There are a number of common factors between the motives of nuclear weapon states and those of aspirant nuclear states, but the regional and geo-political conditions of the country plays a dominant role in making them to pursue nuclear weapons. However in making comparisons, the changing world view of nuclear weapons over time has also to be considered. Before 1945, there was no knowledge of the nature of a war in which atomic bombs were used. While some of the scientists associated with the Manhattan Project were uneasy about the potential implications of the weapon that they were designing, there was no experience for the wider international community to draw upon. Since then a complex structure of treaties has emerged to regulate, restrict and inhibit the growth of nuclear weapon states. Today, nuclear weapon states feel it necessary to declare that they will eliminate their weapons eventually. Working in the opposite direction over time has been the technology of the weapons. While in the early 1940s only a major power could contemplate the enormous costs of embarking on such an uncertain project, now much smaller nations may be able to put together the necessary enabling capabilities.

• Insecurity
The most common strategic reason for developing a nuclear weapon capability is insecurity. If a state feels extremely threatened, it may see a nuclear capability as its only defence. This will be particularly the case if the perceived threat is itself nuclear (or more lately perhaps Biological). The first nuclear weapon programme was developed as the answer to the potential development of atomic weapons by Germany in World War 2, and was continued for similar fears about the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union developed its nuclear capability as part of its armoury against a hostile West. China saw itself as vulnerable to a surprise attack from the United States, and it needed nuclear capability to deter such an attack. Israel saw itself as surrounded by enemies who wanted to sweep it into the sea. Iraq sees itself at risk from Israeli nuclear weapons, and from western nuclear powers and potentially from Iran. Similarly Iran fears Iraq, Israel and the United States. This may be affecting the Saudi Arabia approach to security. India saw itself vulnerable to Chinese nuclear weapons in any war, and Pakistan saw itself at risk from Indian weapons. International isolation can increase a state’s sense of insecurity, and therefore its need for a nuclear capability. This was the case for South Africa in apartheid times, and has been true of North Korea, Iran, Iraq and Libya at various times. The international isolation today will normally deepen if there are signs of a nuclear weapon programme under development, and this may reinforce the belief that such weapons are needed. On the other hand an extended security arrangement with a friendly nuclear power reduces the need to undertake a national nuclear programme.

• Aids to Victory
While the acquisition of nuclear weapons for reasons of insecurity will primarily be centred on deterring nuclear attack, the weapons have also been seen as war fighting capabilities. The United States used them against the Japanese in order to secure victory in 1945. The use of them against Russia and China may also have been contemplated. Certainly the use of nuclear weapons in the Korean War was considered by President Truman. The Soviet Union had a military strategy which incorporated its tactical nuclear weapons into its war fighting doctrine. It can also be argued that the NATO doctrine of flexible response recognised nuclear weapons as having some utility in war. However, the main purpose of this doctrine was to reinforce deterrence rather than conceive of victory over the Warsaw Pact through nuclear use. While military victory through the use of nuclear weapons may have been a conceptual possibility in the early days, it is unlikely to be a convincing rationale for acquisition today, given the likelihood of massive retaliation by another nuclear state.



• Status and Influence
A powerful motivation for acquiring nuclear weapons has been the effect on national status and prestige. Britain seems to have thought least deeply about the implications of embarking on a post-war programme independent from the United States. There was a natural assumption that it would need to have atomic weapons in order to retain its place as a leading world power. Similarly France saw the need for a nuclear capability to underpin its return to the world stage as a leading player. Given that each of the five permanent members of the Security Council are also the first five nuclear weapon states, the association of national status and influence with nuclear weapons is visible to others. It is possible that India may have had such motivation in its bid to become the regional leader. It certainly feels that its population and economy merit much greater international influence than it is accorded. However, the changing international approach to proliferation means that India has not gained greater international status from its weapons. Indeed it is likely to have put back the possibility of it gaining permanent Security Council membership. Argentina and Brazil may also have been looking for status from their programmes. If prestige is a declining factor in nuclear weapon acquisition, influence still remains important. In the post Cold War world, potential intervention by the more powerful international actors is a threat that worries a number of smaller countries. There is an assumption that this threat can be much reduced by the ownership of strategic weapons of mass destruction. The question is asked 'would NATO have intervened in Kosovo against a nuclear armed Serbia?’ Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Libya and Taiwan can all use this thinking to justify weapons acquisition.

• Nuclear force and Economics of Defence
In the early days, both American and British governments argued that nuclear weapons could provide a cheaper military capability than large conventional forces. John Foster Dulles is credited with boasting that they could give a 'bigger bang for a buck. While the absolute cost of building an atomic bomb has dropped over the years, this argument is a less significant factor. Nuclear weapons do not replace conventional forces given their lack of utility for war fighting in the modern world. While the direct research, development and production costs may be much reduced, the economic implications for aspirant nuclear states can be adverse. The international community may show its disapproval of a nuclear programme through the use of economic sanctions as has been seen in Iraq. Nevertheless Iran seems to have decided that a nuclear programme may save it from spending more on conventional forces.


• Internal Civilian and Military Pressures
While nations will justify their nuclear weapon programmes for external security reasons, there are often internal domestic pressures driving the procurement. The main drive in Britain immediately after World War 2 came from the military establishment. It was bureaucratic momentum that kept the French programme in being before de Gaulle came to power. Pakistan officials made it clear that they would have to respond quickly to Indians test as much for domestic political reasons as anything else. Today it is more difficult to envisage the decision to embark on a nuclear weapon programme as being taken as routinely as it was by Britain. The international community ensures that any state has to weigh up all the factors before taking on the restrictions which will inevitably follow. Internal pressures may accelerate (or inhibit) a programme which is already in being. They will also have an effect on the decision to remain a nuclear weapon state. Thus South Africa was able to stop its programme as part of its new internal structure. Britain has reduced its capability to just four submarines with missiles, and has no tactical weapons left. Yet internal political issues make it very difficult for it to go to the final step of nuclear disarmament.

• Elements of uncertainty and nuclear use
An important consideration in nuclear doctrine is an inability to predict the future. China has never had a particularly consistent or logical nuclear doctrine. It appears that it wished to ensure that it had nuclear capability in case it became crucially important at some time in the future. Britain and France both used the arguments that they reinforced deterrence by being second centres of decision. If the Soviet Union were to think that the United States would not risk nuclear retaliation in order to defend Europe, then the French and British nuclear weapons entered the deterrence equation. They increase Soviet uncertainty and strengthened deterrence. Today the British nuclear force is entirely justified as an insurance policy against an uncertain future. While such arguments are used to retain nuclear weapons, they are usually insufficiently strong to be the primary drivers in the acquisition of such capabilities today, given the international difficulties that a potential proliferators faces.



There can be lot of other reasons too, which can make nations to go nuclear, we have analyze most of them , which can play a vital role in making nations to pursue nuclear weapons. We also analyzed few cases of those states which are pursuing nuclear weapons. After analyzing all the above mentioned facts we can easily gather that in spite of country internal and external positions, in spite of their vulnerability to external and internal threats, it is there geo-politics which is making them to pursue nuclear weapons, because all those threats are germinating from the region in which they had there existence. They might be facing the threat from their neighbours, might be from other regional powers, but in each case the role of neighbours, and regional powers is not ignorable, while analyzing their persuasion of nuclear weapons. Hence it is been proved that the geo-political factors plays a dominating role in making nations go nuclear. If there regional threats are over, they have no reason to pursue their nuclear programmes. So regional implications also play very dominating role in encouraging the nation’s to go nuclear.