PAKISTAN started focusing on nuclear development in January 1972 under the leadership of Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. Pakistan's nuclear weapons development program was in response to India's development of nuclear weapons. Bhutto called a meeting of senior scientists and engineers on January 20, 1972, in Multan. It was here that Bhutto rallied Pakistan's scientists to build the atomic bomb for national survival. At the Multan meeting, Bhutto also appointed a Pakistani nuclear engineer, Munir Ahmad Khan, as chairman of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, who till then had been working as Director of Nuclear Power and Reactor Division at IAEA, in Vienna. This marked the beginning of Pakistan's pursuit of nuclear capability. Following India's surprise nuclear test, code named Smiling Buddha in 1974, the goal to develop nuclear weapons received considerable impetus.

Consequently, Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, a metallurgical engineer, working in a Dutch research firm used URENCO blueprints for designing the ultracentrifuges at Kahuta (near Islamabad) also joined Pakistan's nuclear weapons-grade Uranium enrichment program. The uranium enrichment program had been launched in 1974 by PAEC chairman Munir Ahmad Khan as Project-706. AQ Khan joined the project in the spring of 1976 and was made Project-Director in July 1976 after taking over from Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood. Although in 1983, A.Q.Khan was convicted of the theft of these blueprints, the conviction was overturned on some technicality. [1]. A few weeks after India's Shakti (Power) operation (second nuclear test), on 28 May 1998, Pakistan detonated 5 nuclear devices in the Chagai Hills in the Chaghai district, Balochistan. This operation was named Chagai-I by Pakistan. Pakistan's fissile material production takes place at Kahuta and Khushab/Jauharabad, where weapons-grade Plutonium is made; the latter, allegedly, with the assistance of Chinese-supplied technology.

Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Programme was established in 1974 when the Directorate of Technical Development (DTD) was set up in PAEC by chairman Munir Ahmad Khan, who was credited as the true "father" of Pakistan's atomic bomb by a recent IISS, London's Dossier on Pakistan's nuclear program. DTD was assigned the task of developing the implosion design,trigger mechanism, physics calculations, high-speed electronics, high-precision chemical and mechanical components,high explosive lenses for Pakistan's nuclear weapons. DTD comprised the Diagnostics Group, the Fast Neutron Physics Group, Wah Group and the Theoretical Physics Group. The DTD had come up with its first implosion design of a nuclear weapon by 1978 which was then improved and later tested on March 11, 1983 when PAEC carried out Pakistan's first successful cold test of a nuclear device. Between 1983 and 1990, PAEC carried out 24 more cold tests of various nuclear weapon designs. DTD had also developed a miniaturized weapon design by 1987 that could be delivered by all Pakistan Air Force Aircraft. It was the same DTD that carried out the Chaghi tests of May 28, 1998 and the Kharan test of May 30, 1998

Nuclear weapons

Policy

Pakistan acceded to the Geneva Protocol on April 15, 1960, the Biological Weapons Convention in 1974 and the Chemical Weapons Convention on October 28, 1997.In 1999 Pakistan signed the Lahore Accords, with India, agreeing a bilateral moratorium on nuclear testing. However, Pakistan, like India and Israel, is not a signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and, consequently, not bound by any of its provisions. Some Pakistani nuclear scientists have been reported by the CIA to be involved in the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology. In particular, one of Pakistan's chief nuclear scientists, Dr. A.Q. Khan, has admitted his role in nuclear proliferation, leading to fears in the international community about nuclear terrorism; but the Government of Pakistan has taken strict actions against such individuals and stated that the Pakistani nuclear weapons are in "safe" hands and there is no need of any international worries about nuclear proliferation from Pakistan.

Infrastructure

Pakistan's nuclear weapons development program is based, primarily, on highly-enriched uranium (HEU), which is produced at the A. Q. Khan Research Laboratory at Kahuta, a Zippe centrifuge-based uranium-enrichment facility. The Kahuta facility has been in use since the early 1980s. By the early 1990s, Kahuta had an estimated 3,000 centrifuges in operation, and Pakistan has continued its pursuit of expanded uranium-enrichment capabilities.

In the mid 1980s, Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission began to pursue Plutonium production capabilities. Consequently Pakistan built the 40-50 MW (Mega Watt, Thermal) Khushab Nuclear Research Reactor at Joharabad, and in April 1998, Pakistan announced that the nuclear reactor was operational. The Khushab reactor project was initiated in 1986 by PAEC chairman Munir Ahmad Khan, who insisted that the reactor was totally indigenous, i.e. that it was designed and built by Pakistani scientists and engineers. Pakistani industry contributed in 82 % of the reactor's construction. The Project-Director for this project was Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood. According to public statements made by the US Government officials, this unsafeguarded heavy-water reactor can produce up to 8 to 10 kg of Plutonium per year, sufficient for at least one nuclear weapon. The reactor could also produce Tritium if it were loaded with Lithium-6, although this is unnecessary for the purposes of nuclear weapons, because modern nuclear weapon designs use Li6 directly. According to J. Cirincione of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Khushab's Plutonium production capacity could allow Pakistan to develop lighter nuclear warheads that would be easier to deliver through ballistic missiles.

Plutonium separation, reportedly, takes place at the New Labs Reprocessing Plant, which was completed by 1981 by PAEC and is next to Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science & Technology (PINSTECH) near Islamabad, which is not subject to IAEA inspections and safeguards.
Television screenshot of the first known Pakistani Nuclear Test, 28 May 1998.
Television screenshot of the first known Pakistani Nuclear Test, 28 May 1998.

In late 2006, the US Institute for Science and International Security released intelligence reports and imagery showing the construction of a new plutonium reactor at the Khushab nuclear site. The reactor is deemed to be large enough to produce enough plutonium to facilitate the creation of as much as "40 to 50 nuclear weapons a year." The New York Times carried the story with the insight that this would be Pakistan's third plutonium reactor, signalling a shift to dual-stream development, with Plutonium-based devices supplementing the nation's existing HEU stream to atomic warheads.

Arsenal

The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) estimates that Pakistan has built 24-48 HEU-based nuclear warheads with HEU reserves for 30-52 additional warheads. The US Navy Center for Contemporary Conflict estimates that Pakistan possesses between a low of 35 and a high of 95 nuclear warheads, with a median of 60.

The NRDC's and the Carnegie Foundation's estimates of approximately 50 weapons are from 2002-3 estimations. In 2000, US Military intelligence estimated that Pakistan's nuclear arsenal may be as large as 100 warheads.. The actual size is hard for experts to gauge owing to the secrecy which surrounds the program in Pakistan. In recent developments, retired Brig. General Feroz Khan, previously second in command at the Stategic Arms Division of Pakistans' Military told a Pakistani newspaper the nation has "about 80 to 120 genuine warheads"-and also revealed that Pakistan has decoy or dummy warheads to complicate any designs by aggressors.

Pakistan's nuclear warheads are based on an implosion design that uses a solid core of highly enriched Uranium and requires an estimated 15-20 kg of material per warhead. The NRDC also thinks that Pakistan has also produced a small but unknown quantity of weapons-grade Plutonium, which is sufficient for an estimated 3-5 nuclear weapons per annum based on the estimation of 5 kg of Plutonium per warhead. Pakistan also claims that the fissile cores are stored separately from the other non-nuclear explosive packages which, as the Government of Pakistan states, can be put together rather quickly.

Foreign assistance

Historically, China has played a major role in the establishment of Pakistan's nuclear weapons development infrastructure, especially, when increasingly stringent export controls in the western countries made it difficult for Pakistan to acquire nuclear materials and technology from elsewhere. Additionally, Pakistani officials have supposedly been present to observe at least one Chinese nuclear test. According to a 2001 Department of Defense report, China has supplied Pakistan with nuclear materials and has provided critical technical assistance in the construction of Pakistan's nuclear weapons development facilities. This assistance was illegal, per the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, of which China is a signatory.

North Korea has been a suspected supplier of technology for some of Pakistan's long-range ballistic missiles. According to the US sources, Pakistan entered a deal with North Korea to receive long-range, No-Dong-type, ballistic missiles in return for Pakistan supplying key nuclear technology to North Korea to build its own nuclear weapon

Doctrine

Pakistan's motive for pursuing a nuclear weapons development program is to counter the threat posed by its principal rival, India.

Pakistan has not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). According to the US Defense Department report cited above, "Pakistan remains steadfast in its refusal to sign the NPT, stating that it would do so only after India joined the Treaty. Consequently, not all of Pakistan's nuclear facilities are under IAEA safeguards. Pakistani officials have stated that signature of the CTBT is in Pakistan's best interest, but that Pakistan will do so only after developing a domestic consensus on the issue, and have disavowed any connection with India's decision."

Pakistan does not abide by a no-first-use doctrine, also Pakistan has not issued an official nuclear doctrine. There has also been criticism of Pakistan's nuclear doctrine which gives rise to ambiguity.

The organization authorized to make decisions about Pakistan's nuclear posturing is the NCA. Here is a link showing NCA of Pakistan. (NCA)it was established in February 2000. The NCA is composed of two committees that advise the present President of Pakistan, General Pervez Musharraf, on the development and deployment of nuclear weapons; it is also responsible for war-time command and control. In 2001, Pakistan further consolidated its nuclear weapons infrastructure by placing the Khan Research Laboratories and the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission under the control of one Nuclear Defense Complex.

It has been recently reported by the Pakistani Press namely Jang that Pakistan has the ability to MIRV its missiles. This has been seen as possibly the greatest achievement to date. It has also been reported that Pakistan would likely MIRV its Shaheen-II missile.

Role of the USA in Guarding the Nuclear Weapons

From the end of 2001 the United States has provided material assistance to aid Pakistan in guarding its own nuclear weapons. This included the safeguarding of Pakistan's nuclear material, its warheads as well as its laboratories. The cost of the program has been almost $100 million. Specifically the USA has provided helicopters, night-vision goggles and nuclear detection equipment.
It should be noted that Pakistan turned down the offer of PALS technology, a sophisticated "weapon release" program which initiates use via specific checks and balances as it feared the secret implanting of "dead switches