Egypt's Post-Mubarak Path



Reports Friday that Egypt's President Hosni Mubarak has stepped down (al-Jazeera) indicate he has handed over power to the armed forces and left Cairo for a resort in Sharm-al-Sheikh. The military issued a statement saying it would lift a thirty-year-old emergency law "as soon as current circumstances end" and pledged to "holding free and fair elections in light of the constitutional amendments."

Mubarak's exit was surrounded in confusion, largely because of a speech he delivered on February 10, in which he promised to delegate some of his presidential powers to Vice President Omar Suleiman but said he will stay on during the transition to a new government following September elections. Egypt's ambassador to the United States, Sameh Shoukry, rushed to do damage control. "Maybe there was a confusion related to the extent to which the president has transferred power. He referred to some power, but it is categorical that the president has transferred all power," he told NPR.

But some experts question the latest turn of events and the military's role going forward. Ellis Goldberg, a professor of political science at the American University in Cairo, writes in Foreign Affairs that "the real concern is that the regime will only shed its corrupt civilians, leaving its military component as the only player left standing." This, he says, would likely result in "the culmination of the slow-motion coup and the return of the somewhat austere military authoritarianism of decades past." Stratfor analysis argues a military takeover could parallel the events of 1952, when the Free Officers Movement led by Gamal Abdel Nasser, later president of Egypt, overthrew the monarchy. Egypt's presidents since then have all come from the military.

While the army has tried to present itself as a neutral force so far in the protests, it has also been "calling the shots" during the arrests and intimidation that have accompanied the protests, writes Daniel Williams of Human Rights Watch. One outcome for Egypt's future, he says, could be "Mubarak-ism without Mubarak (LAT), with military overseers preserving the old system under a new guise." Others warn of the dangers of a transitional period in which the army is unable to protect its citizens (NYT), as was the case in Indonesia in 1998.

If the power of the army causes some concern, the possible rise of the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood generates other fears. Critics like CFR's Leslie H. Gelb say the Muslim Brotherhood could be "calamitous" for U.S. security. Others, including CFR's Ed Husain, argue that "the Brotherhood in Egypt are open to being shaped by partners, critics, and political reality."

A change in Egypt's government has also raised regional fears. In Iran, Egypt's unrest has stoked tensions between hardliners and the opposition movement. Israel is fearful that the fall of Mubarak, who maintained the cold peace forged between between the two countries by President Anwar Sadat, could mean the rise of "a new Iran" across the border, as Aluf Benn writes in Foreign Affairs.

For now, CFR President Richard Haass says Egypt's deep challenges remain: "We're still talking about a political transition," he told a February 10 CFR media conference call. "Basic questions of pace, sequencing, legal questions, political questions are all out there. The economic challenges as a result of today will, if anything, probably grow slightly greater."

Washington will have to navigate a tricky course between backing democracy and protecting its interests in the region. "The end of Hosni Mubarak's regime in Egypt portends fundamental change throughout the Middle East and the end of the American era in the region," writes CFR's Steven Cook.

Analysis:

Robert Scheer writes the Obama administration is supporting "the sordid option of backing a new and improved dictatorship (HuffingtonPost)" by accepting Vice President Omar Suleiman as Mubarak's replacement.

CFR's Elliott Abrams says in ForeignPolicy.com that it's time for the United States "to bury the unreal, failed 'realism' of those who have long thought that dictators brought stability. What we have seen is that the stability they bring--for years or even decades--carries with it a curse."

The Nation discusses the "uncomfortable truths about U.S. foreign policy" revealed by uprisings in the Middle East.

Analyst David Rothkopf, in Foreign Policy.com notes Obama administration's missteps on Egypt and says U.S. diplomacy on Egypt "must involve a kind of patience and perspective the White House seems to have lost touch with in the past few days."

Obama's Statement on the Situation in Egypt, February 10, 2011


The Egyptian people have been told that there was a transition of authority, but it is not yet clear that this transition is immediate, meaningful or sufficient. Too many Egyptians remain unconvinced that the government is serious about a genuine transition to democracy, and it is the responsibility of the government to speak clearly to the Egyptian people and the world. The Egyptian government must put forward a credible, concrete and unequivocal path toward genuine democracy, and they have not yet seized that opportunity.

As we have said from the beginning of this unrest, the future of Egypt will be determined by the Egyptian people. But the United States has also been clear that we stand for a set of core principles. We believe that the universal rights of the Egyptian people must be respected, and their aspirations must be met. We believe that this transition must immediately demonstrate irreversible political change, and a negotiated path to democracy. To that end, we believe that the emergency law should be lifted. We believe that meaningful negotiations with the broad opposition and Egyptian civil society should address the key questions confronting Egypt’s future: protecting the fundamental rights of all citizens; revising the Constitution and other laws to demonstrate irreversible change; and jointly developing a clear roadmap to elections that are free and fair.

We therefore urge the Egyptian government to move swiftly to explain the changes that have been made, and to spell out in clear and unambiguous language the step by step process that will lead to democracy and the representative government that the Egyptian people seek. Going forward, it will be essential that the universal rights of the Egyptian people be respected. There must be restraint by all parties. Violence must be forsaken. It is imperative that the government not respond to the aspirations of their people with repression or brutality. The voices of the Egyptian people must be heard.

The Egyptian people have made it clear that there is no going back to the way things were: Egypt has changed, and its future is in the hands of the people. Those who have exercised their right to peaceful assembly represent the greatness of the Egyptian people, and are broadly representative of Egyptian society. We have seen young and old, rich and poor, Muslim and Christian join together, and earn the respect of the world through their non-violent calls for change. In that effort, young people have been at the forefront, and a new generation has emerged. They have made it clear that Egypt must reflect their hopes, fulfill their highest aspirations, and tap their boundless potential. In these difficult times, I know that the Egyptian people will persevere, and they must know that they will continue to have a friend in the United States of America.

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Demographics of Arab Protests


From Tunisia to Egypt, youth have become the face of dissent against longstanding autocratic regimes in the Arab world. The region is facing a demographic bulge in which youth aged fifteen to twenty-nine comprise the largest proportion of the population. These young people, frustrated with lack of jobs, have been at the forefront of anti-government protests. Ragui Assaad, a professor at Humphrey School of Public Affairs at University of Minnesota and a nonresident senior fellow at Brookings, says the region has to move toward greater democratic systems and open economies "to allow these young people to vent and have a say in their future." He predicts the youth bulge will be a destabilizing factor in Yemen and will lead to further unrest in Iran with calls for regime change. Migration, he says, will emerge as yet another important issue with youth bulges in the Mideast and an aging population in Europe. "There needs to be international agreements to regulate migrant flows," he adds.
How significant has the role of demographics been in the protests across the Middle East?
Demographics have played an important role, not because they are the problems themselves but because they have exacerbated other serious problems that youth are having in the way that they have been affected by the reforms that have occurred over the past three years in the Middle East. So, demographics, simply by having large numbers of people who are very frustrated at their inability to turn their education into productive jobs, has really exacerbated the problems.
The entire region is experiencing a pronounced "youth bulge," where the proportion of young people is significantly larger compared to other age groups. Is this an opportunity or a challenge?
Currently it's proving to be a challenge, but it's not necessarily a challenge. In other parts of the world, the youth bulge phenomenon has been an opportunity. In East Asia and Southeast Asia with their open economies and good education systems, they've been able to use the youth bulge as an advantage. In the Middle East, unfortunately, it's turning out to be a challenge because of the governments' inability to put together economic policies that make use of these human resources. When you have people whose expectations have risen because of their education, and then these expectations are shattered, they become very angry and dangerous to the regimes.
But these countries in the Middle East--Tunisia, Egypt, and even Yemen--that are facing popular uprisings are at different stages of demographic transition, right?
They are definitely. Tunisia is ahead of the game. Its fertility started declining earlier than in either Egypt or Yemen, and its youth bulge is kind of passing at this point. The young people are moving on to their thirties and later. However, that group was not very well treated by the transition that occurred in Tunisia from public sector-led economies to a more market-driven economy, and their dissatisfaction is still there. However, as a demographic phenomenon, it's been getting less extreme.
"In East Asia and Southeast Asia with their open economies and good education systems, they've been able to use the youth bulge as an advantage."
Egypt is very close to the peak of its youth bulge. These last few years, the youth bulge is beginning to decline as the share of fifteen to twenty-nine year-olds starts to decline. However, that group of young people is making its way into the labor market right now and putting a lot of pressure in the form of unemployment and informalization of the labor market as they get poor jobs.
Yemen is going to have a problem for a very long time because the fertility in Yemen has not declined yet or has declined very little. So, Yemen is going to have a youth bulge that is going to continue well into the future, probably for another thirty years. That is going to be highly destabilizing in Yemen for a long time.
Are youth generally more given to revolutions than other age groups?
One can argue that the youth protests and unrest that occurred in the United States and in Europe in the late sixties was driven by the baby boom that occurred after the Second World War, which was a youth bulge in its own right. So, it is not uncommon for youth bulges to cause unrest. Sometimes it's in the form of peaceful protest, and sometimes it's in the form of civil conflict and other times it's in the form of more serious forms of violence. I think that in a sense we are lucky that in Tunisia and Egypt, the conflict that is resulting is peaceful in the form of these demonstrations. It could have been much worse.
What do these large populations of youth mean for the future and for the security of the region?
Governments have to devise political systems that allow these youth to be represented, to have a voice in the running of their country. And they have to devise economic systems that make good use of these productive resources that the youth potentially are. However, if that doesn't happen, there is going to be a generation of people who are going to continue to be frustrated and continue to be a source of instability. The region definitely has to move toward more democracy, more freedom to allow these young people to vent and have a say in their future.
Are there things the West should be worried about in relation to these large youth populations in the Middle East, things they should be watching for?
"What the West needs to watch for is cases in which political regimes are extremely weak and the countries are very fragmented, [because then] these youth bulges can result in extended civil conflict and potentially a failure of the state."
What the West needs to watch for is cases in which political regimes are extremely weak and the countries are very fragmented, [because then] these youth bulges can result in extended civil conflict and potentially a failure of the state. I think Yemen is at risk of that, and maybe there are other places. Clearly, the situation in Palestine is very worrying, as very pronounced youth bulges with unresolved conflict with Israel could portend future problems.
However, in countries like Tunisia and Egypt, if the West can support the transition to democracy, then there are very good potential long-term implications in terms of making youth move into adulthood and become productive members of their societies. That's going to make the societies richer in general.
Do you think the events in the Mideast have implications for other countries in the vicinity, such as Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, which also have very high youth populations and are struggling to provide basic needs and stability to their populations?
Absolutely, Iran is the perfect example. Iran has the most pronounced youth bulge of anywhere in the world because Iran not only had this reduction in mortality rate that resulted in more young people surviving, but it also had an increase in fertility after the Iranian Revolution. These two factors together produced a very pronounced youth bulge, which is at its peak right now but is expected to decline very fast because of the rapid decline in fertility that occurred in Iran post-1990. These are the young people who were fueling the protests that we saw two years ago in Iran, and they're going to be continuing to fuel protests. These are people who are born after the revolution. They do not necessarily support the Islamic regime there. But they are going to be demanding change for quite some time. So we haven't seen the [last] of youth unrest and calls for change in Iran.
Pakistan also has a pronounced youth bulge, and Pakistan ostensibly has a democratic system in which some of these frustrations can be vented. But especially if there are regional issues and there are issues in the northwest area of Pakistan, it could cause of instability in parts of Pakistan.
In general, the whole region has this demographic phenomenon occurring, but it does not have to be a problem if it is handled properly and if it's considered to be a resource that is used for productive purposes.
"The region definitely has to move toward more democracy, more freedom to allow these young people to vent and have a say in their future."
To get dividends from these youth populations, what do you think these countries must do?
They must pursue development strategies that bring the benefits of development to the [majority] of the population, especially ones that promote labor intensive and job creating growth. So far the development strategies in many of these countries have benefited a few cronies--a few people close to the regime have become extremely rich basically at the expense of the rest of the population.
They [also] have to provide political systems that allow these young people to have a voice in the future of their country. They have to open economies because that's the way they're going to be able to specialize in those activities that make use of labor intensively, just the way that Southeast Asia and East Asia have done.
Another issue that needs to be on the table is the possibility of migration. Many of the developed countries, but in particular Europe, have a deficit of young people, and there's going to be tremendous pressure for migration from the countries in the southern Mediterranean and elsewhere in the Middle East and Asia to migrate. We have to find ways to allow this migration without creating anti-migrant backlashes in Europe or creating problems with absorption of migrants in European countries.
What role can the international community play here?
There needs to be international agreements to regulate migrant flows. We need to strengthen international organizations for migration. Like there are trade treaties that govern trade between countries, there need to be migration treaties as well. The economic forces for greater migration are extremely powerful--as the European population ages and there is the graying phenomenon that occurs in Europe--but still the cultural and social factors of fear of migrants in Europe are going to create problems.

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Egypt, Democracy and Islam

This survey by Pew reveals an even split between Egyptians who value a prominent role for religion in government and those who consider religion to play a small role. The poll also explores Egyptians' attitudes towards democracy and other considerations that will factor into Egypt's uncertain future.
With massive protests threatening to upend the three-decades-long reign of President Hosni Mubarak, the world has been captivated by the events in Egypt. In a survey conducted April 12 to May 7, 2010, the Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project examined the views of Egypt and six other Muslim publics about politics and the role Islam should play in it.
A 59%-majority of Muslims in Egypt believed that democracy was preferable to any other kind of government. About one-in-five (22%), however, said that in some circumstances, a non-democratic government could be preferable, and another 16% said it did not matter what kind of government is in place for a person in their situation.

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Dangers in U.S.-Pakistan Rift


The diplomatic spat between the United States and Pakistan over U.S. Embassy employee Raymond Davis's arrest by Pakistani authorities on murder charges has led to Washington postponing high-level talks with Pakistani and Afghan officials scheduled for next week. Davis has confessed to killing two Pakistani men in Lahore in an act of self-defense. The Obama administration says he has diplomatic immunity and has asked Islamabad to hand him over. Senator John Kerry (D-MA) arrived in Islamabad Tuesday to smooth over tensions (AP), seek Davis's return to the United States, and reaffirm Washington's commitment to a strategic partnership with Pakistan.

This U.S.-Pakistan dispute comes at a time when Pakistan is increasingly challenged by growing violence, a teetering economy, political factionalism, large numbers of displaced people from last year's floods, high rates of inflation and unemployment, and widespread corruption. Strained relations with Islamabad add to problems the United States already faces in trying to ensure stability in Pakistan--a nuclear-armed country crucial to the ongoing war in Afghanistan and U.S. national security interests. In a Foreign Policy survey, fifty-one out of sixty-five terrorism experts questioned said Pakistan posed the greatest terrorist threat to the West.

The Davis case has fanned anti-Americanism (PressTV) among many Pakistanis who distrust the United States for what they see as meddling in their affairs, a charge largely fueled by the CIA-operated drone attacks in the country. "What is euphemistically called a trust deficit has for some time defined the U.S. relationship with the elites and public of Pakistan, and will continue to influence the partnership," writes Stephen Cohen of the Brookings Institution.

U.S. goals for a stable and democratic Pakistan are also frustrated by recurring tensions between India and Pakistan that threaten a regional conflict, and by the Pakistani army's continuing support for some militant groups as strategic assets in its foreign policy, as this Crisis Guide notes. A persistent thorn in Washington's side is the army's refusal to send troops into the militant stronghold of North Waziristan.

This week, the Obama administration proposed to Congress $3.1 billion in financial assistance (PTI) to Pakistan for 2012. This includes $1.5 billion for the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009, which is largely aimed at strengthening Pakistan's economy, infrastructure, and democratic institutions. But as an official U.S. government assessment notes (WSJ), the civilian aid program has "not been able to demonstrate measurable progress." In this essay, Nancy Birdsall and Wren Elhai of the Washington-based Center for Global Development suggest some measurable targets that could help the United States and Pakistan meet shared goals for effective and transparent development.

The foremost challenge for the United States in dealing with Pakistan has been balancing long-term goals with response to immediate threats such as al-Qaeda. "My sense is that we are playing to the short term at this point," says CFR Senior Fellow Daniel Markey in a video interview. One policy recommendation to address this challenge, says Markey, is to open up trade between the United States and Pakistan. "It's that kind of bigger, more long-term thinking that's going to be a tough lift," he says, but it will help both in near term and over the long term.

Analysis:

In the Washington Quarterly, Paul Staniland of the University of Chicago assesses U.S. strategy for Pakistan.

This CFR Task Force Report supports U.S. investment in a long-term partnership with Pakistan, but emphasizes it is only sustainable if Pakistan acts against terrorist organizations based on its soil.

Background:

A survey of nearly four hundred Pakistani journalists (NYT) by Lawrence Pintak of Washington State University and Syed Javed Nazir, a newspaper editor, looks at how these journalists view the U.S. policy in Pakistan and its ongoing operations in Afghanistan

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Al-Jazeera: The World Through Arab Eyes

The al-Jazeera satellite network, which has been instrumental in covering the protests in the Arab world, is garnering increasing attention for the depth and breadth of its coverage and the integral role it has served in fomenting the events. For some observers (ForeignPolicy), al-Jazeera, or "the island" in Arabic, has become part of the story. Abderrahim Foukara, the Washington, DC, bureau chief for al-Jazeera Arabic, characterizes the network as "a channel that sees the world through Arab eyes." He says the network had its beginnings as an upstart alternative to the region's state-owned media and has grown into its current position as the channel offering the broadest coverage of the Arab-Muslim world. "In terms of acute crisis, a channel like al-Jazeera imposes its presence." In light of President Barack Obama's 2009 speech in Cairo, Foukara notes that the new administration recognizes the significance of the network in the president's campaign to improve relations with the region. He concludes by suggesting that the region's youthful demographics offer the United States a prime opportunity to promote its values and cultivate the spirit of human enterprise.

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Myths About "Unwinnable" Afghanistan

The future of the war in Afghanistan is hotly debated around Washington. Hearings are promised--the latest from Sen. John Kerry's Foreign Relations Committee--as a growing number of reporters, lawmakers and activists wonder why we are in Afghanistan and what the United States can gain by remaining at war in this remote, conflict-scarred and presumably ungovernable nation.
Look more closely at the conventional wisdom on Afghanistan, however, and it is clear that some facts have been left out of the well-trod arguments about the "unwinnable" battle that has become America's longest war:
1) Afghanistan was never a state, and it will never function like one.
In reality, Afghanistan has functioned as a nation-state for more than two centuries, and its army and bureaucracy reach back to the 19th century. The country survived the strategic face-off between the United Kingdom and Russia, known as "The Great Game," as a nation-state and, in more recent memory, suffered through a bloody four-year civil war in the early 1990s precisely because each of the country's ethnic groups wanted the prize of the land: control of its capital, Kabul.
Even the Taliban was not happy to have roughly 90 percent of the country when it took power in the 1990s, fighting until 2001 to wrest control of the remaining northern sliver in order to lay claim to the entire Afghan nation.
As journalist and longtime Afghanistan observer Ahmed Rashid noted in the Financial Times, "Afghanistan has been a nation-state since 1761 - a good deal longer than four of its immediate neighbours (Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan).
"Even though Afghanistan has suffered severe internal wars and coups, falling victim to the entire gambit of 20th-century ideologies, the country and its people have shown remarkable resilience."

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Is Bahrain's Regime Next to Fall?

on Friday with reports of troops firing on anti-government protesters. But unlike in Egypt and Tunisia, the unrest in Bahrain is unlikely to lead to the collapse of the regime, says F. Gregory Gause III, an expert on the Gulf states. Gause notes that in Tunisia and Egypt, security forces identified with the protesting crowds, while in Bahrain there's a "strong sectarian division" between the Sunni monarchy's security forces and the crowds, which are largely Shiite. Gause says Saudi Arabia, which has a direct causeway to Bahrain, is worried about the potential security situation and notes there are rumors some Saudis may already be in the Bahrain security forces. Gause also says that the situation in Bahrain poses a serious dilemma for the United States. While Secretary of State Hillary Clinton praised the king of Bahrain and his reforms when she visited just two months ago, now the White House is rebuking the government (MSNBC) for using force. But if the regime fell and the United States was forced to give up its Fifth Fleet base in Bahrain, "the idea that you would sacrifice the headquarters of your Naval forces in the region at a time when your foreign policy goal is to contain Iran would certainly be seen as a victory for Iran and a defeat for the United States," says Gause.
What's behind these troubles in Bahrain?
The immediate spark of the protests was the example of Tunisia and Egypt, which led to the toppling of the heads of state in both cases and to a contagion throughout the Arab world. But the deeper cause is the profound sectarian split within Bahraini society between a majority of the citizen population, which is 70 percent Shiite Muslim, and the other 30 percent, the ruling elite and the ruling family, which is Sunni. There has been a persistent feeling among Bahraini Shiites that they don't get their fair share of their country's wealth, jobs, and political power.


How did the 70-30 split develop?
The indigenous population of Bahrain by the eighteenth century was Shiite. Southern Iraq, the eastern province of Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain have been Shiite areas for a while now. So, when the Al Khalifa family came across from Qatar from the Arabian Peninsula and captured the islands of Bahrain and set up their rule back in 1783, they found a majority Shiite population.
Bahrain is across from the eastern province of Saudi Arabia, the primary Saudi oil region. So, it's of crucial security interest for the Saudis, isn't it?
The Saudis built a causeway between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, which is a collection of islands, back in the 1980s. So, you can drive to Bahrain, and many Saudis do, for the weekend, to get away from the strict no-alcohol regime in Saudi Arabia. But there is also a security element in having that bridge.
Have the Saudis said much about the protests?

They've been much quieter about Bahrain than they were about Egypt. But there are unconfirmed reports that Saudi security forces are part of the security force in Bahrain in dealing with the protests.

This is a regime that has a security force that is almost exclusively Sunni, many of them recruited outside Bahrain and given citizenship, so they're extremely loyal to the ruling family.
Explain Bahrain's relationship with Britain.Bahrain was part of the British maritime protectorate system that the British instituted in the Persian Gulf between the 1820s and the 1880s. They didn't receive their independence until 1971.
When did the United States get involved militarily in Bahrain?We've had a naval facility at Bahrain since World War II, but it was extremely small. Back in the 1960s and 1970s there were three old ships docked in Bahrain, and we had a command called the Middle East Force. But with the Gulf War of 1990-91 and the increase in the American military presence in Bahrain, the number of ships increased; the force was given fleet status as the Fifth Fleet. The headquarters in Bahrain came on land and became much bigger.
When you say the majority of the population is Shiite, that immediately raises the specter of Iran. How much Iranian influence is there in Bahrain?
There's considerable Iranian influence in Bahrain. Many of the Shiite clerics in Bahrain have been trained in Iran. The Iranians have claimed it as a province of Iran based on control of Bahrain by Iranian dynasties in the past. But in 1971, as part of Bahrain's independence negotiations, the Shah of Iran officially renounced the Iranian claim on Bahrain. But since the Iranian revolution in 1979, every once in a while you will find a journalist, or an official, or somebody in one of the official newspapers in Iran, or a cleric raise the issue of Iranian claims to Bahrain. This is not done by the Iranian government itself, but there are people in Iran who hold that view.
For the U.S. government, this unrest in Bahrain makes a difficult situation, doesn't it?
Extremely difficult.
If you were asked for advice, how would you handle this?
This is a real tightrope that one has to walk. One doesn't want allies who are unstable, because then they become more trouble than they're worth. The Al Khalifa government and the Al Khalifa family have ruled Bahrain for more than two centuries. The idea that you would sacrifice the headquarters of your Naval forces in the region at a time when your foreign policy goal is to contain Iran would certainly be seen as a victory for Iran and a defeat for the United States. But if you really believe that this is a turning point in the Arab world, and you've counseled the Al Khalifa family and leaders not to use force and to institute political reforms, it places some hard decisions in front of you. I would probably lean more toward maintaining the relationship and work on them in the long term for better governance.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was there last December, and praised the king and the government for the parliamentary elections they had this fall and for the political reforms that had been instituted.
What is it that the protestors want?
The longer these kind of things go on and the more violence that's used, the more extreme the demands get. At the beginning, you could probably say that the majority of Bahraini Shiites would be happy with political and economic reforms that gave them a bigger stake in the country and a bigger say in what was going on. That of course means a parliament that reflects the majority of the population, but the seats there are gerrymandered so there's a sitting majority in the parliament of Sunnis. It would mean a government that was responsive to the parliament, which would mean that a lot of the Al Khalifa clan that hold these cabinet positions would lose their jobs. So that's difficult, and that's the simplest kind of reform. Now, of course, after the violence, we're hearing that a number of the protestors are calling for the downfall of the ruling family.
There is no one there who would replace the ruling family, is there?
There is no obvious candidate, but there are political groupings that are the equivalent of political parties in Bahrain. The largest Shiite one is called Al-Wifaq, and Wifaq means agreement or concord.
They have eighteen of the forty seats in the lower or elected house of parliament. But they all resigned as a result of the violence. There are other Shiite groups that have boycotted the elections because of irregularities and the gerrymandering and all that. But these groups could probably come together in a political crisis to oppose the regime. This is a regime that has a security force that is almost exclusively Sunni, many of them recruited outside Bahrain and given citizenship, so they're extremely loyal to the ruling family. One of the big differences between Bahrain and Tunisia or Egypt is that the security forces, when confronted with crowds in Tunisia and Egypt, said "those people are us." But when you have this strong sectarian division and the security forces are composed of a minority group, they look at these protestors and say, "Those people are them, not us--if they win, we lose."

The causeway is there in some large part to facilitate the movement of Saudi security forces if they think Bahrain is going under.
What are the Shiite/Sunni proportions in the other Gulf states?
In every other state the Shiites are a minority. You can hear estimates in Kuwait as high as one-third, but I think the 20 to 30 percent range is probably pretty accurate. In Qatar, there is an extremely small Shiite population. I don't think the Shiite population even gets to 10 percent of the United Arab Emirates population, but there are no reliable numbers on that. In Oman, the Shiite population tends to be of Indian origin; they're a distinctive minority that does not have much political power.
If you were parachuted into Bahrain during a time of calm, how would the capital Manama compare, say, with Cairo?
It's richer. It's certainly less crowded. You could take the whole population of Bahrain, and it would be a neighborhood in Cairo. You would be impressed by--for lack of a better term--how Western it looks. It has a Western-style consumer culture, high-rise buildings downtown. It is a city that has very few of remnants of its pre-oil past, and it's a modern urban area.
Do women have to wear the scarf?
No. One consequence of Bahrain being in the forefront of social change as the first oil state in the Gulf is that the role of women in society is not nearly as circumscribed as, say, Saudi Arabia. There are plenty of women who do cover their hair, some of whom use the full face veil, but there are also women who don't cover at all. The women's participation in the labor force is pretty high by Gulf standards. There are women activists who have a very public role. Women run for parliament, but there is only one woman in parliament, Latifa al-Qouhoud. She won in an uncontested seat as a government candidate.
Do the Shiites have unemployment problems?

In Egypt there was a lot of talk about unemployment and wages propelling the unrest.
Certainly the employment picture for Shiites is worse than it is for Sunnis. Some of the Shiite villages give the impression of poverty, as opposed to downtown Manama. One of the major complaints from the Shiite political activists is "we don't have jobs and we look at all these foreigners working in the country."
When they talk about foreigners, are they talking about South Asians primarily?
Yes. In the last twenty years the foreign labor flows in all the Gulf states have mostly been from South Asia.
How do you think this will resolve itself?
This is a regime that's proven it's willing to be brutal to stay in power. It certainly has the support of the Saudis, who would see any collapse of the Al Khalifa regime as a serious threat because the Saudis would perceive a Shiite government coming to power and they would see it as being aligned with Iran. That causeway is there in some large part to facilitate the movement of Saudi security forces if they think Bahrain is going under.

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Indonesia's Lessons for Egypt

Author: Karen Brooks, Adjunct Senior Fellow for Asia
February 17, 2011



Policymakers and pundits have looked around the world at previous revolutions--in Iran, Russia, Turkey, and more--to gauge the possibilities and pitfalls ahead as Egyptians overturn their political order. The White House, however, has paid particular attention to the experience of one: Indonesia.
From the early days of the Egypt protests, the White House quietly reached out to a number of Indonesia experts, including this author, to better understand the story of Indonesia's democratic transformation. President Barack Obama's own experience--having lived in Indonesia during some of his formative childhood years--undoubtedly helps explain this impulse. But there are good reasons beyond nostalgia why Indonesia's success might provide inspiration, and lessons, for Egypt.
Hosni Mubarak's Egypt and Suharto's Indonesia had an inordinate amount in common. Indonesia is home to the world's largest Muslim population; Egypt is the most populous Arab nation. Both are Muslim-majority countries with significant non-Muslim minorities. Mubarak and Suharto both hailed from the military and assumed power--with U.S. backing--at a time of national trauma. Both men used secular-nationalist political vehicles to monopolize the power of the state; both retained military backing through extensive political and financial patronage; both demonized Islamist political forces and drove them underground; both kept a tight lid on the media, the opposition, and all forms of dissent; both accumulated massive amounts of wealth while in power; both were grooming children to succeed them in office; and both enjoyed the support of the United States, thanks to geo-strategic calculations.
The arc of revolution in both countries was also strikingly similar. In both:


1.Initially exogenous factors (the Asian Financial Crisis for Indonesia; events in Tunisia, for Egypt) provided the trigger that brought people into the streets.

2.The protests were led by young people, embittered by the gap between political development and economic growth--and the degree to which that growth had disproportionately benefitted elites around the president.

3.Harassment and even killing of protesters failed to end the demonstrations; looting and rioting only hardened public opinion against the regime.

4.Internet-based tools--in Indonesia, chat rooms; in Egypt, social media--provided new avenues for people to share information.

5.Concessions by the respective presidents--including similar pledges to prepare new elections in which they would not run--proved too little too late.

6.The military, faced with either using force to end the demonstrations or nudging one of their own from power, ultimately chose the latter.

One could argue that the Brotherhood's power and allure in Egypt is at least in part a function of the fact that they have been the only organized political force opposing the regime--and being banned and standing against dictatorship gave them a certain mystique.
And in what perhaps may be the most unusual parallel, Mubarak, like Suharto, resigned precisely two and a half weeks after protesters took to the streets.
The uncertainty unleashed by the speed of these events in a large Muslim country with underground Islamist networks, little by way of civil society, and few obvious liberal-democratic opposition figures, has prompted some panic that what comes next in Egypt will be antithetical to U.S. interests. A similar discourse surrounded events in Indonesia in 1998. Indonesia's example since, however, suggests that need not be the case.
The challenges in front of Egypt are distinctly analogous to those Indonesia has faced: How to transition the military back to the barracks? How to reform the constitution and electoral system to allow for free and fair elections in a timely fashion? How to facilitate the development of political parties on a compressed timeline to ensure that all voices can be represented in the coming elections? How to manage the incorporation of Islamist organizations in a way that enhances freedom and democratic development? How to build not only a free but a responsible press that is able to function as a check and balance in a new democracy?
The good news is that Indonesia has been spectacularly successful with most if not all of the above. The Obama administration is smart to be studying their example. Moreover, the United States was able to play a significant role in supporting Indonesia's democratic transformation, despite its longstanding support for the previous order.
As a member of the Clinton administration, I helped formulate U.S. Indonesia policy in that critical first year and spent several months in country in the runup to the first elections. A few lessons from that experience stand out:
Timelines are critical. Suharto's resignation left Vice President Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie in charge of the country. Within two days, Habibie announced a clear timeline for elections and political reform. The quick elaboration of a date certain for the polls defused a still explosive situation. The military in Egypt has been welcomed as a transitional force, but they must make clear quickly a date for elections--and thus for their exit.
Real reform takes time. Constitutional reform, electoral reform, the establishment of political parties, the development of party infrastructure and platforms, and the creation of an independent elections commission take time. Indonesia's first parliamentary elections were held June 7, 1999--one year and two weeks after Suharto stepped down. Even so, existing political parties did far better than new entrants. If the process in Egypt is rushed, the only forces able to compete will be Mubarak's NDP and the Muslim Brotherhood. The generals need to strike a balance between a timely transition and a sustainable one that provides all voices in society the time needed to prepare for competition.
Bring in the Islamists. The entry into politics of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood--with its conservative Islamist agenda and its antipathy toward Israel and the United States--understandably makes many people nervous. In Indonesia, a political party inspired by the example and teachings of Egypt's Brothers quickly emerged as one of the most disciplined and organized political parties following Suharto's fall.

Egypt's partners therefore must take great pains to strike the right balance between public and private diplomacy as they offer support in the weeks and months ahead.
After three electoral cycles, however, that party, the PKS, appears to have maxed out its popular support at under 8 percent of the electorate. Why? As PKS entered the formal political arena, the party found itself participating in the same unseemly activities that characterize conventional politics in Indonesia (as elsewhere)--including fundraising, corruption, deal-making and mud-slinging. The purity of the party's demand for morality in politics thus eroded over time, and today the PKS is largely seen as just another political actor (albeit the most conservative one pushing the most Islamist themes).

The analogy with Egypt is imperfect, of course--the Brotherhood is bigger and more organized in Egypt, and secular-nationalist parties there are now limited only to the NDP (whereas in Indonesia, two other political parties with national machinery existed for decades, even though the system was fundamentally closed). Still, one could argue that the Brotherhood's power and allure in Egypt is at least in part a function of the fact that they have been the only organized political force opposing the regime--and being banned and standing against dictatorship gave them a certain mystique. Indonesia shows that incorporating such groups into the formal political arena can go a long way in demystifying them and bringing them down to the realm of mere mortals. Indonesia also shows that time can work against such forces, assuming that time allows for the development of a range of credible alternatives.
Egyptians must lead. The international community can play an important role in supporting Egypt's transition to democracy. The United States, Australia, Japan, and other partners provided significant financial and technical assistance to help Indonesia prepare for elections in 1999, and advisors from a range of U.S. based democracy-building organizations provided training to new political parties, opposition figures, media outlets and civil society groups. While other countries can bring invaluable expertise to the table, it's imperative that Egyptians feel they remain in the driver's seat. Egypt's partners therefore must take great pains to strike the right balance between public and private diplomacy as they offer support in the weeks and months ahead--and when and where possible to coordinate their messaging and assistance. The Indonesians understand these sensitivities all too well, and thus may be well suited to help advise the Egyptians on the possibilities and pitfalls ahead.

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paesh

Gaddafi's End


The latest reports from Libya, as of the end of the day there on Monday, suggest a full-scale civil war. Gaddafi appears to be fighting for his life — literally, not just his political life — by ordering security forces to fire on unarmed demonstrators and ordering his military to attack certain military bases. This suggests that the military has already split, perhaps along the tribal lines that remain critical in Libya. Libya is a serious oil producer and, predictably, world oil prices have spiked, going to $105 a barrel as I write — the highest price in three years. Meanwhile, a number of Libyan officials and ambassadors abroad have already defected, condemning Gaddafi's use of murderous force.

This is the end of the Gaddafi regime, after an astonishing 42 years. It is hard to see how he and his sons can survive the next few weeks. If he uses enough force to prevail, the death toll (already in the hundreds) assures that further rebellions will be planned and will occur sooner rather than later.

The United States treated Gaddafi as an enemy due to his support for terrorism against us, until a rapprochement of sorts began under Pres. George W. Bush at the very end of 2003. Gaddafi, apparently scared by the American victory in Iraq, agreed to abandon terrorism and handed over his nuclear and missile programs (which now reside at a U.S. military base). He kept his part of bargain, and so did we — opening an embassy and after a few years sending an actual ambassador. (The ambassador has been out of Libya for a month, since WikiLeaks cables showed him telling the truth about Gaddafi's rule.)

This has meant that American criticism of Gaddafi's horrendous human-rights practices has been muted for the last eight years. But it's time now to tell the whole truth, for the slaughter of peaceful demonstrators was not what we bargained for. The administration should call for his replacement and for a new government dedicated to using those oil revenues for the people of Libya rather than for Gaddafi's bizarre and useless economic policies. Moreover, it should call for the isolation of the country and for immediate sanctions. Gaddafi must become an instant pariah for this continuing and unlimited use of deadly force against his people.

Moammar Gaddafi, who has called himself the “Guide of the First of September Great Revolution of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,” should go down in history with the Emperor Bokassa and Idi Amin as a grotesque reminder of why people have the right to change their government. The sooner he falls, the better for Libyans. But he will leave behind a shattered land with no alternative government, no real political parties, and no experience with free elections, a free press, independent courts, or any of the building blocks of democracy. The one great asset, due to all that oil, is about $100 billion and perhaps more in financial reserves, so Libya — with a population of only about 6.5 million — need not have a future of underdevelopment and oppression. And that suggests another step the Obama administration should take right now: acting to keep Gaddafi's bloody hands off those accounts.

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paesh