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Ayesha Siddiqa Articles
[B][U][CENTER][FONT="Georgia"][SIZE="5"][COLOR="DarkGreen"]The political show goes on[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT][/CENTER][/U][/B]
[B]By Ayesha Siddiqa Friday, 06 Mar, 2009[/B] A QUESTION on the lips of most Pakistanis these days is whether the Sharif brothers and their political party – the PML-N – will manage to push back their rival – the PPP – and its leader Asif Ali Zardari. After the Supreme Court decision disqualifying the Sharif brothers from electoral politics and holding public office, the PML-N seems to have had no other option but to muster street support in the form of the lawyers’ movement and seek out parties and groups of the religious right. People across the country were getting ready for political show-time on the streets until March 3 happened. On this day, matters appeared to take another turn as terrorists struck in Lahore. Now the problem is that as much as the Sharif brothers might want to up the political ante, the reality is (to put it in the words of an Indian film song) that ‘Pappu nach naheen sakta’. Surely, Nawaz Sharif will be cautious in overexposing himself and his followers to the threat of a terrorist attack. The last leader to ignore security calls was Benazir Bhutto who succumbed to a terrorist attack. The identity of her killers remains unknown. Security is bound to be enhanced now and there will be greater vigilance to allow for major processions on the streets. In any case, people will be terrified at least for a few days and would be averse to risking their lives by congregating and taking out processions, be they lawyers or others. The security situation does not bode well for them, especially at a time when the PPP is trying hard to buy the loyalties of the people through restoring the nazims and resorting to other measures to undermine the strength of the PML-N. The political battle was meant to be fought on the streets. It would be the Sharifs’ ability to mobilise the people in this regard that would impress external powers and opposing political forces in the country. As far as mass protests go, the PPP has an edge in terms of its jiyalas who are rabid party supporters willing to give up their lives for the PPP and its leadership. There is a general understanding that the PML-N never had this edge. But this is not to underestimate the fact that the Sharif brothers have the support of the trader-merchant class in Punjab and other places. Historically, they fund the protest even though they are not actively a part of it. So, one could have had a situation as in 1977 when the conservative trader-merchant class funded the PNA movement. Although it would be extremely conspiratorial to hint that the government may have been involved in the terrorist attacks, the fact is that the peculiar turn of events must have made the PPP leadership very happy as it provided an opportunity to contain the upcoming long march and the street protests by the Sharifs. The party’s calculations possibly included buying off parliamentarians in Punjab which would enable it to make a government in the largest province and then use the power to wipe out the PML-N in the next elections. The emphasis is on patronage politics which helps in purchasing loyalties. Voting patterns are affected by a number of factors including popular ideas on who will make it to power. Equally, they have much to do with people’s perceptions of who has been wronged. There is great worth attached to physical and political martyrdom in South Asia and the Third World in general. Not to mention the fact that patronage politics is generally an inefficient system. At the end of the ruling party’s term, there are always a large number of disgruntled people who then decide to switch over to the other side in the hope of getting better benefits. Considering the short life of civilian regimes, patronage politics rarely support the ruling party. But convenient times do not necessarily mean that the battle is or will be over soon. The PPP indeed made a difficult choice by derailing the Punjab government. It might be able to form the provincial government, but it will have to face the uncomfortable situation of dealing with a strong opposition. This means that it will be difficult to undertake policymaking and the party will eventually have to fall back on patronage politics. It should also not be forgotten that the bulk of the Sharifs’ party constituents were happy (or not so unhappy) with the PML-N. In any case, extreme conflict between the two parties in Punjab will make both policymaking and service delivery harder if not impossible in the largest province which means that the people will ultimately be unhappy with the situation. The prospect of such a degree of unhappiness in the largest province is worrying particularly when we consider the fact that the military still predominantly belongs to Punjab. What we are looking at is protracted political warfare in which the battle lines may ultimately be drawn on the basis of ideology (it is still a blessing that confrontation has not taken on an ethnic colour). Even if nothing happens as the long march approaches, the Sharifs will not give up the street fight or the one that has started inside parliament. It is a fact that a number of forces that have an impact on Pakistan’s politics such as the US do not support the PML-N. Given Washington’s understanding that the Sharifs are ideologically conservative as compared to the PPP and its leadership, the US does not seem inclined towards the PML-N. However, this would add to the ideological angle of the battle. Many would interpret this confrontation as a conflict between pro-Pakistan elements and those that are at the beck and call of the US. Ultimately, this will further make politics in this country extremely wonky. More importantly, political confrontation is a reminder not only of the past but also of the myopia of the politicians and political parties. The fact is that Pakistan’s political system in general is driven by predatory instincts in which players do not value loyalty, partnership, ideology or the betterment of the people. Instead, they are driven by concern for short-term gains and their desire for personal power. Under the circumstances, one can easily predict that the boots will eventually march back from the barracks into the corridors of power — if not today or tomorrow then certainly the day after. And then, they will be the ones dancing rather than Pappu and his mates or rivals. The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst. [email]ayesha.ibd@gmail.com[/email] [url]http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/Dawn%20Content%20Library/dawn/the-newspaper/editorial/the+political+show+goes+on[/url] |
[B][U][CENTER][COLOR="DarkGreen"][SIZE="5"][FONT="Georgia"]Absence of alternatives[/FONT][/SIZE][/COLOR][/CENTER][/U][/B]
[B][I][U][CENTER][FONT="Georgia"]The lack of political alternative at this hour is due to the death of politics in the country. One wonders what it would take for a new political force to emerge.[/FONT][/CENTER][/U][/I][/B] [B]By Ayesha Siddiqa Friday Mar 13, 2009[/B] THE country is in a state of political, economic and social chaos, leading us to contemplate the question of finding another political alternative, perhaps in the form of a new political party. The crisis is two-fold. On the one hand there is the decay of existing parties, on the other the absence of an alternative. However, a new party that could fill the political vacuum is nowhere to be seen. There is Imran Khan who is quite popular amongst some segments of the urban elite but has not managed to win mass support, mainly because he hasn’t offered a clear alternative and continues to drift between right and left political ideologies. To give Imran Khan his due, he and his backers have emerged as a pressure group though not as a political force. Perhaps this lack of alternative is due to the death of politics in the country. One wonders what it would take for a new political force, the kind that previously created the two major parties, to emerge. A common feature of all parties is a very strong leadership at the top, and an oligarchic structure which then connects with the lower rungs on the basis of the redistribution of rewards. Ultimately, the reward depends on access to and approval of the top leadership routed through the oligarchy. This works as a bond at the lowest level rather than at the top which makes most parties quite similar, especially the two major national parties of the country. The Muslim League emerged from the pre-1947 crisis. However, after independence and the death of Mohammad Ali Jinnah, reactionary forces not only strengthened their control but also paved the way for the disintegration of the Muslim League. Since it was the only key party at that time, powerful establishment forces hijacked it. Thus, it was not surprising that the Muslim League kept splitting into several factions. Beginning with the first major splinter group controlled by Ayub Khan, the PML recreated itself in the form of different factions. At this point, the party leadership is divided on the basis of personal interests rather than on that of ideology. The political crisis of the 1960s resulted in the creation of the PPP in the western wing and the Awami League in the eastern wing. The crisis led people to the streets. In West Pakistan, the PPP came into being with the combined efforts of socialist, left-of-centre, Islamic socialist and reactionary forces. The PPP’s political agenda and election manifesto of ‘roti, kapra aur makaan’ attracted the common man in search of his rights and hopeful of getting a state that could perform better in delivering basic services to the people. However, the greatest mistake was to accommodate reactionary forces such as feudal lords and other powerful cliques. These were included in the party by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto because he was one of them, and without making deals he couldn’t build a strong party to displace Gen Ayub Khan and his political partners in a short time. In any case, in Pakistan there is a strong tradition of cutting deals with reactionary forces to enable the elite to remain in power. The inclusion of this powerful elite was the PPP’s ideological undoing. During the 1970s, leftist and Islamic socialist forces were pushed to the background and the landed feudal and other powerful groups took their place. However, the PPP’s advantage rested in those pockets that looked upon Bhuttoism as an ideology and a symbol of empowerment for the dispossessed. The memory of Bhutto’s fiery slogans and the times when big business was pushed back, though in a superficial manner, did not go away. Without assessing the ability of their leadership to empower the masses, PPP voters were caught in a time warp, also the result of successive military interventions. The PPP’s greatest advantage was in having charismatic leaders like Zulfikar Ali Bhutto followed by Benazir Bhutto, keeping the vote bank engaged with the idea of delivering to the masses once the party got the opportunity to do so. Credit also goes to the par ty’s peculiar vote-bank management structure for keeping Bhuttoism alive. A strong central control also ensured the absence of splinter groups. The PPP-SB is not even a proper splinter group; it merely indicates a division within the Bhutto family. Like other national and ethnic parties, the PPP has a highly centralised structure controlled by a strong leader able to create and recreate slogans without delivering much. But, unlike the Muslim League, the PPP has an integrated three-tiered party management structure. With a strong leader surrounded by a set of senior leaders representing the party elite, the operations of mobilising voters and distributing rewards is carried out by the middle tier that also delivers the lower tiers to the top leadership. In the context of the country’s political patronage system, the middle tier has a better chance of getting rewards for keeping the ideology alive and the vote bank engaged. This is a highly bureaucratic structure which feeds into the larger political structure of the country. This means that the political party structure is fundamentally part of a system where military dictatorships are replaced by dominant political parties, only to be replaced by another military dispensation. Party management depends on keeping the vote bank alive with the expectation of the even distribution of rewards once the military dictatorship is gone. This may keep the party alive but will not solve political crises. The efficient party structure might come under greater pressure now that a charismatic leader is gone. While we hear about dissent inside the party, a real break might happen with help from the establishment. The long march and divisions between the prime minister and president could well be a precursor to the fragmentation of the PPP. The bottom-line is that most parties have become less imaginative as far as ideology goes. This feeds directly into the death of politics in this country. All new alternatives now depend on the establishment as it was in the past. ¦ The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst. [email]ayesha.ibd@gmail.com[/email] [url]http://epaper.dawn.com/ArticleText.aspx?article=13_03_2009_007_004[/url] |
[B][U][CENTER][COLOR="DarkGreen"][SIZE="5"][FONT="Georgia"]How did they triumph?[/FONT][/SIZE][/COLOR][/CENTER][/U][/B]
[B]By Ayesha Siddiqa Friday, 20 Mar, 2009[/B] THE movement for the restoration of the judiciary makes Pakistani civil society proud of its achievement. It is awesome how ordinary professionals struggled for two years to ensure that a civilian and military dictatorship did not obstruct the move for the independence of the judiciary. The symbolism of the chief justice’s refusal to bow to dictatorial pressure was enormous for a society in dire need of the strengthening of its institutions. However, no matter what the extent of joy, this is the time to reflect on some of the possible challenges that lie ahead of us. In any case, the game is not over as yet. At least at the time of writing it appears that the ruling party could be tempted to try once more to isolate Nawaz Sharif and not lift governor’s rule in time. It would be quite a feat to get the people to agitate once again now that the judiciary issue is resolved. Firstly, it is important to ensure that independence of the judiciary is truly institutionalised. Now, more than ever, will the chief justice have to work hard to ensure that he doesn’t give any semblance of bias and that efforts are truly put in to institutionalise the judiciary so that people don’t have to revert to the streets everyday. This means that he should now focus his attention on fine-tuning, streamlining and managing the judiciary and the legal profession, especially focusing on cleansing the lower courts and even the higher courts of alleged corruption and inefficiency. Affordable and timely justice is what the entire nation requires. Second, he has to struggle to keep himself from becoming controversial. The coming months will be quite crazy as all sorts of cases will find their way into the courtroom. In any case, it is now the chief justice’s responsibility to make sure that the judiciary doesn’t pose to become the recipe for all ills in the political system and the state. However, it must play a role to keep the government in check. Third, it is hoped that the energy invested in street power, which was instrumental in restoring the judiciary, now goes towards strengthening the political party system which continues to be weak. In the coming months and years, the political balance, as far as political parties go, will experience a change (provided the PML-N government is restored). While the PML will strengthen its position in Punjab and pick up strength in the other provinces through expanding its support base and building coalitions, the PPP will weaken considerably. Its chairman is under-age and the co-chair will be weakened further mainly because of the rift at the top. A possible scenario is loose control at the top without a major split because the other leaders do not have the privilege of a symbolic legacy as in the case of the Bhutto progeny. It will require a strong and visionary leader with excellent management skills to put the party together under an alternative leadership which the party lacks at the moment. While the current co-chair has taken a hit in Punjab, he has not done any better in his own province of Sindh either, because of controversial decisions and trying to launch his own set of cronies through replacing the old ones. Meanwhile, Tehrik-i-Insaf and the Jamaat-i-Islami will try to win some space. Yet, they might still not be able to provide an alternative. Under the circumstances, street power could emerge as an arbiter without the building of institutions. This is a slippery slope that we must avoid. Fourth, there is bound to be a strengthening of the bureaucratic establishment. While the streets played a major role, the army chief and external forces that were nervous at the instability in the country provided the final push. This is not to suggest that either the army or America had conspired to weaken the president. It means that the president played a flawed game, the kind that can even inadvertently strengthen the military’s position in the state’s power politics. The new president didn’t realise that he could not afford to engage on multiple fronts which saw rifts within his party, taking on the military through extra-institutional ventures, not strengthening existing institutions and challenging political opponents all at the same time. His strategy was to build an alternative security mechanism comprising the IB, FIA and a special anti-terror organisation, aimed at creating a balance of power internally as an institutional mechanism capable of delivering on the war on terror. Without strengthening existing organisations such as the defence ministry, the new structure was bound to make the army insecure about his intentions as did Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s Federal Security Force. Asif Zardari could still have managed had he not opened another front against his political rivals. Now, he has no one to blame but himself for creating a situation where the army has won a victory in terms of its overall image, posing yet again as a neutral arbiter. It would not be surprising to see the state bureaucracy demand its pound of flesh by clamping down on the powerful alternative institutional mechanism that President Zardari was building. Now even the MQM may not support him the way they did earlier. The ethnic party’s leader was keen to welcome the restoration despite the fact that the MQM had left no stone unturned on May 12, 2007 to oppose the lawyers’ movement. Eventually, the three players managing the change were the streets of Pakistan, the army and external pressure. Had he restored the chief justice after having got rid of Gen Musharraf, Asif Zardari would have earned a lot of political mileage. One wonders why he forgot so soon that people were pleasantly surprised at his initial moves after the PPP formed the government. (The media was patient with him until he started breaking his promises.) Had this restoration come at that time through an executive order, his popularity would have remained steady. This would have given him an opportunity to make many institutional changes to strengthen political institutions and build new ones. All the while when he thought he was the best man for the job of running this state and that he had more experience than any other politician, he didn’t realise his basic flaw of not understanding that democracies in transition are strange animals that must be handled carefully. The greatest challenge is to find the balance between the streets of Pakistan, conscious of their power to bring about change, and the state bureaucracy which is conscious of being the final arbiter once again. [B][I]The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst.[/I][/B] [email]ayesha.ibd@gmail.com[/email] |
[B][U][CENTER][COLOR="DarkGreen"][SIZE="5"][FONT="Georgia"]Sarkozy or Putin?[/FONT][/SIZE][/COLOR][/CENTER][/U][/B]
[B]By Ayesha Siddiqa Friday, 27 Mar, 2009[/B] Why couldn’t we see our president, like Nicolas Sarkozy, as someone who was well-meaning, despite his scandalous behaviour, he asked. More recently, a Russian friend asked me why Mr Zardari could not be like Vladimir Putin — using an authoritative style of governance to control the ‘mafia’. So who is our president like — Sarkozy or Putin? If Sarkozy is to be judged based on his propensity to raise eyebrows on account of his social behaviour, then, yes, Mr Zardari is someone with a similar style. He had warmed up to the then vice-presidential nominee in a style that most Pakistanis objected to, but perhaps that was his manner. However, the French president has other serious matters on his agenda as well. So, what about Vladimir Putin who is considered authoritarian, eager to silence all other voices around him and keen to remain in power against all democratic norms. Given his long association with KGB, the Soviet spy agency, the Russian prime minister’s style does not come as a surprise. He was trained as a member of a coercive organisation in the communist Soviet Union. Nonetheless, there is a major difference between the two men. While using authority, which makes him popular with the rest of the world, Putin does not seem too keen to destroy the Russian bureaucracy that was the linchpin of communist power. In fact, the concern to save some state institutions is one of the reasons behind attempts to bring powerful segments of the mafia under control. This is considered critical to the survival of the Russian state. Is Pakistan’s head of state honouring the integrity of institutions? There are times when one gets glimpses of a plan to build a new political system not dominated by forces traditionally powerful in Pakistan. This is not a bad idea. However, the approach adopted has so far not proved supportive of the aspiration to break old power centres. In fact, there is a risk that these may be strengthened. For instance, the military more than any other institution benefited from the president’s recent conflict with segments of civil society and the lawyers’ movement. Unlike Putin or Sarkozy, who do not weaken themselves or their institutional support base, Mr Zardari’s primary dependence has been on external powers. His calculation seems to be that as long as he delivers on some counts, such as issues relating to military security, he can continue to have the support of outside players. Since the world will not tolerate a military takeover, they have an interest in strengthening a civilian regime in Pakistan even at the cost of tolerating its political inadequacies. Sources also say there was hope at the top of receiving approximately $40bn in foreign aid that would help improve the presidential image and be a strong antidote to all arguments condemning Mr Zardari as a failed leader. One wonders if there is any realisation in Pakistan that the US will not be able to offer anything more than $7bn spread over five years and that too attached to certain conditions. In addition, there is also a possibility that weary of the political turmoil in Pakistan the international community feels too dejected with the present government and is, thus, less inclined to support it. Considering the fact that the US and UK (as disclosed by a former British diplomat) were keen to support the PPP government over other opposition parties, especially the PML-N, before the 2008 elections, the possibility of the aforementioned thinking within the present government is not surprising. Since a lot of people in Pakistan including my milkman, hairdresser, maid and chowkidar also believe that Pakistan’s policies are made in Washington, the political and military leadership cannot be blamed for getting excited by promises of cooperation from western capitals. After all, even western powers don’t understand that stability in Third World countries does not grow on trees or cannot be brought about through tactical political manoeuvres. Like its predecessors, the present PPP government cannot survive, at least not in the form it started out with, unless it shows an interest in building and strengthening national institutions. However, the American emphasis is always on finding short-term solutions to complex problems by routing US regional policies through individuals who can carry out one-window operations. So, when Gen Musharraf, who was perceived as a staunch ally for a long time, couldn’t deliver, others were allowed to throw him away. The general’s predecessor, Gen Zia, was also a US favourite until Washington and Rawalpindi parted ways. The fondness for the current Pakistani leadership may not be any different. There is also no guarantee that the US will continue to look down on the PML-N leadership. The situation is bound to get trickier with changes in the larger geo-political environment. Once the cash-strapped West finds greater challenges to its existence in Afghanistan and the South Asian region, the probability of encouraging other local partners increases. At that time if Mr Zardari’s behaviour appears as frustrating as it is now, it won’t take long for Washington to reconsider its options. The patronage system, be it local or international, is highly destabilising for players that don’t fully appreciate the rules of the game. Under the circumstances, Asif Zardari’s survival depends on building institutions rather than killing them. Even if he loves authority, the rules of the game would build his strength as much through institutions as cronies. Perhaps, if he really seriously thought about becoming Putin he could survive. [B]The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst.[/B] [email]ayesha.ibd@gmail.com[/email] |
[B][U][CENTER][COLOR="DarkGreen"][SIZE="5"][FONT="Georgia"]Many readings of Sharia[/FONT][/SIZE][/COLOR][/CENTER][/U][/B]
[B]By Ayesha Siddiqa Friday, 03 Apr, 2009 [/B] THE students of Jamia Hafsa want nizam-i-adl implemented in the entire country as a way out of the current crisis. They also want Taqi Usmani, their mufti, as chief qazi. Their demands must have attracted plenty of attention and support, especially from those who feel that the new legal system in Swat is the best possible solution to the conflict there. Some people support the Sharia in Swat for at least three reasons. First, it is believed that the Sharia alone will give ordinary people in Swat the speedy system of justice that they want. Second, since the Sharia is the demand of the Swat Taliban, they believe that it is a good idea to implement the system there while ensuring it remains disconnected from the rest of the country. Third, imposing the Sharia is not an issue because that’s what is prescribed by the 1973 Constitution according to which all laws have to be in conformity with the Sharia. But it is worth clarifying that the 1973 Constitution stipulates that all laws conform to the Quran and Sunnah, with no mention of the Sharia. This means that Sharia was not treated on a par with the Quran and Sunnah. This also indicates that the constitution gives the right of interpretation of laws of the state to legislators acting on behalf of the people rather than dogmatic ones of the past. Those responsible for law- and constitution-making did not depend on the Sharia for both deliberate and inadvertent reasons. There was a conscious decision to keep the state from becoming a theocracy. A theocracy was certainly not the intention of the father of the nation Mohammad Ali Jinnah. Another critical factor pertained to the larger question of which interpretation to apply. After all, the Sharia is an interpretation of the Quran and Sunnah. A quick reading of Islamic history amply demonstrates that the rulers and the socio-cultural environment of their time equally influenced interpretations by various individuals. For instance, it is said that the Abbasids directly influenced the process of the development of religious laws, during the latter’s codification, to suit their own interests. According to Islamic scholar Tahir Wasti, some of the comparatively minor crimes then were punishable by the state. However, the bigger crime of murder was left out of this categorisation. In Pakistan, the Sharia debate started under Ziaul Haq whose primary objective was strengthening his power rather than making society Islamic. Unfortunately, there were certain judges who helped the military dictator cheat the entire country by boosting his efforts to have in place Sharia laws that suited his interests. This in itself is indicative of the fact that the Sharia was open to interpretation. The main purpose of any law is to bring peace and justice to society. A law becomes meaningless if it cannot do so. In Pakistan’s case, as demonstrated by Wasti through his meticulously gathered data on the implementation of the law of Qisas and Diyat in the country, there appears to be a correlation between the imposition of religious laws and increasing crime in the country, especially homicide.Since the law of evidence makes the implementation of Qisas difficult, the state had primarily depended on using the law of Diyat. This essentially meant that a crime like murder, that can have far-reaching repercussions for society at large, was deemed a private matter that could be settled through compromise. For those, who argue that the purpose of blood money and compromise denote the spirit of forgiveness encouraged by Islam, the implementation of this law in Pakistan proved to be better suited to the interests of the powerful and did not, in fact, reflect a sense of evenhanded justice and forgiveness for all tiers of society. In many cases, the poor and weak were forced to accept a compromise. Interestingly, the system was never strongly challenged by the legal community as a whole, perhaps because a compromise could mean less work while being paid the same fee in the case of some lawyers. Referring to the peculiar situation in Swat, could one expect any better from Sufi Mohammad and his son-in-law Fazlullah than to implement the Sharia law in a way that suited their interests? The law of Qisas is also problematic because the conditions for a witness cannot be met by most including Sufi Mohammad, Fazlullah and the rest of their crew. It seems quite likely that those people whose loved ones have been murdered by the militants will be forced to accept a compromise in the name of the Sharia. In fact, the Swati people have little choice in the matter because the state has abdicated the right to administer justice. This is certainly not in line with the instructions of the Quran and Sunnah, which, were these to be implemented in their true spirit, would require a fundamental re-negotiation of the legal regime in Pakistan and all over the Muslim world. Other Muslim countries including Saudi Arabia are not any safer even with the implementation of religious laws by the most powerful. Ultimately, any law has to have the inherent capability to protect the individual and society at large. It is a question of debate whether religious laws in the Muslim world have been able to achieve this. The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst. [email]ayesha.ibd@gmail.com[/email] |
Social transformation
[B][U][CENTER][COLOR="DarkGreen"][SIZE="5"][FONT="Georgia"]Social transformation[/FONT][/SIZE][/COLOR][/CENTER][/U][/B]
[B]By Ayesha Siddiqa Friday, 10 Apr, 2009[/B] IT is no secret that today’s Pakistan is different from what it was before the 1980s. Society’s norms are changing, especially from the perspective of women. Intolerance is slowly increasing towards working women, an issue that must be addressed. This attitude towards women cannot be resolved simply by increasing the number of female parliamentarians. Real empowerment of women can only come about when there is strong legal protection provided to women at the workplace. In addition, it is necessary for the media to monitor the treatment of women. The present government tried to empower women through working on some useful legislation. This year in February the cabinet approved two bills making sexual harassment at the workplace a punishable offence. The first bill mandates every public, private or semi-private organisation to have a code of conduct against sexual harassment at the workplace and to constitute a three-member committee to handle individual complaints. It establishes the authority of the said committee and related major and minor penalties. The second bill is an amendment to the Pakistan Penal Code through Section 509A which defines sexual harassment and makes it a punishable offence. Although the bill awaits parliamentary approval, women in the country are hopeful regarding an improvement in their status. However, there is a gap between the government’s promises and actions. This is clear from a case at the Pakistan Audit Department where a senior officer was accused of sexually harassing a female colleague under his supervision. The department’s preliminary inquiry established the charges against the officer and recommended disciplinary action against him. Later, when the department sought permission from the competent authority, which in this case was the prime minister, to proceed against the said officer, the accused requested an inquiry officer other than one from the PAD. Interestingly, this inquiry officer exonerated the accused on the basis that the complainant had not submitted a written complaint. No credence was given to the fact that the accused could not produce any witness in his favour during the proceedings while over a dozen witnesses had appeared on behalf of the prosecution. Furthermore, the extra-departmental inquiry is in contravention of the draft bill which only provides for an independent ombudsperson for the complainant under the aegis of the National Commission for the Safety of Women if she is not getting a sympathetic hearing from her own department. What is worse, the Establishment Division is even considering the accused for promotion to BPS-21. Given this situation, one wonders what will happen to the bill once it comes up for discussion in parliament. With the likes of Maulana Fazlur Rahman and his brother or tribal chiefs sitting in the assembly, there is the danger that they might extract major concessions from the government before the bill is finally passed. After all, parliamentarians such as Israrullah Zehri could always justify changes or their resistance to women’s empowerment on the basis of archaic tribal traditions or societal attitudes. But then the attitude of society is something that evolves or is constructed by many factors such as the approach of policymakers, opinion-makers and others. Human agency is critical in constructing social attitudes and norms. Should we forget that a few decades ago, especially during the 1960s and the 1970s, we had a different social attitude with greater liberalism than what we see today? Liberal society then was the result of attitudes of the critical human agency. Watching some television dramas these days will explain the changes that key sectors such as the media are bringing to society. For instance, there are plays in which we are shown love affairs between the maidservant and the master of the house. The underlying message is that the lady of the house, who is probably educated and a working woman, is not good enough when compared to the less educated or illiterate maid. Such an exercise in perception-formation feeds into attitudes at the workplace. At the risk of generalising matters it could be said that the man or boss could begin to perceive educated women at the workplace as those who are not attending to their homes and can, hence, be mistreated. Such representation of women in the media is also an indicator of the larger danger of a kind of radicalisation in society that has gradually begun to threaten life in the country, especially in urban centres. Given such representation, is it strange that families of working women should be threatened in Karachi, Islamabad and Lahore? The other day I was talking to a friend who was in a dilemma over not being able to send her four-year-old daughter to school as it had received threats from militants in Lahore. Taliban-type forces in all major cities threaten schools to stop educating girls else they will be bombarded. Should civil society not do anything about it? The answer is no. Given the threat of radicalisation, civil society must congregate to protest and show its resolve to fight radical elements in society. Those claiming to be the soldiers of God should not get the right to determine the future of state and society for their own power interests. Such an exercise must go hand in hand with a movement for bringing greater justice and fairness to state institutions. It goes without saying that change will only come about when the media adopts a more constructive attitude vis-à-vis social issues. Women constitute half this country’s population. They deserve a better work environment and treatment. Portraying those who are capable as useless creatures is nothing but a travesty of justice. Without capable women, who are protected by the legal system, state and society will not be able to grow. [B]The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst.[/B] [email]ayesha.ibd@gmail.com[/email] |
[B][U][CENTER][COLOR="DarkGreen"][SIZE="5"][FONT="Georgia"]Beyond the ‘original sin’[/FONT][/SIZE][/COLOR][/CENTER][/U][/B]
[B]By Ayesha Siddiqa Friday, 17 Apr, 2009[/B] THE Nizam-i-Adl Regulation 2009 has been promulgated by the NWFP government after being approved by the president at the recommendation of the National Assembly – all in the name of national security. Many will consider this a forceful response to the Obama administration which seems to have its own plans to fight the war on terror and influence Islamabad’s behaviour. This raises the fundamental question of whether our policymakers actually realise what path they are treading. Or as Cyril Almeida stated in his excellent article on these pages last Friday, that Pakistan is a dangerous place because it doesn’t know what to do about militancy. Why is it important to give the US a bloody nose? Because, according to some Pakistani commentators, America is solely responsible for the bloodshed in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Had it not been for 9/11, violence of the scale in Pakistan today might not have occurred. Driven by their Pakhtun nationalism, many individuals quickly formed militant gangs to fight the invading force. As demonstrated in Afghanistan and other parts of the world, foreign invaders contribute to the acceleration of chaos in a major way. Had Washington listened to Mullah Omar and allowed him to gently deal with Osama bin Laden, there wouldn’t have been this war on terror. In fact, America’s ‘original sin’ goes back to the 1980s when driven by its passion to give the Soviets a bloody nose in Afghanistan, the CIA partnered the ISI to create jihad and jihadis. It was the most cost-effective way of fighting the war. One cannot forget the historical photograph of American President Ronald Reagan sitting with numerous Afghan warlords in the Oval Office. But then towards the end of the 1980s both the Soviets and Americans disappeared from the scene which was then taken over by our own armed forces. From then onwards, the jihad project was kept alive for other objectives including the fulfillment of the famous plan of ‘strategic defiance’ of the US envisioned by local military minds such as Generals Mirza Aslam Beg and Hameed Gul. The idea was to build an additional infantry force that would provide Pakistan ‘strategic depth’ in terms of Afghan manpower in case the country was ever attacked. A part of this force would be deployed at other fronts as well. At times, these jihadis were even fed through the slaughter of Pakistan’s Shia community whose members are being targeted since the 1980s. The plan worked fine until 9/11 after which the US attack on Afghanistan opened a Pandora’s Box. The ideologically motivated elements that otherwise might have taken a bit longer to usurp Pakistani society’s breathing space, came to the surface. This was a plan gone awry because of uncontrolled exogenous factors. Until the American attack the militant forces had been slowly poisoning society in Pakistan. For instance, the killing of Shias taking place since the 1980s was not due to Pakhtun nationalism but the ideology of Ibn Taimiyah. And these forces were further strengthened once the Taliban were assisted in controlling Afghanistan, a regime that was recognised only by three states – Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Now, a combination of historical factors makes it difficult to turn the clock back. First, the war in Afghanistan continues to intensify. This does not mean that American withdrawal will change things dramatically. In fact, if the US were to leave as it left Vietnam many years ago, violence would increase, especially in the short- to medium-term. Second, a reversal of the social transformation, which is happening rapidly in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, requires major socioeconomic development efforts. This might not happen due to the current global economic conditions. Third, the intelligentsia is divided between the liberal and the conservative. While the latter continue to focus on America’s wrongdoings without taking into account the evolution of our own society and its responsibility in this the former bury their faces in the sand and imagine that all of this will blow over. There is hardly any willingness to question and challenge the intellectual space which the extremists have taken over. The liberals are not willing to question the religious arguments presented by the other side. In today’s Pakistan, the common man listens to the religious right and the militants because there is no one out there willing to challenge the interpretation presented by the religious and political right. Since we do not investigate issues pertaining to religion, there is no point looking at that route. I am assuming this is what Cyril Almeida also meant when he talked about our inability to think of what is happening to us. If things continue this way, it won’t be too far when our liberal elite will have to escape to the rest of the world, just like the Afghan elite did during the 1990s. Finally, we have a state that does not have any clue about where it wants to be in this century. People have classifications for weak states such as banana republic, a term many despise. Probably, the right term for Pakistan is the ‘jalebi republic’, circles within circles and no clarity about the future. We have a political elite which never learns from its past mistakes and is happy being protected by an outside force instead of building institutions at home; a security establishment which like an angry young man can go to any lengths to respond to a challenge to its ego; an establishment that would like to challenge the US without proper planning as to what it would do once external sources of funding, which it heavily depends on, dry up. This is not to argue that Pakistan cannot survive without foreign aid. The poor are far more resilient than the ruling elite who, in any case, do not allow foreign aid to effectively find its way to the grass roots. So, one wonders what will this elite do once the foreign money disappears? Last but not least, one must also mention a liberal political party that enters into deals with the Taliban. Given these conditions, the liberal elite might be better off packing their bags. The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst. [email]ayesha.ibd@gmail.com[/email] |
[B][U][CENTER][COLOR="DarkGreen"][SIZE="5"][FONT="Georgia"]Fighting the hordes[/FONT][/SIZE][/COLOR][/CENTER][/U][/B]
[B]By Ayesha Siddiqa Friday, 24 Apr, 2009[/B] THE outcry these days is that the Taliban are now firmly in our midst. While some believe they will eventually be defeated, others are of the view that the tide of Talibanisation will wipe out everything else. There are two important questions here: one, are the Taliban a temporary phenomenon and, two, does society have the capacity to fight them off? The Taliban’s growing influence is no secret. The Taliban and their partners ensconced throughout the country have the capacity to weaken the state’s authority in critical parts of Pakistani territory. We are already confronted with a situation where the Taliban have established control over areas where they wield influence. This expansion has taken place over several years in small increments. And all along many of us thought that this was a one-off problem that would eventually be resolved. In the mid-1990s we had the Taliban state in Afghanistan, then the Sufi Mohammad episode which we tried to resolve by putting him in jail. In later years, it was the Red Mosque stand-off followed by the TNSM’s resurgence in Swat along with a growing Taliban presence in other parts of the Frontier province. Now these staggered events seem to be connecting in the form of new gains for the Taliban and their numerous partners. There are many good-hearted people who still believe that the Taliban can be defeated. Such assertions continue to be made even though our security forces have failed to gain the upper hand in Swat and other places. Call it a breach of intelligence or lack of capacity to fight an insurgency, the fact is that the state does not command the power to reclaim its territory. Unfortunately, it seems that the Taliban might win due to the combined capacity shortcomings of the security apparatus, the government and society at large. It is clear that the political government is desperately short on the will to fight. The political actors are mired so deep in point-scoring that the primary objective has been lost. Our policymakers cannot deliberate on issues that will make or mar the Taliban’s forward march. For instance, no strategic evaluation has been undertaken of the Taliban threat and its tactical dimensions. And this applies not just to the present government but also its predecessors. The Malakand agreement and the freeing of Maulana Abdul Aziz clearly indicate this lack of capacity. Maulana Abdul Aziz was freed on bail even though he, according to his own claim, endangered the lives of hundreds of seminary students during the military’s Red Mosque operation. The maulana’s case, in fact, dates back to 2003-04 when he was charged with sedition for issuing a fatwa considered derogatory to the armed forces and was subsequently removed from his position. He was rescued by none other than a federal minister, Ejazul Haq. The minister took upon himself the responsibility of mending fences between the maulana and the government. So it is not surprising that a strong case was not brought against him in court to keep him behind bars longer. For those dismayed by the court’s recent decision, it would be worth noting that the judiciary has few options when the prosecution is unwilling to build a strong case. This is not to say that the judiciary and the legal community stand absolved of responsibility. We have a judiciary that is famed for taking suo motu action. Shouldn’t then there be a judicial inquiry into the sort of environment created by the maulana for his students? Even the students’ interaction with their family members was reportedly controlled and supervised. Or what about challenging the Malakand agreement itself which is a travesty of the 1973 Constitution? The judiciary must show more resolve than it did after the introduction of Zia’s draconian Nizam-e-Islam regulations. Then, barring a few judges such as Justice Ramday, the majority happily applied laws that trampled on all norms of justice and human rights. And let’s not forget that the legal community in general did not really resist Zia’s laws. None of the bar councils protested against laws that ultimately resulted in an increase in homicide and injustice. As the country confronts an expansion of the Taliban, the legal community seems unable to muster the courage to launch a movement against what has happened in Swat. It is surprising that some lawyers place a higher value on the restoration of judges than on questioning the Malakand agreement which poses a greater threat to the state. The maulana’s release sends a clear signal to men of his ilk fighting the state in Swat, Waziristan, Punjab and other places. This needs to be countered. We are in this fight together and the state envisioned by Jinnah — in which people of different castes, creeds, ethnicities and religious beliefs were to coexist — can survive only if we close ranks. Putting the blame on others and not doing our bit is not going to serve the cause. The head of state has to go beyond expecting other countries to fight his battles or capsizing to unknown pressures while signing controversial ‘peace’ deals with militants who refuse to lay down arms. The Malakand agreement is the legal instrument that will result in the empowerment of the Taliban. These militants will not stop at Swat or even at Buner. They will not only expand their presence in the Frontier but will also move into other parts of the country. The tragedy of the present moment is that while the strength of political and human rights movements is fledgling at best, the Taliban and their ‘jihadi’ partners have increased their capacity to proliferate throughout Pakistan. This is a time when everyone needs to stand up and not seek shelter in political expediency. As such, Mian Nawaz Sharif cannot hide behind his political deal with the PPP and support the Malakand agreement while at the same time talk about the threat posed by Talibanisation. We can fight this only if we muster the required will, develop a clear understanding of what lies ahead and then evolve a coherent implementation strategy. The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst. [email]ayesha.ibd@gmail.com[/email] |
[B][U][CENTER][COLOR="DarkGreen"][SIZE="5"][FONT="Georgia"]Deadly social change [/FONT][/SIZE][/COLOR][/CENTER][/U][/B]
[B][U][CENTER]For many, the area from Mianwali to D.G. Khan and Bahawalpur should be the least likely area for Talibanisation. A closer look shows that it is not.[/CENTER][/U][/B] [B]By Ayesha Siddiqa Friday, 01 May, 2009[/B] A LOOK at today’s Pakistan does not inspire confidence in the state. In addition to the Talibanisation threat in some parts of the country, there is chaos in other areas like Balochistan where people are dissatisfied with what the state has to offer. Then, there are those areas where there is no conflict but that have begun to look at other options because the state has little to offer. In fact, in places like Gilgit sections of the people are beginning to look north, towards China in fact, which now appears a more attractive proposition. The state and the establishment have little to offer by way of explanation except that this is a conspiracy to destroy the state. This is not to imply that the Pakistani state does not have enemies. However, this kind of a mindset is not likely to discover solutions to the numerous problems the state faces. The establishment, the government and its functionaries are not prepared to accept that years of an unstable sociopolitical system are unlikely to have better results than the ones we see in the form of Talibanisation and political radicalisation. Owing to space constraints I will concentrate on the threat of Talibanisation which seems to be growing beyond the Frontier province and is pres ent in south Punjab as well. It would not be surprising to see Swat’s domino effect on other parts of the country in the grip of similar sociopolitical circumstances. The influence and victory of the TNSM in Swat was due to a combination of factors such as the long absence of social transformation in the region, stagnation of the political power system, which the TNSM now claims to have changed, and the inability of political representatives to honour the mandate given to them by the public in last year’s polls. It is tragic that those who were not voted into power by the ordinary Swati are ruling Swat today. The ANP has surrendered its powers. This model could come to be replicated in other parts such as south Punjab. For many, this area, ranging from Mianwali to D.G. Khan and Bahawalpur, should be the least likely area for Talibanisation. A closer look shows that it is not. First, it has remained a favourite breeding ground for numerous militant outfits especially those linked with the Kashmir struggle. There was not much effort to mop up this area besides superficial measures such as banning some outfits that nevertheless resurfaced under other names. Second, this part of Punjab is prominent in terms of large landownership and a feudal lifestyle. This is also an area where feudal institutions in terms of economic power merged with political and spiritual power. So, many prominent political families are not just significant due to their wealth and political power but because they are connected to the shrines as well. The gradual institutionalising of the power of the shrine has strengthened them rather than giving some breathing space to ordinary people some of whom are moving in the direction of rabid religious ideologies. So, it is lack of understanding of this background that leads people to show surprise that south Punjab, which was considered a hub of Barelvi Islam, is moving towards Deobandi and Wahabi ideologies. A closer look, in fact, shows that a lot of Barelvis have shifted towards other ideologies and are part of the jihad industry without abandoning their original ideology. The gap between the Barelvis and Deobandis has narrowed most peculiarly in south Punjab. Is it because of the hundreds of madressahs that mushroomed in this belt especially in the 1980s? The answer is yes and no. Yes because the new madressahs, which were different from the traditional ones in the area, introduced a more dramatic curriculum that nurtured in the students an appreciation of sectarian and ideological differences. Hence, the sectarian violence in the region, which predates the current shift, dates back to the 1980s and 1990s. The radicalisation, including sectarian violence, represents an urge for social transformation because some prominent landowners in this area are Shia as opposed to the underdogs most of whom are Sunnis. The growing radicalisation in southern Punjab shown up in the inability of the state to carry out land reforms and shift the socioeconomic and political power structure from a pre-capitalist society to a capitalist one will have its consequences in the years to come. So while the proliferation of madressahs is part of the problem it does not explain the social development in its entirety. Not to mention that southern Punjab as a sub-region has suffered due to the gradual, reverse migration of the elite to other parts of the country creating a power vacuum that is ready to be filled by another lot. The movement of the youth towards jihad, hence, is a warped form of social transformation in which the dispossessed youngsters have suddenly found a source of empowerment. The promise of a better life in the hereafter in which they will get hoors, a crown of jewels and have 70 individuals forgiven is something that they cannot expect in this life. Not to mention the monetary compensation their families get from militant outfits for their sacrifice. What is dangerous is that none of this is being voiced as part of social transformation. When a change takes place the bulk of the people will remain sacrificial lambs while others will replace the existing power elite as in Swat. Sadly, no one wants to talk about Punjab because the current leadership is too engrossed in its political pragmatism to touch militant outfits. The bulk of the PML-N leadership does not have the vision to mop up the province while there is time to do so. If it were not for the political narrow-mindedness of the political elite, a clean-up in Punjab would require a well-planned police operation to be followed by the arduous task of social reconstruction. ¦ The [B][I]writer is an independent strategic and political analyst. [email]ayesha.ibd@gmail.com[/email][/I][/B] |
[B][U][CENTER][COLOR="DarkGreen"][SIZE="5"][FONT="Georgia"]Lost in classification[/FONT][/SIZE][/COLOR][/CENTER][/U][/B]
[B]By Ayesha Siddiqa Friday, 08 May, 2009[/B] THE other day a friend discussed the idea of organising a conference where social scientists would analyse the current situation in Pakistan. Her idea was to have views presented from perspectives representing the left, centre and right. The conversation made me think if such classifications worked in this country any more. I was also reminded of an article written by a friend a few months ago arguing that a lot of liberals had joined the restoration-of-the-judiciary bandwagon along with a majority of right-wingers. The fact is that in today’s Pakistan all such older and simpler classifications are defunct. The more we look into these categories, the harder it is to make sense of where things stand. Gone are the days when it was possible to distinguish leftists from rightists or liberals from the conservatives. In any case, it is not possible any more to come up with a single category that can describe people’s views. As such, those supporting the judiciary movement do not necessarily become rightist or leftist nor do they become liberal or conservative. Individuals, groups and parties are known to vary their positions in accordance with the issues they deal with. Should the classification be based on how sympathetic is it to the public perspective as opposed to the establishment’s point of view? The problem then is that the public view is not something that is naturally organic but is formed by policymakers and opinion-makers. For instance, the support that is rendered to Sufi Mohammad or the Taliban in some segments of society would not make the relevant policy liberal or leftist. But then should the classification be based on whether the particular position is secular or religious? This classification is equally defunct because how would one explain the association of parties like the ANP and the PPP with the Taliban? Is it not association when these parties support policies that will only strengthen the Taliban and not the secular forces? The unfortunate politics of pragmatism has made things highly complex and fuzzy. It is sad that people are being forced to pick sides based on their insecurity rather than principles. For instance, today many think of the MQM as a liberal party which will protect secular values while forgetting that the party has been accused of brutalising ordinary people or its rivals. A lot of people who once condemned the party are suddenly now convinced that Altaf Hussain might be the only source of salvation for the country. Many might consider this commentary as a tirade against ‘liberalism’, in much the same way they objected to any criticism of the PPP or the ANP’s deals with the Taliban. However, my point is that such terms lose their meaning in a state where the government systematically surrenders its capacity to establish its writ and in fact outsources the process of safeguarding the interests of the people. Equally condemnable is the state’s inability to provide opportunities to the migrant population, the Baloch and other nationalities and give them a sense of security in the country. When the majority of people are lost in classification, principles tend to lose all meaning. Parties and groups are striking deals on the basis of their interest to remain in power rather than anything else. Such politics is bound to deepen the chasm in the country. The most glaring example of this is the peculiar nationalist politics that is unfolding in most parts of the country. One of the most critical developments pertains to the boxing out of Pakhtuns from urban Sindh and Punjab. Although this is not a big movement at the moment, the threat of bloodshed in Karachi aimed at pushing the Pakhtun out is a possibility. Unfortunately, no government or political party has thought about a formula for allocating political space to different communities, which may be the only way that ethnic politics, mired in conflict and violence, may be curtailed. Similarly, we are observing greater coordination between groups from opposite ideological polls in the Frontier to protect their nationalism. It shouldn’t surprise anyone to see the ANP getting together with the mullahs and other conservative elements in support of Pakhtun nationalism. After all, the ANP’s bid to sign deals with the TNSM and condemn human rights activists that tried to highlight Taliban atrocities in Swat and other places was nothing else but Pakhtun nationalism. The Pakhtuns are not only upset with the treatment meted out to them in other parts of the country, they are also unhappy with the presence of Punjabi militants in the tribal areas and in Afghanistan. Interestingly Punjab also considers itself a victim, which is obvious from the popular perception that there is some conspiracy by the Pakhtuns (funded by India and the US) to damage the largest province. Hence, the urgency to push out Pakhtun workers in the province. This policy of course does not appreciate that Punjab has its own share of militants that are now popularly known as the Punjabi Taliban. Over the years, and due to the present conflict, nationalist tensions seem to have become extremely intense. What’s most amusing is that proponents of each nationalism and ideology consider their point of view to be liberal and people-friendly. Most strive to impress that they are fighting imperialism without admitting that their position adds to the strengthening of colonisation rather than achieving the reverse. [B][I]The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst.[/I][/B] [email]ayesha.ibd@gmail.com[/email] |
[B][U][CENTER][COLOR="DarkGreen"][SIZE="5"][FONT="Georgia"]How can they win friends?[/FONT][/SIZE][/COLOR][/CENTER][/U][/B]
[B]By Ayesha Siddiqa Friday, 15 May, 2009[/B] THE world is worried about increasing Talibanisation in Pakistan. It is concerned that this phenomenon might reach other countries too. Hence expatriate populations are looked upon with suspicion and blamed for all ills in foreign countries. However, it is important to recognise that these states are equally responsible for creating an environment that propels people towards aggression or a certain ideology. A case in point is the British government and relations between Pakistanis and the UK state. There is a growing perception in the UK that Pakistani expatriates are linked with terrorism and there are several cases in which such linkage has been established. More importantly, there is concern regarding the links between these expatriates and their country of origin. A number of young men are exposed to militant organisations and join these outfits during visits to Pakistan. London’s response has been to curb communication and enhance scrutiny measures pertaining to these expatriates and Pakistanis visiting the UK and to concentrate on issues which, in its view, will help resolve Pakistan’s extremism problem. To begin at the end, the British government is keen to help Pakistan with building the capacity of the police and paramilitary so that militants can be fought effectively. This approach is beneficial for the government and consultants who thrive on aid. However, this formula alone might not work when the police are artificially disempowered. London does not seem too keen to ask the recipients of its aid any questions. Similarly, the British government is trying to exercise greater control over the community in the UK that has some links to Pakistan. London is also busy making efforts to control the movement of Pakistanis to the UK. The recent case of the Pakistani students is an example of this policy. So is its peculiar visa policy. The general policy is problematic and will exacerbate the threat that the British are trying to eliminate. For instance, the arrest and holding of innocent Pakistani students without charge is not going to win the British friends. The case of the students and the earlier incident of the shooting of a Brazilian man after the London bombings in 2005 demonstrate the need for the British police to build their capacity. In both cases, the police miscalculated badly. The shooting of the Brazilian proved to be a case of mistaken identity and the students were probably arrested without any evidence. The above argument does not mean that one does not sympathise with Britain’s sense of insecurity. A state and its government must protect the people. However, methods of protection must not be confused with faulty and problematic policies. What is required is a lot more integration of communities in the country rather than looking out for those ‘others’ who can be blamed for whatever has gone wrong. Despite all the hue and cry about justice, fair play and respect for rules and regulations, the fact is that all governments tend to stray when they feel the need to do so. So, whatever high values the British system subscribes to, its policies and the behaviour of its representatives can be held questionable, especially in the current context of the strategy on fighting the war on terror. Surely, London has never thought about the highly questionable position of its diplomatic outposts. These days, embassies and high commissions appear more like an extension of the East India Company. Take the simple case of obtaining visas. In Pakistan, it is not the exorbitant visa fee which is the problem. Rather, it is the unfriendly attitude of the high commission which is bothersome. One would expect that after charging huge sums of money, it would have an effective system of response. But that does not seem to be the case and there have been several instances where passports have been stuck with the high commission in Islamabad for months. Besides, there doesn’t seem to be a workable system where people can get their passports back in case of an emergency that entails travel to another country. Is this approach reserved for ordinary Pakistanis? Where an exorbitant visa fee is involved, there might be consistency and other nationals may also be subjected to it. However, there is much to suggest that stringent treatment is reserved for a few nationalities, Pakistanis being among them. This kind of behaviour can make people reluctant to visit Britain and bar genuine travellers from doing so — a group of people that could otherwise have been sympathetic to Britain’s concerns. Inconvenience and humiliation can hardly win friends. Furthermore, not everyone can lay claim to an ‘above board’ attitude. In Britain’s case, there have been stories of the involvement of prime ministerial families selling weapons to countries perceived as having dubious intentions and of kickbacks given to certain Middle Eastern countries to buy British military technology. It would make a lot of sense for the British government to investigate its own missions as part of its strategy to fight the war on terror. [B][I]The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst.[/I][/B] [email]ayesha.ibd@gmail.com[/email] |
[B][U][CENTER][COLOR="DarkGreen"][SIZE="5"][FONT="Georgia"]Death of a terror group[/FONT][/SIZE][/COLOR][/CENTER][/U][/B]
[B]By Ayesha Siddiqa Friday, 22 May, 2009[/B] A FEW days ago, Sri Lanka announced that the Tamil Tiger leader Velupillai Prabhakaran was dead. This victory might not be a major milestone in the development of the Sri Lankan state and civil society, but it certainly speaks volumes for the coming of age of Colombo’s armed forces. At another level, it reflects the gradual unravelling of Prabhakaran’s Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. Two years ago, had someone told Colombo or the Tamil expatriates, who backed and funded the Tamil cause, that Prabhakaran would be dead, they would have laughed. Since committing their first political murder in the early 1970s of Jaffna’s mayor and forming the group called the Tamil New Tigers (TNT), later the LTTE, the rebels had given the Sri Lankan government a run for its money. His guerilla organisation aimed to fight the authoritarian Sinhalese state that discriminated against the Tamils. (In fact, Sinhalese too were treated badly. In the 1980s, the army butchered about 60,000 Sinhalese youth involved in a leftist protest.) Formed by Velupillai Prabhakaran in 1974, the LTTE developed into a potent force that fought the Sri Lankan state for 35 years. Its notorious suicide squads, personally baptised by the leader, wreaked havoc throughout the country and in India where they killed Rajiv Gandhi. In fact, Tamil rebels carried cyanide capsules round their necks which they were ordered to swallow in case they were caught by state forces. This was also their sign of commitment to the cause. Over the years, the LTTE established control over Sri Lanka’s north and east, operating, in fact, as a de facto government whose reins were held by Prabhakaran. The Tamil rebels had their own ‘navy’ and ‘air force’ as well. From a distance all that was left was for the international community to give some formal status to Prabhakaran’s control of this territory which he had hoped might happen through the involvement of some international players such as the Norwegians in the Sri Lankan crisis. Oslo tried several times to negotiate peace between the warring parties. Prabhakaran clearly had an advantage over his enemies. He managed to become the uncontested leader of the Tamil rebels. In the end, this also proved to be his undoing. Experts believe that the concentration of power in one person and the merger of the political and military wings of the LTTE did not provide sufficient space to the organisation. Eventually, cracks appeared in the top command because Prabhakaran tried to be political leader as well as military commander, resulting in a major rift between Prabhakaran and his commander in the east Colonel Karuna. The rift was later exploited by Colombo to its advantage. Eventually, Colombo managed to squeeze the Tamil leader to the north. However, Colombo’s plans to fight its rival did not take off until it managed to build an internal consensus to defeat the Tigers and to develop its military. Historically, the Sri Lankan military was a ceremonial force. It was not until the beginning of 2000 that decision-makers focused on the need of restructuring the armed forces, introduce central planning and give it the shape of a professional force. In 2006, during a study tour of Colombo I met young gentlemen who were part of the team of experts that had been hired to establish a more professional ministry of defence that could plan for a winnable war. So, the period at the beginning of this century when the LTTE was seemingly gaining ground, also saw the Sri Lankan military building itself to fight the war. Some of the officers that I met during a trip expressed greater resolve to fight the LTTE. The above developments coincided with the regional and global resolve to push back the Tamil Tigers. Since assassinating Rajiv Gandhi, the LTTE had lost the support of the Indian government. Having lost the war in Sri Lanka, New Delhi, in any case, had lost the appetite for a Sri Lankan adventure and had begun to understand the high cost of an independent Tamil state. So, it stepped aside while Colombo procured weapons from all over, including Pakistan, to add to its firepower. Apparently, a couple of shiploads of infantry equipment and other stuff produced at PoFs, Wah, arrived in Sri Lanka every month. Nonetheless, it is important to note that this firepower could not have an impact until the greater professionalisation of the security services. In fact, during the 1990s, Colombo had tried to enhance its military capability through the purchase and use of Kfir fighter bombers from Israel that did not impede the advancing Tamil Tigers. Moreover, aerial bombardment had proved pretty useless. Some grave tactical mistakes were made by the LTTE. One major blunder was its constant flip-flopping between two positions: war and peace. The bid to attract international attention by agreeing to the Norwegian-sponsored peace initiative meant that the rebel group compromised on its war efforts. The last nail in the coffin, as many suggest, was forcing the people to boycott the presidential elections which resulted in Ranil Wickremesinghe losing to Mahinda Rajapaksa the current president, one who was found to be much more rabid in his approach towards the LTTE. Politically, the test for the Sri Lankan state begins now regarding its moral and political capacity to accommodate the Tamil population which must be quite confused and scared at this juncture. The LTTE-controlled area along with the rest of the island requires development to repair the battle-scarred areas. This is tough in a place where social sensibilities have changed dramatically. There is a serious chasm between the Sinhalese and Tamil population that can only disappear with the integration of the Tamils in the Sinhalese-dominated state. As for the region, let’s see if Prabhakaran’s death proves to be a precursor to the physical and ideological elimination of other terrorists in other parts of the region as well. The task shouldn’t be difficult because the militants we are fighting are no match for those of Velupillai Prabhakaran, who will certainly be remembered in Sri Lanka as a legend of terror. [B][I]The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst[/I][/B]. [email]ayesha.ibd@gmail.com[/email] |
[B][U][CENTER][COLOR="DarkGreen"][SIZE="5"][FONT="Georgia"]The lesser evil?[/FONT][/SIZE][/COLOR][/CENTER][/U][/B]
[B]By Ayesha Siddiqa Friday, 29 May, 2009[/B] FACEBOOK is a great invention. It allows you to interact with people, without having to meet them, and have discussions. I accidentally got into a discussion with some on my friends’ list regarding my comment on Gen Musharraf’s current status. There were quite a few who responded to my question about who was paying for the former military dictator’s stay at the expensive Dorchester hotel. There were immediate suggestions regarding the source of money. Some believed that he might have earned his money courtesy his lecture circuit. For instance, the Indian Express paid him millions of rupees for his lecture in Delhi. But then Dorchester is no child’s play. It is truly expensive and we are talking a lot of money. The interesting point about the discussion was not whether my friends and I managed to solve what had begun to look like something out of the Da Vinci Code, but that the debate highlighted our attitudes towards democracy versus dictatorship or civilian versus military rule. Very quickly the entire debate began to focus on the issue of the lesser evil as opposed to the bigger one and on whether or not Musharraf was a greater problem than the current regime. Of course, there were some views that were easier to understand such as those of a serving air force officer who tried to reprimand the rest of us for showing lack of respect towards the leadership. One wondered why he bothered to contribute since the discussion was among civilians, generally considered less nationalist and second-class citizens by the men on horseback. One really wondered if the air force officer himself understood that leadership was not about heading an organisation but about motivating people with a set of clear achievements. However, the rest was more interesting as it reflected the confusion that has gripped the entire nation today regarding the lack of choice as far as the leadership is concerned. The problem has intensified due to the inability of the present regime not managing to capture the imagination of the people, especially the middle class and the educated and affluent upper middle and upper classes. It is indeed sad that Asif Zardari seems to have broken all records where losing the people’s confidence is concerned. Consequently, Pakistanis with a US Ivy League background and those in a better position at home are immediately reminded of the days when Musharraf was in power. It is also rather comical that today when Zardari announces that he has brought home money no one is willing to believe that the funds are meant for IDPs. A popular perception is that corrupt practices will take care of a lot of these resources. There are also more fingers being pointed at the behaviour of the ministers. We are probably once more in the same cycle that is the fate of praetorian societies. Short-term planning driven by greed, rather than a long-term vision is the hallmark of such societies. Such behaviour is not specific to Pakistan and can be found in a number of Latin American countries where there is a general inclination towards the military whenever things go wrong, but not to the point of wanting the military to continue permanently. At this point, there are two issues one would like to raise. First, how real is the corruption of politicians in Pakistan? Surely, we would all like to believe that the present set-up is just as corrupt as that headed by its predecessors. It is a fact that the government suffers from genuine inefficiencies and an inept top leadership. However, do we really have a lot of evidence to produce in a court of law regarding alleged corruption? Why is it that successive civilian and military governments were unable to catch ‘thieves’ despite keeping these leaders in prison, throwing others out of the country and having access to all official records? This is not to argue that politicians are clean, but then are they any worse than the generals who take over with the excuse of cleaning up the political and economic system and who manage to do nothing except create greater chaos? Why is it that military regimes never manage to catch the corrupt or is it that there is far more propaganda than what is actually stolen from the coffers? For instance, while the grapevine is rife with stories about illegal money being made by this government, there is very little on how some of the most influential members of the previous government earned their billions. Second, why should a bad and inefficient civilian leadership make former military dictators or future ones any better? Sadly, the middle and upper classes in Pakistan, as in other parts of South Asia, are constantly tempted by Singapore’s political model. Things have to be modern and tidy even if it means no democracy which is not a lame concept dictated by Washington but a system that is marked by good governance and the rule of law. Moreover, why should we imagine that the inept civilian leadership is not a product of its military predecessors? Like many Latin American states, the ineptitude of the civilian leadership distracts people from understanding that corrupt and incapable leadership elements in the military and civilian are interlinked. The greedy senior military generals, businessmen, industrialists, large land owners and influential mullahs are interconnected. These days there are deep familial connections as well. Hence, it is not surprising that the military does not manage to catch any of the corrupt politicians despite its claims of possessing the ‘capability to meet any challenge’. So, while there is no forgiveness for what this government is unable to achieve, it is unfair to get into the lesser evil-versus-bigger evil debate (this reminds one of the classification made by the US of the good Taliban versus the bad Taliban). Evil multiplies and this is what we have seen happening throughout the six decades of our history. [B][I]The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst.[/I][/B] [email]ayesha.ibd@gmail.com[/email] |
[B][U][CENTER][COLOR="DarkGreen"][SIZE="5"][FONT="Georgia"]Indian stakes in Pakistan[/FONT][/SIZE][/COLOR][/CENTER][/U][/B]
[B]By Ayesha Siddiqa Friday, 05 Jun, 2009[/B] ISLAMABAD’S idea to allow transit trade facilities to Afghanistan and India has caused the media to react strongly with many believing that this would prove inimical to Pakistan’s security interests and clear the way for undesirable characters to enter the country for the purpose of spreading violence. Besides, there is apprehension that the terms of trade will not be to Pakistan’s advantage. Still others tie the trade issue – in the same way as the composite dialogue between India and Pakistan – to a solution of the Kashmir standoff. Beginning with the tactical issue of concern for security, the reasoning in Islamabad is as valid and lame as it is in India. Surely, terrorism is one of the primary problems on both sides of the border which makes the concern valid. Security was one of the reasons why the Indian external affairs bureaucracy clamped down on issuing visas to Pakistanis arguing that greater traffic was breeding terrorism. However, restricting visas or trade is a bureaucratic measure that does not take into account the fact that greater legal interaction will develop greater understanding and, perhaps, sympathy for each other’s position. In any case, the bulk of the terrorists don’t seek permission to enter. Also, terrorists do not necessarily have to accompany goods in transit between New Delhi and Kabul because there is already enough smuggling taking place between India and Pakistan for terrorists to make use of. Better monitoring could ensure that trade does not assist the terrorists. As far as terms favourable to Pakistan are concerned, this is not really an issue of transit trade but about the capacity of the government to evaluate what’s good or bad for it. One really wonders what the issue is because technically speaking Islamabad has already made an offer of transit trade to India – the gas pipeline between Iran and India via Pakistan for which Islamabad hoped to receive attractive compensation. The trade between Afghanistan and India would mean compensation for Pakistan for allowing the use of its territory. Also, what is being discussed at the moment is transit facilities for Afghan goods. But then what does one do about the Kashmir issue? More than 60 years of experience tell us that we were not able to solve it militarily and using the issue to withhold solutions for other matters is not likely to work either. At the moment, India has no stakes in solving the issue to Pakistan’s advantage especially when it is investing in its own political system to come up with a solution for the Indian state and the Kashmiri population. For instance, while some groups challenged the national elections and the turnout was low, there were others that did go and vote. The Indian state could always argue that there was a low turnout in other parts of the country as well. Eventually, participation in elections could lead to a dialogue between the centre and the territory under India’s control. Part of the reason why India refuses to be sympathetic to Pakistan’s position is that it has no major stakes here. Transit trade and bilateral trade is one of the formulas for starting a more constructive relationship between the two countries. Allowing Indian investment to come into Pakistan for Pakistan’s benefit was reportedly recognised in a State Bank report which never saw the light of day. It was argued that opening up commercial links could help Pakistan capture some of the NRI investment coming into India. Trade and transit trade as part of larger economic relations is a major way to change attitudes and perspectives. This is not to suggest that economic relations would automatically translate into a solution for Kashmir and here we can take the example of the US and China, that despite having huge stakes in an economic relationship, continue to confront each other on the issue of Taiwan. But Beijing has not tried to use its current financial investment in the US to the latter’s disadvantage. At present, Washington’s huge deficit financing is funded by the Chinese. Any diversion of funds at this stage would further cripple the US economy which Beijing is not doing because it also has stakes in the American economy. The softening of political positions, of course, takes time. Pakistan and India need to learn from this example. There are many who disagree on the basis that any economic link will be to India’s advantage and not to Pakistan’s. This perception is a fallacy but will continue to be held as long as Islamabad does not reflect on its own strengths. For instance, Pakistan’s agriculture sector is fairly competitive and has much to offer if we build on its advantages. Unfortunately, there is greater worry in the policymaking circles regarding industry, especially the automobile industry currently being subsidised by the state. While it is one of the sectors that might get affected due to trade with India, we could think about building our industrial base through negotiating offsets with our neighbour. This is an industrial process that pertains to a systematic but real transfer of technology and not what we have been used to thus far. Using offsets to build our industrial base is something we must consider with other partners as well, particularly in the defence sector. One of the other advantages of encouraging regional trade relations is that it will enhance Pakistan’s financial capacity and the overall productivity of the economy. The country badly needs to transform itself from an aid-dependent economy to a more productive and self-sustaining one. The reason that we fail to go beyond the $12bn mark in our foreign exchange reserves is due to the limited productive capacity of the economy. Boosting trade and transit trade in the region will give Pakistan access to its own resources, which, in turn, will reduce its dependence on other states. Trade does build its own dependence but not at the cost of independent foreign policy and larger policymaking, a problem that occurs in an aid-based economy. Interdependency build through trade, on the other hand, could help bilaterally resolve contentious issues in the future. [B][I]The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst.[/I][/B] [email]ayesha.ibd@gmail.com[/email] |
[B][U][CENTER][COLOR="DarkGreen"][SIZE="5"][FONT="Georgia"]South Punjab ‘movement’[/FONT][/SIZE][/COLOR][/CENTER][/U][/B]
[B]By Ayesha Siddiqa Friday, 12 Jun, 2009[/B] MOHAMMAD Ali Durrani, the former information minister, recently went public with his plan to struggle for an independent Bahawalpur province. One can simply dismiss his views as an extension of the old Seraiki movement which people have heard about for very long. This time round, however, the idea has been floated by a man reputed for his deep connections with the establishment. The timing of the proposed movement also raises questions about what may happen in that part of the country. The former minister’s reasons for starting the movement are quite logical. He is of the view that when Bahawalpur was merged into the One-Unit in 1955, the State of Pakistan had stipulated that the princely state would revert to its original status if the One-Unit were dissolved. Durrani believes that not only did the State of Pakistan go back on its promise, it failed to invest in the socioeconomic development of Bahawalpur. Resultantly, there is a lot of poverty and underdevelopment in the region. What he did not mention was that land in Cholistan, Bahawalpur’s desert area, is routinely distributed to people from outside the area, especially military and civil bureaucrats. Also, since Bahawalpur does not fall into the Punjab (rural) civil services or military quota, there are fewer people from the region in the state bureaucracy. Durrani’s feeling for the area may not be doubted because he belongs to Ahmedpur, a city in district Bahawalpur. However, one would certainly like to ask the minister if he felt this way while he was part of the previous government and in a position to do things for the region. Did he ever ensure that his party, the PML-Q, make plans for the area? After all, Q-League stalwarts such as Ejazul Haq and Chaudhry Pervaiz Elahi contest elections from Bahawalpur division. Or did he ever present a vision for the government to go beyond the construction of an airport, a medical college and a university? Most of the public buildings in Bahawalpur — the central library, its only hospital and others — are a gift of the old nawab. There is a possibility that Durrani might have tired of waiting for Pervez Musharraf to return to politics and assign some task or important office to his former information minister. Let’s not forget that there are many prominent people from the former State of Bahawalpur who, like Durrani, belong to the local elite and have participated in politics at the provincial and local levels. Makhdoom Shahabuddin, Makhdoom Altaf, Makhdoom Khusro Bakhtiar, Makhdoom Ahmed Alam Anwar, Makhdoom Hassan Mehmood and his sons, Tasneem Nawaz Gardezi and Riaz Pirzada are some of the luminaries of Bahawalpur who have held positions in successive governments. So it is quite pathetic to argue that these people could not convince the establishment of which they were a part to invest in social development in their region. Not only have these Makhdooms ignored the development of their areas, some are also known for keeping up the archaic tradition of not marrying off their sisters and daughters to keep the family wealth at home. The family of the Makhdooms of Rahimyar Khan is known for this. The airports built at two sites, namely Bahawalpur and Rahimyar Khan, are gifts from the sheikhs of Dubai and Abu Dhabi. In return, Pakistani governments award huge concessions like turning state land into private hunting grounds for these foreign dignitaries. Yet another possibility is that a movement for an independent province is meant to mask all other socio-political activities in the region so that these might go unnoticed by the rest of the country and the world at large. This refers to the various militant organisations that continue to operate in Bahawalpur division. Although the provincial and central governments are trying their best to constrain these militant outfits, there is no clear plan of action for cleaning up the area. A total elimination of these organisations becomes difficult due to the lack of clarity or a strategy regarding militancy. Either the central or the provincial government has come up with the brilliant idea of supporting the Barelvi movement, including its armed wing, which means that the area could suffer the way Karachi has through the conflict between the MQM and MQM-Haqiqi. And now there is this mention of a political movement that has no real support at the local level but carries the potential of creating mayhem in the medium to long term. The resulting confusion ought to leave all observers fogged. It is true that the average Bahawalpuri talks nostalgically about the glory days of the princely state, but the fact of the matter is that the majority are no longer stuck in the past. Consequently, the family of the former nawab of Bahawalpur, which ordinary people still respect, can no longer hope to get all the votes in elections. There are new power networks and groups that have diluted the memory of the state. For instance, the development work done by District Nazim Tariq Bashir Cheema has strengthened his control rather than that of the traditional power centres. He focused on tehsil Yazman, his personal area of interest, to procure political support for the future. Similarly, there are many other new faces that win support on the basis of services provided to constituents. A political movement for an independent status could only be built if funded from unexplained sources. If such a movement did manage to take off, it would create such chaos that the other divisive elements which have been systematically planted in the area would be forgotten. The strategy might prove beneficial if the intention is to hide those elements and forces that have a greater impact on peace and stability in the region. Genuine empowerment of the area will only come through greater development work and a fair distribution of resources. In any case, such a movement will only multiply existing problems rather than solve issues to the benefit of the people. Thus if Mr Durrani really wants to do something for his place of birth, he would be better off talking about improving governance, ensuring the rule of law and eliminating the terror outfits that could destroy the rich culture of Bahawalpur. Perhaps he could start with his own accountability and a sincere assessment of the area he calls home. [B][I]The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst.[/I][/B] [email]ayesha.ibd@gmail.com[/email] |
[B][U][CENTER][COLOR="DarkGreen"][SIZE="5"][FONT="Georgia"]What about the police?[/FONT][/SIZE][/COLOR][/CENTER][/U][/B]
[B]By Ayesha Siddiqa Friday, 19 Jun, 2009[/B] President Asif Zardari announced his decision to allow a cantonment in Swat with more allowances for military personnel, especially those fighting in the difficult terrain. This is indeed an expression of his appreciation for the military’s ongoing efforts in the fight against the Taliban in Swat and Fata, and his concern for national security. Surely, the nation must take note of the sacrifice of its soldiers, officers and civilians who died to save the state and society from the Taliban. While the president is involved in appreciating the services of different people and institutions, one would like to draw his attention towards another force. This refers to the police which have been at the forefront of the war on terror for a long time, in fact, much before the army. One hopes that Mr Zardari will also announce some form of compensation and facilities for the law-enforcement agencies rather than just for the military. This recommendation does not emanate from a sense of competition with the army, as some generals might imagine, but recognition of the fact that one may not actually be forced to use the army on internal fronts if the necessary investment is made in security. It is a matter of getting one’s priorities right and understanding that the police (including Pakistan’s) have the best intelligence network and the necessary information to act against internal enemies and extremist forces. Since the police operate in all neighbourhoods, its officers are aware of all the good or bad guys in the area. Furthermore, the police may use forceful methods but symbolically they are a less coercive tool than the military. Hence, deploying the police should be the first option. This naturally leads to the larger question of how one can depend on a force that is deemed corrupt and inefficient. One is reminded of a joke about three police officers — American, British and Pakistani — comparing notes. The American boasts of being able to catch a thief within 72 hours of the crime. The British competes with a claim of 24 hours. Not to be left behind, the Pakistani policeman claims to be smarter than the other two: ‘We know of the crime even before it takes place,’ he says. Jokes apart, one cannot expect a great performance from a poorly paid, and badly trained and equipped force that fails to achieve results or impress its clients. The money invested in the police as compared to the military is much less and thus there are fewer impressive results. The police in this country lack investment in resources that could help motivate security personnel into performing better. In cases where the force has been provided with resources and leadership and backed by those at the top, the results have been nothing short of amazing. The Islamabad Traffic Police (ITP) are an example of how things can be changed with the right combination of resources, leadership and commitment. A visit to the SSP traffic’s office is mind-boggling. Not only are the officers manning the premises polite, a visitor does not require a reference to enter the office of the SSP who tries to solve the visitor’s problems as quickly as possible. SSP Sultan Azam Taimuri and SP Ashfaq Ahmed Khan seem to have made their office responsive to the needs of the people. Besides investing in better training and equipment, an improvement in services was made possible due to the commitment of the top political leadership. We may fault former prime minister Shaukat Aziz for a lot of things, but it is necessary to appreciate some of his achievements, one being the ITP. Reportedly, the Islamabad police were not stopped from impounding VIP vehicles if the drivers of the latter were caught violating the rules. Obviously, the top political leadership set the priorities right as far as the performance of the ITP was concerned and showed a commitment to combat the notorious VIP culture in the capital. Visiting the ITP office one realises that the lives of ordinary Pakistanis can be made easier once the system in place is set right. And we have the capacity to do so. In any case, policymaking is about setting priorities right and then showing a commitment towards fulfilling the goals. Governments often fall into the trap of making policies that may have a symbolic value but comparatively few dividends. The proposed investment in the Swat cantonment is one such issue. Why build another cantonment which would require more funds for its protection? A possible answer could be that a cantonment would guarantee that the Taliban would not ever enter the area again. This is based on the assumption that the inflow of Taliban forces is driven from outside, by enemies of the Pakistani state. There are two possible scenarios. First, the war continues for many years in which a cantonment will prove to be a sitting duck, highly fortified and with no confidence even among the soldiers who would only be able to use heavy artillery without stepping out. A second scenario, on the other hand, is that most extremist forces are eliminated and people manage to return to their homes. In such conditions what would be of greater benefit is to invest in the socio-economic and human resource development of the area. A better administrative, judicial and law-implementation mechanism might be expensive but would bring greater benefits. A happy, satisfied and secure set of people would not require the military security that Islamabad plans to invest in. In any case, such expansion would be tantamount to bringing an infrastructure in the area that would dominate everything else. Many would justify it on the basis of development that a cantonment might bring. However, investing in direct development is likely to prove more beneficial than such indirect development. The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst. [email]ayesha.ibd@gmail.com[/email] |
[B][U][CENTER][COLOR="DarkGreen"][SIZE="5"][FONT="Georgia"]What are we up against?[/FONT][/SIZE][/COLOR][/CENTER][/U][/B]
[B]By Ayesha Siddiqa Friday, 26 Jun, 2009[/B] A COUPLE of weeks ago I had a chance to discuss the domestic situation on a local television channel in the company of a renowned intellectual. As in most talk shows, we participants were going around in circles trying to prove our respective points. However, what I gathered from the debate was the need to define what we are up against. Is it an insurgency that we face or terrorism? Clarity on the issue is necessary. The difference between how the state treats the ongoing conflict and the way society perceives it is a major problem in the country today. Interestingly, the state tends to use the American definition of calling the conflict an insurgency rather than terrorism. The Americans are justified in using this term because the resistance in Afghanistan and Iraq is partly geared towards evicting the US and other forces considered as invaders. In case Washington loses the war, it will not affect its overall power but only its power interests in this part of the world. However, the conflict does not remain an insurgency when it enters Pakistan. Contrary to what Imran Khan would like people to believe, the war inside Pakistani territory is not about restoring the honour of the Pakhtun or evicting the invading forces, but about a specific group of people trying to change the nature of the state. Many people tend not to notice the subtle difference between the two terminologies of insurgency and terrorism. Insurgency pertains to a militant movement by a group of people to attain certain political objectives that relate to the rights of a group of people in a specific territory. So, the insurgent’s violence ultimately affects one part of the state. More important, it is comparatively easier to divide the insurgents or negotiate with them since the ultimate objective is betterment of a group of people. The Baloch movement is the only example of insurgency in Pakistan. Terrorism, on the other hand, is the use of violence to pursue a larger agenda with the goal of taking over and changing the face of the entire state. So, the only point at which a terrorist might negotiate is the offer of partnership in managing state affairs. Unfortunately, a lot of people in government and outside do not draw the distinction. There are some who even argue that the state can actually negotiate with the terrorists. Such perception delinks ideology from violence and fails to evaluate the significance of the terrorists’ political agenda. In this case, ideology is a multi-purpose tool. It is used to strengthen the movement. This is something that the terrorist cannot compromise on, else the whole focus of using violence against the state and society would be lost. In addition, ideology helps in winning the support of people beyond the core group and is non-negotiable. More importantly, this ideology is critical in changing the face of the state. Thus, it is more or less impossible to negotiate with terrorists. For me, it was surprising to hear an intellectual talking about the possibility of negotiating with terrorists — the only discussion possible with the Taliban in Pakistan is on how best to strike a partnership in governing parts of the state or the state itself. It is quite amazing that while Islamabad has shown great resistance to the Baloch insurgency, there is division in its ranks on how best to deal with the others operating in the rest of the country. The inability to bring development to a disgruntled people in time has encouraged the separatist movement, which, if it succeeds, will only affect one part of the country i.e. Balochistan. Meanwhile, state functionaries and significant groups in society have failed to build a consensus on how best to fight off Taliban terrorism for two reasons. First, there is the failure to properly define the conflict. Second, there is an inability to differentiate between the Taliban and the rest of the population due to common ideological threads. Many tend to argue, all that the Taliban are asking for is more religion to bring improvement in governance. Perhaps, the only issue on which people tend to disagree with the Taliban is the extent of their violence. As long as the target is other nationalities and not the Pakistani forces or people, the Taliban could be tolerated because of the common ideological thread. Therefore, there are those that relate to the Taliban mainly as a group which could bring peace and stability to Afghanistan. The Taliban, it is argued, only turned violent after the Americans struck after 9/11. This argument is extended to the Pakistani Taliban as well. However, it is dangerous to believe this because it tends to justify Taliban ideology without condoning their violence. Those who stress the ‘fight against a foreign occupying force’ theory forget two things. First, the Afghan Taliban might be fighting the US but do not necessarily represent a force of resistance to foreign occupation. After they fought the Soviet forces, the Mujahideen and Afghan warlords were deployed ambitiously on other fronts which gave them the appetite for extending their influence. Religious ideology came in later as necessary ideological clothing for the Taliban expansion. So, the Taliban fighting in Afghanistan and their partners in Pakistan are the ones who have a taste for expansion. Second, invasion as a concept is not foreign to the region. It dates back to centuries. It includes the invasion of Mohammad bin Qasim who is said to have entered the region from the south and not the north. But what we are witnessing at the moment is an internal expansion which is aimed outwards on the basis of ideology. So, the Taliban as a group are not just about resistance. They also represent a regional expansionist force which makes them different from other insurgents. Unless we begin explaining this to the people, instead of using terms borrowed from abroad, we might never be able to win the battle for hearts and mind that is necessary to make gains in the military conflict. [B][I]The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst.[/I][/B] [email]ayesha.ibd@gmail.com[/email] |
[B][U][CENTER][COLOR="DarkGreen"][SIZE="5"][FONT="Georgia"]More provinces?[/FONT][/SIZE][/COLOR][/CENTER][/U][/B]
[B]By Ayesha Siddiqa Friday, 03 Jul, 2009[/B] THAT Pakistan must be divided into smaller and more manageable administrative-cum-political divisions is an argument that one has heard for many years. After all, if India can have new states based on linguistic divisions, why can’t Pakistan have more provinces? It makes a lot of sense if newer and more manageable administrative divisions are carved out of the existing four provinces with the objective of catering to the political sentiments of the people. Smaller units will mean the decentralisation of power, which should appease those who are worried about the concentration of power. The application of the above formula should make at least two groups happy: Punjab’s Seraiki and urban Sindh’s Urdu-speaking Mohajir communities. They have been struggling for years for recognition of their political and social rights. Unfortunately for the Mohajir community, it is demographically not in a position to make such a demand. Its political representatives might try to join forces with Sindhi nationalists to stop the inflow of the Pathans or Punjabis. But this will only work as long as they share political objectives, especially when one considers their history of animosity. More importantly, there is less discussion of a division of Sindh or other provinces and more about the division of Punjab — especially in the context of a province for Seraiki speakers — not to mention divisions within the Seraiki-speaking area and the issue of making Bahawalpur a province. None of the above means that Punjab today is more prepared for a division than other provinces. However, this indicates the weakening of the elite consensus in Punjab which may eventually move towards the breakdown of the agreement of the ruling elite in the largest province. Although smaller administrative divisions are absolutely logical, one must not be labouring under the misapprehension that the debate we are hearing has anything to do with the betterment of ordinary people. The Seraiki-speaking elite dwelling mainly in southern Punjab is weary of the concentration of power in Lahore, especially in the hands of the PML-N and the Sharif brothers. A new Seraiki province with its capital in one of the larger cities of southern Punjab will dramatically change Punjab’s political scene. But the role played by central forces is critical. Sources suggest that the PPP government would support this formula so that the power of the Sharif brothers can be diluted. Electoral results show that PPP support is concentrated in rural Punjab which is basically south Punjab versus PML-N’s following in the urban centres. A new political division will dilute the Punjabi urban versus rural division. Another province will also mean that Punjab would not be directly and totally controlled by the Sharifs and their party. Shahbaz Sharif can only be chief minister in one province, not two. Not to mention the fact that the success of the Seraiki movement will result in the possible creation of the Potohar province or some other division. The Bahawalpur province debate is inextricably linked to the demand for a Seraiki province. One explanation for a smaller province is that it is bound to kill the movement for a larger province. From a particular perspective, the demand for a Seraiki province versus a Bahawalpur province is the battle between two political poles, one more centrist and pro-establishment than the other. The entire debate is interesting because it indicates the weakening of elite consensus in Punjab, a province which is considered critical to Pakistan and its power politics. It must also be mentioned that the subcontinent has taken a newer shape every time elite consensus broke down. Starting from the independence of India and Pakistan to the breakup of Pakistan in 1971, this will probably be the third time in our history that the breakdown of consensus might give a new shape to the political division of territory. Of course, this time it will be done in a more decent manner, which is to be expected since there is no grass-roots demand for a new province. There are many who believe that this is about the betterment of the people. Surely, people in Multan, D.G. Khan, Bahawalpur and other places are bothered by the long trek to Lahore whenever they need to get things done. It is also a fact that there is greater development work in north and central Punjab than in the south. There are three issues worth considering in this regard. First, the south versus north and centre is also a story of uneven urban development. Second, the lack of development is not just about the concentration of power in Lahore but the peculiar concentration of capital and industrial development in the province. North and central Punjab are better developed because most industries, including defence, are located there. While this is because the bulk of the military is from the north and centre, the majority of dynamic entrepreneurs are also located here rather than in the south. Third, the comparative lack of industrialisation is also because the large landowners and politicians of southern Punjab have stuck to the more traditional industries and methods of capital formation. This varied pattern is not surprising since the relatively poorer agriculture of north Punjab led to other forms of money-making. In any case, the Seraiki-speaking elite attached itself to the larger Punjabi elite including the military to get their share of resources. I remember Makhdoom Khursheed Zaman Qureshi of Bahawalpur, interim minister for agriculture in Punjab during Musharraf’s tenure, talk about the benefits of giving free land to the generals in south Punjab. There are others like the Legharis with links to the ISI through the Mehran Bank scandal. The stories are endless. The fact of the matter is that the Makhdooms, Legharis, Abbasis, Gilanis etc from south Punjab see the division of the larger province as an opportunity to build their own stronghold. In a nutshell we might see a new shape of Punjab but such a change must be planned properly to divert benefits to the people rather than to the predatory elite. [B][I]The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst.[/I][/B] [email]ayesha.ibd@gmail.com[/email] |
[B][U][CENTER][COLOR="DarkGreen"][SIZE="5"][FONT="Georgia"]Defence: a grey area[/FONT][/SIZE][/COLOR][/CENTER][/U][/B]
[B]By Ayesha Siddiqa Friday, 10 Jul, 2009[/B] DECISION-making in the defence sector is generally a grey area because of the secrecy that surrounds the process. However, in decision-making environments where political and accountability systems are not strong, there is greater vagueness. Two questionable deals in this country involve equipment for the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) and the Pakistan Navy (PN). In the PAF’s case, former air chief Kaleem Saadat claimed that Gen Musharraf ruined a $1.2bn deal to acquire Swedish surveillance aircraft. The second instance concerns President Zardari’s alleged link to financial mismanagement in negotiating a deal for new submarines. According to the current procedure, different directorates in the services headquarters are involved in evaluating weapons’ requirements and then coming up with staff requirements which are evaluated by the planning departments in their respective headquarters. The army’s system is more elaborate than that of the other two services. Once the service boards shortlist their requirements the latter are communicated to the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (JCSC) to prioritise the procurement of arms for the three services. This is then communicated to the government through the defence ministry. The army chief has a lot of influence in the JCSC. This has especially been the case over the past decade because of changes in the system where the post of chairman is occupied by an army general. The position no longer goes to the other services. The contract is taken care of at the defence ministry where officials from their respective service headquarters and posted in the ministry assist the process. In this system, the head of state, especially if he is also the army chief, plays a major role. As army chief, the president can influence the final selection. So Gen Musharraf was in a position to influence the contract and the final acquisition. But what about Asif Zardari who was also accused of making money in the past from the acquisition of the French Agosta-90B submarines? It is worth noting that the Musharraf government could not get any real evidence of Benazir Bhutto’s and Asif Zardari’s involvement in the submarine deal despite pulling up former naval chief Admiral Mansoorul Haq. It is important to note that while the previous PPP government could be linked to questionable power-sector deals, it probably had less to do with defence purchases. In any case, the procurement process is longer than the average life of a political government for a single person to influence the decision. This is not to say that the PPP is above board. This is simply the nature of the defence acquisition system. Any financial mismanagement in defence deals has to involve military personnel at the service HQs and the JCSC. According to the prevalent procurement system, the acquisition of weapons depends on staff requirements decided at the service headquarters. The ‘higher defence reorganisation’ planned under the Bhutto government during the 1970s had made the defence ministry responsible for all weapons-procurement administrative work such as calling for bids, floating tenders, writing contracts and negotiating with sellers. Ideally speaking, staff requirements must reflect the needs of a service. These muse be based on tactical, operational and strategic intelligence. The defence ministry should be responsible for fine-tuning staff requirements and finding the right system to meet the service’s needs. Currently, the selection of weapons is done at the services’ headquarters which means there is greater interaction between the divisions responsible for planning and potential sellers. Resultantly, staff requirements also reflect the bias of the procurement team for a specific seller. This is where money is to be made. It is after overt and covert deals have been taken care of that the case is passed on to the government. Where the PN and PAF are concerned obtaining approval for a major acquisition depends on the interest shown by either the army or the head of the state, the final authority. The air force has been luckier than the navy due to the relevance of the service to the army-dominated military strategy. With the largest service overly involved in politics, governance and now internal security, the PAF is considered vital to fighting a potential war with India, a concept that dominates our military strategy. On the other hand, the PN, which has less strategic significance, tries to attract top policymakers. There are fears that this could be done through offering them a share in the money. The top management influences the naval staff requirements and the final selection of weapons. This has happened in the case of the acquisition of the P-3C Orions for which the PN has no naval staff requirement or NSR i.e. no real demand has been generated for the aircraft. Another case refers to negotiations with the Chinese for the F-22P frigates in which the service chief overrode the decision, despite issues raised about the technology by relevant quarters. There are some that suggest that the appointment of a relatively junior District Management Group officer as ambassador to Paris is meant to facilitate a deal with the French. Such claims do not take into account two factors. First, an ambassador is too insignificant in the entire procurement process to influence a deal which the defence establishment including the ministry of defence manages. Second, the PN’s existing submarine fleet is of French origin. Changing the source would mean adding to the cost as it would involve setting up newer maintenance and other facilities. Not to mention the fact that Islamabad acquired the Agosta-90B under a transfer-of-technology agreement which not only escalated the cost of the deal but also meant that the PN could make additional submarines. The capital investment in the acquisition of weapons represents about 12 to 15 per cent of the lifecycle cost of the equipment. In simple language, a larger array of weapons in terms of their source will add to the overall cost of equipment without increasing efficiency. It is time we took another look at our military strategy and weapons-procurement planning which suffers from major flaws starting from the absence of a rational procurement planning loop. Weapons’ procurement suffers from the absence of a ‘system’ that actually qualifies as one. Unless one is introduced, we will keep losing money to corrupt bureaucrats and leaders. [B][I]The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst. [email]ayesha.ibd@gmail.com[/email][/I][/B] |
[B][U][CENTER][COLOR="DarkGreen"][SIZE="5"][FONT="Georgia"]The peace puzzle[/FONT][/SIZE][/COLOR][/CENTER][/U][/B]
[B]By Ayesha Siddiqa Friday, 17 Jul, 2009[/B] [B][I][CENTER][SIZE="3"][FONT="Georgia"]MODERN-day media is a strange animal. It is easily excited, raises expectations quickly and then just as rapidly dashes them.[/FONT][/SIZE][/CENTER][/I][/B] The excitement focused on the meeting of the Pakistani and Indian prime ministers is a typical example. On the morning of the foreign secretaries’ meeting in Sharm el Sheikh there began a rush of phone calls that increased during the course of the day in which anchorpersons were eager to know what could be obtained from the meeting and why we couldn’t stop talking to India. The tone and tenor of the conversation was similar on the other side as well. At this point in time, Indo-Pakistan ties can hope to make little movement. Given the highs and lows of our bilateral engagement, there is little that the two establishments expect from each other. They can only try and convince the international community of their eagerness to have a debate and ensure the absence of military conflict. Socio-politically these are historic days for the subcontinent because the media, one of the most effective tools for lobbying public support for policy, is an active player in the foreign-policymaking debate. The common media refrain in both countries is that their side must not talk to the other. The media is being exceptionally hostile and influencing public opinion and policymaking. Of course, policymakers don’t admit that using the media is dangerous because after a certain point it becomes difficult to roll back public opinion. Hence, it is not surprising that earlier on Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh spilled the beans (regarding his official position) in front of the Pakistani president even before the press left the room. It was more than an error to put his cards on the table in the presence of both the president and the press. Manmohan Singh was probably not too excited about Mr Zardari’s ability to comprehend the bottom-line in terms of India’s desire to maintain friendly relations with Pakistan — the message was that Islamabad would have to eliminate terror and violence mechanisms operating on Pakistani territory before New Delhi considered talks with Pakistan. In the past New Delhi had built up a rapport with the Nawaz Sharif and Pervez Musharraf governments to the extent that both sides had the confidence that they were about to improve jinxed India-Pakistan relations for the better and that there would be no turning back. While the dispensations thought that they could carry their security establishments with them to improve relations with India by putting Kashmir on the backburner, the Indian government was convinced that they had finally met Pakistani leaders who could command sufficient respect at home to convince the people and the military to give up on the Kashmir issue. Each time, some crisis prevented a further buildup of relations. India does not seem to have the same confidence in the present government. In fact, in the days following the Mumbai terrorist attack last year, many in New Delhi were not even sure who the real government in Pakistan was when it came to relations with India. Asif Zardari and his cabal seem to have promised things that they could not deliver later. Moreover, while the president seems to talk about a composite dialogue, especially trade with India, the prime minis ter appears to follow the traditional line. Interestingly, in the past Delhi was willing to talk about everything including bits of Kashmir. Today, the political regime in Islamabad wants to talk about everything including trade with bits of discussion on Kashmir. The Indians are not too keen on this. So, Dr Singh wanted to let the fly on the wall know that lest the Pakistani leaders say something in public and raise expectations about normalcy in India-Pakistan bilateral relations, it must be put on record before the press that Delhi wouldn’t budge on a single point. Unfortunately, the war on terror is an issue on which there is no ‘seeing eye to eye’ for the two sides. While India sees Pakistan as the source of all problems, Islamabad believes that India along with its American partners is causing it all the pain. Of course, no one mentions the fact that Islamabad should do more in terms of providing concrete evidence for India and America’s involvement in the violence in the northern areas. At this juncture, there are two realities. First, it is very difficult to make any movement on any peace initiative because our agendas have become very divergent. The non-state actors whom people would like to see evicted from the South Asian strategic scene have come to stay mainly due to the inability of the state actors to indulge in some out-of-the-box thinking. Second, diplomatic force and pressure might not help beyond a certain point. The two neighbouring states along with their friends and allies will have to sit together with greater patience than before to understand each other’s insecurities and concerns. The reality is that we are in a historical ideological bind from which there is no getting out, at least, not for the present. Territorial disputes are a component of the real tension. Thus, some form of territorial solution, be it of the Siachen glacier issue or the Kashmir imbroglio, is important as this would indicate the interest of policymakers on either side in evolving newer imagination about each other. However, what appears more likely at this stage is that India and Pakistan will muddle through the present times and continue with relations that are not normal until a point of greater destruction is reached. This would then teach us a lesson in peace. Or perhaps we would come to learn the worth of the latter through some miracle. Seen from the lens of the media, it is really a game of patiently sitting and watching events in the subcontinent. After all, both states and the entire South Asian region can either sink or swim together. [B][I]The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst. [email]ayesha.ibd@gmail.com[/email] [/I][/B] |
[SIZE="4"][COLOR="DarkRed"][B]No capacity to govern[/B][/COLOR][/SIZE]
[B]Friday, 24 Jul, 2009[/B] FOUR seemingly different news items over the past 15 days or so caught my attention. Pertaining to the conduct of the civil bureaucracy and the government’s handling of it, these news items etched an interesting picture of the government’s capacity to deliver good governance. The first dealt with the appointment of a DMG officer as ambassador to France. The second focused on the shelving of a madressah-reform programme conceived by the education ministry in 2002 and involving a budget of billions out of which the department was unable to spend more than Rs333m and reaching a little over 500 madressahs. Although the economic affairs division refutes the claim that the education ministry received any funding from the US to carry out madressah reforms, the source of money is a tactical matter. The more important issue is that a certain, critical objective was not achieved. The third issue concerns the behaviour of Pakistan’s consul-general in Los Angeles who wasted the taxpayer’s money to travel from Los Angeles to San Francisco to welcome politician Babar Awan who was on a private visit. Finally, there was the story a BPS-20 officer dragging his boss to court alleging misconduct, something he himself was accused of. The officer apparently used high connections to have himself absolved in another matter. How are these stories connected? Each case is a comment on why and how Pakistan suffers from a lack of capacity to deliver good governance. As I asked some senior bureaucrats whether the civil bureaucracy was capable of delivering services to the people one retorted: “If those who made sacrifices for Pakistan were to return today and be given another chance, they might not do it again.” Bitter, but very true! Today, we do not have a system which can deliver good governance to the people although the country does not lack capable and well-trained bureaucrats. It is quite amusing to hear senior bureaucrats talk about how things were put right under their individual charge. One is always tempted to ask why the country is in such a condition if so many individuals were doing things right. Is good governance deliverable anymore when we have officers who render personal services to politicians at the taxpayer’s expense, or when there are officers who use links with top politicians to hide their misconduct? Do we wonder why people in Pakistan are not keen to pay taxes? Why should they pay the government when they have absolutely no control over the allocation of resources? It is an open secret that despite being elected through popular ballot most politicians tend to serve their own interests or those of domestic and foreign power centres. Any government that fails to demonstrate legitimacy in its actions will find it hard to convince the people to agree to pay taxes or declare their assets. The bureaucratic system is such that while there is no punishment for law evaders, there is no prize for those that honour the law either. Focusing entirely on their individual acumen bureaucrats tend to disregard the argument that they suffer from an incapacity to deliver governance. Most senior civil servants are suave people who know how to conduct themselves in different environments. For instance, our diplomats have done quite well in competitive environments such as the UN. However, how can they be expected to perform when policymakers at the top are hell-bent on compromising national interests? Bureaucrats would rather lay the blame at the door of the political or military leadership. Can civil servants really be blamed when there are flaws in policymaking? For instance, should one blame the bureaucrats when policymakers appoint the worst bureaucrats to oversee critical ministries like health and education, even agriculture? And how can the government be expected to carry out madressah reforms when there is a partnership between the PPP and the JUI-F at the top? However, intellectuals such as Dr Mubashir Hasan argue otherwise. He is of the contention that it is the civil bureaucracy that rules the roost in Pakistan. Being one of the strongest institutions of the post-colonial state, civil bureaucrats are the ones that guide, or misguide, the political class. Indeed, there are many in Pakistan who believe that even sharp politicians like Bhutto were led astray after they fell foul of the bureaucrats. Civil servants would challenge this contention. One of the arguments is that today’s politicians are not simpletons. In fact, those that manage technical ministries such as finance are quite well-trained and have input from multiple sources including multilateral aid donors and others. However, the reality is that bureaucrats are as much stakeholders in the system as politicians. The country’s governance is poor because neither of these two key stakeholders (and others that are not discussed in this article) have the capacity to see the larger picture which includes the cost and benefit of any tactical move or strategic policy action. The civil servant, who said that no one would now be willing to sacrifice when others don’t, is not wrong. The real problem is that the systems in Pakistan’s polity have completely come apart. Individuals want to outperform each other to score individually. Even the senior judiciary appears to have acquired a passion for publicity. There are no signs of building systems that deliver to the general public. So, no matter how tall the claims, the fact of the matter is that what we lack today are systems that can deliver and make brilliant individuals perform. The blame for this absence must be pinned on the key stakeholders who are driven by their individual greed, resulting in the death of a viable system meant to deliver good governance. The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst. [email]ayesha.ibd@gmail.com[/email] |
[SIZE="5"][COLOR="DarkRed"][B]Why an arms race?[/B][/COLOR][/SIZE]
[B][U][I]by Ayesha Siddiqa[/I][/U][/B] [B]Friday, 31 Jul, 2009[/B] MONDAY night is sure to have caused anxiety and excitement among certain sections of those who received the news of India’s launch of its first indigenous nuclear submarine. The Foreign Office denounced the development as something that could start a nuclear-arms race in the region, and Defence Minister Ahmed Mukhtar awoke from his slumber and lambasted the Indians. The Pakistan Navy’s admirals spoke about the need to respond. The question is: will the launch really trigger a nuclear-arms race in the region and destabilise Pakistan’s security? First, the term ‘nuclear submarine’ does not mean a submarine loaded with nuclear weapons. In fact, it would be appropriate to say a ‘nuclear-powered’ submarine that can stay submerged for a longer period of time. This capability alone makes a nuclear submarine an extremely lethal weapon because it could sneak beneath a country’s territorial waters and fire a conventional or nuclear warhead. Also, since they are longer, nuclear subs can carry larger torpedo tubes that are useful for firing nuclear warheads. India’s launch shouldn’t come as a surprise because New Delhi had been working on this project since the end of the 1980s when it had hired a Charlie-class Soviet nuclear-powered sub. This was basically to familiarise itself with the use of a nuclear sub. Even at that time, senior officers in Pakistan were upset and desirous of obtaining similar technology for Pakistan. Luckily, we did not embark upon an expensive project. Later, during the 1990s, the Indian Navy exercised with the Israeli Navy in the Indian Ocean practising on Israel’s Scorpene subs of French origin, learning how to fire nuclear warheads from conventional subs. We don’t need to copy the Indians because the Pakistan Navy already has the French Agosta 90B subs with an air-independent propulsion system that allows it to remain submerged for longer periods than the older subs. This means that if the navy could miniaturise nuclear warheads, it could sneak into Indian waters with the Agosta 90B at a time of extreme crisis and threaten the Indians. Technically speaking, the job is done. Now, we don’t have to follow the Indians who probably wanted the new submarine for a feel-good effect and to join the league of the ‘bigger boys’ including China, the US, Britain and France. The real danger of the launch of a nuclear submarine by India is that it might force us to follow suit. If our admirals close their eyes they might just see their counterparts sticking out their tongues at them. This could prove to be a dangerous bait and bleed us financially. A nuclear submarine is an extremely expensive project. The Indians have managed to do it because they had more cash and a lot of Russian help. Pakistan, that had toyed with the idea of hiring nuclear submarines during the 1980s in response to India’s action and had failed to get one, might want to buy one from China. It does not seem likely that Beijing would give this technology to Pakistan at this stage. An arms race is not the best formula for Pakistan. We will probably want to force ourselves to acquire this or that technology within a short span of time. There are two possible options. First, we could covertly buy the technology from someone and end up with the kind of bargain we did with North Korea — this might give us a bloody nose. The second would be to start on an indigenous product. Although we secretly claim to have the capability to adapt our Agosta 90Bs to carry nuclear warheads, the French designers deny that we have the capacity to alter the basic design of the torpedo tube. But this might just be the extent of our naval engineering work. Despite our claims to have made the Agosta 90B subs under a transfer-of-technology deal with the French, our agreement with Paris for the subs and the mine-hunters was so wishy-washy that we really cannot go beyond assembling these naval platforms or integrating the systems on these machines. This is one of the basic steps in the development of indigenous production. We have never gone any further due to a lack of research and development, the absence of offset arrangements with original weapons manufacturers and a weak vendor industry. The defence industry, which is in the public sector, and its vendors, who are mostly private entrepreneurs, represent two diverse cultures. Mainly due to organisational-cultural problems there has never been a healthy interface to allow the public-private defence industry to carry out value-added work. In comparative terms, the Pakistan Ordnance Factories and the Heavy Industries Taxila have taken bigger strides. But this is also because the technology is less complex than what the air force and navy require. The Pakistan Aeronautical Complex was catching up a few years ago when it had signed an offset agreement with Boeing. However, there are problems in its Karakoram-8 and JF-17 Thunder co-development, co-production contract that must be eradicated if the air force is to get maximum benefit. The navy lags behind. Indeed, if any lesson is to be drawn from the Indian nuclear sub launch it is that Pakistan must revamp its entire defence production policy that rarely gets attention because those at the top are interested in buying weapons off-the-shelf. We have to develop our engineering and technology base, which in turn means greater education. And better education will mean setting our priorities straight. (One is reminded of a poster inscribed with the hope that a day would come when schools would have ample money and the air force would have to hold a bake sale to buy a bomber.) In the meantime, let’s leave the nuclear-powered sub competition to China. In any case, having acquired an indigenous nuclear-sub-building technology India has not really acted wisely, for this has been at the cost of millions of dispossessed and hungry. Why would we want to take that route? The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst. [email]ayesha.ibd@gmail.com[/email] |
[B][U][CENTER][COLOR="DarkGreen"][SIZE="5"][FONT="Georgia"]Peace with India[/FONT][/SIZE][/COLOR][/CENTER][/U][/B]
[B]By Ayesha Siddiqa Friday, 07 Aug, 2009[/B] ‘But why do we have to talk to India?’ was a line echoed by many on television screens in Pakistan with similar sentiments being expressed on the other side. The national security community on both sides suddenly sees no value in building peaceful relations. Under the circumstances, it is very clear that the romantic notion of peace is now defunct. Ordinary people probably get excited when conservative rightwing leaders come on television and say that talking to the other side is of no use. The sad reality is that the days of desiring a great friendship are over. Indeed, the post-Egypt meeting days did not bring a lot of joy to the Indian and Pakistani premiers. Both were lambasted for sacrificing vital national interests. While the Indian opposition and rightwing media criticised Dr Manmohan Singh for compromising on key principles, those in Pakistan were angry that Mr Yousuf Raza Gilani appeared to sacrifice Pakistan’s key interests in Kashmir. After all, why didn’t the joint statement mention the disputed territory? So, right now there is a crowd on both sides that would rather experiment with the missiles. Historically, the governments in both countries have been belligerent towards one another. But the people wanted peace. Now, the tables have turned and while there are always those that understand the worth of peace in the neighbourhood, the rightwing national security community dominates the present discourse. Since the Kargil crisis in 1999 followed by tensions in 2002, both governments have adopted a reasonable stance in handling tensions. We are at a stage where talking peace is becoming boring. Indians ask why peace should be discussed when Pakistan keeps shipping terrorists to their country. Why, they ask, should their great country that has prospects of becoming a regional and global power come down to the level of a small neighbour that cannot match India’s capacity. Moreover, many in India believe that Pakistan will exhaust itself in this competition. For this category of Indians, Pakistan’s collapse would be something to celebrate. However, they might be disappointed to know that Pakistan is not about to collapse. It may not have the capacity to fight and faces countless challenges but the national security community can think of many ways to stay alive, at least to fight their rival. What a sordid state of affairs. It is a fact that the days of bonhomie are over. Peace does not seem possible mainly because there are parties on both sides that benefit from conflict. The Indian prime minister was both wise and rational when he explained to his own constituents that they could not wish away Pakistan because it is a neighbour. The problem lies in thinking in terms of a best pal or worst enemy. A friend from South India labels this a Punjabi fixation. I am always tempted to remind her that South Indians too suffer from the syndrome! Even the most intelligent Indians get angry when confronted with the question of Pakistan saying that the country is inconsequential where India is concerned. Surely, these people would react differently if they were not bothered about Pakistan. The Pakistani government might have a myriad problems but it is being prudent in desiring good relations with its next-door neighbour and in saying that India is not a primary source of threat to the country. This certainly does not mean that we surrender our key interests. It means that we recognise that military conflict will not bring any solutions. How do we expect our neighbour to talk about concessions when we continue to allow non-state actors to use our territory to launch attacks on it? It is also a reality that since the end of the 1990s it was twice that we came close to embarking on the path of peace. Had this venture not been upset, we could have moved to a better level of understanding. The beneficiaries of conflict ask why India should be spared when it used similar tactics against us. The defeat of 1971 is still fresh in the minds of many — especially those who derive benefit from conflict. The much-despised Gen Pervez Musharraf, who still claims that Kargil was a brilliant idea, later understood that the only viable option was to make peace so that Pakistan could be put on the road to harnessing its human resources and concentrating on socio-economic development. This is when he began to think of and suggest ‘out of the box’ solutions. Had it not been for the laziness and lack of imagination of India’s strategic community, the problem might have been solved then. New Delhi can always argue that quick action is not possible in the backdrop of its coalition politics and so it could not move fast on resolving minor issues like Siachen or the more doable Sir Creek border issue. The fact of the matter is that the thinking of its national security and political community is almost as myopic as that next door. One wonders what it would take for strategists in India to realise that the troubled Pakistan has nine lives and will always be there. In fact, a weaker Pakistan will be detrimental to India’s security. So, not talking is not an option that either side has. In fact, not talking is not going to solve any problem at all. It is foolhardy to imagine that there could be a way to block out the bothersome neighbour as the rich do with the poor. Or imagine that the problem will wither away on its own. It would be wise to pray for sanity to return to the strategic community on both sides. Since neighbours can’t be wished away, a better future can only be constructed through cooperation and not ‘mutually assured destruction.’ [B][I]The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst. [email]ayesha.ibd@gmail.com[/email][/I][/B] |
[B][U][CENTER][COLOR="DarkGreen"][SIZE="5"][FONT="Georgia"]Terrorism and the police[/FONT][/SIZE][/COLOR][/CENTER][/U][/B]
[B][CENTER]The greatest strength of the police is its tremendous intelligence network. Police know what is happening in an area and who the crooks and the good guys are.[/CENTER][/B] [B]By Ayesha Siddiqa Friday, 14 Aug, 2009[/B] IN a recent letter to the editor in this paper, a reader has expressed surprise at a perception contained in columnist Ahmad Faruqui’s article Talking to India (Aug 3) that no assurance can be given to an “apprehensive Indian population that Pakistan’s shadowy intelligence agencies are serious about cracking down on the zealots…”. It has also been pointed out in the letter that “it is the law-enforcement agencies, not the intelligence agencies, that are supposed to take corrective action against anyone who breaks the law”. This shows a lack of understanding of how law-enforcement agencies in Pakistan are less powerful than the military and its intelligence agencies. In a country, which has been ruled by the military for half of its history, it is strange, that some people should still not be able to comprehend the fact that the armed forces or any institution attached to them are more powerful. However, the more pressing question remains of whether the police can fight the terrorists. Experts believe that the police do not have the capacity to fight terrorism. Surely, the police could never deal with the Taliban in the tribal areas which in any case have never been under state control.In fact, control over places like Swat in the Frontier province was also lost as weapons flowed into these areas. Once the police found itself out-manoeuvred because of better equipment in the possession of the other side, fighting became difficult and Fazlullah and his group got out of control. Such circumstances also lead to a lack of motivation. How can a numerically inferior and ill-trained and under-motivated force fight the highly motivated jihadis? It is no secret that the police in most provinces are busy protecting the numerous VIPs. However, its strength, especially in areas where the state has some marginal writ, lies in its institutional network which is extremely sound when it comes to gathering information at the local level. For instance, the police can tackle the Punjab-based jihadis. This is not because these different groups responsible for deadly attacks inside and outside the country are weak. In fact, they are deadlier than a lot of Taliban groups as their force is driven simply by ideology and they are not tied down by ethnic and tribal affinity. In terms of their lethality, the Punjab-based groups are on a par with the Jemaah Islamiya of Indonesia or the Uzbek warriors. Here, the argument is that the greatest strength of the police is its tremendous intelligence network. Police know what is happening in an area and who the crooks and the good guys are. Many must have heard of the joke about the search for the British queen’s lost dog. While the British, German and American police were unable to find the canine, a Pakistani police official went into a nearby forest and returned with a cow who ‘confessed’ to being the queen’s dog. This reflects the institution’s brutality and its penetration. So, it is impossible that the local police had no idea about Master Riaz (linked with the Mian Channu blast) and his ac tivities. In fact, police in Punjab, like their colleagues in the Frontier, know exactly where the culprits are. Problems occur when they are ordered not to touch unsavoury characters or there is intervention from the authorities considered more powerful than the lowly police official. In a socio-political system driven by sheer authority, a police SHO or ASI knows fully well that saying no to someone who claims to be a military intelligence official might have extremely unpleasant consequences. There are many instances when the police are unable to carry out their duties due to outside interference. There have also been many instances in the past when jihadi groups proved effective in tackling extra efficient police officials and officers. Some might argue that such intervention happened during times when most or some of the jihadis were state assets. Nevertheless the problem is two-fold. First, it is still not clear if all state elements have completely withdrawn their support for certain jihadi outfits. For instance, in numerous cases journalists try ing to study south Punjab were warned off not by jihadis but by military intelligence. So, are these militants assets? Clearly, the Pakistani state seems to be sending mixed signals. There is the political state which wants to solve the problem; thus we have the interior minister submitting a list of 25 banned organisations. But then secondary verification shows that even organisations like Al Qaeda are not banned (this was admitted in the Lahore High Court) which means that covert state elements may well be continuing their support to groups. Second, with such confusion police officials find it very difficult to tell if the more powerful part of the state continues to support the militants. After all, intelligence agencies never publish an announcement saying that they are withdrawing support.Perhaps police officers should be held responsible for not raising a hue and a cry when they see things going wrong. The majority constitute those who are afraid for their lives con sidering that the police are in the direct line of jihadi fire. In the words of a police officer, “Why should I put myself in the line of fire when all that I will get for sacrificing my life is Rs100,000 and a state funeral? I go after the shooting is over.” Incidentally, the officer cited above is truly one of the most professional, committed, honest and well-trained officers. But the bulk of police officers give in to pressure be it from politician, the army or military intelligence. The pressure from above and irresponsible policing then results in poor handling of situations as we saw in the case of Gojra. The bottom-line is that while the government goes around asking for better training and equipment for its police force, it must also attend to internal systemic problems. While the police needs clarity regarding state policy, it would help if the lawenforcement agencies were empowered to carry out their duties without any interference. It is also high time that we understand that covert states have a high opportunity cost and hamper peace and stability in the country, the region and the world at large. ¦ The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst. [B]EMAIL [email]-ayesha.ibd@gmail.com[/email][/B] |
[B][U][CENTER][COLOR="DarkGreen"][SIZE="5"][FONT="Georgia"]The capital rumour mill[/FONT][/SIZE][/COLOR][/CENTER][/U][/B]
[B]By Ayesha Siddiqa Friday, 21 Aug, 2009[/B] The capital is abuzz with rumours of a minus-one formula. Some are suggesting that there is a minus-three formula. Such destabilising stories were confined to the grapevine until the information minister, followed by the Sindh chief minister, spoke about them. One must never undermine the power of the rumour mill in the capital. It works efficiently, especially when there is a weak political government, and causes nervousness. Perhaps, the intention is to make the government tense. This would result in further weakening it and pave the way for its possible collapse. So why does the rumour mill work and who are the forces that are part of it? The minus-one formula refers to the topmost leadership of the present government and the minus-three, according to the grapevine, pertains to the topmost leadership plus the top leadership from the primary opposition party. Some even suggest that the minus-three formula refers to the top man in government and his two close cronies. The bottom-line is that both formulas are about the ouster of people that are despised by alternative power centres. It is apparent that a powerful establishment will not allow a political dispensation to settle down comfortably especially if it is suspected of expanding its writ at an extremely fast pace without any regard for the core interests of the establishment. Historically, the corruption and inefficiency of the government comes in handy in generating propaganda that can weaken it and lead to its ouster. The misfortune of the present government is its inefficiency which has hurt people more than its alleged corruption. In fact, corruption in a developing country becomes problematic when it is accompanied by inefficiency. For instance, in the past two decades one has rarely come across an example of an agri-based economy running out of fertiliser. Poor farmers, who consequently had to purchase the commodity from the black market, can hardly think in positive terms about the government’s capacity to deliver. However, it is far more interesting to see how different segments of state and society seem to be conspiring to restructure the government. At this juncture, we can see two governments in Pakistan; one headed by the president, the other by the prime minister. While the president appears to have a poor perception of the people’s needs and aspirations, a shortcoming that is a result of him being confined to the presidential palace, he is also not conscious of appreciating the line between the areas that belong to the establishment and issues that he could deal with. There are two issues worth mentioning. First, all previous governments of the 1990s fell because they were not careful when it came to assessing their limits. Civilian rulers often come under the misperception that they have more power than the establishment. Second, this is not something peculiar to Pakistan. A glance at numerous Latin and Central American states shows that the empowerment of democratic institutions and the strengthening of civilian rule in those countries were obtained through years of careful negotiation with the establishment. The problem in Pakistan is that there is never a plan or a method to do so. Clearly, national security is an area that represents the military’s corporate interests (the term must not be confused with commercial interest though these too are now part of the military’s larger corporate interests). Any leader seen as intruding in such affairs or as changing the general drift of policy in matters critical to the military’s interest is considered a huge challenge. Unfortunately, the present government at the topmost level has depended excessively on external help at the cost of not creating institutional support to negotiate power with the military. The president’s misperception of being more knowledgeable and experienced than others in running affairs of the state will prove costly. His attitude has already resulted in a necessary rearrangement at the top level which compromises his control. So, if members of the government feel that there is some vicious minus-one formula in place, this is not their wild imagination. It is very difficult to run after hard evidence because most of the functioning and management in politically unstable systems is done through word of mouth rather than employing institutional mechanisms. In fact, if such societies begin to have institutions they would not be weak any more. This is not to suggest that the alternative powers are close to making the desired changes in the government. A drastic change might be envisioned but is difficult due to the lack of clarity regarding the PPP’s future. The issue with dynastic politics is that changing the party leadership takes a long time. The history of the Muslim League is a case in point. Since being taken over by the establishment the party underwent many drastic changes and splits. However, time is a critical factor if the same is to happen to the PPP. There is none in the top leadership of the party who has the capacity to become its alternative guardian. The party might be hurting but is not about to break. Under the circumstances, the grapevine will be used effectively along with some elements in the media that are acting as the establishment’s fifth column to keep the top leadership on its toes. For sceptics, this sector has become a critical part of the discourse between different power centres due to the absence of any institutional mechanism for a dialogue. Meanwhile, the assault on this government is different from the one of the 1990s because the top leader appears to be no easy prey and is intent on fighting. If he doesn’t realise the necessity of creating institutions and improving his efficiency at talking and delivering, the government and resultantly the state will become highly unstable. The issue of power politics is that power centres which have a stronger institutional base are extremely rigid and difficult to fight back. Moreover, the onus of not destabilising the government and state falls on the civilian regime, the political parties and the establishment. None can be absolved from leading the state towards another crisis. [B][I]The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst. [email]ayesha.ibd@gmail.com[/email] [/I][/B] |
[B][U][CENTER][COLOR="DarkGreen"][SIZE="5"][FONT="Georgia"]Capital games[/FONT][/SIZE][/COLOR][/CENTER][/U][/B]
[B]By Ayesha Siddiqa Friday, 28 Aug, 2009[/B] People wonder why the present government is not trying Gen Musharraf. Is it just due to its goodness of heart or is there something else that might be the cause of this apparently cautious behaviour? Actually, there are two issues at hand here. First is the evasiveness of the prime minister. While not making any move to bring a case in court against the former general, Mr Gilani appears to be raising hopes by giving the impression to the people and various political parties that the former dictator may actually be tried in a court of law. Second, perhaps the prime minister is not pursuing the case because he understands that there is far more to be lost than gained by any action against Gen Musharraf. We always tend to forget that there were actually three parties to the deal that allowed Benazir Bhutto and her spouse to return to Pakistan: (a) the Bhutto family and party, (b) the US and British negotiators and (c) the Pakistan Army which was ruling the country through its chief. The former general left the seat of power with great reluctance and later the country as a free man — surely there must have been some guarantees allowing him to do that. The role played by his organisation in providing him an easy passage cannot be ruled out. Unfortunately, whenever democracy passes through a transition period we tend to forget, at least in Pakistan, that the army is a powerful force and negotiating power in the long term is not an easy task. The organisation would certainly not want one of its own maligned and castigated publicly. After all, a public trial of one of its members is an embarrassment that no general who might consider taking over the state in the future would want. An institution which believes that it alone knows how to rule and has the best interest of the state at heart will never give up the option to return to power directly. For all of us, who are constantly unhappy with the president, perhaps he is far more intelligent in understanding the power of the army and the wrath that the mention of Musharraf’s trial might invoke. One has to behave sensibly especially when there are skeletons in the cupboard that could be discovered. It takes only a few disclosures or controversies to malign a politician. Just take the example of matters that are being brought up on the media in the past couple of weeks. First there was the controversy relating to the 1992 army operation. Why worry about Kargil when stakeholders are also accusing Nawaz Sharif of his involvement in the 1992 cleanup operation in Karachi? Has the MQM leadership brought this up so that the May 12, 2007 killings in the metropolis are disregarded, even though at this point there weren’t too many people questioning the MQM? Perhaps, the idea was not so much about obfuscating its alleged wrongdoings as highlighting what could be questioned about Nawaz Sharif’s political behaviour. The PML-N leader has the option of going public with what exactly happened in Karachi and disclosing the extent of the army’s involvement. However, he could also get bogged down in further controversy. In any case, the Karachi story is not the only one. There are others which involve financial scandals as the list of politicians, some of them very high-profile, who allegedly received funds from the ISI indicates. Although this list has been published a number of times before, the issue here is why it has been brought up at this point. Interestingly, a revelation made more than a year ago by the US-based Pakistani author Shuja Nawaz in his book Crossed Swords that included names like Hafeez Pirzada did not get much publicity. This is not to argue that politicians are not corrupt. In fact, the problem is that politicians in this country, like the military leadership, have engaged in questionable and compromising behaviour. However, the point being raised here is that it is only the stories of unfriendly politicians that are leaked or brought up again from time to time and then built upon in the media. So, the present PPP leadership understands the cost of exposing Musharraf who will certainly be protected by his own institution, a facility that others in this polity do not have. A better option would be to get all politicians to clean up their act. For instance, the MMA government in the Frontier province used religion as a ploy against the federal government every time it had to bail itself out of a tough corner. Clearly, there is always a list of favourite versus not-so-favourite politicians. The list, which is pulled out for the public eye, depends on who is not in favour with the establishment at a given time. This is a sad state of affairs where neither the establishment nor the politicians can be said to be above board. All that is left is for the stakeholders to play the game of survival. [B][I]The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst. [email]ayesha.ibd@gmail.com[/email][/I][/B] |
[B][U][CENTER][COLOR="DarkGreen"][SIZE="5"][FONT="Georgia"]River of fire[/FONT][/SIZE][/COLOR][/CENTER][/U][/B]
[B]By Ayesha Siddiqa Friday, 04 Sep, 2009[/B] LISTENING to criticism and appreciation of Jaswant Singh I was reminded of a conversation I had a few months ago with a Baloch nationalist who was trying to explain to me how an independent Balochistan would happily build links with the independent states of Punjab, Sindh and Pakhtunkhwa. I was amused to see his calm expression as he talked about post-independence interaction in a civil manner. He did not seem to appreciate for a minute that there would be rivers of fire flowing any new partition in the region. Perhaps, the Baloch nationalist leader was forgetting that 62 years after partition people have still not managed to avoid the pitfalls. The story of Jaswant Singh’s book exposes the mindset of the people. I do not plan to comment on the book. Instead, this is a commentary on attitudes observed after the book’s publication. The Bharatiya Janata Party threw out one of its key members and there were many others in India who reacted sharply to Jaswant Singh’s analysis. Obviously, the BJP and others in the same mould didn’t even read the book else they might have seen that Singh was, in fact, being fair in analysing partition. Equally quick were those in Pakistan whose commentary was that Singh’s fate depicted Indian imperialism and intolerance. One would like to remind such people of two other books that received similar treatment. The first one, which is closer to Jaswant Singh’s book, is Ayesha Jalal’s The Sole Spokesman about Jinnah and partition. This book had generated controversy. I distinctly remember angry reactions from some who thought Jalal had committed sacrilege by arguing that Jinnah did not have a grand plan for the partition of India. Ayesha Jalal was luckier than the great Urdu novelist and short-story writer Qurratulain Hyder. The reaction to her novel Aag ka Darya from certain rightwing quarters was severe. Pro-establishment intellectuals were upset that her novel did not take a position for the Muslims. Her narrative included the lives of both Hindu and Muslim characters — the way they lived, their sociology and politics — who were not very different from one another. For the rightwingers, it was atrocious for Qurratulain Hyder not to have described the Muslims as the ultimate victims. It is apparent that many, especially the religious and political right, are not able to cross the blazing rivers of imagination to a place where the ‘other’ cannot be described as a victim or praised. It is difficult to admit but a lot of us in South Asia are extremely intolerant when it comes to the ‘other’. Partition was a collective experience in which all sorts suffered. I remember chatting with the Sikhs in Amritsar, hailing from my mother’s neighborhood. In 2006, I sat chatting with men and women about Muslims who lived there before 1947. They had fond memories. The reality is that the Hindus who migrated from Pakistan to post-partition India were actually the foreigners with behaviour patterns that the people in this neighbourhood were not used to. The story on the other side of the border was similar. People had to learn to live with total strangers! During our conversation I asked one old Sikh gentleman why then was there such killing and bloodshed. It all seemed like an accident to him. According to him, the carnage was the reaction of a mob to the news of the arrival of trains from across the border full of dead bodies of Sikhs and Hindus. I am sure the gentleman, his family, elders, friends and neighbours did not know then that people on the other side had heard similar tales and had reacted in the same fashion. Collectively and individually, people from the northern tip of the subcontinent engaged in mass killings that they then tried to explain away by making demons out of the other side. I am reminded of the story of a calm and collected gentleman with an extremely gentle appearance. In the last days of his life he confided to his family how he had killed a family hailing from a different faith. In our six-decade history, we as a people on both sides of the border have not managed to face the reality regarding our involvement in acts of brutality, nor have we tried to investigate where and how the carnage started. Such a historical inquiry, which is still possible, is necessary for a closure of our past bitterness — imperative for crossing the river of fire. Some of us might even wonder if it is any use conducting such an inquiry as we might have crossed the Rubicon and may no longer be in a position to bring about peace in the region. A phenomenal development in the past couple of decades has been the transformation of the Indian-Pakistan dispute from a territorial to an ideological one. The new generation on both sides has been fed on the belief that the ‘other’ never intended any good. So, while there still is some fascination to visit the other side — places one has seen in films or heard about — the divide has now become almost impassable. I can speak about the experience of teaching in at least one public-sector university in Pakistan where children did not even think it necessary to build cultural ties. We have to admit that in these so many years we have managed to extend the river of fire rather than build a bridge across it. And so, what some writers have to say might create temporary excitement but it later falls on deaf ears. I wonder whether the Baloch leader would appreciate the loss that nations and civilisations create for themselves. [B][I]The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst. [email]ayesha.ibd@gmail.com[/email][/I][/B] |
[B][U][CENTER][COLOR="DarkGreen"][SIZE="5"][FONT="Georgia"]The Steel Mills case[/FONT][/SIZE][/COLOR][/CENTER][/U][/B]
[B]By Ayesha Siddiqa Friday, 11 Sep, 2009[/B] SO, the media has now become a tool for better governance. At least this is the impression one gets from the prime minister’s recent sacking of the Pakistan Steel Mills’ (PSM) chairman for his alleged corruption and making the concern lose Rs21bn. Interestingly, Moeen Aftab Sheikh was removed even before an inquiry was instituted or a report submitted about his supposed wrongdoings. Legally, this hurried action would be considered mala fide since no charge-sheet was brought against the gentleman and the decision was taken before the inquiry report. The case raises two fundamental questions: first, does the decision indicate the government’s concern for accountability, or does it indicate its inability to run a business and appreciate the problems caused by economic recession? Or perhaps the objective was merely to get rid of the chairman, an officer with an unblemished career in government for 35 years. Second, was the media fair in embarking upon a witch-hunt without ascertaining the facts of the case? The government still does not know the exact losses, as there are varied figures. It’s the PSM management which estimated the concern’s losses at Rs21bn. However, the estimate given in the special report of the auditor-general gives a lower figure of Rs9bn. Also, why did Mr Gilani not wait for the report from the PSM’s auditors? This was the prime minister’s opportunity to earn kudos from the public for taking someone out without taking the trouble to explain to the media that the huge loss was not caused by individual corruption but was a result of global economic recession. This is not the first time that PSM has incurred huge losses. The organisation had run an accumulated loss of over Rs20bn for the period 1985-90 and 1993-99, which could have been paid off when the mill started making money from 2001-02 to 2008. Unfortunately, PSM fell on bad times again due to a slump in the international market after April 2008. Another misfortune was the absence of a national steel policy, which meant that there was no plan to bail out the national steel-making concern. The government did not make any effort to stop the customs department from allowing private importers from importing secondary steel at the lower import price meant for primary steel. This scam meant that the private sector could undercut the PSM as they managed to import and sell low-grade steel at around Rs40,000 per tonne compared to the PSM’s Rs42,000 per tonne, thus earning a mark-up of at least Rs10,000-12,000. An additional problem was caused by the dumping of 0.5 million tonnes of steel by the ship-breakers and electricity loadshedding, which forced numerous downstream industries dependent on PSM to close down. So, orders for about 300,000 tonnes of steel were cancelled. The Steel Mills’ management was stuck with an inventory of Rs9bn, which it tried to dispose of by altering the marketing strategy. The decision was taken during a meeting attended by the chairman and members of the finance and accounts, commercial and marketing departments, the minutes of which were duly recorded. Instead of selling according to a quota system, a policy of open sales was introduced. This meant that major investors could pick up large quantities of steel and help PSM stay afloat. The main beneficiaries of the new policy were five different concerns: Metropolitan, Amreli, Abbas Engineering, Al-Abbas Steel and Abbas Steel. Contrary to the belief that the lowering of prices was meant to benefit one of President Zardari’s close friends, there were a total of 232 beneficiaries. Interestingly, the friend (Riaz Lalji) continues to be a significant buyer even after Aftab Sheikh’s sacking due to his greater production capacity rather than anything else. The decision to lower prices was meant to save the mill. Industrial experts are of the view that shutting PSM is not a possibility because restarting it would not only be technologically difficult but also cost approximately Rs20bn. Meanwhile, the government would have to foot the bill for PSM’s 17,000 employees, which stands at about Rs600m per month. In any case, the open sale policy was meant to solve the liquidity problem for which the management also used workers’ gratuity. This is not odd since all public and private sector firms do so. The Karachi shipyard under the navy’s management had also done the same in the mid-1990s to stay afloat. Using funds like gratuity or the contractor’s seed money is a done thing for a business concern, especially for the PSM, which badly needs funds for its modernisation. The Steel Mills is 25 years old with a limited production capacity of a million tonnes. Its British consultant Corus had advised its increasing capacity to about three million tonnes for the concern to become profitable. Resultantly, the management signed an MoU with the Chinese firm MCC which would not become binding unless approved by the ministry of industries and production. It is a misplaced accusation that the government was being forced to incur a debt of Rs2.2bn since no final agreement was signed and there was nothing binding on the government until MCC produced a feasibility study. Had the media seen the MoU, they would have found that the document was not binding on the government until certain conditions were met. In any case, investment for development purposes is not money lost. Equally baseless is the accusation about the management making money from a contract with the Railways since nothing was signed. There is also no evidence of corruption since all procurement was done in accordance with the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (PPRA) regulations and implemented by the committee formed by the government. The accusation of higher prices being paid for raw material and freight is a fallacy since the price of coal, iron ore and coke varies in the international market and the management had to adapt to the changes, which it could not do all the time being a public-sector organisation. Perhaps what is needed is an inquiry into what the government achieved with its sudden and artificial show of justice. More importantly, is the media above board and should it be allowed to lynch people without a proper hearing which is the norm in civilised societies? [B][I]The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst.[/I][/B] [B][I]ayesha.ibd@gmail.com[/I][/B] |
[B][U][CENTER][COLOR="DarkGreen"][SIZE="5"][FONT="Georgia"]Corporate farming[/FONT][/SIZE][/COLOR][/CENTER][/U][/B]
[B]By Ayesha Siddiqa Friday, 18 Sep, 2009[/B] RECENTLY, a controversy has emerged regarding the government’s plan to lease or sell land to foreign clients in order to increase agricultural productivity and earn money. Both the federal and Punjab governments seem keen on the plan. But what this entails and what the likely cost of such a move will be is worth assessing. In principle the idea seems fine. Conceptually, it would bring greater investment, especially development of agricultural infrastructure, create more jobs in the rural areas and contribute to the country’s economy. It would probably be better than begging before the ‘Friends of Pakistan’ or other donors. However, the extent of benefits that Pakistan will accrue from this proposal depends on the management of the concept. The government plans to offer about 700,000 acres of land to potential investors probably from Saudi Arabia and the UAE. At the moment it is not clear what methodology will be used for the purpose. Will it just involve state land or include private land as well? This is not the first time the idea of corporate farming has been floated in government circles. Reportedly, it was discussed during Pervez Musharraf’s time with the option of leasing land to the Chinese. Beijing had proposed that it be leased 2,000 acres of land for a period of 10 to 15 years with the agreement that China would make technological and financial investments in the land, invest in newer forms of seeds and other products and leave the new infrastructure to the state or the owners after the termination of the contract. Further changes were recommended by people in the government, suggesting that the investors sign agreements with individual owners guaranteeing their continued ownership with the additional advantage of an annual share in the profits. This would be in addition to providing them with the existing level of income at the time. While the negotiations with China fell through, the present government seems to have moved to other potential clients like Saudi Arabia and the UAE. There are different stories regarding the formulas being offered to foreign investors. The first story is about the government leasing state land in Cholistan (Punjab) and Balochistan to foreign contractors. Apparently, the Punjab agriculture minister confirmed that about 600,000 acres of land was offered in Cholistan, which was rejected due to brackish water in the region. There are also stories of the government helping private companies from the two aforementioned countries acquire land from private owners to grow vegetables and other crops, which would be exported to their own countries. It was suggested that the government could provide some sort of tax holiday and have security units protect the leased/sold land. Such suggestions raise questions. First, why would the government provide any financial concessions to these investors, especially if it plans to make money? It doesn’t make any sense, especially when they will take away the produce to their own countries. Second, why would the government need to have security contingents if there is no contestable claim over the land or if the entire arrangement is reached amicably? Or is it that land would be taken forcibly from at least some people, which would make both Islamabad and the contracting countries anxious about retaliation? There is a basic problem with leasing or selling land to Middle Eastern or Gulf states – these countries already have stakes in Pakistan’s real estate. For instance, for years large tracts of land in Cholistan have been earmarked for different rulers from the Gulf, who use the land as hunting grounds and have built mansions in the area. The story doesn’t end here. These rulers are said to have developed their own set of cronies in the host state and one wonders what influence they would exert with greater involvement in Pakistan’s real estate. The Gulf states and Saudi Arabia now seem to have the capability to remote-control events in Pakistan as we saw recently when King Abdullah comforted Pervez Musharraf and gave an audience to Nawaz Sharif. Political economy also has to do with these linkages, particularly at the lower level. The capital and political influence brought in by these rulers creates local-level partnerships as well, many of which can be seen in south Punjab. In one case, for instance, a Musharraf-regime minister for state from the area partnered a main agent of the Abu Dhabi ruling elite to set up a sugar mill. The relationships between the ruling elite of these states and their links in Pakistan are generally so secretive that it raises concerns about what would possibly come out of the deal. The deal itself could create a cartel in agriculture, which might only benefit the bigger or politically significant landowners. With so much secrecy surrounding negotiations there is a possibility that smaller or mid-level farmers may not benefit. The politically influential landowners would not only get better arrangements but also become partners in the deal. This would also include the numerous military generals who have land in and around Cholistan. Not familiar with farming and probably not making a lot of money at the moment, these individuals would be only too happy with such an arrangement. Equally happy would be bigger landowners of the area, who, in any case, capitalise on available resources and use contacts to maximise profits from their land. For instance, fruit export is a profitable venture, but its greatest beneficiaries are the bigger landowners who also seem to be pushing the idea of leasing land to foreign firms. Currently, the problem is that the resources to develop agriculture are monopolised. Perhaps creating a system where most farmers have access to resources would benefit agriculture more than the formula under consideration. Leasing land in this fashion may just add to Pakistan’s reputation as a banana republic. [B][I]The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst. [email]ayesha.ibd@gmail.com[/email][/I][/B] |
[B][U][COLOR="DarkGreen"][SIZE="5"][FONT="Georgia"][CENTER]The military’s ideology[/CENTER][/FONT][/SIZE][/COLOR][/U][/B]
[B]By Ayesha Siddiqa Friday, 25 Sep, 2009[/B] The country’s ruling elite and the military have traditionally used a particular aspect of religion to gain strategic dividends. —File Photo PAKISTAN observers often wonder what the Pakistan military’s primary ideology is. Is it a secular institution or one which is high on religious values? Since the military is considered the strongest institution of the Pakistani state, the question becomes critical in determining what direction the country will take or how its armed forces will fight the war on terror. One particular perspective is that the military is essentially a secular institution which got transformed temporarily under Gen Ziaul Haq, who made sure that his officers had a religious grounding. He had allowed the tableeghi jamaat to penetrate the armed forces and introduced a religiously conservative current in society. Subsequently, the Zia era was blamed for the continued links between certain military personnel and the Taliban post-9/11. Later, it was argued that Gen Pervez Musharraf put the military back on the secular track by weeding out religious-minded, senior officers replacing them with others who were socially acceptable to the international community. In fact, senior officers now claim that the military is highly professional and secular. This is correct in that ‘secular’ in this case means that the army is not driven purely by religious instincts in pursuing its goals. But then ‘religious’ or ‘secular’ are not the right terms to describe the organisation. Indeed, if one is searching for the correct term, it would be pragmatic-nationalist. This means that instead of sticking to one ideology the institution can shift between a couple or more ideologies at the same time. So, when it was convenient to turn religiously ideological during the 1980s it could do so. Even Gen Zia was not solely driven by his personal inclination to support the Afghan ‘jihad’; the geo-strategic and geopolitical environment was important in the framing of decisions. There was no dichotomy between pursuing jihad and having a strategic alignment with the US even then. Zia also found religious ideology handy in pursuing other military-strategic goals. Deploying non-state actors was financially, politically and militarily cost-effective. Hence, all generals maintained links with the jihadis despite the fact that they were different from Zia. The pragmatist-nationalist character of the military also explains why it was able to swiftly shift between ideologies, especially after it had to undergo a change in the wake of 9/11. This also means that maintaining links with the different jihadi organisations, as explained by Arif Jamal in Shadow War: the Untold Story of Jihad in Kashmir, does not necessarily depend on having a religious ideology. The author’s interesting conclusion is that even seemingly ‘secular’ generals like the present chief, Gen Ashfaq Kayani, could pursue the same policy as the generals during the 1990s. Jamal claims that a lot of jihadi organisations were thrilled to hear of the appointment of Gen Kayani as the new chief and many reopened their offices in 2008. He also argues that several meetings were arranged between the various Afghan Taliban groups and the Kashmiri jihadis in 2007 by the ISI to help them with a strategy to stop Indian help from reaching Hamid Karzai’s government in Kabul and placing more sleeper cells in India for possible activation at later dates. This argument explains the character of the Pakistan Army and its use of religion or at least one aspect of it, namely jihad, for its strategic advantage. There is nothing odd in the argument since the military was part of what was described by Hamza Alavi as the Muslim salariat class, which used religion to motivate a movement for an independent state. The fact is that this class was always linked to the use of religious ideology. It might not want to adopt a Saudi model for state-making, though the Pakistani state has gradually moved closer to Saudi Arabia, but religion has always remained central to the fulfilment of the strategic goals of the salariat, which later evolved into the ruling elite. This basically meant that while the Islamic norms of social justice might not be adopted, religious identity would be used in some form to meet political and military-strategic objectives. Jamal’s argument is that like all such plans that generate opportunity costs, the jihadis of today, who seem to be challenging the Pakistani state, are inadvertently a product of a specific plan to fight the war in Kashmir. The camps where Ajmal Qasab and others were trained by the Lashkar-i-Taiba to carry out the Mumbai attacks, the author claims, were set up by the ISI to win the war in Kashmir. Even if the attack was not ordered by the intelligence agency, it indicates a situation where the jihadis trained for a particular purpose might have used their training to carry out attacks on their own or gone beyond the brief. Obviously, the military always had to use religion as a motivating factor from the time when Col Akhtar Malik planned the first offensive to capture Kashmir in 1947/48 to the 1980s and 1990s when, according to Jamal, a lot of new jihadi organisations were established. Gen Ayub Khan adopted a similar approach while planning the historic but failed Operation Gibraltar in 1965. However, the military was not the only force which used the above-mentioned approach. Even seemingly liberal-secular leaders like Zulfikar Ali Bhutto favoured the policy of using non-state actors to the country’s perceived military advantage. For instance, Bhutto personally came to congratulate the hijackers of an Indian Airlines flight in January 1971. It is important to remember that the use of non-state actors was part of a larger package of mixing religion with state strategy. In adopting this approach Bhutto might have not been too far off from Ziaul Haq who, as Jamal argues, developed an alignment with the Jamaat-i-Islami to support the Afghan jihad and to use that as a cover for strengthening the army’s war in Kashmir. The country’s ruling elite and the military have traditionally used a particular aspect of religion to gain strategic dividends. While they can conveniently claim to have retained their secularism and saved one organisation from turning ideological, a similar claim might not be made for society at large. The proliferation of ‘jihad’ in mainland Pakistan is but the opportunity cost of strategy. The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst. [email]ayesha.ibd@gmail.com[/email] |
[B][U][CENTER][COLOR="DarkGreen"][SIZE="5"][FONT="Georgia"]An alternative discourse[/FONT][/SIZE][/COLOR][/CENTER][/U][/B]
[B]By Ayesha Siddiqa Friday, 02 Oct, 2009[/B] [B]A Few months ago, I met a three-member team from a UK-based think tank called Quilliam. Based in London, the organisation claims to be the first counter-terrorism think tank in the world. It was started by two young Muslims, Ed Hussain and Maajid Nawaz, who were formerly part of the Islamist organisation Hizbut Tahrir (HT). They are now dedicated to weaning Muslim youth away from global jihad and towards peace.[/B] It was interesting listening to Maajid Nawaz who had come to Pakistan to talk about his experience as a member of HT. He said he used to visit Pakistan to recruit people in the military and in government for the global jihad. It was during a period of incarceration that Nawaz said he saw the light and decided to wean people away from jihad. Luckily for the two men, the British government was able to provide funding to set up Quilliam. Now they both go around the world with a missionary zeal to spread another kind of message. Their aim is also to bridge the gap between the Muslim world and the West. The Quilliam team’s trip to Pakistan was aimed at visiting universities where Maajid Nawaz spoke to students about how he was wrong in supporting global jihad. Earlier, the organisation had funded a conference of the vice-chancellors of various Pakistani universities to convince them of the project that Nawaz later undertook. The organisation is certainly an interesting idea. But it might not take off in the Muslim world because of its inherent shortcomings. To start with, the think tank has no input from within the Muslim world, which makes it a foreign concept. The problem is that a foreign idea tends to attract negative attention. Quilliam seems to represent the foreign frustration at the lack of an alternative discourse in the Muslim world. It has tried to start the discourse by providing these former HT members with a forum. However, the lack of real contacts inside the Muslim world turns this into a venture without depth. For instance, in their eagerness to establish contacts and work amongst the youth, Quilliam has partnered organisations in Pakistan with little or no credibility. Another noticeable flaw is that since it is unable to get respectable names from the Muslim world on board, the organisation will not be able to achieve much to please its donors. Besides the two names mentioned earlier, there is no significant name on Quilliam’s team that would generate positive attention. It would be foolhardy to pretend that there is no scope of an alternative debate of ideas in the Muslim world or people are not capable of doing that. Quilliam could, in fact, build itself as a neutral forum to develop ideas across the Muslim world or even between the Muslim world and the West. Surely, a well-funded organisation can make better use of its resources than just telling the HT story. At a conceptual level there are two issues worth considering. First, an alternative discourse to curb violence will have to see that rebellion within the Muslim world is partly (if not entirely) driven by a post-colonial discourse, especially where the Muslim population is faced with brutality and is struggling for survival. People in such places cannot be dissuaded from fighting militarily until and unless there is also a new discourse on the other side regarding the solution of the problem. More importantly, in many places the post-colonial discourse dovetails into an anti-imperialist debate. The problem is that religion becomes a tool that people don’t want to abandon because of the absence of an alternative ideology or set of ideas. Second, it goes without saying that there is a real need for a new discourse within the Muslim world on numerous issues starting from the concept of the state, war and peace to social norms and economic life. Historically, the Muslim world was progressive due to the independence of academic institutions when it came to arriving at new concepts. Even in the recent past institutions like Al Azhar in Egypt were to be taken note of for encouraging new ideas. However, it is also a fact that the formulation of ideas in the Muslim world has stopped or taken a peculiar direction as far as political thought is concerned. The bulk of the interpretation of religious texts has been driven by the post-colonial ethos of societies and thinkers. At this juncture, there is an urgent need in the Muslim world to think anew about a lot of issues, not to appease the West, but to contribute to the internal political discourse. Issues such as the link between religion and politics in an Islamic state or war and conflict involving a Muslim state, or the position of non-Muslims in an Islamic state are matters which require a rethink. It is not that finding a new direction is not possible. For instance, there have been Muslim scholars in the past such as Abd Al-Razik at Al Azhar who came up with revolutionary ideas regarding the political character of a Muslim state, especially in the context of the link between religion and politics. Though his ideas in the 1930s were not pursued as they were considered too revolutionary, there are newer thinkers who have contributed fresh input to the concept of an Islamic state. It is unfortunate that most of this discussion is taking place outside the Muslim world by Muslim scholars. It needs to be brought into and made part of the mainstream. Perhaps organisations such as Quilliam could become a forum for the exchange of ideas, rather than just doing what many might regard as a foreign conspiracy. But then, one is also forced to wonder why, despite the riches of the Muslim world, we are unable to create a forum that would allow Muslims to talk amongst themselves and voice new ideas. Of course Muslim states in the Middle East and the Gulf fund research initiatives at foreign universities such as the Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies. However, it is important to bring new ideas and discussion to the heart of the Muslim world if a change is to be brought about or if the social and political development of Muslims is the goal. Until new ideas are generated and discussed, Muslims can hardly hope to flourish or progress. The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst. [email]ayesha.ibd@gmail.com[/email] |
[B][U][CENTER][COLOR="DarkGreen"][SIZE="5"][FONT="Georgia"]Jihad and the state[/FONT][/SIZE][/COLOR][/CENTER][/U][/B]
[B]By Ayesha Siddiqa Friday, 09 Oct, 2009[/B] Pakistan’s support today is central to winning the war on terror. Hence, American aid is meant to encourage the political government and, to a certain extent, the military to cleanse the country of the thousands of jihadis that have been in Pakistan since the 1980s. The strategy might work to a degree in eliminating some groups. Indeed Pakistan’s support is critical in reducing the size and subsequently the threat posed by terror networks like Al-Qaeda. The current assessment is that the terror outfit has in fact reduced in size and is partly relocating to Africa. But this is not an indicator that the battle has been completely won. To vanquish the faceless enemy, the US and its allies have to achieve the harder goal of winning hearts and minds without which the war on terror is not winnable. This is because terror networks are difficult to locate, especially when they have society’s support. The problem right now is that while people in Pakistan might be anxious regarding some Taliban groups on a killing spree in the country, neither they nor the state in its entirety have complete faith in America’s war on terror or its presence in the region. While institutions of the state have problems due to the manner in which the US chooses to fight the war, a common perception is that the Taliban imposed the war on Pakistan due to the US presence. So, to many the Taliban and jihadis essentially represent a struggle against American imperialism in Afghanistan. What, of course, goes hand in hand with such perceptions is the view that 9/11 was an American conspiracy to invade Afghanistan, the key to Central Asia. These are interesting times when the religious right begins to look like the left. The battle for hearts and minds is essentially a part of the exercise of making the war legitimate. Currently, the argument presented by some in Pakistan, including certain prominent televangelists, is that America’s war essentially represents a clash of civilisations and is being imposed on Pakistan by an illegitimate government on behalf of the US. Notwithstanding the general suspicion regarding the US, there are two issues that need attention when it comes to the debate on what a ‘just war’ is in the Muslim world. Firstly, what is a just war in Islam? According to some, a just war is one which is fought for the defence of Islam or for extending the religion to other parts of the world. The thinking goes that since the war on terror has been imposed by the US by falsely accusing Al Qaeda for 9/11, the struggle against it is legitimate. It would certainly add to everyone’s knowledge if Pakistani authorities disclosed how Khaled Sheikh Mohammad, who was interrogated by Pakistani forces before being handed over to America, confessed to his involvement in the bombing of the World Trade Centre. Those that oppose the war on terror create the same categories as those that support the war of the ‘bad’ Taliban versus the ‘good’ Taliban. The latter are those fighting American hegemony in South Asia or other parts of the world. The bad ones are those that attack Pakistan on the behest of the US or Indian intelligence agencies. It becomes imperative for all Muslims to fight the US, which is threatening the survival of the Islamic civilisation, while Pakistan is considered the citadel of Islam. So, people are caught between their dislike for violence imposed internally and the message coming from certain quarters that this violence is actually caused by the American presence in the region. Consequently, the situation would improve after America’s withdrawal from Afghanistan and Pakistan. Such perspectives received greater support after Washington’s needless expansion of the war to Iraq. But then there is no consensus on what a just war is. Over the years, the concept of jihad has been through several interpretations depending on the times. Today, there is no consensus amongst the community of believers regarding the legitimacy of war. One of the important issues pertains to the question of who has the authority to wage a war. Is it the state or the individual’s responsibility? This question is not easy to answer as it is directly connected with another equally complex matter regarding the nature and legitimacy of the state. The fact is that most religious opinions on war involving the individual citizen pertain to times when scholars had responded to external invasions and considered their own governments to be lacking in legitimacy to represent the people. The current times, unfortunately, don’t appear very different. However, the issue requires further thought even if the US left the region. This brings me to the second issue of what a legitimate Islamic state is, a matter that has a direct bearing on whether the public would support the war or not. For the US, the battle to win hearts and minds becomes even more problematic considering that people in most countries of the Muslim world are not happy with their governments. This is certainly true in Pakistan where there is a lot of confusion about who has the right to govern. The rampant corruption of the leadership adds fuel to the fire of the arguments of those who believe and profess that democracy is not suited to an Islamic system of government. Some televangelists in Pakistan, who are gaining popularity amongst the educated middle-class youth, argue that democracy as a system is foreign to Islam and hence must be abolished. Naturally, a state established on what they consider the wrong principles does not have the right to decide on which side of the fence it wants to fight. These self-appointed preachers present a specific view on the politics of the state as if there is no space for any other perspective. Indeed, there is an ongoing debate on the relationship between politics and religion. While the concept of caliphate was supported historically, modern Muslim scholars such as Al Razik and Abdullah An-Na’im talk about the possibility of the separation of religion and politics which would allow for newer methods of selecting a government. A debate on the aforementioned issues is no guarantee that the situation would immediately turn around for the US in Afghanistan. But it may save the world from protracted conflict on other fronts. The clash of civilisations is an ugly phenomenon and discussion in Muslim societies will help world peace. [B][I]The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst. [email]ayesha.ibd@gmail.com[/email][/I][/B] |
[B][U][CENTER][COLOR="DarkGreen"][SIZE="5"][FONT="Georgia"]On different wavelengths[/FONT][/SIZE][/COLOR][/CENTER][/U][/B]
[B]By Ayesha Siddiqa Friday, 16 Oct, 2009[/B] THE recent attack on GHQ and yesterday’s attacks in Lahore and Kohat and the government’s response to these incidents reminded one of the days after the terrorist attack on Islamabad’s Marriott Hotel. There were some in the government who referred to the incident as Pakistan’s 9/11. While that particular date in American history can be interpreted in several ways, its greatest significance lies in the fact that it brought the state and society in the US on the same page as far as fighting the war against terror was concerned. Did we manage to achieve this consensus on Sept 20 last year? Perhaps not. But this is where the catch lies. The enemy is far more intelligent than what some of our television commentators would like us to believe. In the GHQ case, the terrorists not only understood the strategic value of attacking at the heart of the army’s power base, they also appeared to understand the chasm between the state and society and within the state at several levels. The attackers understand the civilian-military divide better than a lot of people who talk about a new era of civilian-military relations in the country and boast about the two sides being on the same page. They probably understand that the civilian government might pretend to be powerful but that it depends on externally borrowed power and that in the case of friction between the two centres of power, it is the civilians who would back off. This was most obvious from the fact that instead of raising some critical questions after the attack on GHQ, all that the president and prime minister could do was congratulate Gen Ashfaq Kayani on the excellent handling of the crisis. There is no doubt that the nation is saddened by the death of unarmed officers and soldiers, and supports any action to punish those who carried out the attack. But the entire event ought to be discussed threadbare without any mudslinging. Why was it that 10 men penetrated a highly guarded area and remained ensconced in GHQ for about 19 hours, especially when the army’s high command was in the premises? There are two important issues here. First, the Pakistan Army, which is trained mainly in conventional warfare and fighting state forces, is not well trained in counter-insurgency operations. This explains why despite being armed with G3s and other types of infantry equipment the force guarding GHQ could not respond properly. Hence, this capacity must be beefed up at the earliest. Second, the connection of the key planner Aqeel, alias Dr Usman, with the army medical stores is a reminder of the problem that could perhaps prevail in pockets inside the rest of the military. This pertains to the religio-political inclinations of individual civil and military officials and officers that directly or indirectly support the jihadis. Aqeel’s is not a unique case. Earlier there was Major Haroon Ashiq alleged to be involved in the murder of Gen Faisal Alavi. He was linked with one of the Punjab-based militant outfits. His capture led the police and agencies to other retired officers who had split from the Lashkar-i-Taiba and were waging ‘jihad’ on their own. We must also not forget the air force officials and officers involved in the first attack on the former president Gen Pervez Musharraf. Reportedly, the agencies were forced to go deep within the PAF in search of people connected to different militant outfits or the tableeghi jamaat. At this point, how sure are we that all older links between the jihadis and individuals in the police or military have been snapped? Instead of eulogising the army, parliament should be carefully looking at and questioning the old linkages from the perspective of having a handle on the problem of ‘jihadism’ and what it means for the state. ISPR director general Maj-Gen Athar Abbas stated that the attackers had planned to use the hostages to negotiate the release of about 100 terrorists. Reportedly, there are about 400 terrorists in different jails. Some of the more high-profile detainees are believed to include Malik Ishaq, head of the Lashkar-i-Jhangvi (LJ) and Qari Saifullah Akhtar, head of the Hizb-ul-Jihad Islami. The government must now look at its preparedness and the capacity to protect its high-value detainees. Although the military and government now seem inclined to consider other reasons for the attack, such as the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan trying to avenge Baitullah Mehsud’s death, the rescue of high-value terrorists seems to be the primary reason, which must not be ignored at any cost. It must not be forgotten that the attack on the Sri Lankan team in Lahore was also meant to take hostages who could then be exchanged for top jihadis. Sources even claim that the LJ’s Malik Ishaq was involved in the earlier case and had decided to use the attack to get himself freed after the elected Punjab government failed to deliver on a mutual agreement between LJ and the PML-N leadership. What’s equally interesting is the fact that there is an effort by those in power to ignore or divert attention from areas which are as infested with extremist militants as Fata and the tribal areas. The sudden effort to get policemen from most districts of south Punjab to deny the existence of the jihadi problem in their areas is a reaction similar to when the government denied the Pakistani connections of the Mumbai attackers even before investigating the matter. The denial is strange since most of the attacks in Punjab or the federal capital are believed to be provoked or carried out by Punjabis or Punjab-based militant outfits. Perhaps the fear is that this might divert international attention towards Punjab or make ordinary Pakistanis think about the reasons why jihadis have spread terror across Pakistan and not confined themselves to the tribal areas as the authorities would like us to believe. Interestingly, even the ISPR’s emphasis is that the attack might have involved Punjabis but that it was carried out at the behest of the Pakhtun Taliban. It is indeed important to fight militants in Waziristan who are influenced by Al Qaeda, but why does it have to be at the cost of ignoring the Punjab-based outfits who are proving to be good hosts for the terrorist network? Sources believe that Al Qaeda has trickled into areas bordering Punjab. These outfits operate beyond the Pakhtun-inhabited tribal areas and their threat is evident from the sectarian killings in Dera Ismail Khan and other places. There is a possibility that the civilian government might lose the initiative in an urge to appease the military and the latter might just lose the initiative to act against those that were part of the GHQ attack for unexplained strategic reasons. This raises the question of how much bloodshed would there be before strategic re-evaluation. [B][I]The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst. [email]ayesha.ibd@gmail.com[/email][/I][/B] |
[B][U][CENTER][COLOR="DarkGreen"][SIZE="5"][FONT="Georgia"]Diet of negativity[/FONT][/SIZE][/COLOR][/CENTER][/U][/B]
[B]By Ayesha Siddiqa Friday, 23 Oct, 2009 [/B] As the government fights its battle against terror, different trends are emerging which will shape society. It would be fair to argue that the current battle being fought by Pakistan, the way it is being fought and its eventual outcome will determine whether society remains liberal, marginally liberal or tips over in the other direction. It is important to point out what these terminologies mean. The term ‘liberal’ has nothing to do with western values. It refers to the notion of tolerance and multi-polarity which were once the hallmark of the entire South Asian region. The opposite of this is not necessarily extremism but an attitude that varies between conservatism and extremism, in which there is little space for an alternative viewpoint and where society becomes extremely inward-looking. This, in turn, means a society that has little or no capacity to learn from history or review its own behaviour towards others. In perhaps the next decade or so we will be looking at a new generation of leaders comprising today’s youth. The capacity of this generation to understand liberal values in their true spirit has dwindled. It is assumed that being liberal means pursuing western values, which is a wrong interpretation. However, youth who do not subscribe to the above have moved in a confused direction. Where are they headed? Is it social conservatism or conservative nationalism? The new generation may turn out to be xenophobic, inward-looking and negatively nationalistic. This means their ability to review their own behaviour, especially at the national level, would not be adequate. They would not consider their own flaws with the perspective of correcting them. They would feel they are facing a hostile world which has to be fought. They may not believe in peaceful coexistence and tolerance. Would such behaviour be considered odd? Probably not, because this is what they have learnt. Caught between the devil and the deep blue sea, the youth are frustrated by years of corrupt rule and poor governance and the negative reputation the country has acquired in the past couple of decades and more. When they try to understand what is happening to them and the country, there are influenced by those who would like them to believe that Pakistan is a target of an international conspiracy to destroy it and take away its crown jewels: the state’s nuclear weapons. For them, the Kerry-Lugar bill and the interaction between ‘white’ foreigners and local people fit into the heinous plan. The conditions in the bill (now an act) — particularly the terms pertaining to civilian control of the military — are a ploy to weaken the country’s only institution. The military subscribes to this conspiracy theory as well because, as suggested by the grapevine, there are those in the organisation who believe that the president would like to destroy the institution to strengthen himself. But even if we imagine this to be true, the fact is that most national leaders (barring the religious right) believe that strengthening civilian rule is directly proportionate to weakening the military, at least politically. Even Nawaz Sharif, whose effort to limit the milita ry’s power led to a confrontation with the then army chief, subscribed to this belief. The conspiracy theory mentioned above trickles down to the youth as well, which is natural due to society having become militaristic. But the more important thing is that the new heroes of the upcoming generation take the shape of rabid evangelists who do not draw upon a positive or constructive plan but build their case on past failures. In some cases there is constant reference to the golden days of Islam. Indubitably, there were many renowned scholars who were Muslim. However, what is not told to today’s youth is that these scholars were individuals who could thrive due to the general level of tolerance and multi-polarity in society, which allowed these people to excel. Otherwise empires are neither Muslim, Christian or of any other religion. It’s just that the rulers use religion to manipulate people and gain legitimacy. A nation’s greatness is not something that passes down from generation to generation. It depends on its ability to motivate people to create and be generally innovative. A society that does not have tolerance loses the ability to be creative in the positive sense.Moreover, states have rivals. In view of the realist paradigm states try to maximise their gains by building power, which leads to confrontation and the desire to minimise the power of others. So it shouldn’t come as a surprise that foreign powers would want to influence some of Pakistan’s political decisions, especially those that affect the interests of others. However, Pakistan’s destruction does not benefit anyone. A compliant state entity is easier to manage than a chaotic and fragmented polity. Taking control of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons is too high a risk for anyone. But it is also a reality that driven by their need to have compliant decision-making by Islamabad, foreign powers have traditionally partnered governments and encouraged bad governance and corruption. This is done without understanding that such governments can only deliver in the short term and no more. Hence, foreign stakeholders can be accused of harbouring short-term relationship plans for Pakistan. But then the issue is that this happens due to the Pakistani leadership’s inability to focus on a long-term vision for the state. This attitude has resulted in people losing a sense of ownership in the state, which is the main cause of the prevailing disarray and bleak scenarios. Unfortunately, the youth have been raised on such negativity. Just like the generation that grew up during Gen Zia’s days, the generation that has grown up on negative images, corruption and biased opinions might prove to be equally depressed and myopic. Surely, our political leadership must be blamed for the situation. But why not include others as well who have contributed in equal measure to the mayhem? [B][I]The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst. [email]ayesha.ibd@gmail.com[/email][/I][/B] |
[B][U][CENTER][COLOR="DarkGreen"][SIZE="5"][FONT="Georgia"]The nature of the beast[/FONT][/SIZE][/COLOR][/CENTER][/U][/B]
[B]By Ayesha Siddiqa Friday, 30 Oct, 2009[/B] The series of recent terrorist attacks call for a close analysis of the militant threat and the formulation of a strategy to ward off such tragedies. At the moment, we seem to be jumping from one target to another, fighting some enemies and denying the existence of others. Hence the plan lacks strategic depth as the state appears to pursue one type of enemy leaving out others. It will help to explain that the state of Pakistan is confronted with three enemies that are closely intertwined. Firstly, there is Al Qaeda, which comprises Arabs, Uzbeks and a select group of Pakistanis. Then there is the Taliban who consist of different branches including the Afghan Taliban in Afghanistan. The latter are ideologically connected to the group known as the Pakistani Taliban who, although they consider Mullah Omar their ameer-ul-momineen, are engaged in fighting a battle inside Pakistan to capture the state. This is considered essential to establish a system that could then be taken to the rest of the world. A glance through Farzana Sheikh’s recent book Making Sense of Pakistan demonstrates that some modern Muslim thinkers such as Abul Ala Maududi and Allama Iqbal also considered the state as a forum. However, this is not to suggest that these two thinkers advocated using violence in the same way as the Taliban. Then there are the Punjab-based Salafi-jihadi groups wrongly termed as the Punjabi Taliban. Actually, Taliban is a term that has a certain historical context and can only be used in the case of the Afghan Taliban. Nevertheless, the Punjabi jihadis are ideologically-driven and keen to take on the state. The various Punjab-based groups or those connected with Punjab assist others in Waziristan and Swat. They even use the tribal areas as a hideout. For example ‘Commander’ Ilyas Kashmiri, who heads the 313 Brigade of the Harkat-ul-Jihad-ul-Islami (Huji), took refuge in Waziristan in 2005 after he developed problems with Pakistan’s military. Then there is the Amjad Farooqi group, which was also involved in the assassination attempt on Pervez Musharraf. The above description is meant to demonstrate that since the enemy is diverse, it cannot just be seen through the single lens of the Taliban. Unfortunately, the state has buried its head in the sand by arguing that while there is a problem in Waziristan, there is hardly anything to worry about in Punjab. The Punjab government in particular seems to deny the fact that there are Punjabis involved in religious militancy. The Punjabi jihadis, in fact, are crucial because they mingle easily with the crowd in places where the attack is to be carried out. The attackers must reconnoitre the target in advance before chalking out a plan. An outsider can be spotted easily. Thus the dependence on Punjab-based militants to carry out attacks in the capital or Lahore. Recently, it was claimed that the mastermind of the Marriott bombing and the GHQ attack was caught from Bahawalpur. Reading such reports one wonders why the Punjab government is going on the defensive, withholding information about the presence of militants in Punjab, especially southern Punjab. Naming southern Punjab as a possible place for jihadi recruitment does not mean that youth from other places such as Faisalabad, Gujranwala or Lahore are not involved. However, the concentration of religious militants is in this region. This fact is logical because of the link between three major militant outfits in southern Punjab. One could argue that the government might not want people to concentrate on this region because of the presence of outfits which do not fight the state, such as Jaish-i-Mohammad or Lashkar-i-Taiba, and that the problem is only with the breakaway factions, as ISPR spokesman Maj-Gen Athar Abbas recently argued. But the fact is that no one can control individuals or groups breaking away from the mother organisation and linking up with the Taliban or Al Qaeda. It is amazing the extent to which the government can go to withhold information about the seemingly ‘friendly’ groups. For instance, recently during a television programme Punjab Law Minister Rana Sanaullah went out of his way to suggest that the Jaish-controlled madressah, which is also the outfit’s headquarters, is not a no-go area. He even tried to make a lame excuse when informed that a team from a local channel was attacked when they tried to take shots of the area from the outside. More interestingly, the minister immediately accused me of using a western lens to look at the situation, an accusation also made by Jaish-i-Mohammad in its weekly magazine Al Qalam. The article was written with the specific purpose to incite people against me. The writer had twisted words and facts from one of my previous articles and presented them in a way that made me appear as an enemy. This was immediately brought to the knowledge of the interior ministry, which promised to provide help. Intriguingly, it took the Bahawalpur DPO more than three hours to make the first contact. The lapse might have been at either end but considering that I could survive for three hours I declined their help. In any case, one does not expect sympathy from a district administration that has lately been going out of its way to hide the activities of an outfit. The game is that you are not allowed an opportunity to prove anything because the evidence suddenly disappears once you raise a hue and cry. The Punjab government’s attitude reflects political expediency. A lot of big traders in southern Punjab and other parts of the province who are constituents of the different factions of the Muslim League are believed to finance the outfits both directly and indirectly. This is not to suggest that other political parties are any better. However, the bottom line is that while as an individual one feels unprotected by the state, it is sad to think that the authorities believe they can deal with religious militancy on a piecemeal basis. A holistic strategy is necessary, not to protect western interests but to safeguard the state and its citizens. [B][I]The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst. [email]ayesha.ibd@gmail.com[/email][/I][/B] |
[B][U][CENTER][COLOR="DarkGreen"][SIZE="5"][FONT="Georgia"]Political no man’s land[/FONT][/SIZE][/COLOR][/CENTER][/U][/B]
[B]By Ayesha Siddiqa Friday, 06 Nov, 2009[/B] WITH the start of military operations in Swat and Waziristan and an increase in suicide attacks across the country, some other pressing concerns seem to have slipped to the periphery of the radar screen in the last six months. The Balochistan issue is a case in point. Unfortunately, the region is a political no man’s land. The dictionary definition of ‘no man’s land’ is unoccupied land separating two opposing forces. This means that since opposing forces are unable to deliver anything concrete in terms of a viable policy for Balochistan, the situation there makes it analogous to a geographical no man’s land. For years the state has been unable to properly develop the region, which state functionaries argue is not the fault of the federal government but that of tribal leaders and provincial politicians. The state has always been iniquitous in taking development to peripheral regions. And the division between the mainland and the periphery is not something based on geographical terminology but on concentration of power. Resultantly, the main stakeholders do not necessarily bother about areas that do not appear on their radar screen due to a lack of interest. Besides Balochistan, another example of an abandoned area is the Thar region of Sindh, where the dire situation of people suffering from famine is hardly ever noticed. I remember the days of famine in Ethiopia, which was sufficiently projected on national television and radio. What did not receive any attention at all at the time was a crippling famine in Thar. Even now the water shortage and widespread hunger in that area is not being adequately reported by the national media. Referring to the Balochistan issue, the problem right now from the state’s perspective is that powerful stakeholders do not want to see it as anything other than a national security issue. The reported evidence of New Delhi funding some Baloch nationalists or Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s links with the militants’ leadership is excuse enough for Islamabad to pick up hundreds of Baloch people and not bat an eyelid because it is a matter of national security. The bigger problem with ‘national security’ in Pakistan is that the military seems to have sole ownership of policymaking related to such issues. Political solutions, as was obvious from the fate of negotiations with Baloch leaders conducted by Messrs Mushahid Hussain and Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain, do not necessarily have to be implemented. The perspective of the ‘deep state’ is that these forces, which apparently have links with India and Afghanistan, are tribal and coercive and can only be dealt with by force. Before Gen Pervez Musharraf’s time the state played ball with the same actors. The fundamental shift that took place over the last decade was that the deep state thought of exploiting regional resources on its own without paying higher costs to the local regional partners. Not that the policy of malleable local partners was abandoned. In fact, the state went on to replace people who played tough with those that could do the job in a less costly way. Thus Nawab Akbar Bugti was killed and replaced by another tribal leader, who was provided weapons and allowed concessions in line with the old system. Such an approach basically means that the deep state does not allow for long-term investment in the socio-political and socio-economic development of the region. Islamabad never tried to befriend the Baloch middle class that occupies the political no man’s land between the Pakistani state and the Baloch tribal leaders. For instance, instead of giving this educated middle class a stake in provincial development, especially real estate, land was given to the chief minister for distribution amongst his cronies. The problem with Balochistan being a national security issue is that neither the political government in Islamabad nor GHQ in Rawalpindi seems keen on looking for a political option. One could even argue that the option for a political solution – which could be brought about by using the services of Asif Ali Zardari, who has close links with many of the Baloch sardars – is lost due to the perceived internal battle between the military and the president. There is no concrete plan for the region on the other side of the divide as well. Those that want to ‘liberate’ the Baloch people from the shackles of Islamabad’s domination do not have a constructive plan either beyond creating mayhem or killing innocent people in the province. The people of a federating unit have a right to choose their destiny. Considering John Stuart Mill’s principle of the state being for the greater happiness of the people, if the people of Balochistan want to go their own way they have a right to. The problem, however, is that the leadership of the separatist movement seems clueless about building a consensus for their struggle amongst the other ethnic communities of the province. Balochistan today has a multi-ethnic population and killing ethnic minorities is not a sustainable option if the separatist leadership wants to go beyond extorting the right price from Islamabad. The Baloch nationalists do not have dominant control over the region like the Bengalis did in former East Pakistan, for a favourable military/guerrilla initiative. At best they can disrupt normal life and divide people even further. The fact which does not get fully reported in the national media today is the number of Hazaras and settlers getting killed in Balochistan. The dissident leadership probably does not appreciate that such aimless killing does not create sympathy for their political cause, nor will it benefit them during the process of negotiating transfer of assets (if we were to imagine that they manage to succeed in making a separate state). They also do not exhibit any clear-cut political and socio-economic plan beyond extorting rent from global players for resources inside Balochistan. Even if they succeed in attaining their objective, they might not do better than the sheikhs of the Gulf states. This means seeking rent for natural resources, the price of which will in any case be determined by the international market and external pressures. Sadly, the majority of the population in Balochistan continues to suffer between two extremes. The only solution for the Balochistan issue lies in following the political path, which might not happen in the foreseeable future. [B]The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst. [email]ayesha.ibd@gmail.com[/email][/B] |
[B][U][CENTER][COLOR="DarkGreen"][SIZE="5"][FONT="Georgia"]The threat within[/FONT][/SIZE][/COLOR][/CENTER][/U][/B]
[B]By Ayesha Siddiqa Friday, 13 Nov, 2009 [/B] A few days ago I came across a letter to the editor in Dawn in which the writer had protested against the use of the word ‘Taliban’ to describe the brutal killers currently terrorising the nation. In the writer’s view, such people should be termed ‘zaliman’. I thought I would advise the writer to watch more television and read newspapers to get rid of his anger against the Taliban. Perhaps the writer would have benefited tremendously by watching a programme aired recently on a TV channel in which three distinguished maulanas — including Jamaat-i-Islami leader Fareed Paracha — argued that the Taliban were being needlessly maligned since there was no evidence available to prove that the attacks were being carried out by the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan. Furthermore, it was said that the TTP’s claiming responsibility for terrorist attacks inside Pakistan did not add up to much since anyone could make those calls just to malign the organisation of non-state militants. The above interview came a couple of days after the army claimed to have found evidence of India’s involvement in the conflict in Waziristan. Islamabad should take the evidence to the International Court of Justice since it does not hope to get a fair hearing from anyone else in the world, certainly not the US. Since India and America are viewed as being ‘hand-in-glove’, Pakistan cannot afford to share the above information with Washington as New Delhi did in the case of the Mumbai attacks. The evidence of India’s involvement should be sufficient to put the aforementioned letter writer’s mind at rest. Now we no longer need to search for internal sources of violence. Since the responsibility of the conflict in the region is now the responsibility of the US followed by India, we need not even look at the fact that Pakistan witnessed about 45 terrorist attacks before 9/11 which many in this country view as the sole cause of strife and bloodshed in the entire region. We can no longer argue that 9/11 just expedited the process of bringing to the surface all those elements or networks that later caused violence in the region. I would go further and apprise the writer of another crucial fact that technically, there are no home-grown terrorists in Pakistan since there has never been any conviction in a major case of terrorism. The significant names that are associated with extremist terrorist activities such as Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, Riaz Basra and Malik Ishaq of the Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP)/Lashkar-i-Jhangvi (LJ), Qari Saifullah Akhtar of Harkat-ul-Jihad-ul-Islami (HuJI) or Masood Azhar of Jaish-i-Mohammad (JM) and many others are foreign concoctions. The country’s legal system is such that the onus of proving an individual or organisation’s responsibility in an act of terror lies on the state. So, if the police are unable to bring concrete evidence before the court it is difficult to convict those accused of terrorism by the law-enforcers. Moreover, the legal procedures take so long that the prosecution (being the state) is unable to hold on to witnesses. They either die, are killed or are too scared to give evidence against organisations and individuals with a particular reputation. Technically, it is but fair to let people go if nothing can be proven against them. This was essentially the position which Pervez Musharraf took for not pursuing action against those who were swapped for the hostages of Indian Airlines flight IC 184 which was hijacked to Kandahar in 1999. Why arrest someone if even the enemy had failed to convict the people after keeping them in jail for so many years? Hence, it is not surprising that there are hardly any convictions. In a couple of cases where this has happened, as in the case of American journalist Daniel Pearl’s murder, the death sentence has not been carried out. We now know that Khaled Sheikh Mohammad of Al Qaeda and not Omar Saeed Sheikh committed the murder. Probably, it was in appreciation of Sheikh’s innocence that his jailers in Hyderabad allowed him access to several SIMs and mobile phones that he then used for very naughty activities, which we will not report here as acts of potential terrorism. One might just wonder about the killings of Shias in the country, which have been going on since the mid-1980s when the SSP was reportedly established to fight the Tehrik-i-Nifaz-i-Fiqh-i-Jafria by the state. We hardly notice that last year there were systematic killings of Shias in Dera Ismail Khan and before that of Shia doctors in Karachi. The killing of Shias in Balochistan by the Taliban also goes unnoticed by the media and the authorities. Surely one cannot discuss Balochistan at all where there is much more serious evidence of India’s involvement. The maulanas might argue again that sectarian violence in Balochistan is an Indian/American conspiracy. The person who wrote the letter might decide to respond to this piece and might argue that the behaviour pattern of the Pakistani establishment and the bulk of the people remains the same. We accused the East Pakistanis of being Indian agents and said the civil war was caused by Hindu teachers in collusion with the Indian state. Any signs of India’s involvement very naturally mar our ability to look at other possibilities or threats. In East Pakistan’s case, for instance, the internal crisis had nothing to do with the unfair treatment of the Bengalis by the West Pakistani civil and military establishment. The only truth about that era was that the Mukti Bahini was trained by Indian intelligence. We in Pakistan are coming close to a point where we can comfortably forget that we have elements within that want to take over (perhaps not physically) the state in pursuance of their pan-Islamic agenda. The war being fought by Pakistan due to international pressure is what has caused all the violence. I would like to refer to the golden words of Punjab’s Law Minister Rana Sanaullah in response to the allegation of south Punjab turning into a hub of extremism and terrorism. The minister felt there was no training taking place in the region and if people were getting recruited to fight in Afghanistan or other places, how could the government stop this. After all, we live in a free country. Under the circumstances, my only advice to the writer of the letter is that if he begins to feel unsafe vis-à-vis the presence of the ‘zaliman’ within, he/she should build additional bunkers outside the house. [B][I]The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst. [email]ayesha.ibd@gmail.com[/email][/I][/B] |
[B][U][CENTER][COLOR="DarkGreen"][SIZE="5"][FONT="Georgia"]Perils of policing[/FONT][/SIZE][/COLOR][/CENTER][/U][/B]
[B]By Ayesha Siddiqa Friday, 20 Nov, 2009[/B] IT doesn’t take a genius to notice the mounting pressure on the PPP government and President Zardari, especially after former partner PML-N decided to adopt an aggressive policy towards the ruling party. This approach includes criticism of everything that happens under the PPP watch. Recently, even the Islamabad police seem to have been dragged into the fray when the PML-N leadership in parliament reacted sharply to the story of the killing of a potential suicide attacker by the police at a security picket in the capital earlier this month. It is claimed that it was actually a fake encounter staged to improve the IG’s reputation. A hue and cry continues to be raised despite the fact that the police was exonerated by an inquiry conducted by the Islamabad Capital Territory Administration. The police also say that no one came forward to claim the body before it was finally buried after two days of waiting. However, the PML-N leadership in parliament continues to raise the issue. Perhaps the government needs to take them seriously since the party leadership is quite familiar with extrajudicial killings, which have always been common in Punjab. They would probably know better how judicial inquiries are managed in such cases. Given a chance to hold an inquiry themselves the said parliamentarians might have revealed more as some might have greater knowledge of extrajudicial killings. After all, it was about six months ago that Nanu Goraya lost his life in a fake encounter in Gujranwala. The Punjab government had kept violent militant outfits like Sipah-i-Sahaba-i-Pakistan (SSP) and Lashkar-i-Jhangvi in check during the late 1990s reportedly through extrajudicial killings with the objective of controlling crime and violence in the largest province. It was the use of this methodology which resulted in the SSP’s retaliation in the form of an assassination attempt on then prime minister Nawaz Sharif. Policing in our peculiar socio-cultural environment — particularly the capital city — is not easy. Islamabad is a mini-Pakistan where one can find a concentration of power, cliques, opposing forces, and all those socio-cultural vices that put additional burden on the law-enforcers. The IG police and his staff have to cater to approximately 1.5 million people. Given our VIP culture it is probably easier to take care of ordinary people than cater to hundreds of parliamentarians who constantly go in and out of the city and would be least forgiving if there was any letup in their personal security. Besides, there are about 81 embassies, 76 ambassadors’ residences, 22 UN offices, 14 hospitals, 20 universities, 1,044 schools and colleges, 77 markets and 305 madressahs which have to be guarded with a police force of 10,332. The police also have to run around protecting the head of state and government and other dignitaries that visit the capital. The presence of diplomats and foreigners does not make things any easier. What adds to the burden is the government’s indecision on other related issues such as the placement and management of 305 madressahs located within different sectors. The Lal Masjid incident indicated the dangers that could emanate from these seminaries. There is no system or policy to monitor people who come and stay in these madressahs from outside the city. While it is the government and parliament’s responsibility to decide on this critical issue, it is the police which face the consequences due to being placed on the front line. The police force, which generally has a bad reputation and represents the authoritarian and barbaric face of the state, is also the force which has played a vital role in the past couple of years in the war against terror. While people eulogise the hard work and commitment of soldiers who have laid down their lives in the fight against terror, it is unfair not to remember the unsung heroes from the police who are often the first ones to lose their lives during a terrorist attack. Approximately 22 police officials have lost their lives in terrorist attacks in Islamabad. There have been five attacks in 2009 alone. It is heartening to see lower-ranking police officials in Islamabad doing their duty in such tough times without the necessary wherewithal for their personal protection. These men don’t have bullet-proof jackets, sniffer-dogs, or explosive detection equipment. The police do not have equipment for communication intercepts, which is critical for tracking both criminals and terrorists and homing in on a potential suicide attacker. The ability to track mobile phone calls alone helps tremendously in tracking down criminal and terror networks. Given the level of communication and competition amongst various government agencies, the police remain uncertain of the cooperation provided by various intelligence agencies. The fact that terrorists manage to attack the capital, move around with large amounts of explosive material and even sneak inside GHQ and the adjoining areas indicates a breakdown of intelligence. Parliament would benefit by probing the issue of the dearth of actionable intelligence. The police and ordinary citizens face the consequences of the failure of actionable intelligence. Better intelligence would also help sort out the problem of multiple pickets in Islamabad or other cities which are meant mainly to impede the movement of a potential terrorist towards a high-value target. But the cost is borne by ordinary people who are frustrated due to long queues. The judicial system does not help either in cleaning up the current mess. The fact that there are today 13,000 criminal cases pending in the lower courts in Islamabad speaks volumes about the slackness of the judicial system. This is not just the case in the capital but throughout the country. It is a major burden on law-enforcement if criminals and terrorists continue to walk free due to the slackness of the judicial system. The case of Lashkar-i-Jhangvi’s Malik Ishaq getting acquitted by the courts from cases in which he was accused of committing over 80 murders is a prime example of the sorry state of affairs. Not to mention the fact that the top brass of the police — unlike that of the intelligence agencies or other official outfits — also has to deal with the consequences of proactive higher courts and present themselves before the various parliamentary committees almost on a daily basis. While it is good to hold the police accountable, it also raises the issue of cutting into time which could be spent on improving security. We know that we do not have the ideal police force. But due encouragement and appreciation of what the law-enforcers face could add to better security. [B][I]The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst. [email]ayesha.ibd@gmail.com[/email] [/I][/B] |
[B][U][CENTER][COLOR="DarkGreen"][SIZE="5"][FONT="Georgia"]A requiem for freedom[/FONT][/SIZE][/COLOR][/CENTER][/U][/B]
[B]By Ayesha Siddiqa Friday, 11 Dec, 2009[/B] One is often asked whether or not Pakistan will survive the current crisis. You tell them that, yes, Pakistan will survive. After all, territories don’t grow feet to walk away with. There is a sigh of relief and those asking the question happily walk away despite one’s attempts to draw their attention to the fact that there is something fundamentally changed about Pakistan. In fact, there are some seriously sad things happening around us that do not grab people’s attention because all they are bothered about is the survival of the physical. Saving the soul is not an idea that catches the public’s attention. I wonder how many people notice the rapidly changing world around them. Suicide attacks and bomb blasts add to the din created by those who are busy establishing a new brand of nationalism which has no shade of tolerance, pluralism or multi-polarity. There are young bloggers who believe that all forms of dissent especially those that challenge their version of nationalism must be silenced. One would not be surprised if they use uncivil methods to achieve their objective. Another set of people believes that killing is justified as long as it happens in other countries. Conceptually, there is no difference between the thinking of this lot and others who have been murdering innocent people in this and other countries. After all, terrorism is a byproduct of extremism. Two decades after Ziaul Haq the general is still remembered for changing the nature of state and society. We have not even begun to think about the generation that is being fed on erroneous dreams of attaining national and civilisational glory through brute force. They are being fed tales of Pakistan and the Mujahideen defeating the communist superpower. They hope to perform a similar feat. Just imagine what will happen inside Pakistan after the US forces begin to withdraw in 2011 — in fact, how about a withdrawal from Afghanistan accompanied by a drastic reduction in America’s financial power which is already happening? This is not to say that the Americans should remain there but that there are elements who will don the victor’s mantle and trample on the rest of society in Afghanistan, and try to do the same in the rest of the world. Choosing sides is no longer an easy task. Such people, who subscribe to the ideology of Hameed Gul — Pakistan’s indigenous version of Osama bin Laden — see the battle in terms of a clash of civilisations. From the point of view of such people, the world is back to the days of the Crusades except that this time it is the Muslim world up in arms against all other civilisations. Therefore, an American withdrawal would be tantamount to the supremacy of one race over another. Sadly, they are not alone in their adventure. It is sadder to observe some of those, who were formerly from what was deemed as the liberal left in Pakistan, arguing that the Taliban should not be pushed until the Americans are out. Such an argument is made without recalling that the partnership between the liberal left and the extreme right in Iran was at the cost of the former. The left represented by Ali Shariati didn’t realise how fast it was taken over and swallowed by its partners. Mention must also be made of the centrist liberals in Pakistan who believe that the right can and must be eliminated. In a nutshell there is a general lack of imagination in creating alternative ideological narratives that are easily comprehensible and can be acted upon. No wonder the Sufi-pop music beat has not caught up with ordinary people. However, my lament is not just for Pakistan but for the rest of the world as well where labels and ideologies entrap people. Terms like ‘Islamophobia,’ ‘Islamofascism’ and others represent the absolute absence of imagination. Or perhaps this is an easier method to keep the ordinary population engaged and look the other way while the corporate world saps states and societies. It is interesting to read blogs on the Internet or get email messages from ordinary folk who believe that the only problem with the world is Islam and its ideology. Such emails are welcome because at least there are some who would like to engage rather than get enraged without communicating with those on the other side of the ideological divide. Their comments reflect ignorance of their own religious history. The other Semitic religions (even others) have had their fair share of their own version of the Taliban. The Taliban, for example, would envy what transpired between the Catholics and the Protestants in Ireland. It is not that one religious ideology is inferior or superior to others. But bloodshed becomes the fate of societies once religions are monopolised by the ruling elite or used to enhance the power of some versus others. The killing of Jews by those that converted to Christianity is another good example of the abuse of religion for the sake of power. An understanding of their own religious histories by adherents of other faiths would perhaps help them sympathise with Muslims who are at the moment caught between an angry world and an unimaginative religious interpretation and discourse by their own priestly class. A religion that came about to bring a social transformation must not fall prey to those who don’t understand its basic spirit and use it for their narrow power interests. At this time religion must be reinterpreted, not to make it acceptable to the rest of the world but to breathe life into the Muslim world itself. The fact that this will improve relations with other communities is something that will follow naturally. To present the current crisis as a Judeo-Christian onslaught against Islam or vice versa is criminal. States and societies must understand that such an argument is a trap which can only take the common people towards disaster. As for Pakistan, I hope my readers can empathise with my lament for a country that is receding very fast like the dim lights dotting a distant shore. I don’t see this one being rescued. However, a new one where there is room for all to coexist must be imagined. [B][I]The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst. [email]ayesha.ibd@gmail.com[/email][/I][/B] |
[B][U][CENTER][COLOR="DarkGreen"][SIZE="5"][FONT="Georgia"]After the NRO[/FONT][/SIZE][/COLOR][/CENTER][/U][/B]
[B]By Ayesha Siddiqa Friday, 18 Dec, 2009[/B] Now that the NRO problem has apparently been resolved people are jumping with joy. There are some commentators who believe that this represents the strengthening of the system and democracy, that the Supreme Court verdict is a warning for presumptuous, overly ambitious and corrupt politicians. The decision certainly is a milestone, but what does it mean for the overall learning process of the various stakeholders in the country’s power politics? And will it influence the future of Pakistan’s politics? These are two basic points to ponder. Although it can be argued that the NRO was always controversial and people were eager to sort the matter out soon after it came into existence, there was always the possibility of the issue getting sidelined due to workable political arrangements. It cannot be ruled out that if relations between Asif Zardari and the PML-N — more precisely, the Sharif brothers — had been better there might have been a possibility of an agreement being reached. Or perhaps if the president had not made the fatal mistake of trying to change the balance of civil-military relations and getting caught in the act, the different forces might not have aligned against him so cohesively. Not that the present decision is not welcome. However, it is also a fact that some hidden forces were making a point of exposing the president’s questionable behaviour and decisions and hiding that of many others. No wonder Asif Zardari cooperated in the NRO case and did not really try to hold back information. After all, there are others who were part of the NRO as well, including the MQM. Though the NRO pertained to cases of financial corruption, military dictator Pervez Musharraf had also included in the NRO criminal cases that did not technically belong there. It will now be interesting to see if the Supreme Court actually takes the matter to its ultimate conclusion by also questioning those who pushed forward the NRO. Surely, it will take Musharraf and those of his close aides who had cobbled this questionable law together to task. Since the highest court has jumped into the fray of supporting state institutions before they crumble forever, the task should be completed. One cannot undermine the significance of public perception. It is equally important for people to have faith in a judgment and not see it as driven by any political or other bias. Building faith in the judicial system is vital and calls for accountability of all other state institutions as well to strengthen the perception that the decision on the NRO was in good faith and to strengthen the rule of law. But if a question is asked about whether the decision signifies the strengthening of the democratic process and civilian institutions, the answer must be in the negative. Since the perception regarding the decision is that it strengthens the armed forces and their ability to manipulate political stakeholders, it is not possible to see a major shift in the balance of power. The decision does coincide with the growing anger of the security establishment against the civilian government for becoming ‘too big for its boots.’ Given the friction between Islamabad and GHQ over the Kerry-Lugar law and other issues, the military is certainly coincidentally, if nothing else, a prime beneficiary of the Supreme Court decision. A humiliated president has lesser possibilities with which to tackle a rival institution. The presidency-GHQ tension denotes a third critical attempt by the political class to curtail the military’s power. The first attempt was made by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who inherited a relatively weak army and had ample room to reduce its relative power. He partly tried to do it through building institutional mechanisms such as the joint chiefs of staff committee and the defence ministry and putting all service chiefs under the supreme command of the prime minister. However, he did not put spirit into his reforms and ended up strengthening the military. Nawaz Sharif was the second leader to get a similar opportunity. It was hoped that he could make headway because he belonged to the most powerful ethnic group and had managed to infiltrate the higher rungs of the officer cadre. Probably the reason that the army views Nawaz Sharif with suspicion is due to his ability to partially and temporarily divide the officer cadre. The appointment of Gen Ziauddin Butt as the new army chief replacing Gen Musharraf appeared to be accepted by a number of senior army officers. However, Sharif blew the chance because of his final rash move. Most recently, Asif Zardari also thought of undercutting the phenomenal power of the military by convincing the United States to support the civilian set-up versus the military. Zardari was instinctively right in assessing that he had time on his side in making the move. The army was seen in a bad light due to a decade of Musharraf’s rule and people were talking about strengthening political institutions and decreasing the power of the armed forces. Zardari’s formula: it would take the Islamabad-Washington partnership to do the job. But President Zardari seems to have fallen victim to his lack of understanding of the military, its institutional dynamics and the importance of creating internal partnerships and institutional protective barriers to achieve this objective. For instance, he did not realise that the same civil society that protested against the military would stand up to defend the ISI and oppose provisions in the Kerry-Lugar bill to defang the military. Nor did he understand the worth of putting life into the available institutions if the power balance had to be corrected. In fact, what numerous politicians have failed to understand is the need to put life into the ministry of defence, to build its capacity and ‘civilianise’ its power or decision-making structure. Since the defence ministry is the only institutional cushion between the political government and the military, its capacity is critical. Politicians in Pakistan fall prey to their insecurity regarding lack of time and miss the point. Now, the president can think about extending the deadline for repealing the 17th Amendment to be able to play a role in the extension or appointment of the army chief. That’s his last but temporary lifeline. He could buy some time by giving a cold shoulder to the US, but these are temporary mechanisms. It will be a while before another opportunity comes along for the civilian stakeholders. [B][I]The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst. [email]ayesha.ibd@gmail.com[/email][/I][/B] |
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