Uprising and Crackdown in Syria

[SADIA SHAFIQ]

Uprising and Crackdown in Syria

The Asad family has ruled Syria since 1970. President Bashar al Asad, like his father Hafez al-Asad before him, has wielded almost total control over domestic politics and has steered the country’s outsized foreign policy to play key roles in multiple arenas in the Middle East(Lebanon, Israel-Palestine, Iran, and Iraq) despite Syria’s small size and lack of resources. Now,with the country in turmoil, many observers are interested in how prolonged Syrian instability (or a possible changing of the guard there) might affect other U.S. foreign policy priorities in the region, such as Lebanese stability and countering Hezbollah; limiting Iranian influence; andsolving the Arab-Israeli conflict. Unlike in Egypt, where the United States has provided support to the military and democracy assistance to newly empowered political groups, the U.S. role in Syria is more limited. Some U.S. sanctions are already in place and Syria has been ineligible for U.S. aid due to its inclusion on the State Sponsor of Terrorism list. Military and intelligence cooperation is sporadic and limited. Thus the role the United States can play in Syria’s evolving domestic crisis is in question, and policymakers may be searching for channels of influence in order to preserveU.S.interests in a rapidly changing political landscape.

Current Status
As of September 2011, popular efforts to overturn the Asad regime have stalled amidst a brutalregime crackdown. Protests continue in Syria almost daily, but reports indicate that the fractured opposition is having difficulty maintaining momentum as the conflict wears on. In recent weeks,some demonstrators have even directly called for international non-military intervention to support their cause, a sign that that some Syrians may be losing hope due to regime-instigated
violence. Many foreign nations have condemned the regime’s tactics and some, including the United States, have called on President Bashar al Asad to step down, but no country has indicated its willingness to militarily intervene on behalf of the opposition as had been the case in Libya.Moreover, U.N. efforts to further sanction the Syrian Arab Republic Government (or SARG) have stalled over continued Russian and Chinese opposition to U.N. sanctions. According to U.N. figures, as of September 2011, at least 2,600 people have been killed since the start of the Syriauprising in March 2011.Many opponents of President Asad had hoped by now that his regime would fracture, particularlythe military. That has not happened in any significant way, and the Syrian government has
violently sought to ensure core regime stability. When reports surfaced that demonstrators were contemplating violent resistance against the SARG, regime-protection forces even more
aggressively pursued opponents, particularly army defectors and former regime officials such asHama Attorney General Adnan Bakour, who has been the highest level civilian defector to date.

President Obama said that

“The future of Syria must be determined by its people, but President Bashar al-Assad is standing in their way. His calls for dialogue and reform have rung hollow while he is imprisoning, torturing, and slaughtering his own people. We have consistently said thatPresident Assad must lead a democratic transition or get out of the way. He has not led. For the sake of the Syrian people, the time has come for President Assad to step aside.”

A special session of the U.N. Human Rights Council in April adopted Resolution S-16/1, whichunequivocally condemns the use of lethal violence against peaceful protestors by the Syrianauthorities” and requested that the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights provide apreliminary report on the situation of human rights in Syria. On June 14, the High Commissionerreported that the Office of the High Commissioner (OHCHR) “has received numerous reports

alleging the excessive use of force by Syrian security forces against civilians, the majority of whom were peaceful protestors. The most egregious reports concern the use of live ammunition against unarmed civilians, including from snipers positioned on rooftops of public buildings, andthe deployment of tanks in areas densely populated by civilians.”

The final report, reviewed at a special Council session in August, included reports of murder, “disappearance,” and torture by Syrian security forces and indications that at least 1,900 Syrians had died in the violence throughJuly 15.In response, the Human Rights Council has appointed a three-person independent commission of inquiry that is tasked with reporting by the end of November about specific abusesand identifying perpetrators.The continuing protests and violence are creating increased pressure for international action,

although the positions of some key actors have not changed significantly since June. U.N. leadersand European leaders have been increasingly vocal in demanding action, and the Arab Leagueand several Arab governments have called on the Syriangovernment to implement reforms andhalt the use of force. Opponents of international action, including Russia and China, remain waryabout the use of sanctions to create further pressure on President Asad and his government. Syrian opposition leaders are calling for international sanctions, but remain vehemently opposed tointernational military intervention. As such, most experts and observers see no potential for asuccessful initiative to seek United Nations Security Council mandate for a military operation.

At present, attention is focused on competing draft Security Council resolutions, sponsored by theRussia and the United States, France, Portugal, Germany, and the United Kingdom respectively.

Sanctions Against the Asad Regime


The U.S.-European draft would impose travel and asset sanctions on Syrian leaders and institute an arms embargo on Syria. The Russian draft would call on opposition and government leaders to resume dialogue while reforms are implemented. U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice has indicated that the U.S. government has not been encouraged by the positions that temporary Security Council members Brazil, India, and South Africa have taken on Syria andsimilar issues to date.

Key related recent statements and developments include

•

On September 15, U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon called on the

international community to take

“coherent measures and speak with one voice,”saying, “for six months, we have seen escalating violence and repression. The

international community has repeatedly appealed to President Assad to stop, mostrecently the foreign ministers of the Arab League. He must now listen to such

urgent calls.”

•

The United Kingdom, France, and the European Union (EU) continue to

condemn the Asad government’s use of force against protestors, and support the use of sanctions as a means to compel it to cease the repressive use of force. On September 2, the EU banned the import of Syrian oil and widened the scope of existing asset freezes and travel bans on Syrian officials in response to what EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashtondescribed as “the appalling and unacceptable escalation of the brutal campaign the regime has been waging against the Syrian people

Russia continues to resist proposals to include U.N. sanctions on Syria in aSecurity Council resolution on the crisis. Some Syrian activists reportedly haveorganized protests criticizing Russia for its position. On September 12, PresidentDmitri Medvedev said, “Russia proceeds from the assumption that it’s necessary to approve a resolution on Syria that will be tough, but well balanced at the same
time that would address both parties to the conflict—President Bashar Assad’sgovernment and the opposition. Only in that case could it be successful. …Theresolution must be tough, but it mustn’t automatically involve sanctions. …Thereis absolutely no need now for any additional pressure.”
•

China also has opposed the use of U.N. sanctions on Syria. A spokesperson for
the Chinese Foreign ministry said on September 15,

“The Syria issue should beresolved by relevant parties in Syria through consultations. We hope that Syria will start a Syria-led political process as soon as possible and resolve the crisis
through dialogue. We believe that the international community should abide by the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter as well as the norms governing international relations and should fully respect Syria’s sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity. Whether the international community should take further action on the Syria issue depends on whether the action will
help ease tension in Syria, promote the resolution of differences through political

dialogue, and maintain peace and stability in the Middle East.”

8

•

The Arab League has taken a more active role in recent weeks. Arab League

Secretary General Nabil al Arabi visited Damascus over the weekend ofSeptember 10 for discussions with President Asad. Reports suggest that Al Arabi returned to Cairo with a commitment from President Asad to step down in 2014,to call legislative elections within 6 months, and to name a national unity cabinet for the transition period.

9 The Syrian opposition has widely rejected similar

conditions and has demanded an immediate end to President Asad’s rule. The subsequent Arab League Ministerial meeting in Cairo issued a statement onSeptember 13 stating that,

“The current situation in Syria is still very serious and

an immediate change has to happen in order to stop the bloodshed and preventpeople facing more violence.”

•

Some Arab Gulf state leaders are publicly criticizing the Asad government as

well.

King Abdullah bin Abdelaziz Al Saud of Saudi Arabia called on PresidentAsad to stop his “killing machine” and implement reform in early August, and Qatari Foreign Minister Hamad bin Jassim bin Jabor Al Thani said on September 13 that,

“We cannot allow people to be killed this way. …The army must

withdraw from inside the cities so that we can start talking about a dialoguebetween the people and the government.”

Both countries, along with Kuwait and Bahrain, have withdrawn their ambassadors from Damascus.

Ali al Moussawi, an adviser to Iraqi prime minister Nuri Kamal al Maliki, said inSeptember 2011 that

“We believe that the Syrian people should have morefreedom and have the right to experience democracy....
We are against the onepartyrule and the dictatorship that hasn’t allowed for the freedom of expression.”

Several weeks earlier, Iran had harshly criticized Syria as well. According toIranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad,

“Regional nations can assist the Syrian people and government in the implementation of essential reforms and theresolution of their problems.... A military solution is never the right solution.”

[SADIA SHAFIQ]

Palestinian Initiatives for 2011 at the United

Nations

Many Members of Congress are actively interested in the question of possible U.N. action onPalestinian statehood. Congress could try to influence U.S. policy and the choices of other actorsthrough the authorization and appropriation of foreign assistance to the Palestinians, the United Nations, and Israel and through oversight of the Obama Administration’s diplomatic efforts.Changes to aid levels may depend on congressional views of how maintaining or changing aid levels could affect U.S. leverage and credibility in future regional and global contexts. Officials from the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Palestinian Authority (PA) aretaking action in the United Nations aimed at solidifying internationa support for Palestinian statehood. On September 23, 2011, at the opening of the annual session of the General Assembly,PLO Chairman and PA President Mahmoud Abbas submitted an application for Palestinian statemembership to the U.N. Secretary General—on the basis of the armistice lines that prevailedbefore the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 (the “1967 borders”)—in order to bring about a Security-Council vote on whether to recommend membership. Abbas cites a lack of progress on the peace process with Israel as the driving factor behind PLO consideration of alternative pathways towarda Palestinian state. The Obama Administration has indicated that it will veto a Security Council resolution in favor of statehood. In an alternate or parallel scenario, an existing U.N. member-state supportive of PLO plans may sponsor a resolution in the General Assembly. Such a resolution could—with a simple majority vote—recommend the recognition of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders—either as-is or subject to future Israel-PLO negotiation—and change Palestine’s permanent observer status in the United Nations from that of an “entity” to that of a“non-member state.” U.S., Israeli, and PLO diplomacy focused on Europe—particularly permanent Security Council members France and the United Kingdom—has been active andcould further intensify as the time for a possible vote draws closer. Diplomacy also might currently or in the future include negotiations regarding the venue for, and the timing and wording of, potential resolutions or other actions on Palestinian statehood. Some observers speculate that tightened Israeli security with respect to the West Bank and Gaza and popular unrest or civil disobedience among Palestinians could ensue, depending on various scenarios. Although Abbas maintains that he seeks an eventual return to U.S.-backed Israel-PLO negotiations on a more equal basis, an upgrade of the Palestinians’ status at the U.N. also could facilitate subsequent efforts to apply greater pressure on Israel, especially if the PLO gains greater ability to present grievances in international courts—such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or International Criminal Court (ICC). Whether U.N. action or its aftermath would make Israel more or less willing to offer concessions in a negotiating process remains unclear, especially in light of ongoing regional political change and the volatility and possible deterioration of Israel’s political and military relationships with Egypt and Turkey.

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman and Palestinian Authority (PA) President-Mahmoud Abbas cites a lack of progress on the two-decades-old peace process with Israel as the driving factor behind current PLO/PA2 consideration of alternative pathways toward a Palestinianstate. In recent months, PLO and PA officials have actively worked to obtain more widespread international recognition of Palestinian statehood in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem)and the Gaza Strip. Over 100 countries have recognized the state of Palestine that the PLO declared unilaterally in 1988. No North American or Western European governments that providesignificant financial support to the PA and are influential in the Middle East have recognized the1988 claim, and the current Palestinian initiative has raised new questions about the positions ofthese third parties.PLO officials are pursuing action in the United Nations aimed at solidifying international support for Palestinian statehood, and they appear to enjoy support from the Palestinian public and several international institutions for their efforts.Proponents of these initiatives at the U.N.support the timing of their efforts by citing both the plan of PA Prime Minister Salam Fayyad to reach “de facto statehood” by August 20115 through strengthening PA institutions and economic development, and the goal President Obama enunciated in September 2010 for establishing aPalestinian state by 2011 as part of a negotiated two-state solution with Israel. According to a September 2011 poll by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, 83%ofPalestinians in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza Strip support “turning to the-UN to obtain support for a Palestinian state.”Reports in 2011 from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the Office of the U.N. Special Coordinator for the Middle EastPeace Process stated that the PA has made institutional progress in areas traditionally deemed necessary for statehood,but noted continued impediments: an underdeveloped private sector,constraints—mainly Israel-imposed—on movement and access respecting the West Bank and Gaza, fiscal problems related to a dearth of international donor funding, and lack of progress in negotiations.

PLO Chairman/PA President Abbas has initiated action at the opening of the annual U.N. General Assembly session that could lead to votes in both the Security Council and the General Assembly.On September 23, 2011, he submitted an application for Palestinian state-9 membership—on the basis of the armistice lines that prevailed before the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 (commonly knownas the “1967 borders”)—to the U.N. Secretary-General, who is expected to submit the matter to the Security Council for its action on whether to recommend membership. A positiverecommendation would require 9 “yes” votes out of 15 and no vetoes by any of the five permanent Council members. The Obama Administration has indicated that it will veto a Security Council recommendation resolution, but in the unlikely event the Council were to make a positive recommendation,a two-thirds majority vote would be required in the General Assembly to admit a Palestinian state to the United Nations. Although the Security Council sometimes votes on whether to recommend membership within days after the application is filed.

The United States may be faced with a choice between backing its vigorous opposition to U.N. action with possible changes to U.S. aidto the PA and the U.N., and taking more of a wait-and-see approach by reserving possible ultimatums for what follows the U.N. outcome both diplomatically and on the ground. Both approaches contain risks. By unsuccessfully mounting strong opposition to U.N. action, the United States may lose credibility and leverage with key actors. A restrained response, however,could lead these actors to perceive U.S. flexibility as weakness open to further exploitation.Either way, the outcome and aftermath of U.N. action on Palestinian statehood could presentfurther challenges to U.S. efforts to pursue a negotiated two-state solution that secures U.S.interests, is acceptable to the Palestinians, guarantees Israel’s security, and is credible to bothparties and the international community.

Observer Status in the United Nations

The current relationship of Palestine and the United Nations, as defined through a series ofGeneral Assembly resolutions, is as an “entity” having received a standing invitation to participate as an observer in the sessions and the work of theGeneral Assembly and maintainpermanent offices at Headquarters.

16 Since 1946, non-member states of the United Nations that were members of one or more specialized agencies have applied with the U.N. Secretary-General for the status of Permanent Observer. This practice originated with the application of Switzerlandin 1946 for access as a Permanent Observer. It has been suggestedthat the General Assemblyadopt a resolution on the status of Palestine in the United Nations that would change its observerstatus from “entity” to non-member stateUnited Nations Membership: Criteria and Process

Criteria

Article 4 of the United Nations Charter establishes the parameters and criteria as well as theprocess for acquiring membership in the organization. Paragraph 1 of the Article reads –

Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which accept theobligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, areable and willing to carry out these obligations.

Bruno Simma, in his two-volume article-by-article commentary on the Charter,convertsparagraph 1, above, into “five criteria for admission.”
•

“Membership...is Only Open to States”


“The Applicant State Must be ‘Peace-Loving’ ”

Applicant States Must Accept the Obligations Contained in the PresentCharter.

Applicants Must, in the Opinion of the Organization, be

Able and Willing[emphasis added] to Carry out the Obligations Contained in the Charter

TO be continued......

[SADIA SHAFIQ]

Back ground of issue

Many proponents of emphasizing Palestinian claims to statehood acknowledge that greaterinternational support through the United Nations or elsewhere will not resolve disputes betweenIsraelis and Palestinians on core issues—borders, security, settlements, refugees, Jerusalem, waterrights. Some observers express skepticism that international or unilateral action on the statehoodquestion can transcend symbolism to significantly contribute to Palestinian independence. Anupgrade in status would not confer characteristics of sovereignty that might strengthen the-Palestinians’ position in a negotiating context—such as an independent military capacity andcontrol over territory and borders. Israel would probably retain control over East Jerusalem andoverall control—despite the PA’s limited self-rule—in the West Bank, while the Sunni Islamistgroup Hamas (a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization) would probably continue its de-facto rule over the Gaza Strip.If Israel continues to control developments on the ground in the West Bank and East Jerusalem,along with access to Gaza, the PLO might face questions about next steps from its own people.PLO officials have portrayed the possibility of U.N. action as consequential, if not ultimatelydecisive, on thestatehood issue. However, reduced levels of financial and political support frominternational patrons stemming from U.N. action could hinder possible subsequent efforts byPalestinian leaders to follow up such action with measures seeking to change Israel’s posture inthe West Bank and Gaza, and to rally popular and international support for these possible followupmeasures.A resolution upgrading the permanent observer status of Palestine in the United Nations to a nonmemberstate may also set in motion developments that eventually change how Israelis andPalestinians address their ongoing, fundamental disputes. If Palestinians and other international actors perceive that Palestinian political or legal claims have more basis for redress, altered expectations and calculations could lead to a new dynamic in how Palestinian and third parties relate to Israel with regard to core issues of the dispute. Possible developments—many of which Israel decries as connoting or possibly leading to “delegitimization”—include greater levels of Palestinian civil disobedience /unrest;international boycott, divestment, and sanctions (BDS)movements; and an increase in grievances filed concerning Israeli actions in international courts—such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ)and the International Criminal Court(ICC)—and other forums. A General Assembly resolution purporting to recognize Palestinian-statehood could strengthen the Palestinian case for membership in or greater access to some of these international courts and forums, but would not automatically confer such privileges or rightsupon the Palestinians.Some PLO leaders have stated that following acknowledgment of even limited Palestinian sovereignty, aspects of Israeli control over the West Bank and Gaza would constitute a “stateoccupying another state.” This argument is presumably advanced in order to increase international pressure on Israel to reduce its presence and military control over the territories Yet,several international actors might reject this argument, particularly if the state’s borders have not been definitively established in the Security Council. Israel is likely to reject it under any circumstances.

Until late September, when Palestinian resolve to submit an application for U.N. membership became clearer, the most credible alternative to a U.N. vote appeared to be the possibility of a last-minute agreement by the international Quartet (United States, European Union, United Nations Secretariat, Russia) on parameters for a resumption of Israel-PLO final-statusnegotiations—drawing from the guidelines President Barack Obama offered for future negotiations in speeches he gave on May 19 and May 22, 2011. President Obama called for basing the borders of Israel and a future Palestinian state on the 1967 lines with mutually agreed swaps to establish secure and recognized borders for both states under the principle of “two states for two peoples.” However, future resumption of negotiations may be unlikely unless Israel drops its insistence on Palestinian recognition of Israel as a “Jewish state”and the PLO drops its insistence on a halt to Israeli settlement building. Moreover, even negotiations resume, their prospects remain uncertain, if not dim. The unwillingness of Hamas to recognize Israel’s right to exist and renounce violence further complicates matters. Israel remains unwilling to negotiate

directly with Hamas, and Israelis and Palestinians appear unwilling to compromise conflicting positions concerning the claims of Palestinian refugees and the status of Jerusalem.

Israel’s Reaction
Broad international support for Palestinian statehood could amplify Israelis’ concerns about their own security, particularly in view of ongoing political change in the surrounding Arab world and the volatility and possible deterioration of Israel’s political and military relationships with Egyptand Turkey. Israeli threat perceptions could lead to greater flexibility on its positions on some of the core issues expected to be resolved in a final-status Israel-PLO peace agreement, although the political climate in Israel makes this unlikely. The rationale, espoused by commentators and some

former Israeli leaders commonly identified with the left and center of the political spectrum, would be that time for reaching a deal with the Palestinians is running out, as changes in theregion lead Palestinianleaders and Arab state governments to show greater responsiveness topopular anti-Israel sentiment, and that negotiating peace is Israel’s best chance to ensure its longterm security.

Israeli leaders might, instead, be more likely to become less flexible in negotiations due tocalculations that Israeli concessions are likely to embolden—not assuage—Palestinians and otherArabs, encouraging them to seek greater gains at Israel’s expense. Many Israelis see the wave ofchange in the Arab world, and especially in Egypt, as a repudiation of the logic of trading land for peace, and as contributing to an unpredictable environment that merits caution, not concessions.If these views prevail, Israel might conclude that its best options lie in using its military and otherstrategic assets to shape desired outcomes either unilaterally or in concert with regional and international allies and supporters. Possible specific Israeli responses may include, among others:

withholding transfer revenue (taxes and customs Israel collects on behalf of thePA) that constitutes nearly two thirds of the PA’sbudget;increasing construction and approval of Israeli settlements and infrastructure inthe West Bank and East Jerusalem; andtightening security in and around the West Bank and Gaza

Thefollowing questions could become pertinent:

•

Will Mahmoud Abbas and his PLO/PA/Fatah colleagues and possible successors
be willing and able to drive the Palestinian agenda toward a negotiated peacewith Israel, or will past experience, regional trends, and popular sentimentcompel them to pursue alternatives?

•

Will efforts by Fatah and Hamas to form a consensus PA government and reunite

the West Bank and Gaza under limited self-rule resume in light of their May 2011agreement? What form might these efforts take?

•

Could the outcome of international or unilateral action contribute to internal
challenges to Fatah-led PA leadership in the West Bank and/or Hamas rule inGaza?

What are the relative risks of uprisings fed by changed popular
expectations or the actions of organized militant groups?

•

If a Palestinian entity claims or receives greater international recognition of its
sovereignty over the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem on the basis of the1967 lines, how might the rights and privileges of Palestinian refugees and other diaspora members living outside the 1967 borders be affected