From the outset, according to a senior administration official, Mr Obama not only concluded that Egypt’s president of 30 years was beyond saving. He also welcomed this example of peaceful democratic change driven from within and not, as in Iraq, by Western power. This development, Mr Obama concluded, had “a very good upside” for the United States. The emergence of a democratic Egypt would at last help America to align its interests with its values and sharply counter the message of violent change preached by al-Qaeda.

Mr Obama’s optimistic reading of events was all every well when Tunisia and Egypt were the templates for change. But it was too much to expect all the long-entrenched autocrats of the Arab world to go so gently into their good nights. In Yemen and Bahrain, pro-American regimes are clinging bloodily to power in spite of America’s pleas for reform. Since both have been highly useful to the United States (Yemen helps to hold al-Qaeda at bay and Bahrain hosts the Fifth Fleet), this makes it much harder for Mr Obama to align his country’s interests with its values.

Libya, the Americans insist, is a completely different kettle of piranhas. Even after giving up an illicit nuclear-weapons programme and compensating victims of the Pan Am bombing of 1988, Colonel Qaddafi was never America’s ally. And the depredations he has unleashed on the opposition eclipse anything witnessed so far in the course of the Arab awakening. That is why, on March 3rd, Mr Obama said the colonel had lost all legitimacy and had to “step down from power and leave”. To nudge him on his way Mr Obama closed Libya’s embassy in Washington, froze many of his assets and promoted international sanctions.

At the beginning of March, in other words, Mr Obama’s policy seemed to be regime change by exhortation and sanctions. The exact sequence of events that resulted in American forces being ordered into action just over a fortnight later is now hotly disputed. But what finally changed Mr Obama’s mind is no mystery: it was the imminent fall of Benghazi, the biggest city still in rebel hands, and the prospect of a calamity befalling its 700,000 or so inhabitants. “We cannot stand idly by when a tyrant tells his people that there will be no mercy,” Mr Obama said on March 19th. Though removing Colonel Qaddafi remains American policy, Mr Obama insists that this is not the aim of the military action authorised by the Security Council.

Most Arab leaders have little love for Colonel Qaddafi, so have muted their criticism of this latest war. But the “very good upside” Mr Obama discerned when he abandoned Mr Mubarak in February is no longer such a sure thing. It is much harder for him to maintain that counter-narrative of peaceful democratic change, which was supposed to disconcert Iran and al-Qaeda, while American missiles rain on Libya.

Meanwhile, the big regional problems that confronted America before the Arab awakening have not gone away. After his Cairo speech, Mr Obama tried to make good his promise to push for peace in Palestine. Last year he attempted to kick-start negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, and picked a fight with Israel’s prime minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, over Israeli settlements in the occupied territories. But the initiative failed, and in February Mr Obama ordered a veto of a Security Council resolution that would have condemned the settlements.

An interactive map of influential nations explains the diplomacy behind military action in Libya
Mr Obama has had only slightly more success with Iran. After intricate diplomacy last year, he won Russian and Chinese support for a Security Council resolution that applies tough new economic sanctions. Yet the tighter squeeze has not made the Iranians stop enriching uranium.

The administration hopes that the Arab awakening may revive Iran’s pro-democracy“green revolution” of 2009. At that time, Mr Obama limited his support for the opposition out of fear that an American embrace might taint it. Now he is less cautious: in a message for the Persian new year he told Iran’s young that they were not “bound by the chains of the past”. For the time being, however, the regime is holding firm.

Iran also has the satisfaction of watching Mr Obama’s response to the Arab awakening weaken some of America’s oldest alliances in the Middle East. The Gulf rulers in general, and Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah in particular, began to lose faith in America’s reliability as a protector the moment Mr Obama decided to abandon the faithful Mr Mubarak. The Saudis are reported not to have consulted America before deciding that they would send troops across the causeway to help the embattled royal family in next-door Bahrain.

To opponents at home, all this is evidence that Mr Obama is out of his depth. Sarah Palin, on a visit to Jerusalem, said that if she were president she would have shown “more decisiveness”. Maybe. But Mr Obama can at least say that his improvised responses to the fast-moving Arab awakening have conformed broadly to the principles he laid out in his thoughtful speeches in Cairo and Oslo. If only intellectual consistency were a guarantee of success in war and diplomacy.

__________________
Ahmad Shakeel Babar
.
"If you really want to achieve something the whole universe conspires for you to get your dream realized."

The politics behind the push

__________________
Ahmad Shakeel Babar
.
"If you really want to achieve something the whole universe conspires for you to get your dream realized."

The allies are sending out dangerous signs of confusion just when resolution is most needed

ONLY five weeks after Western aircraft flew their first sorties over Libya, the fight has already become wearily familiar. The rebel advance and Colonel Muammar Qaddafi’s claw back towards the east have been succeeded by what looks like stalemate. The outrage that united the world against the threat of butchery in Benghazi has begun to dull. The coalition’s different interests have reasserted themselves.

The particular argument at the moment is about whether America will supply the special aircraft needed to attack the colonel’s troops in urban areas (especially wretched Misrata where his men have been committing atrocities). Barack Obama has been stalling, the Europeans hyperventilating. The aircraft are desperately needed and losing Misrata would be a hefty blow (see article), but the worry is that the dithering is symptomatic both of a broader reluctance to see the job through and division over how it should be done. It is the moment in a campaign when, for the lack of application and clear thinking, the endeavour is in danger of slipping away. It is crunch time, when commitment counts.

The reckoning
Recall what is at stake in the deserts of north Africa. Non-interventionists on both sides of the Atlantic grumble that the West has “no dog in this fight”. Cynics say that Arabs have never “done democracy” and ridicule the Libyan rebels as a hotch-potch of chancers with bogus claims to be democratic and some nasty jihadists in their midst. Behind it all lies the spectre of Western troops sinking into yet another quagmire, as they did in Iraq and Afghanistan. Where, people ask, is the timetable, the exit strategy or the definition of the mission? The partition of Libya is said to be probable. Mission creep is afoot.

Yet there is no reason why mission creep should turn Libya into a quagmire. Libya is emphatically not Iraq or Afghanistan. The effort against Colonel Qaddafi is tiny by comparison. Libya has no IEDs, no Green Zone, no American proconsul. There is not, will not and should not be an invading force of ground troops. Libya is a different sort of operation.

The aims of intervening there are both humanitarian and idealistic but also political and pragmatic. And on all fronts, a lot more has been going right than wrong. For a start, thousands of lives have been saved, in Benghazi and elsewhere across the country, since the colonel has been prevented from unleashing his vengeance on those who sought, at first peacefully, to express their opposition to him. Misrata is a reminder of the horrors averted in eastern Libya.

The sceptics claim that this fight is no one else’s business, but the entire world will be better off if a region of 350m Arabs that has been stuck in poverty and dysfunctional politics since the collapse of the Ottoman empire a century ago is given a chance to come alive. All too often, before the Arab spring, the choice was between a fatalistic torpor under authoritarian leaders such as Hosni Mubarak or the delusions of extremists such as al-Qaeda. Suddenly Arabs are being asked to shed the culture of victimhood, take responsibility for themselves and uncork the creativity of their young.

As for the racist assertion that Arabs cannot be democrats, nobody expects full-fledged democracies to appear instantly. The creation of better Arab governance will be a messy, uncertain process, but it is better than stagnation under vicious autocrats like Syria’s Bashar Assad (see article). The momentum for this historic change is the other prize at stake in Libya. The mission will be accomplished when the Qaddafis are replaced by a more inclusive government, with UN oversight.

Such talk of regime change alarms many. The pacifist brigade complain that calls by Mr Obama and his British and French friends, David Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy, to get rid of the colonel exceed the terms of the UN Security Council resolution. So, they add, do the bombs dropping on Tripoli.

Yet this venture is unarguably legal: the UN resolution endorses “all necessary measures”, barring an occupying force, to protect civilians. That helpful elasticity plainly gives the intervening coalition the right to bomb military assets, such as tanks and artillery, that the colonel is using to fire indiscriminately at civilians. The resolution does not call for the colonel’s removal but, as commander-in-chief of his forces, he has been responsible for crimes against humanity. A true peace, in which Libyans can freely express their opinion on the streets, cannot return for as long as he remains in power.

It’s in America’s interest too
The Libyan venture is still tilting towards success, but the fall of Misrata, a loss of collective Western nerve or a few military or diplomatic missteps could tip it the wrong way. And here Mr Obama is crucial.

That is not to deny that his allies could do more. It would be helpful if other Arabs, especially Egypt, joined Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Jordan in supporting the rebels. Too many Europeans, such as Italy and Spain, have also been reticent — despite their insistence that European hard power still matters. In the past European air forces foolishly did not equip themselves with enough ground-attack aircraft of the sort that could now pulverise the colonel’s hardware with precision in built-up areas. And they have compounded this weakness by failing to put enough fighter jets in the sky.

But it is Mr Obama’s full weight behind the enterprise that has been most missed. Acutely aware of the mess caused by his predecessor in Iraq, he was right to take a back seat when the Arab upheavals began. Yet over Libya he has held back too much. No one wants the American cavalry to charge in on the ground and in war you can never guarantee the outcome you seek. But Mr Obama should not withhold American aircraft in the calculation that he can keep his hands clean. Alongside the Europeans and Arabs, he should send trainers, spotters, logistical and telecoms support to bolster the rebels, as the UN resolution allows him to do. No matter what the polls say back home, the American president is in this now; and voters will only applaud when he is successfully out of it. If ever there was a time for calculation to give way to resolution, it is now.


Removing the Qaddafis: Crunch time in Libya | The Economist

__________________
"A soldier will fight long and hard for a bit of colored ribbon". Napoleon Bonaparte