Who will take note of the targeted killings in Karachi? Not, for obvious reasons, the dominant political group there, with its unique talent for looking at things through doctored eyes. The Supreme Court (SC) has a sharp eye for many things. Somehow the frightening political murders of Karachi have failed to register on its radar screen.

Equally curious is the selective accountability zeal to be seen since the death of the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO). Revived as a result of that judgment are over 8,000 cases, many of them relating to grave criminal charges. What's becoming of them? We really don't know. Attracting all of the attention is the figure of President Asif Zardari and some of his close associates, none more so than that jack-in-the-box figure, Interior Minister Rehman Malik, who in a career full of surprises has gone from one thing to another.

Needless to say, the powerful should be the first to be called to account. But it would help if judicial enthusiasm, instead of appearing to be selective, travels also a bit left and right -- for the sake of credibility, if nothing else.

Admittedly, the president makes for an engaging target. There is a Pakistani version of the Godfather waiting to be written here. And with an added twist: Don Corleone in the movie thrived on his political connections, judges and politicians firmly in his pocket. In the Pakistani version of the movie, the Godfather would not just be a fixer but the top honcho himself.

The SC, however, has a problem. It is trying to live up to a somewhat inflated account of what it must and can do. If many of its wilder partisans are to be believed, it should be not just the highest court but also a revolutionary tribunal out to cleanse society of its evils.

Laudable aim, but is it also achievable? More to the point, is it in line with constitutional commandments?

A court can do much good but within limits. If it takes too much on its plate there will be many things it will not be able to enforce. The SC during Musharraf's days stopped the sale of the Steel Mills. What good did it do? The Steel Mills is a bigger white elephant today. The SC has tried fiddling with petroleum prices, not to much avail. My Lord the Chief Justice of the Lahore High Court, well on his way to giving a whole new meaning to judicial activism, tried fixing the price of sugar, with less than happy results. Reacting to newspaper headlines, and attracting media attention, can be quite a high, but may not be quite the role envisioned by the Constitution.

Which doesn't mean the SC should hang up its gloves as far as suo moto jurisdiction is concerned. But for this authority to be effective it must be used sparingly, and in the most extreme of cases, or in time it will begin to lose its deterrent character. The nation struggled for the restoration of the rightful judiciary. It is in the interests of the higher judiciary to see that nothing hurts its standing among the masses.

In a somewhat different context, the time may have come to assess the outcome of the moves set in motion last summer to get rid of the president. Involved in these moves were some shrill and powerful voices in the media; covert hands from the usual suspects in Aabpara and its environs; and the full force of the non-voting middle class which imagines itself as the standard-bearer of liberal values but which, historically speaking, ends up being the herald of every authoritarian intervention.

Even if unsure of methods and tactics these elements were pinning their hopes on (1) their own rampant enthusiasm, and (2) judicial activism.

The SC did deliver a damning judgment on the NRO but, to its growing frustration and anger, it has yet to see it faithfully implemented. What has happened is quite the opposite of what the brigades of October, November, then finally December, had predicted and expected.

If a fair calculation was made -- and, my bias betraying itself, I say this with a heavy heart -- the president is today in a more secure position than he was at this time last year. Between him and the SC no love is lost. But on some counts fences stand mended between the presidency and our most holy of holies, General Headquarters (GHQ).

Here we have to get some basics right. The securitisation (if I may use this awkward word) of the presidency has not happened because of any extraordinary skill emanating suddenly from that quarter. This is one miracle not likely to occur any time soon. The presidency is benefiting from circumstances. As long as Afghanistan remains on the boil, the White House, the Pentagon, the CIA, Centcom, and Nato Hqs in Kabul, don't want things unsettled in Pakistan. This doesn't suit them.

Our allies, Shylocks in their own way, want three things of us: our army to remain engaged in FATA, at current rates of pay of course; our government to continue to play a supporting role; and, to avoid diversions, no tension on the Pakistan-Indian border. From the US point of view the best thing about the Pakistan army is that it is the most effective fighting force in the entire Afghan theatre and, given American levels of support, also the cheapest. Since 2001 the best bargain the US has driven is with Pakistan.

And because Generals Kayani, Petraeus and McChrystal are on the same page as far as these issues of war and peace are concerned -- of course with differences of emphasis here and there -- the destabilisation of democracy is part of no one's agenda. It doesn't make sense. This is less commitment to democracy than an acceptance of reality. War is a distracting business. Peacetime provides the right environment for the usual intrigues against democracy. GHQ, currently, has not that luxury.

We have to get another thing straight. It's the Americans who piled up the pressure on Musharraf to quit as army chief. The corps commanders did not go up to Musharraf and say he should hand the army chief's baton to someone else. The judicial crisis and the lawyers' movement weakened Musharraf but only up to a point. External factors played a decisive role in determining the eventual outcome.

In many things we are wholly sovereign, such as our nuclear programme, and the mess we make of simple things. In some other things we like our sovereignty to be diluted with a bit of American counsel. There is nothing sinister or anything specially reprehensible about this. This is part of the mental wiring we have acquired over the years.

Pakistan is caught up in the vortex of events not entirely in its control. We cannot yank ourselves out of the American alliance. We can't get up one fine morning and say that no NATO containers will pass through Pakistani territory. Yes, we can negotiate better deals and seek advantages here and there, and speak with a clearer voice with our allies (and paymasters). But geography precludes the comfort of isolationism. Our strategic location is both an asset and a curse. It has drawn us into adventures which it would have been worthwhile to avoid.

Zardari, we should understand, is part of this larger design. He hasn't happened fortuitously. Musharraf didn't quit the presidency just like that. The Americans wanted him out because by then he was of no use to anyone. Zardari did not force his way into the presidency. He was aided by outside forces, which haven't lost their relevance.

The moves against him were thus bound to fail. The US has fine-tuned the art of getting rid of troublesome allies -- Diem, Noriega, etc. But Zardari is no trouble. He is tailor-made for American requirements. Why would they want to get rid of him?

So the collision theory of institutions should be kept in some perspective. The government and the SC are on a collision course but when it comes to counting the days of the present dispensation we shouldn't lose sight of the larger picture.



Email: winlust@yahoo.com