What the Arab Spring and the Occupy Wall Street movement have in common


Is Zuccotti Park the next Tahrir Square? For weeks, people have been asking me if the protests taking place in lower Manhattan and around the U.S. were similar to those I covered in Egypt during the Arab Spring. After a visit to the Occupy Wall Street demonstrations, I saw signs that this just might have the making of an American Fall.

The most striking similarity to the Arab Spring has to do with the spirit and demographic of the protests. At the core of both demonstrations were youth who feel they have been marginalized by an unfair system. In Egypt, that system was political - undemocratic and skewed in favor of a ruling elite. The Egyptian economy had enjoyed sustained growth for several years, giving outsiders the illusion that things were getting better, but the new wealth did not trickle down. In the U.S., the protesters are angrier at the economic system. In their eyes, it too favors the elite. The demonstrators on Wall Street argue that the financially powerful are rarely held accountable for their mismanagement of the U.S. economy, while the masses must suffer the consequences of those failed policies. Both sets of protesters have the common goal that social justice must be at the core of reform.

There are other similarities. No political group gave birth to either movement; rather, the people organized themselves. As a result, both movements are leaderless: no group, much less an individual, can claim to speak for the entire body of the protests. (That said, the Tahrir Square crowd and the occupiers both gained traction after they were joined by trade unions).

In Cairo, I was struck by the festive atmosphere at the demonstrations. Men and women, young and old, chanted, sang, danced and celebrated their calls for change. I saw some of that spirit in Zuccotti Park: the protests there are part carnival, part political rally. That's not to say they are unstructured and chaotic. Just as in Tahrir Square, people were organizing themselves into committees, working hard to maintain a sense of civic responsibility by keeping their surroundings clean, collecting garbage and avoiding doing damage to nearby property.
Both movements learned they could speak more efficiently to the world by setting up committees for public outreach and communication. They used social media instead for traditional media to gather momentum, setting up Web pages, seeking donations and issuing communiques.
Both movements learned they could speak more efficiently to the world by setting up committees for public outreach and communication. They used social media instead for traditional media to gather momentum, setting up Web pages, seeking donations and issuing communiques, They spoke to the world directly, appealing to the masses before the journalists: once ordinary people were listening, the media had no choice but to pay attention.



Now to the differences. In Egypt, the main challenge facing the protesters was fear — the dread of reprisals by the brutal regime of President Hosni Mubarak. In the U.S., it's apathy. In Egypt, the regime eventually cracked down on the protesters, not only using violence to try to disperse them but also cutting off the Internet and cell-phone networks. That only spurred on more protests, which kept growing until they paralyzed the city and the country. The occupiers have not brought lower Manhattan to a halt, never mind New York City. If they tried, it's far from clear whether it would be well received by other citizens: they may see the movement as a nuisance. At the same time, it's unimaginable that the Obama Administration would jam cell-phone networks and cut off the Internet. Authorities will most likely allow the protests to continue so long as they don't break laws or disrupt daily life.

At first, the protests that began with dozens in Wall Street were largely ignored. By the third week, they had spread across the country. The Occupiers may not be seeking the toppling of a regime, but like the people of Egypt, they want to be heard - and now they have been.

By Ayman Mohyeldin

Solved Paper of PAKISTAN AFFAIRS CSS-2012


Q. what is bureaucracy and what are its characteristics? How did it play its role in strengthening and integration of Pakistan?


Ans: Bureaucracy is an association of officials carrying out operational and administrative tasks. The officials serving in the bureaucracy are called bureaucrats. Bureaucrats are mostly non-elected officials, with the exception of a very few countries where certain tiers of bureaucracy are elected. In bureaucracy the officials and employees are assigned specific responsibilities and they have to work within the hierarchy of an authority.

Characteristics of Bureaucracy:
1. Well defined hierarchy of governance.
2. Management of tasks through rules.
3. Specifically assigned functions.
4. A bureaucrat is required to be impersonal in carrying out his work.
5. Job security is to be ensured to the bureaucrats in carrying out tough decisions.
6. Well defined regulations for upward mobility.

Role of Bureaucracy in Strengthening and Integration of Pakistan:
1. Provided government in the times when democratic governments were sent home, so made the country governable in testing times.
2. Kept those parts of Pakistan governed where the elected representatives were not there like FATA.
3. Served as a cushion between the masses and law-enforcing arm of the state.
4. Worked towards ensuring meritocracy.
5. Despite shortcomings in fulfilling the assigned work, no other institution could replace it.

Conclusion:
Notwithstanding what the bureaucracy did for Pakistan, it is a matter of fact that it has not been a bureaucracy of an ideal democracy. It is a conservative bureaucracy which has resisted change over the time. It has helped the dictators negatively in doing away with the democratic dispensations, and had helped them in their quest for consolidation of their power. Pakistan's bureaucracy needs to be made professional and able to cater for the modern needs.. It can only be done through transparent and credible selection process and an up to date training process.

Q. Discuss critically the role of SilSilah( orders) in the development and progress of Muslim Society in the Subcontinent of Indo Pakistan?
Ans: In the subcontinent Sufi's and Saints were the ones who introduced Islam. It was purely through their efforts that Islam evolved its base in India and from that the concept of spiritualism arose. Sufi's and Saints apart from preaching their religion in a peaceful manner also worked to forge good relations between the different nations of Indian Subcontinent. They not only guided their Muslim brethren in molding their lives according to the basic teachings of Islam but also showed them the ways to make good and brotherly relations with the followers of other religions.

The major Silsilah (Orders) in the Subcontinent:
1. The Shadhiliyya order
2. The Chishti order
3. The Shattariya order
4. The Suhrawardi order
5. The Qadiri order
6. The Naqshbandi order

Conclusion:
Saints introduced mystical form of Islam which was very moderate and projected the peace-loving nature of this religion. Hindus and Hinduism were deeply influenced by the Sufi saints of these orders. Their teachings played integral role in the social, economical and philosophical development of the Muslims. Islam spread swiftly in the Indian subcontinent and across Asia due to their selfless teachings. It can safely be remarked that it was Sufi Muslim saints, not conquerors, who spread Islam in this part of the world.

Q. The location of Pakistan has given the strategic strength to the state. What are its physical features and narrate its advantages and disadvantages?
Ans: Pakistan's strategic position has undoubtedly rendered it such an immense importance that it cannot be ignored by the world powers. Pakistan's strategic location provides economic incentives too by placing it at the hub of future economic activity in South Asia. Pakistan is also considered as the gateway to central Asia and it's expected that its ports will attract shipments to and from Central Asia to other parts of the world. For trading to Far East, the ports of Pakistan are the most attractive refueling stops. Pakistan is such placed strategically that it provides access to the warm water, to the land locked countries like Afghanistan, and to the southern provinces of China.

The Physical Features of Pakistan:
1. Rivers like Indus River and its five major subsidiaries making the planes fertile.
2. Mountain ranges like the Hindu Kush and Himalayas on the north.
3. Pakistan is placed on the tropic of cancer making it best place for agriculture.
4. The fertile planes of Punjab.
5. Climatically well placed, as it gets four seasons.
6. It has a long coastline.
7. Forests that make about 5 percent of the total Pakistan.
8. Huge gas and coal reserves and considerable oil reserves in the desert and arid regions.

Advantages of the Physical Features of Pakistan:
1. One of the largest irrigation system in the world: irrigates about 28 percent of land.
2. Its rivers are navigable, so transport can be done through them.
3. Its four seasons provide it with diverse crops, so there is no reliance on single crop.
4. The huge forests at the North make for 5 percent of Pakistan, making it almost wood self-reliant.
5. The mountain ranges at the north provide natural protection against the cold Siberian winds.
6. Large tract of land in Balochistan can provide natural strategic depth and Pakistan wouldn't need to seek strategic depth in Afghanistan.

Disadvantages:
1. Extreme weathers at different locations.
2. Monsoons resulting in floods.
3. The planes of Punjab does not provide natural barrier in the face of an Indian military assault.
4. The large tract of land in Balochistan has made it difficult to access even for the state in providing essential services.

Conclusion:
By analyzing the both advantages and disadvantages of the physical features of Pakistan, it can safely be concluded that the advantages far exceed the disadvantages.

Q. what are the security concerns of Pakistan? Suggest measures by revisiting the foreign policy of Pakistan?

Ans: Pakistan faces multi-pronged security concerns, but mostly these concerns emanate from India's Military might and its nefarious designs. There are many indigenous issues also that have become security threats for Pakistan. A congruent and a well defined Foreign Policy can do away with almost more than half of these threats. Lets have a look at salient security concerns of Pakistan and some foreign policy measures that can help to tackle these issues.

Security Concerns:

1. India's growing power in terms of economy and military might.
2. Threat to Pakistan's Sovereignty due to attacks from Afghanistan.
3. India's Growing Influence in Afghanistan and its perceived anti-Pakistan activities.
4. Indigenous acts of terrorism from Taliban.
5. The insurgency in Baluchistan.
6. The resurgent energy crisis resulting in destabilization of the country.
7. Sectarian issue.

Suggested Foreign Policy Measures:

1. Promote trade and commerce to keep hostilities at bay.
2. Foreign policy should not be India centric.
3. Relaxed Visa Regime.
4. Foreign Policy should be sole prerogative of the parliament.
5. Foreign Policy should depart from that of security state to welfare state.
6. Import of technology to tackle energy crisis.

Conclusion:
Pakistan already has a nuclear umbrella for its security, and by virtue of that the possibility of an all out war with India is not a reality now. Pakistan's paranoiac approach towards the threat from the East is a bit miscalculated, and the situation calls for a review of that approach towards the foreign policy. Wanton expenditure of resources in that direction will take us no where.


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Dile-e-Masoom Pay Tery Qatilana Hamly..!!
Apny Naino Say Kaho Zra Tamez Sy..!!

Termination of the Cold War ended a pretext of heavy US naval presence in the Indian Ocean.

China is helping Pakistan in building this port as well as a host of associated projects such as railroad links, industrial complexes, etc. India and Iran are raising eyebrows over the increased Chinese presence, which is also attracting the attention of the US. Regionally, India and Pakistan are involved in an intense security dilemma and Iran is struggling to assert its influence as a regional power broker. Natural resources of Central Asia can only find their way to the Gwadar port through Afghanistan, which is in a state of persistent instability for the last many decades. An environment of suspicion has already started fermenting in policy making circles of all the concerned states due to increased Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean, and it could particularly blow out of proportion if it turns out to be a prelude to a military presence.

In the aftermath of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), stemming from 9/11 incidents involving a majority of the terrorists from Middle Eastern countries and their heavy crackdown, American support is dwindling in the Middle East countries. The US, due to its strategic interests, is maintaining a heavy military presence in the area. The requirement of a base in close proximity to the Persian Gulf may arise if the US decided to pull out its forces from the Middle East. In this context, one would not rule out the US's desire to have military basing rights at the Gwadar port, as there are abundant occasions of extending such facilities by Islamabad in the past. This would, however, surely trigger uproar in Chinese circles and Pakistan's time tested entente cordiale and strategic partnership could be put to an extreme test. Additionally, such an eventuality will put Pakistan in a very odd situation vis-à-vis Middle Eastern countries.

Can the Gwadar port project harness enough US attention to stimulate its interest in keeping the region stable? Substantially improved capacity of the US to project power confirms its intentions to take a more active role in the affairs of this region. Although the termination of the Cold War ended a pretext of heavy US naval presence in the Indian Ocean, American policy makers were still “preparing for two major theater wars (MTWs) in Northeast Asia and the Persian Gulf.” That is why, in May 1997, in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the Navy retained its 12 Carrier Battle Groups and 12 Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs). US academia has its own ambitions, Koburger, Jr., in his book Sea Power in the Twenty-First Century, projected that by 2021, the US Navy should have seven super carriers plus reserves and a sealift capability of 12 Marine Expeditionary Units.

The US has an interest in keeping the oceans open to all, which is evident from the presence of, at the minimum, US Middle East Force in the Persian Gulf since 1949. In 1992, the Pentagon drafted a new grand strategy designed to preserve unipolarity by preventing the emergence of a global rival. Although the strategy never saw approval at the time due to severe internal resistance, it did generate discussions across the board by academia as well as different states. The focus being, is the unipolar world stable? Interest in this discussion is to elucidate the US role in the Indian Ocean. Charles Krauthammer argued that unipolarity is durable and peaceful, but the chief threat is Washington's failure to do enough. What is the US required to do in this area and why? It is talked about more often than not that China and the US are destined to be adversaries as China's power grows. Both states so far, however, have shown restraint and avoided situations that can destabilise the area.

In the Middle East, the US main ally, Saudi Arabia, has 261 billion barrels of proven oil reserves (more than one/fourth of the world total) and up to 1 trillion barrels of ultimately recoverable oil. Shortly after the Arab oil embargo in 1973-74, the US (and other Western countries) created the Strategic Petroleum Reserves (SPR) as the nation's first line of defense in case of an oil crisis. In November 2001, former President Bush made an unprecedented decision to fill the SPR to its full capacity of 700 million barrels. And in 2001, the US imported 54 per cent of its oil requirements, out of which 30 per cent came from the Persian Gulf region. The US economic prosperity and strategic security, therefore, depends on an uninterrupted supply of oil.



The 9/11 terrorist attacks against the US have created a significant challenge to the long-term partnership between Washington and Riyadh. Trickling control over the Middle Eastern region would also mean loosening its grip over the dynamics of the region. For this reason, the US desires a strategic alternative of Middle Eastern oil, and natural resources of CARs are bound to become a strategic alternate of the US oil supply. Pakistan's Gwadar port is one of the probable sites to provide an outlet to CARs natural resources, via Afghanistan. Only a few days before the 9/11 attack, the US Energy Information Administration documented Afghanistan's strategic “geographical position as a potential transit route for oil and natural gas exports from Central Asia to the Arabian Sea. American intervention into Afghanistan in pursuit of suspected terrorists has only further complicated an already delicate regional balance.

Hopes of keeping economic interests alive nevertheless remained alive even after US operations in Afghanistan, as The New York Times reported on December 15, 2002 that, “The State Department is exploring the potential for post-Taliban energy projects in the region.” The future of Afghanistan will determine the future of the US influence over the routing of CAR resources through this area. Circumstances after the unfortunate September 11 attacks not only brought an 'old ally' (Pakistan) back into its camp, but also suited its alternate strategic oil supply plans. Although a reasonable portion of US oil tycoons support CARs oil supply through Iran, the policy goals oppose the building of a pipeline that transits “energy competitor” Iran, or otherwise gives it undue influence over the region.

Desire for a strategic alternate of oil aside, the indications of wearing American commitment in the Middle East does not necessarily indicate lowering of its resolve in the area as the Pentagon is becoming increasingly interested in the concept of mobile offshore bases for deployment in the Persian Gulf, to ensure the US military access to critical regions in the future. Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean areas are, therefore, likely to remain the priority of US policy makers for the foreseeable future. Naval presence is likely to increase even further due to increased discontentment in Middle Eastern countries and declining acceptance of US ground forces. This presence will have a direct bearing on the Gwadar port project, and it ought to have positive effects.

In the same context, one would not rule out the US desire to have military basing rights at the Gwadar port, as there are abundant occasions of extending such facilities by Islamabad. This would, however, surely trigger uproar in Chinese circles and Pakistan's time tested entente cordiale and strategic partnership could be put to an extreme test. Additionally, such an eventuality will put Pakistan in very odd situation vis-à-vis Middle Eastern countries. Chinese probable response to such a request will be discussed in subsequent paragraphs.

Next, one would discuss Washington's potential response if China increases its military presence in the Indian Ocean. The US view of the threat and the stakes in the Indian Ocean, particularly the Persian Gulf, has its source in misunderstanding of the events of the 1970s; that of a severe oil supply crisis in the 1990s – and probably beyond. President Carter's statement in his 1980 State of the Union address, subsequently labeled as the “Carter Doctrine,” that “Any attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf Region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the US and such assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.”

As far as the US is concerned, China has not replaced Russia as a significant global threat. China, nonetheless, is likely to be a major American foreign policy problem of the 21st century and the evidence suggests that China will probably be powerful enough to challenge America's preferred order in Asia and may, indeed, wish to do so. A serious security situation may arise if China chooses to increase its military presence on the pretext of protecting its interests linked with the port project. Pakistan, being the country housing this port, will have to convey the port's “utility” terms in the most explicit way to dispel port's military usage by any of the states.

The Indian Ocean region has remained and will be an area of interest for the American policy makers. It is, however, a well recognised fact that the US helps to “shape the environment” (in the words of the Pentagon's quadrennial defense review) in various regions. Pakistan does need that help to ensure success of its port project. Notwithstanding internal dynamics, which are pushing policies, overall economic and strategic interests ought to drive the US to foster cooperation amongst states of the region. The US “assured” stabilisation in the area will guarantee success of the Gwadar port project, and Islamabad needs to formulate policies that can attract such “assurance.”

Muhammad Shahrukh Niazi

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Success is not final, failure is not fatal; it is the courage to continue that counts.

For some reason, nuclear and security-related issues have remained a no go area for Pakistani researchers and academics.No wonder, we have not had any meaningful literature on India-Pakistan nuclear stand-off and its regional and global implications.

In an unlettered society where one rarely comes across people genuinely into writing or reading and where books are sold not by content but their weight as a waste paper commodity and where book stores are disappearing fast getting converted into video shops and burger stands, the arrival of every single new book by a Pakistani author is freshening expression of a resolve not to give up the book culture.

No matter how many “Kitab Houses” may have become “Kabab Houses” to cater to the growing culinary appetite in our society, there is no dearth of publishing houses in Pakistan to keep apace with the undying quest for knowledge. It is an encouraging sign. Books on assorted subjects of general interest, especially literature and history have been appearing in abundance. For some reason, nuclear and security-related issues have remained a no go area for Pakistani researchers and academics. No wonder, we have not had any meaningful literature on India-Pakistan nuclear stand-off and its regional and global implications.


The barrier of reticence, it seems, now stands crossed. Two recent research-based well-written and thoroughly referenced books, one on South Asian nuclear deterrence and the other on Indian nuclear deterrence, both authored by Pakistani writers of eminent credentials under the banner of Oxford University Press, make a seminal appearance on our otherwise murky scene of scholastic aridity. Both provide an insightful account of the historic as well as geo-political dynamics underpinning the nuclearization of this region.



Professor Zafar Iqbal Cheema's book entitled 'Indian Nuclear Deterrence: Its Evolution, Development and Implications for South Asian



Security' (Oxford University Press) is the first serious attempt at dissecting India's nuclear ambitions rooted in its 'Greater India' dream. I am familiar with many books but this one is perhaps more comprehensive than any other book on this subject in terms of its timeframe (1947 until now) and the spectrum of issues involved ranging from the evolution and development of Indian nuclear program to its status-driven regional and global dimensions.

It exposes, with documentary and other relevant evidence from diverse sources, how for 50 years, India sought with single-minded devotion the re-enactment of the mythical Maha Bharata (Greater India) concept. It sought to dominate its periphery and the entire India Ocean, as the first step towards recognition of India's status as a global power.

One is spontaneously reminded of Robert Oppenheimer, the arch developer of the “atom bomb” who after witnessing the power of the first nuclear explosion, called Trinity Test in New Mexico was so moved as to famously acclaim that the sight made him think of the lines from the Bhagavad-Gita: “If the radiance of a thousand suns were to burst at once into the sky, that would be like the splendor of the mighty one: Now I am become death, the destroyer of worlds.”

India “inducted” the nuclear dimension into the volatile security environment of South Asia by exploding the myth of a “Smiling Buddha” through its first nuclear test in 1974 which was hailed by the West as a “peaceful” nuclear test but in effect it was the “splendor of the mighty one” signalling to the world: “Now I am become death, the destroyer of world.” India demonstrated the “splendor of the mighty one” again in May 1998 leaving Pakistan with no choice but to respond in kind.

It becomes clear from this book's statistically-supported narrative that no philosophical discourse is needed to understand or agree that nuclear weapons are never meant to be used. They are only for deterrence which apparently has worked during and after the intensely bipolar Cold War era. Nuclear deterrence has also so far worked as a strategic balance between India and Pakistan, the only nuclear equation that grew up in history totally unrelated to the Cold War as an offshoot of the India-Pakistan legacy of unresolved disputes and their perennial mode of conflict and confrontation.

Cheema's book confirms the fallacy of conventional perspectives on the development of Indian nuclear deterrence – that the Indian nuclear programme entailed 'exclusively peaceful uses' during the Nehru era and the nuclear weapons capability was initiated by Shastri government after the first Chinese nuclear test in 1964. It offers incontrovertible evidence that Dr. Homi Bhabha, the architect of Indian nuclear programme, formulated a nuclear weapons development strategy within the structural framework of the Indian civilian nuclear programme with Nehru's approval. It thus also denotes how Indian nuclear pursuits compelled Pakistan to go nuclear in reciprocation.

On their coming to power in New Delhi, the BJP sought to resurrect the legend of greater India and lost no time to implement its militaristic and communal agenda by a series of actions that only aggravated the security environment in our region. The BJP agenda publicly announced its intentions “to exercise the nuclear option and induct nuclear weapons, occupy Azad Kashmir and to demolish mosques to build Hindu temples.”

I recall in April 1998, Pakistan's prime minister addressed a letter to the G-8 heads of state and government drawing their attention to India's threatening nuclear designs and the consequences that would ensue from its induction of nuclear weapons. India's five nuclear tests on May 11 and 13, 1998 proved us completely right. India had unleashed on our borders blasts of every sort, namely, thermonuclear, boosted fission, tactical weapons.

We knew at that time that peace was hanging by a slender thread in South Asia. In the absence of any assurances or security guarantees, we had no choice but to take measures to protect our freedom and independence. Our tests later in the month (May 28 and 30) were an act of self-defence; they established our minimum credible deterrence and in fact restored the regional strategic balance serving the larger interest ofpeace and stability in South Asia.

Cheema's book makes one thing clear. It was not Pakistan which “inducted” nuclear weapons into the volatile security environment of South Asia. We were compelled to do so. Since then, nuclear weapons are a reality in our region. They constitute an essential element of our security in the form of credible minimum deterrent. They also constitute a credible nuclear deterrent for India. It is this subject which Professor Cheema now focuses in some detail providing factual scholarly material to understand and evaluate the South Asian nuclear deterrence model in its conceptual and operational detail through a Pakistani lens.

The book's central premise is that the BJP government decision to carry out nuclear tests in 1998 was not an “out of the box” development and was only step prefigured in a strategic continuum commenced during Nehru's government. It suggests that the official declaration of India as a nuclear weapons state after the 1998 tests, its subsequent nuclear weaponization programme and announcement of a draft nuclear doctrine in August 1999 were in effect willful furtherance of the earlier policies representing a clear strategic continuum.

After having crossed the nuclear threshold, India has been seeking recognition by the international community as a nuclear weapon state, which it hoped, among other things, would entitle it to permanent membership of the UN Security Council and entry to the exclusive nuclear club. On our part, by demonstrating our capability, we were able to establish a strategic parity with India.

Chapters 4 and 5 are devoted to a comparative study of the nuclear policies of India and Pakistan in terms of their threat perceptions and strategic compulsions and objectives. A comparative study of their command and control systems as well other core elements of India's deterrence especially ballistic missile capability and its ABM system, its fissile material capability, nuclear weapon technology and warhead capability makes a useful account to understand the regional nuclear scenario. What becomes further clear from this analysis is that India's development of a nuclear triad gives it an assured second strike capability, necessitating for Pakistan not to ignore the need for a dynamic concept in its own credible minimum deterrence in the face of India's overbearing nuclear capability.
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Chapters 9 and 10 of the book offer a study of the development of nuclear deterrence and its implications for peace and security in the region. Chapter 10 specifically analyses the impact of conventional military asymmetry on strategic stability and Indian attempts of coercion and escalation dominance through threats of limited war, pre-emption and Cold Start strategy. The study, besides giving an insight into Indian nuclear command and control structure, also analyses the attempted transformation of Indian military doctrine into a strategic nuclear doctrine with global outreach.

Cheema reveals no secret by acknowledging that India justifies its sea-land and air-based nuclear capability to counter what it claims its perceived potential threat from China as well as Pakistan. But the fact of the matter is that India's military potential has always remained Pakistan-specific, and despite Islamabad's repeated offers of “mutual restraint and responsibility” it has shown no reciprocity. Pakistan has been pursuing since 1999 its proposal for a “strategic restraint regime” based on three inter-locking elements of conflict resolution, nuclear and ballistic restraint and conventional balance.

There is a lesson to be drawn from this book. Instead of unleashing a relentless nuclear arms race in our region, we in South Asia should be exploring how to harmonize our respective security doctrines. Perhaps, the best course for India in this critical period of regional turmoil fuelled by a common threat of terrorism and militancy will be to accept Pakistan's Strategic Restraint Regime proposal and also the offer of a No War Pact, which is even broader than India's so-called No First Use doctrine, and encompasses both conventional and nuclear fields. Instead of raising the ante at bilateral level, we should be working together and coordinating our arms control and disarmament approaches in international forums like the Conference on Disarmament (CD).



By Shamshad Ahmad

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Success is not final, failure is not fatal; it is the courage to continue that counts.