Dear Fellows, I am starting this thread to post opinions, research reports, videos and other material (except news items) regarding Pakistan's foreign policy and her relations with, mainly but not limited to, US, China, India, Afghanistan etc.

you can help by posting the relevant material however the rule must be strictly followed - the rule is "only relevant, factual and well researched material should be posted and no merely copy past please. If you are posting please write broader topic in title such as Sino-Pak relations or Indo-Pak relations. this would help the aspirants to easily organize the material when preparing for exams"

To judge whether an article is worthy to be posted here, one must read it first.

Pakistan’s foreign policy, like that of any country, is influenced by a host of factors, which have domestic, regional and international dimensions. Given the limitations imposed especially by geography and history, the broader orientation of the policy reflects continuity. However, since the process of foreign policy formulation is also determined by current considerations and future motivations, its specific aspects do overtime experience visible change.

In this context, perhaps the most challenging factor is the country’s unique location in South Asia—between the Himalayan peaks linking it with China and the Indian Ocean making it proximate to the oil rich Persian Gulf; and sharing long borders with India on the east, and Afghanistan and Iran on the west. However, the same factor offers the country enormous opportunities.

Decades-old conflicts in the region, such as Kashmir, which has caused several wars and standoffs between India and Pakistan, and Afghanistan, which has seen successive rounds of warfare in the last over three decades, have essentially produced a situation whereby the country’s security establishment plays a determining role regarding core its foreign policy areas such as the nuclear issue and relations with India, Afghanistan and the United States.

Criticize Pakistan, if you will, over why its security establishment dominates foreign policy, or, for that matter, domestic politics! However, a logical analysis of the country’s historical evolution since independence suggests that it has mostly been confronted with rather difficult and potentially threatening circumstantial realities limiting the national choice for a democratic system and a foreign policy decision making led by civilian governments.

There are, indeed, consequences when a country’s foreign policy, as well as domestic politics, is not consistently shaped by civilian forces. These consequences are, for instance, visible in Pakistan’s current preference for employing force to quell insurgency or combat terrorism, rather than adopting broader political economic and social measures towards the same end. However, again, the country’s long borders and unbreakable ethnic bond with Afghanistan, where a full-fledged international war has been underway in the last nearly a decade, makes the use of force an absolutely essential means of safeguarding national security.

The same holds true for the general notion about Pakistan’s foreign policy being Indo-centric. There is no doubt that the country’s security establishment generally has a final say when it comes to relations with India. It is equally true, however, that the same has mostly been the case even during successive civilian regimes of the 50s, 70s and the 90s. However, there have been several instances of civil-military differences over relations with India; for instance, at present, the leaders of both the mainstream political parties, the ruling PPP and the opposition PML-N, see no harm in pursuing peace process with India.

As for the security establishment’s approach towards the issue, it must be different. In its perception, the pursuit of peace process with India is futile in the absence of any meaningful gesture from New Delhi that it is serious in negotiating an amicable settlement of Kashmir with Pakistan. There appears to be no change in India’s post-9/11 policy of isolating Pakistan by questioning its credibility in combating terrorism. Even during the former regime of President Musharraf, who, despite leading the country’s security establishment, initiated a peace process with India, a course that we can generally expect its civilian leaders to take.

In retrospect, while there are no hard and fast rules when it comes to the shaping of Pakistan’s Indo-centric foreign policy approach, just as in the case of the country’s policy towards Afghanistan, what India does or is unwilling to do, in its relations with Pakistan is a major factor shaping the perceptions and approaches of latter’s security establishment and governing leadership.

On the more than one occasion since 9/11, for instance, India has raised security stakes for Pakistan on its eastern borders, especially at a time when Pakistani army and paramilitary has been engaged in combating al-Qaeda and Taliban. If one part of this battle is motivated by Pakistan’s domestic security consideration, the other is guided by the requirements of the US-led international war against terrorism in the region, especially Afghanistan.

Obviously, when a country is faced with an existential threat from non-state insurgent-terrorists inside and across its western borders with Afghanistan, the recurrent emergence of a third source of security danger from traditional foe India in the east must be worrisome for the security establishment. If this is not enough, at least in the latter’s perception, there is significant increase in India’s clout in post-Taliban Afghanistan. Sand-witched between two hostile states is the last probability that any country’s security establishment can contemplate.

It is, therefore, extremely important that if and when the peace process between India and Pakistan gets in vogue, it will be founded on concrete assurance by each side of guaranteeing the legitimate mutual interests in the region. Since Pakistani tribal regions bordering Afghanistan and Afghanistan’s eastern and southern areas are lived by Pashtuns, both parts ridden with insurgency and terrorism, Islamabad should naturally be expected to pursue a reconciliation inside Afghanistan whereby legitimate political, economic and security aspirations of the majority Afghan Pashtun population are accommodated.

If India’s security establishment perceives such settlement in Afghanistan as problematic for itself in the region, then it leads to a conflict of interest between New Delhi and Islamabad over the conflict resolution in Afghanistan. In this context, it does not matter whether the civilian government or the security establishment is at the helm of Pakistan’s Afghan policy. The country’s unique historical, geographical and ethnic links with Afghanistan entail that the conflict in Afghanistan is resolved in accordance with the country’s complex ethnic composition.

For its part, Pakistan cannot expect India to move credibly on the path to peace without addressing New Delhi’s legitimate security concerns regarding the continued presence of outlawed non-state actors such as Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) in Pakistan accused of perpetrating the 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai. So, in the end, it all comes down to quid-pro-quo in determining whether and how far ties between countries move from hostility to completion to cooperation.

But, then, the situation, especially in a theatre of global geo-politics and violent regional and international struggles that accompanies it, is generally so complex that its explanation without ‘ifs’ and ‘buts’ tends to be rather simplistic. For instance, with reference to the outlawed insurgent-terrorist groups like LeT or the Haqqani Network, allegedly using North Waziristan as a safe haven to attack Afghan and foreign troops in Afghanistan, Pakistan is often accused of deliberately overlooking their violent activities or even acting as a collaborator.

Whatever the truth, if the ground realities are rationally analysed, there is indeed some scope for alternative explanation. Consider, for example, the possibility that the very forces which Pakistan’s security establishment nurtured in the 90s to bleed India in Kashmir may have become a Frankenstein Monster for it in recent years—just as the Arab Mujahideen became for the United States in the form of al-Qaeda! Thus, rather than being unwilling to do as much as India or the United States expect from Pakistani counter-terrorism campaign—what to speak of collaborating—the security establishment may be helpless in tackling self-created forces of insurgency and terrorism. In other words, it may be a simple case of former friends becoming current foes.

Suppose the accusation that Pakistani security establishment is unwilling to combat the forces of insurgency and terror inside its territory is true. Even the justification for such unwillingness can, at least to some extent, can be rationally analysed. For example, like any other country, Pakistan can be expected to first attack those like home-grown Taliban groups who are attacking its soldiers and civilians. Once the existential threat they pose to the country is fully dealt with, only then it will be able to focus on terrorist-insurgent groups using Pakistani territory to commit insurgency in Afghanistan and terrorism in India.

Again, if and when the times arises for the second leg of Pakistan’s counter-insurgency/counter-terrorism campaign, its resoluteness should depend upon how far Kabul and US-led international forces in Afghanistan are willing to serve Pakistan’s legitimate security concerns and interests in the country, especially in terms of any future process to resolve the Afghan conflict. The same, or even more, holds true in the case of India: how far it is willing to go to address, for instance, Pakistan’s legitimate demand of settling Kashmir.

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Ahmad Shakeel Babar
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"If you really want to achieve something the whole universe conspires for you to get your dream realized."

Few things are common in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, i.e. the American presence, suicide attacks, car bombings, Al-Qaeda presence, Special Operations by CIA contractors, sectarian violence, bomb blasts at religious places, seminaries, Masjids, attacks on security forces, army and police. All these similarities are not just fluke; something covert is behind all these stirring. Whatever US interests are in these countries, (oil in Iraq, strategic influence in Afghanistan (for trillions of dollars untapped mineral resources) or de-nuclearisation of the only Muslim state Pakistan) the main sufferer is Pakistan. According to WikiLeaks more than 109,032 people have been killed in Iraq. In last three years almost 10,000 people have lost their lives in Afghanistan and Pakistan alone faced 10,000 casualties in 2010 alone. That shows Pakistan has become the ground for the next great game. This volatility started after the US war against Taliban in Afghanistan and with that started the role of US Special Forces inside Pakistan with the permission of former president Parvez Musharraf.

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A very pertinent question arises that why the US and its allies want to denuclearize Pakistan? Pakistan is the only Muslim country which possesses nuclear weapons along with credible delivery means. This is the only country in the region which can challenge the hegemony of the US allies India and Israel. To understand this great game against Pakistan we have to understand the level of strategic partnership between America, India and Israel.

India has signed a 10 year nuclear deal with the US in 2008. The deal would open nuclear technology and energy market for India. Its nuclear programme would undermine Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent. In a recent visit by the US president to India, both countries singed deals of almost $10 to 15 billion. The most important component of the deal was purchase of 10 C-17 Globemaster-III military transport aircraft for the Indian Air Force. Induction of such aircraft would help improve the IAF ’s mobility and reach. America has also expressed its support for the inclusion of India in the UNSC as a permanent member. Pakistan’s political and military leadership now must reconsider its relationship with the United States and take decisions according to the aspirations of the people of Pakistan. On the other hand, India’s strategic partnership with Israel has also proved to be very effective for the Indian military.

India is Israel’s single largest importer of defence equipment constituting about 50 per cent of Israel’s defence exports and about 30 per cent of India’s imports. Defence trade between both countries includes transfer of Risaat-II spy Satellite, Barak missiles to the Indian Navy, night fighting devices to the Indian Army and the Indian Air Force and improved the radar network by providing advanced electronic warfare systems, information technology and Phalcon airborne early warning radar systems etc. These systems have significantly improved India’s reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities.

India and Israel are also collaborating to strengthen their military ties, especially in areas like joint Research and Development in defence projects, counter-terrorism and intelligence-sharing. Israel’s technological advancement in military weapon and equipment has compelled India to strengthen its ties with Israel. However, it is believed that Israel may have overtaken Russia to become India’s largest supplier of military equipment and expertise, with sales of land-based surveillance systems, seaborne missiles, and more exceeding $2 billion per year. In addition to that Israel has also provided training to Indian Army soldiers and Special Forces.

Such collaboration would bring innovation and drastic change in the Indian military and it would enable Indian soldiers to use latest technologies in the modern warfare. India and Israel’s most distinctive collaboration is in intelligence. Intelligence agencies of Israel (MOSSAD) and India (RAW) are in close coordination and cooperation in the fight against terrorism. Both countries also train each other’s officers and update each other on the latest techniques and technologies used in espionage, counter terrorism and counter insurgency warfare. India’s acquisition of Electronic Warfare (EW) and Network Centric Warfare (NCW) systems from Israel will enhance its capabilities for reconnaissance, information gathering, communication, and coordination between its armed forces and pose a grave threat to the security of Pakistan.

The US has always supported Israel and we have never heard of any pressure on Israel regarding its nuclear programme. India and Israel has been pampered by the US as far as their nuclear programmes, high tech technology transfer and expertise is concerned, whereas Pakistan has always faced sanctions, political impediments and technology denial from the US-led Nuclear Suppliers Group. Such dual standards in the US foreign policy clearly depict the wicked intentions against Pakistan. The Raymond Davis saga is the opportunity for us to think and take some concrete steps to safeguard the national security interests of Pakistan before it’s too late.

The author is Research Fellow at South Asian Strategic Stability Institute, Islamabad.

Source: Wake up leaders!

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Ahmad Shakeel Babar
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"If you really want to achieve something the whole universe conspires for you to get your dream realized."

Economic theory and empirical evidence have clearly established the links between trade, productivity and economic growth. Countries that have large internal markets have also benefitted from integrating into the world economy and opening up their economies. World trade in 2009 amounted to $12 trillion. The size of Pakistan’s domestic market is only $180 billion.

Even a 0.5 percent share in the global export market implies that our exports could rise to $60 billion. Imagine the jobs that will be created directly or indirectly as a result of expansion in the production of exportable items. On the other side, imports bring into the country the transfer of technology embedded in imported goods and services and raise the country’s production possibility frontier. Thus, it follows that increased trade is in the larger economic interest of the country.
It is also becoming quite obvious that the balance of economic power is moving away from developed countries to developing countries. China has overtaken Germany to become the largest exporting country and surpassed Japan to become the second largest economy in the world. China and India are projected to be the two fastest growing economies of the world over the next several decades. Pakistan is blessed by its location being neighbour to both these large economies. Our national economic interests dictate that we should expand our trading relations with both these countries and penetrate their markets.
The question then arises: Will expansion of trade with India bring benefits to Pakistan or would we be swamped by our big neighbour? A lot of myths and misperceptions on this point need to be explored. India-Pakistan trade is a win-win situation. India has a middle class of about 300 million people with rising purchasing power that matches that of South Eastern Europe while Pakistan’s middle class is approximately 30 million. A 10 percent penetration into the Indian middle class market would double the market size for Pakistani companies and businesses.
All studies on India-Pakistan trade have so far demonstrated that the relaxation of constraints in the way of bilateral trade would benefit both the countries. State Bank of Pakistan study in 2005 estimated that the volume of trade could rise five times from the actual one billion dollars. An ICRIER study showed a much higher volume – about $10-11 billion (Pakistan 55 percent textiles; India 90 percent non-textiles). Net welfare gains are positive in every single scenario – conservative to optimistic.
Trade will lead to some limited specialisation and trade in intermediate inputs for use in exports to high income countries. Granting MFN treatment to India would bring gains to Pakistan and an FTA would generate even larger benefits.
At a highly disaggregated level it was found that there are 2,646 common items of Pakistan’s imports that India exports worth over $15 billion. For half of these items, the unit value of Pakistani imports is more than the unit value of Indian exports. Pakistan can import these items cheaply from India. At the same time 1,181 items worth $3.9 billion are common between India’s imports and Pakistan’s exports. About 70 percent of these common items have unit values less or equal to the Indian import unit value. This suggests that these exports from Pakistan can be supplied to India at a lower cost than what they are getting from other countries.
It should also be kept in mind that bilateral trade balance with any particular country does not have to be positive. There would be no trade in that case. Pakistan would run a trade deficit with India just as it does with China and surpluses with others. India is a larger, more diversified economy and also produces goods that Pakistan exports. The determining factor is whether the cost of imports from India is less than comparable quality imports from other sources. In that case both our local industry and consumers would gain.
If the empirical evidence is so strong why is trade between the two countries so low – less than one percent of Indian exports and less than five percent of Pakistani imports. The volume of bilateral trade has not exceeded two billion dollars (the total volume of Indian and Pakistani exports is around $200 billion).
There are three main reasons that have impeded the growth of trading relations: (1) political relations between the two countries have remained discordant and contentious over a long period of time. A trust deficit does not allow stability which is a pre-requisite for any exchange of goods and services to take place, (2) both countries have, until recently, pursued import substitution policies that protected local industry behind protective barriers, (3) the commitment to regional economic integration in South Asia has remained quite weak. Even in face of bilateral political disputes it is possible to promote trade within a regional preferential trading area framework. This has not happened in South Asia.
These constraints can be relaxed. Countries with adverse political relationships, without giving up their principled stand on disputes and differences, have engaged in cross border investment, trade and movement of people. Over time these activities have helped in fostering better understanding of each other’s view points. Confidence building measures and creation of stakeholders in the countries can eventually defuse the tension and soften the ground for peaceful resolution of disputes and disagreements.
It is therefore not right to wait for resumption of economic relations until the bilateral political disputes are resolved. If economic engagement is fierce, it is most likely that the hawks in each country will be confronted by the new stakeholders who are benefitting from such engagement and without giving up their respective positions while carrying out the composite dialogue. Resumption of economic relations should be allowed without any pre-conditions and without the countries giving up their respective positions. Composite dialogue should carry on at the same time to resolve the disputes and disagreements.
On the second constraint, it is heartening that both India and Pakistan have opened up their economies, abandoned the old Import Substitution policies and embarked upon a process of integration with the world economy. The reforms they have carried out, such as cutting tariff rates, elimination of QRs, regulating duties, para-tariffs which leave them in a much better position to pursue preferential liberalisation.

Pakistan and India signed SAFTA in January 2004 – which came into force in January 2006. SAFTA is aimed at reducing and eventually eliminating tariff barriers, facilitating cross-border movement of goods, promoting fair competition in the region and creating an effective framework for regional cooperation. But the agreement is still hindered by fairly restrictive sensitive lists, strict rules of origin and a slower time frame and scope.
Regional Trade Agreements like SAFTA will have positive effect on growth, trade, technological diffusion and foreign investment. Trade within the region will unleash new technology, lower domestic prices, provide new technology and usher in economics of scale in production and distribution as the effective market size expands. Joint ventures in pharmaceuticals, chemicals, petrochemicals, automobiles, agro processing, technology transfer arrangements among IT firms, and joint gas pipeline projects are some of the possibilities that can take place within SAFTA if harmonisation takes place.
India – a much bigger economy accounting for more than 80 percent of Gross Regional Product, imbued with self-confidence and aspirations to become an economic power – should demonstrate a greater degree of generosity instead of insisting upon reciprocity. A wider offer to its neighbouring countries in terms of opening up the markets and trade and removing barriers to mobility would be of ultimate benefit to India. It is advisable for India to establish asymmetric relationships with its neighbors and provide more concessions to them and expect less from them in return.
Given the large and growing size of its effective market the economic losses to India would be miniscule while political good will and returns would be substantial over time. Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka will be much better off economically if they are able to penetrate the buoyant Indian market. Friendly, peaceful and irritant-free neighbours would aid rather than hinder India in moving towards its long term goals. A region with the highest number of people living below the poverty line would surge ahead.
Recommendations:
What needs to be done in practical terms to open up bilateral and regional economic cooperation. While India and Pakistan should continue the dialogue to resolve the core political issues they should start by focusing on non-political constraints that will promote bilateral trade. Businessmen of the two countries will then take care of the opportunities that will present themselves.
• Pakistan should grant MFN treatment to India while India should reduce its tariffs on agriculture commodities, textiles and other goods that are of potential value to Pakistan.
• Both countries should reactivate SAFTA and agree on a phasing out of the sensitive list over next few years. A restrictive list would nullify all the potential gains of preferential trade access.
• Technical barriers to Trade (TBT), Sanitary and Phyto Sanitary Measures (SPS) that are in fact, acting as powerful deterrents to exchange of goods should be rationalized and simplified. These are, in fact, non-tariff barriers that hinder the flow of goods.
• Trade facilitation through expeditious border crossings, new border crossings, quick custom clearance, telecommunication, improved transport links, shipping protocols, easing visa restrictions for businessmen should be carried out immediately. Railway, air and road connections between the two countries should be increased.
• Governor Reddy and I had signed an agreement for opening of branches by two Indian banks in Pakistan and two Pakistani banks in India in 2005. This agreement has not yet been implemented. Without banking services, opening of letters of credit, cross border transactions of funds, trade cannot take place.
• Domestic tax, tariff and subsidy policies that distort incentives for production and trade should be substituted in both the countries by more neutral policies.
• Institutions to manage and facilitate trade integration such as setting standards, quality control, technical regulations, material testing should be strengthened and made user friendly.
• Harmonisation in legal regulations for investor protection, contract and IP Rights enforcement, labour relations, would promote relocation of industries within the region as the expanded market size and mobility of goods and services would result in economies of scale. Locations for inputs, components, raw materials with low transaction costs would confer comparative advantage to final finished goods.
Let us recall that the 2006 composite dialogue had on its agenda resumption of Rail Service between Khokhrapar and Monabao, bus service between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad, religious visits to Lahore and Nankana Sahib, new shipping protocol, deregulation of air services and joint registration of Basmati rice.
The above outlined measures, if implemented sincerely, can open a new vista for the two countries in the 21st Century. It is high time political leaderships of India and Pakistan demonstrate courage and conviction.

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Ahmad Shakeel Babar
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"If you really want to achieve something the whole universe conspires for you to get your dream realized."

The Paradigm Of Peace By Dr Akmal Hussain



The gains from peace for the economy, polity and state in both Pakistan and India are immense, yet the two countries are poised in a hair-trigger situation of war. For Pakistan, as the relatively smaller country, the gains from peace as well as the losses from war are greater. It may, therefore, be helpful to examine the logic of peace and the danger of war.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of India, some time ago, noted that internal militancy is the principal threat to his country’s national security. This mirrored an earlier statement by Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani that militant extremism was the primary threat to Pakistan’s national security. The emergence of non-state actors as the principal security threat is reinforced by the fact that inspite of relatively high GDP growth rates in the past, mass poverty persists in both countries.

According to a study by Dr Arjun Sengupta, 77 per cent of the population in India lives below the poverty line, defined in terms of Rs20 per day per person. Similarly, 77 per cent of the population in Pakistan is food insecure. For the overwhelming majority of the population in both countries, what matters is human security, rather than the threat from a neighbouring state. Indeed, economic deprivation is an important factor in the rise of internal conflict that threatens the state structures of both Pakistan and India. Yet the national security establishments in both countries are essentially configured for war against each other.

Consider, first, the danger of war. After the Mumbai terrorist outrage in 2008, it is highly likely that another such incident will trigger an Indian military response. The danger lies in a misjudgment by India about the tolerable scale and nature of its punitive military action. If the territorial gain of an Indian incursion into Pakistani territory reaches an unspecified critical level, Pakistan has already made clear that it will use nuclear weapons to defend itself. At the same time, the declared Indian nuclear doctrine involves an all-out nuclear attack on Pakistan, following a limited nuclear attack by Pakistan.

Furthermore, as George Fernandes, the Indian defence minister at the time, clarified in December 2002, such an all out nuclear retaliation would occur even if Pakistan drops a tactical nuclear bomb on Indian forces operating within Pakistani territory. Even in a limited nuclear exchange, according to a study reported in Newsweek (June 8, 1998), over a hundred million people on both sides of the border would be killed, with many hundreds of millions more dying of radiation related illnesses.

Even as their military establishments are preoccupied with achieving ‘national security’ through a paradigm of military conflict, the citizens of these adversarial states share a common concern for human security: From the threat of war, religious extremism, economic deprivation and environmental degradation.

Consider the gains from peace. Economic cooperation with India would enable Pakistan’s economy to be catapulted on to a high growth trajectory through gains from trade and much needed foreign investment. This would substantially reduce poverty and attenuate the related stresses on both society and state. Continued tension with India fuels the forces of religious extremism, and undermines the sustainability of a pluralistic society that is vital for democracy. On the other hand, a paradigm of peace would enable a shift from demonising the other to mutual fertilisation. This would enrich cultural plurality and produce a counter point to the narrowed mind which fuels extremism.

The arms race between India and Pakistan is largely responsible for the poverty of their people. India ranks 142nd in terms of per capita income, but is the first in the world in terms of arms imports. Pakistan is not far behind, ranking 119th in terms of per capita income and 10th in terms of arms imports.

It is time to re-conceptualise national security. A new paradigm of peace would reduce the danger of cataclysmic destruction, provide economic security to the people and strengthen democracy. Would this not enhance national security?

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Ahmad Shakeel Babar
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"If you really want to achieve something the whole universe conspires for you to get your dream realized."

Possibilities of Nuclear war in the subcontinent by Dr Akmal Hussain

The challenges that threaten a nation state, often though not always, spur new thinking beyond the existing framework of premises and perceptions. It may be useful in Pakistan’s present situation to examine the concept of deterrence that is the basis of defence policy. In Pakistan, the idea of national defence is predicated on the postulate that India is a permanent enemy. So the relationship with India is perceived as a zero sum game, whereby Pakistan’s gain is India’s loss and India’s gain is Pakistan’s loss. Accordingly, peace initiatives must be treated with suspicion. It can be argued, that such a postulate is inconsistent with the objective of achieving a stable deterrence between two nuclear armed states.

Nuclear weapons are the key element in the concept of deterrence. It is presumed that such deterrence will achieve a balance of terror that can provide a semblance of peace. The problem with nuclear weapons is that they can only serve the aim of national security if they deter, but never get used. As soon as nuclear weapons get used they become a means of self destruction for both protagonists, since the use by one induces a retaliatory response by the other. After all, mutually assured destruction (MAD) is the defining feature of nuclear deterrence. Yet, if deterrence based on a nuclear arsenal is to achieve the declared objective of preventing aggression, then as New Zealand-born Canadian weapons researcher Theon Te Koeti has argued: “It must reasonably be assumed that there is a possibility of it being used.” So while the possibility of nuclear war is integral to deterrence, the question of ‘peace’ hinges on reducing the probability of nuclear war.

There are three defining features of the India-Pakistan situation which imply a high probability of an accidental or deliberate nuclear war, thereby making deterrence in this context unstable: (a) The flying time of nuclear missiles between India and Pakistan is less than five minutes. This induces a tendency for first use of nuclear weapons in a situation where war is considered by any one state as imminent. (b) The unresolved Kashmir dispute and the emerging water disputes, fuel tensions between the two countries and make them susceptible to disinformation about each other’s intentions. (c) Intra-state social and political conflicts, feed off each other and exacerbate interstate tensions. These tensions have an explosive potential due to the belief in each country, that terrorism and insurgencies within it are being supported by the security apparatus of the other country.

In the current situation, another Mumbai style attack on an Indian city could induce a conventional military response from India, which could quickly escalate to a nuclear war. If India made limited territorial gains at a number of points along the border under their ‘Cold Start’ doctrine, it could induce the use of tactical nuclear weapons by Pakistan on Indian troops within its territory. Under the Indian nuclear doctrine (as indicated by Defence Minister George Fernandes in 2002), in such an eventuality, a full scale nuclear attack on Pakistan would be launched. Apart from this, since most of Pakistan’s major cities are within less than 100 kilometres of the border with India, loss of one or more of these cities following a conventional assault could spark a nuclear response.

Given the inherent instability of deterrence in the India-Pakistan context, the challenge for diplomacy is to reduce the present high probability of nuclear war. This is why the Pakistan government has done well in sharing with Indian security agencies, intelligence reports that terrorist groups may target the World Cup semi-final in Mohali. The subsequent invitation by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani and President Asif Ali Zardari is an example of wise statesmanship. It could provide an opportunity to make a new beginning in the peace process. The aim of this peace process should be to give succour to the people of the subcontinent, who live under the sword of Damocles called deterrence.

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Ahmad Shakeel Babar
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"If you really want to achieve something the whole universe conspires for you to get your dream realized."