April 13, 2012
By Kamran Shafi

I just can’t sleep. Not since the landslide/avalanche carrying hundreds of thousands of tonnes of rock and mud and snow 1 km long, 1 km wide, and 80 feet thick, overwhelmed a whole battalion headquarters, burying alive 138 soldiers and civilian workers. I toss and turn, and ask myself how it would feel if the roof of my room fell in on me. I think about those poor young men, brave and selfless young men and I weep.

My mind goes back in time, to when I commanded fine young men just like the ones who lie in the snowy wastes of Siachen. God, how I abhor the name ‘Siachen’, as I think about No. 2436392 Sepoy Azam Ali, formerly of Gurgaon, now of Jaboka, Tehsil and District Okara, my faithful batman who just ten years ago (and 38 and 35 years respectively, after he and I left the Army) put his arm around my little Zainab then six years old as he saw the driver lose control of the car and head straight into a tree, saving Zainab but breaking his own arm in three places.

I think about No. 2436365 Sepoy Mohammad Ashraf, formerly of Hissar, now of Sindh, who cut his own leg to the bone as the result of his bayonet coming loose chasing a wounded rabbit that I had shot for the men, as fresh meat was hard to get across a four hour supply line in the height of summer when as a subaltern I was posted with my platoon in Kheri, Bajwat. As we were bandaging his leg he saw the blood drain from my face and said, despite his own excruciating pain: “Saab aap ja kay lait jao, mein theek hoon.”

I think of all those fine soldiers, and then as I toss and turn again, begging for sleep, I let out a choice curse for those who have put at extreme peril the lives of the thousands of Pakistani and Indian young men by ordering the occupation of the icy wastes of the glacier and the area that surrounds it, India leading, for the original sin in Siachen was committed by India; and Pakistan following close behind. Shame on you, the lot of you.

Anyone been to 16,000 feet even, where it is hard to eat, breathe and sleep, let alone the 22,000 feet where troops are stationed for a large part of the year? A nephew was posted there some years ago and told me of the physical difficulties faced by the troops which are too graphic to write verbatim in this family newspaper. Suffice it to say that having difficulty in breathing is a minor problem, the most basic bodily functions are difficult (in some cases impossible) to perform.

Quite frankly, I don’t care a solitary damn about Trig heights and Lines of Control and Areas of Influence and AGPLs (Actual Ground Position Line) when it comes to the lives, no less, of young Pakistani men. And young Indian men too, who find themselves in like quandary. What I really care about are their families: fathers, mothers, wives, children, sisters, brothers, and their welfare and care which, ultimately, lies in the hands of these young men who are so callously put in harm’s way by their commanders.

We are here talking only of the massive one-off death toll as a result of the landslide/avalanche. How about the many hundreds of Pakistani and Indian soldiers who have died over the 28 or so years that this madness has been going on: from the cold, pulmonary and cerebral edema and a host of other beasties; losing limbs to frostbite; falling down precipices, and so on. We have to note that both sides do not publicise these figures: I guess because it takes away their macho auras. Well, shame on them.

The most criminal part of this whole Siachen thing is the devil-may-care attitudes of our bureaucracies, both civil and military, both Pakistani and Indian. From what I know, the politicians would rather see the end of this most tragic tamasha sooner rather than later. I personally know of one such initiative that almost succeeded: Benazir Bhutto and Rajiv Gandhi came so close to an agreement during his stop-over visit on his way from Moscow to Delhi in 1989 that Ms Bhutto asked Vai Ell (aka Yusuf Lodhi), one of the finest cartoonists ever, to do a cartoon on Siachen that would be presented to Mr Gandhi on his departure the next morning.

I was PIO at the time and it fell to me to present the rolled up and beribboned cartoon along with the album of photographs of his visit that the PIO presents to all visiting dignitaries at the steps of the aircraft.

As I was presenting it to the Indian PM with the words, “Excellency, a special gift to you from our Prime Minister”, Ms Bhutto said, “Let’s see it, Kamran”. I opened the ribbon and showed the cartoon. It depicted high mountains in the background with a bearded mullah and a Hindu priest on either side of them and Benazir and Rajiv in the foreground. They are both saying: “Let’s leave them behind and climb the mountain.” I quote this from memory; Vai Ell is long departed from this world (RIP, my friend) I so wish I had kept a copy. Mrs Sonia Gandhi might still have the cartoon: I respectfully urge her to share it with the world.

In the event, however, one of these young Prime Ministers was kicked out of office and one was blown up by a suicide bomber. I have to say that if the recent tragedy does not work as a catalyst to stop the madness, nothing will. How apt is this description of the conflict over Siachen: “Two poverty-wracked nations engaged in a costly standoff over an uninhabitable patch of mountain and ice.”

Do something, gentlemen on both sides, or is it the case that the trade in military gear and equipment for use at high altitudes is rather lucrative?

Damn you, Siachen.

The Express Tribune

April 14, 2012
By Kuldip Nayar

It is churlish on the part of a few Indian circles to oppose the visit by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh till Pakistan makes amends for the November 26 attacks on Mumbai. The matter is before the courts of both countries and all have to wait till the process of justice is complete.

Similarly, I do not understand why some elements in Pakistan are making noises over an 18-hour visit to India by President Asif Ali Zardari. People should take into consideration that the ice has been broken after Zardari-Singh meeting. There is suddenly an atmosphere of give and take at the highest level. This will help peace efforts.

The two words which Singh used after the meeting have been missed in the midst of media hype and officials’ caution. He said that they discussed all problems between India and Pakistan and found “pragmatic and practical” solutions. In other words, both leaders went beyond the official and public line on Kashmir and the other pending issues to normalise relations.

Whether and how the solutions they discussed would be implemented is not possible to guess. Essentially, the steps they would take are dependent on the consensus they are able to build in their respective countries. The Zardari government has been left with less than a year before it faces fresh elections. It has many masters to placate to retain a majority in the National Assembly. And then the biggest party is the army which is the country’s third chamber.

Zardari was himself conscious of the forces he had to reckon with. Therefore, he met Chief of Army Staff General Pervez Kayani and also Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani at Lahore before taking the plane to Delhi. Zardari, by now an astute politician, must have known from them the contours within which he had to stay.

Normalisation of ties

Singh is adept in compulsions of coalition politics. The support to Zardari’s visit by BJP leader Yashwant Sinha, former foreign minister, indicates that the party with anti-Pakistan image also backs steps for normalisation. This makes things easier. Singh’s problem will be within his own party. One indication is the absence of Congress president Sonia Gandhi from the lunch in honour of Zardari. She, who monopolises the party, did not consider the participation important. On the other hand, she gave the message that she was far tougher than the BJP hawk, L.K. Advani.

The most charitable explanation of her absence is that Sonia wanted her son, Rahul Gandhi, to get all the limelight when he was introduced to the heir apparent, Bilawal Zardari, son of Benazir Bhutto and grandson of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Maybe, she would have emerged better if she had blessed the scion of new generations of the two dynasties which are linked with succession.

Zardari’s visit, which began with a pilgrimage at Ajmer and developed into a political event, has made Singh’s trip to Pakistan easier. And both sides, including Indian Home Minister P. Chidambaram and Pakistan Interior Minister Rahman Malek, have discussed how to accelerate the process of prosecution in Pakistan. Yet this legal or somewhat motivated delay cannot come in the way of Singh’s visit. At stake is missing the aperture which Zardari’s one-to-one talk for 40 minutes has provided. The trade agreement has already prepared the ground for something, not Sir Creek which Singh has said is “doeable”.

It is apparent that the architect of the November 26 attacks, Hafiz Saeed, who now carries a prize of $10 million (Dh36.7 million) on his head, was discussed in detail. Indian Foreign Secretary Rajan Mathai confirms this. Zardari must have felt that action against Saeed is a litmus test for India to measure whether Pakistan is really keen on punishing those who attacked Mumbai from its soil. Pakistan too is beleaguered by the elements which Saeed has unleashed. This calls for firm action.

In fact, what is needed is a joint mechanism to eliminate the Taliban. Now that the American and the Nato forces would be leaving the region in another two years, it is imperative for New Delhi and Islamabad to think of filling the vacuum. Kabul’s sovereignty is important, more so because it is bearing the brunt of the Taliban.

Pakistan has experienced how the Taliban behaved when they took over the Swat valley. Pakistan has no resources to fight the battle alone, particularly at this time when relations with America are turning sour.

India and Pakistan can fight against the Taliban who are lying low for the moment, waiting for the western forces to quit. For any joint action, both India and Pakistan have to settle their differences which are primarily because of the trust deficit. The meeting between Singh and Zardari has provided the two countries with an opportunity to sit across the table and find a solution to their problems. When the two can agree upon “pragmatic and practical” solutions during a 40-minute talk, why can’t both countries on the whole break the logjam? It is time now to go ahead.

Kuldip Nayar is a former Indian High Commissioner to the United Kingdom and a former Rajya Sabha member.
Source: Gulf News

April 14, 2012
By Amina Jilani

“Why the Siachen issue must be resolved”, was the title of an editorial published in The Express Tribune on April 10, three days after 138 citizens of Pakistan were buried under an avalanche on the world’s largest glacier, barring those of the polar caps — 78 kilometers in length standing at an altitude of 5,400 meters above sea level.

Why this must be resolved is surely because it is the most senseless and futile conflict currently taking place in this conflict-ridden world, with two sides fighting over an uninhabited area, a killing ice field that has claimed thousands of lives of each side’s troops. Apparently, neither India nor Pakistan ever publicly release their respective loss of lives, a loss which the experts put at almost 4,000 troops since — ludicrously — 1984 when it became one more bone of contention over which the two neighbours ceaselessly scrap, spending millions (or is it billions?) of rupees each day stupidly facing off against each other.

There is a solution which could be arrived at if both sides were to put aside their stubbornness and stupidity and see sense over this no-man’s land where international borders have not been defined by the UN-sponsored 1948 ceasefire that ended the first of the wars waged by the two countries that seemingly have no concept of what is good for their people.

Over the years, sensible men have held their heads in their hands bemoaning the sheer absurdity of the Siachen conflict. Now that this latest tragedy has struck, perhaps the matter will again be raised. The concept of a Peace Park at Siachen was first put forward by the Indian environmentalist and mountaineer, Aamir Ali in 1994, when mountaineers from India and Pakistan met in Switzerland to mobilise support for the park.

In 2008, Indian and Pakistani glaciologists established a detailed plan for research partnerships that could facilitate the establishment of the park and in 2009, representatives of both countries met in Norway to discuss the matter. Naturally, the discussion turned towards the intense pollution — human waste, medical waste, guns, arms and ammunition, shells, fuel containers and so forth — in the area. Now, uncountable tonnes of garbage are dumped into crevasses, which eventually flow into the water supply upon which millions of Pakistanis depend. Also discussed were the glacial melt from global warming and the military competition hastening the glacier’s demise. Glacial ice is routinely cut and melted and both sides use chemicals — Siachen, apart from being the world’s largest, is also its fastest retreating glacier. Not an environmental situation to be devoutly wished for.

Reportedly, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, at one time, expressed hope that the region would become a “peace mountain”. Also reportedly, Siachen was discussed at the brief meeting held between Mr Singh and the president of Pakistan in New Delhi on April 9 — but probably not in the context of a peace park. Standing in the way are the politicians and the armies of both sides.

In our national press, dateline Karachi April 8, was a news item under the headline “Plea to turn Siachen into peace park”. The item reported that a body known as the Pakistan Peace Coalition has seen sense on the matter. But who will join hands with this organisation? The world has 170 such parks — let this wasteful and destructive stand-off over a stretch of wasteland, the possession of which cannot benefit the people of either country, cease. The Siachen ecosystem recognises no national borders.

Stephen Cohen of Brookings wrote on the Siachen conflict in the Wall Street Journal of 1999: “[It] might be thought of as just another low intensity border war — were it not being fought between the world’s two newest nuclear powers. This combat over a barren, uninhabited nether world of questionable strategic value is a forbidding symbol of their lingering irreconcilability. [It is like] a struggle of two bald men over a comb … the epitome of the worst aspects of their relationship.”

The Express Tribune

April 14, 2012
By Ejaz Haider

The Indian cyber Gog and Magog tell us that India acted in Siachen because Pakistan had plans to occupy the area. Let me reconstruct the story from the account of Lt-Gen Dr M L Chibber (retd), GOC-in-C Northern Command in 1984.

1978, Gen Chibber is DMO: India notices that Pakistan is permitting mountaineering expeditions into the area. (NB: Pakistan had traditionally allowed expeditions west of the imaginary line that extended from NJ9842 “thence north to the glaciers”.)

“We sent a patrol next year and it was confirmed that Japanese expeditions had visited the Siachen Glacier. So routine patrolling started. Similarly routine protest notes used to be exchanged. The problem precipitated on 21st August 1983 when a protest note from Northern Sector Commander of Pakistan was handed over to his counterpart in Kargil stating that Line of Control joins with the Karakoram Pass, also that all the area West of this extended line belongs to Pakistan. When Army Headquarters saw this and also got information that Pakistan [sic] troops had occupied [sic] Bila Fond Pass, they ordered [the] Northern Command to prevent the occupation [sic] of the Glacier area by Pakistan during the mountaineering season in 1984 (italics mine).”

The italics show that Pakistan was not attempting to alter any ground reality. It was Pakistan’s clear understanding that the area, according to the 1972 delineation and demarcation of the LoC, belonged to her. It is a matter of record that all foreign expeditions coming into the area applied for permission from Islamabad, not New Delhi. Gen Chibber’s use of the word “occupation” for the deployment in Bilafond La was therefore inaccurate. That deployment was the result of Indian patrols that had begun to ingress in the area. Beyond this lies realpolitik. The best account of the run-up to the Siachen conflict is by General Jahandad Khan (Pakistan leadership challenges) and is fully corroborated by Gen Chibber (General Chibber spoke about it in May 2000 when he was visiting Pakistan. For his complete interview and detailed excerpt from Gen Khan’s book, see http://www.defencejournal.com/2000/june/interview.htm)

The initial deployment at Bilafond La was a 10-day sojourn by an SSG company which was asked to withdraw because the personnel had no equipment to survive when it began snowing in the first week of September. Indian troops, comprising the Ladakh Scouts, had camped in the Siachen area. Seeing Pakistani troops they “left their location in a great hurry abandoning all their rations and tentage”.

Increased Indian patrol activity led to meetings in the GHQ to decide the “plan of action for the summer of 1984 when the Indians were bound to come in greater numbers”. Gen Jahandad realised that “whoever succeeded in occupying the passes first” would be the winner because dislodging him would be almost impossible. As Corps Commander, his assessment to the GHQ was: “Next year (1984), India is most likely to pre-empt the occupation of the main passes of Baltoro Ridge with two-battalion strength for occupation and a third battalion as reserve. It would need another brigade to provide them with logistic support. Maximum helicopter force will have to be utilised for logistic support. Their air force will be available for air cover and also air drop of supplies/equipment.”

He estimated that Pakistan would require a “brigade group with a battalion plus to occupy these passes and the rest of the force to provide relief and logistic support. We would also need maximum porter force to carry supplies and ammunition from Goma to the glacier position. All our helicopters force, both Aloutte and Puma, will have to be mobilised for recce and logistic cover. The PAF has to stand-by to provide air cover. I had also cautioned GHQ that this operation will be very costly in logistic support. Our Military Intelligence must be alerted to keep us informed of all enemy movements beyond Leh to forestall their occupation of the glacier area.” However, at a meeting held in December 1983, General Ziaul Haq thought the operation would be on a limited scale. His assessment of both the “quantum of force required” and “the logistic problem of this operation” was incorrect. The Indians were quicker. We miscalculated the timing of the Indian ingress and also failed to notice a brigade-size movement from Leh in the second half of April 1984. By the time our troops arrived, the Indians had already occupied Gyong La in the south “strategically important because it could interfere with the enemy’s line of logistic support”.

Fact 1: India aggressed. Fact 2: We didn’t plan any presence until India began patrolling the area. Fact 3: Our intelligence failed and our deployment was late.

Lesson: lower the guard and be prepared to face the consequences.

The Express Tribune

April 14, 2012
Shamshad Ahmad

President Asif Ali Zardari’s one-day private visit to India for an Ajmer pilgrimage was masterfully timed to divert the attention of his people who were beginning to pour out into massive streets protests against his government’s failure to control power outages and soaring prices.

Prime Minster Manmohan Singh’s gesture of oriental hospitality gave Zardari free lunch as well as a welcome photo-op to create a diversionary media stir putting everyone on both sides in a guessing mode. Zardari is known for staging ploys. Whatever his motivation or desired outcome, his India yatra was no more than a diversionary move. But his luncheon meeting with Manmohan Singh, unlike their last encounter in the Russian resort city of Yekaterinburg, on the sidelines of SCO Summit in June 2009, did serve some good purpose.

Any high-level political contact between India and Pakistan is always a welcome development. In that sense, Zardari’s photo-op with Manmohan Singh was a positive development not only in the bilateral context but also for a turbulent region where nothing seems to be going right ever since it became part of the US great game in this part of the world. In American perception, at a time when so many things have gone wrong in South Asia-and for US interests in the region-any positive development in this ill-fated region would appear as a ray of light in an otherwise darkening scene.

Zardari did take one calculated decision before embarking on this visit. He did not take Foreign Minster Hina Rabbani Khar along, knowing that the presence of glamourin his entourage will detract from the purposefulness of his visit. He knew it would divert everyone’s attention from him and instead shift the focus to non-issues as it did last year during Ms Khar’s own visit to Delhi. The Bollywood frenzy sparked by our foreign minister’s personal charm and elitist fashion accessories-Roberto Cavalli sunglasses, oversized Hermes Birkin bag and pearl jewellery-took away the focus from real India-Pakistan issues.

Not only that, her host, India’s foreign minister S M Krishna, in order not to miss some of the stolen limelight had to spend more time in dying his hair jet black than in reading his voluminous MEA brief on India-Pakistan issues. Zardari obviously could not risk his stature to any such vagaries. The media on both sides of the border still went into frenzy-like rapture, giving the event an importance it never deserved. It crossed all limits, overplaying its familiar euphoria. Zardari’s Delhi yatra instantly became a media festival. No one cared what would actually happen and what would it mean or what was the history of India-Pakistan relations.

In actual effect, nothing visible happened at the Delhi luncheon meeting. No new ground was broken. One would be best advised not to be overenthusiastic about this development or overoptimistic about its prospects. One thing is clear. Given the troubled history and complex nature of India-Pakistan relations, no single event in bilateral settings will ever bring about any change in the actual course of this complex relationship. Only a process of engagement with seriousness of purpose on both sides will bring genuine breakthrough in India-Pakistan logjam.

I know when we negotiated and finalised the Composite Dialogue in June 1997, it was never meant to be an event. It was conceived as a process with carefully structured framework to address the whole range of India-Pakistan issues including the Kashmir issue.

For this process to continue purposefully, India and Pakistan will have to develop through proper diplomatic engagement a clearer framework of principles on the basis of which to address their outstanding issues and organise their future relations. There has to be visible progress at least in some areas. To sustain the process, regular agenda-specific and result-focused contact between the political leadership of the two countries will also be needed.

Steady improvement of India-Pakistan relations requires not only confidence-building measures but also progress in conflict resolution which should be visible to the people on both sides, particularly on the doables. The areas in which some forward movement can be expected include the issues of peace and security including CBMs, Siachen, Sir Creek, the water issue, economic and commercial cooperation, promotion of friendly exchanges in various fields, visa liberalisation and terrorism.

A significant forward movement in these areas could set in motion an irreversible process of genuine India-Pakistan detente which would not only reinforce the constituencies of peace in both countries but would also promote an atmosphere conducive for future progress on the major issues, including Kashmir. In recent years, both sides have been claiming “flexibility of approach and sincerity of commitment” but the momentum of normalisation will be difficult to sustain in the absence of sincerity on both sides and serious and result-oriented dialogue with a clear road map for resolving the outstanding issues.

In the ultimate analysis, however, the success of this process would depend entirely on the freshness of political approach that political leadership on both sides would be ready to bring in with sincerity of purpose. There will be no quick fixes, and we should be ready for a long-drawn-out process which must not be interrupted by change of governments or personalities on either side nor should it be subjected to the vagaries of domestic politics.

Both countries must recognise that in today’s world there will be no military solution to their problems. They must reduce mutual tensions and encourage forums in media and civil society to reinforce the lobbies in both countries for peace and stability. Kashmir remains the overarching factor casting a shadow on the prospects of peace in the region. A solution of the Kashmir dispute will have to be pursued in a manner that is acceptable to both India and Pakistan and to the people of Kashmir.

This requires continuation of the “composite dialogue” to build up trust and confidence and develop mutually beneficial cooperation which would facilitate progress towards the resolution of disputes. Depending on progress on Kashmir and in mutual confidence-building through nuclear and conventional restraint, the two countries in due course could also explore a long-term mutually agreed mechanism for conflict-prevention, conflict-resolution and peaceful settlement of disputes.

For Washington, instead of cheering India-Pakistan overtures from the sidelines, it would be more befitting if its own engagement in the region was reoriented towards promoting strategic balance rather than disturbing it. If the turbulent political history of this region has any lessons, the US engagement must be geared towards developing a sense of security and justice in this region by eschewing discriminatory policies in dealings with India-Pakistan nuclear equation, the only one in the world that grew up in history totally unrelated to the Cold War.

Washington unfortunately has its own priorities for this region as part of its China-driven larger Asian agenda which is based on bolstering India’s military and nuclear power as a counterweight against China. It must understand what we need in this region is not the induction of new destructive weapons and lethal technologies but consolidation of peace, stability, development and democratic values that we lack so much. South Asia needs stability through balance, not asymmetry of power. Also the risk of a Pakistan-India proxy war in Afghanistan is fraught with perilous implications for regional and global peace and must be averted at all costs.

The writer is a former foreign secretary. Email: shamshad1941@yahoo. com
-The News

April 16, 2012
Hussain H Zaidi

Given the mutual mistrust and hostility that have characterised relations between India and Pakistan with the attendant enormous economic and social cost, even a seemingly small step towards the shoring up of their relations needs to be welcomed. One such step is the recent meeting between President Zardari and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh during Zardari’s one-day “private” visit to India to pay homage to the shrine of a renowned saint.

The visit coincided with the Siachen tragedy in which more than 120 Pakistani soldiers and civilians were trapped by an avalanche-a grim reminder of the potential catastrophe that the antagonism between the two South Asian nuclear powers entails. Just before the presidential visit, Washington had announced a bounty for Jamaat-ud-Dawa chief Hafiz Saeed, whom New Delhi accuses of having masterminded the November 2008 attacks in Mumbai.

A recent breakthrough in the bilateral relations is Pakistan’s decision to normalise trade with India, which will culminate in the grant of the most-favoured-nation status (MFN) to that country by the end of this year. Already the positive list for imports from India has been replaced with a negative list comprising about 1,200 products.

Regardless of which of the two countries will derive greater benefits from an opening up of trade-most likely it will be India, which already has a trade surplus of $1.5 billion, because of its better economic indicators-the decision brings out the capability of the two sides to thrash out the thorny issues.

The 40-minute parleys between President Zardari and Prime Minister Singh were held without an agreed agenda. However, the two leaders raised issues bearing upon bilateral relations. However, the two sides differ on the relative importance of the issues, and understandably so. To India, what holds the key to revival of relations with its western neighbour is stepped up action by Pakistani against the militants based inside its territory, particularly the alleged perpetrators of the Mumbai act of terrorism. India has also been pressing Pakistan to extradite the persons allegedly behind the Mumbai carnage. Islamabad hasn’t obliged, because it has no extradition treaty with New Delhi.

Pakistan, on its part, regards the Kashmir issue together with the alleged diversion of the Indus River waters by its eastern neighbour in violation of the 1960 Indus Basin Treaty as the core issues. Islamabad believes that the relations between the two countries should not be held hostage to one issue.

Trade normalisation aside, for quite some time Indo-Pakistani talks, whether they’re on political or working level, have remained inconclusive, creating the impression that the dignitaries don’t mean business and meet just for the fun of it. The talks have achieved nothing, save for the agreement to remain in touch.

That said, it is exceedingly important that the communication channels between the two countries remain open. The Pakistan-India relations are inherently unstable and even a small move or incident can undo the good work done for years. That’s why, more often than not, their leaders have to start from scratch. For this reason, the parleys, whether formal or informal, political or official level, may be welcomed, for this is the only way to settle the issues.

The way forward in Pakistan-India relations is for both sides to come out of their smugness, be willing to make concessions and set out to resolve the issues, rather than just taking them up. In particular, they have to shun the rhetoric of making the talks hostage to what they call the core issues. In the past, Pakistan made the mistake of emphasis on Kashmir over all other issues. At present India is stuck to its stand on the militancy issue.

In all fairness, this is easier said than done: relations between the two countries are so much enmeshed in sentiments and have so little of pragmatism that making a significant shift from its stated position on any “core” issue would be a real challenge for the government in either country.

Regarding New Delhi’s allegation of the involvement of both state and non-state actors of Pakistan in the acts of terrorism in India, Islamabad’s position is that it is a greater victim of terrorism than India and is doing all it can to put down militancy. The West, particularly the US, shares the Indian perception that Pakistani citizens or residents masterminded the Mumbai killings and wants it to crack down on them and bring them to justice. Hence, within a month of the Mumbai killings, the Security Council outlawed Jamaat-ud-Dawa through a resolution passed on December 10, 2008. In compliance with the Security Council resolution, Pakistan’s security forces launched a crackdown on the Jamaat-ud-Dawa and arrested its chief, Hafiz Saeed, who was later set free by the courts for want of sufficient evidence. India on its part needs to realise that the war against terrorism is a drawn-out one and expecting quick results would be unrealistic.

As for Kashmir, the core issue from Pakistan’s standpoint, both countries have traditionally adopted a hard stance on that, which has defied attempts to settle the problem. The two sides need to adopt a flexible posture and explore out-of-the-box possibilities for resolving the problem. Pakistan, in particular, needs to realise that a military solution to the Kashmir issue is not possible, and that neither the UN nor the big powers which control it have any intention to get Security Council resolutions on the disputed territory implemented.

Such realisation dawned on the decision-makers in Pakistan during the Musharraf era, when softening of the Line of Control (LoC), together with greater autonomy to Kashmiris and joint oversight by both Pakistan and India, was proposed.

However, this offer did not elicit a positive response from India. Subsequently, the Pakistan government also did not press with the offer, mainly because making “concessions” to India on Kashmir would precipitate intense opposition. The opening paragraph of the historic Simla Agreement concluded in July 1972 reads: “The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan are resolved that the two countries put an end to the conflict and confrontation that have hitherto marred their relations and work for the promotion of a friendly and harmonious relationship and the establishment of durable peace in the subcontinent, so that both countries may henceforth devote their resources and energies to the pressing task of advancing the welfare of their people.”

However, conflict and confrontation have continued to mar Pakistan-India ties, and their meagre resources remained largely devoted to warfare rather than to the welfare of their people.

Later, Benazir Bhutto and Rajiv Gandhi, Nawaz Sharif and I K Gujral, Nawaz Sharif and Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Pervez Musharraf and Mr Vajpayee, and Musharraf and Manmohan Singh expressed such commitments in their meetings. But on each occasion, the process was stalled and bilateral relations worsened. It is high time the two countries learnt from the past and worked for durable peace and development in the region.

The writer is a freelance contributor based in Islamabad. Email: hussainhzaidi@gmail.com
-The News

April 16, 2012
Asif Ezdi

A little more than a week ago, a battalion headquarters of the Pakistani army in the Gayari sector of Siachen was suddenly buried under a nearly 20-metre-thick mass of snow, ice, slush and boulders after being hit by a massive avalanche. A search-and-rescue operation launched immediately after the disaster has so far failed to turn up any survivors among the 127 soldiers and 11 civilians stationed at the camp at the time.

While a nation unified in grief waits anxiously and prays for news of survivors, our political leadership has shown a remarkable degree of detachment from this monumental tragedy. They have offered few words of solace to the families of the missing persons and hardly any expression of appreciation for the incredible sacrifices being made by our soldiers who daily brave murderous conditions of weather and terrain to keep the country safe from further incursions by a not-too-friendly neighbour.

Zardari and Gilani have contented themselves with issuing routine statements through the press-of the kind that would be made if some natural calamity were to hit a remote Pacific island. Neither of them has appeared in person to offer comfort to the families of the victims, most of them from Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Kashmir, or express our admiration for the fortitude of our soldiers in the highest battlefield of the world.

Some members of our “civil society” and the “liberal” sections of the media have also failed to acknowledge the debt we owe to the troops who guard national territory in Siachen. One of them, the head of the South Asian Free Media Association (SAFMA), has called for a unilateral Pakistani withdrawal from the area. “Why should we be going for an agreement (with India)? We should just withdraw,” he is reported to have said. “If we do that, Indian domestic pressure will also result in a withdrawal there.” Can there be anything more naïve?

There is of course a host of reasons-human, financial and environmental-why both countries should withdraw from Siachen without waiting for a resolution of the bigger Kashmir question. About 8,000 soldiers from both sides are estimated to have died since 1984. Most of these deaths, about 70 percent, were from the near-Arctic weather conditions and a treacherous terrain beset by landslides and avalanches.

The financial burden of the deployment is also huge. India has stationed seven battalions and spends $800,000 daily, not counting the added wages and bonuses it pays to its personnel stationed there. Pakistan has deployed less than half the number of the Indian soldiers and spends one-fourth the amount.

The environmental damage caused by the troop movements, training exercises and building of infrastructure is not only local but affects also the entire population downstream which depends on drinking and irrigation water from the Indus River-and that means practically 80 percent of the population of Pakistan. This is not only because of the melting of the glaciers but also the permanent pollutants in the military waste-like cobalt, cadmium and chromium-which are leached into the river. India, on the other hand, is unaffected because it does not take water from the Indus.

Despite all these reasons, negotiations between the two sides on a mutual withdrawal from positions occupied since 1984 have been at an impasse because of Indian insistence that Pakistan should authenticate the Actual Ground Position Line, on the map as well as on the ground. Pakistan is not ready to do so as it would amount to recognising the Indian incursion. After Gayari, some Indian security analysts are hoping that Pakistan will now soften its position.

Only a day after the Gayari calamity, Zardari landed at New Delhi grinning from ear to ear-accompanied by young Bilawal flashing a V-for-victory sign-to visit Ajmer. He had a luncheon meeting with Manmohan Singh in order to pursue his very personal agenda of “normalisation” with India, so personal that even the foreign minister was not included in the delegation. That agenda, which is very much in accord with India’s – and Washington’s – priorities in relations with Pakistan, has two principal elements: (a) establishment of normal trade and economic relations and the promotion of enhanced people-to-people contacts between the two countries; and (b) a “settlement” of Kashmir on the lines of that which Musharraf was negotiating with Manmohan Singh through the backchannel.

Zardari has already delivered in a big way in the first of these two areas by opening up the Pakistani market to Indian exporters-without any quid pro quo from Delhi. This has surprised even the Indians who were expecting that any move by Pakistan towards trade liberalisation would be vetoed by the military establishment. Zardari pleased the Indians further by suggesting at his meeting with Manmohan Singh that Pakistan and India should emulate the India-China model, in which the two countries have been steadily expanding their trade and economic relations despite the unresolved boundary dispute.

To nudge Pakistan to take further steps to expand bilateral economic exchanges, Delhi has now announced a decision in principle to allow direct investment from Pakistan. India’s next target in the economic field is to get Pakistan to open the land route to Indian exports to Afghanistan and Central Asia. It would be safe to conjecture that this subject came up in the Zardari-Manmohan meeting and that Zardari was amenable.

As regards Kashmir, India’s keenness to resume the backchannel dialogue held from 2004 to 2007 during Musharraf’s rule is no secret. The “settlement” that the two sides were then negotiating would have set aside the UN Security Council resolutions and legitimised India’s occupation of two-thirds of the state in return for some concessions by India of very dubious value, which, besides, would also be easily reversible.

Those who argue in favour of a settlement on these lines, as Khursheed Kasuri does endlessly, contend that there is no alternative because there cannot be a military solution. They are only partly right. There cannot be a military solution. But there is another-better-choice open to Pakistan and the Kashmiris than legitimising India’s occupation. That option is to maintain the current international status of Kashmir as disputed territory till the exercise of the right of self-determination by the people of the state and to continue Pakistan’s moral, political and diplomatic support for the Kashmiris under UN Security Council resolutions. The time when Kashmiris will have azadi might seem distant but it will surely come because the age of colonialism is dead, much though India may want to keep it alive in Kashmir.

After the ouster of Musharraf in 2008, both Zardari and Manmohan Singh were interested in resuming the backchannel negotiations on Kashmir. But the suspension of bilateral dialogue by India after the Bombay terrorist attacks in November ruled that out. In an interview last week with The Wall Street Journal (12 April), the Indian foreign secretary Ranjan Mathai indicated unmistakably that India would now like to resume the backchannel dialogue. India, he said, would be happy to start talks towards a deal to keep Kashmir’s borders as they are but allow greater trade and movement of people across the Line of Control. The backchannel, Mathai said, “was a very useful channel of discussions. They made progress.”

This is a subject that is sure to have come up in talks during Zardari’s visit. It is significant that BJP leaders were present at Manmohan Singh’s luncheon meeting with Zardari. So was S K Lambah, the Indian envoy to the backchannel negotiations.

Both Pakistan and India need an atmosphere of tranquillity in the region in order to concentrate on their economic and social development, but peace will not break out by the two sides’ beating the peace drums. Peace will only come if there is the will to find equitable solutions to bilateral disputes.

Email: asifezdi@yahoo.com

-The News

April 16, 2012
By: Khalid Iqbal

Pakistan and India are strange neighbours. Their relationship is deeply grounded in mistrust. On the onset of a typical crisis, the bilateral mechanism to manage such events collapses almost instantly. Anticipating the entanglement, regional and extra regional well wishers start flocking in to keep the two antagonists apart. Thanks to these good offices, the war has been averted a number of times. The recent private-public visit by Pakistani President was an interesting event. The composition of the delegation indicated that it had an official dimension too. To keep the expectations manageable, a two-facade mix and match was worked out.

The visit of this level was the first in the last seven years. It commenced on the heels of a human tragedy caused by a massive avalanche that had hit a Pakistani military camp in Siachen, which left 124 army personnel and 11 civilians buried alive. An announcement of a pull out of respective militaries from the glacier could have a befitting gift to the two nations. However, Pak-India relations are too complex to be swayed it seems, even by a human tragedy of this magnitude. The two leaders settled by exchanging one frail prisoner each.

Both the countries have gotten used to an interesting pattern and profile package in the context of their bilateral interactions. They work meticulously for years to build a rapprochement framework, or at least an aura of it; then something happens and things are back to square one – generally, a near war situation.

The cycle then reengineers itself under the pressure of compulsions to stay engaged. Under the fear of domestic backlash, leaders from both sides restart through somewhat shying encounters on the periphery of international diplomatic venues, then graduate to meet under the cover of sports, cultural or religious events. Political oppositions of both the countries remain too eager to blame respective governments for a ‘sell out’ without really specifying the commodity. Dr Manmohan Singh was about to lose his job after his meeting with Pakistani counterpart on the sidelines of NAM summit at Sharm El-Sheikh. However, this time it was an enabling political environment; the opposition political parties of Pakistan had wished the President of Pakistan good luck before the visit and the Indian leader of opposition joined him for lunch.

One major setback to bilateral relations came as a result of Indian invasion of Siachen in 1984, a glacier that had been respected as a “no man’s land” since independence. Siachen was invaded to pressurise Pakistan amidst the most dense and intense phase of the Afghan war of independence against the erstwhile Soviets. Soon after, it was followed by massive military deployments, all along India-Pakistan border, under the garb of military exercise “Brass-tacks”. Presumably, both these actions were executed by India on the behest of Soviets. During those days, India used to be too happy to play proxy for Soviets. Like these days, during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan also, India was on the wrong side of popular Afghan aspirations.

Siachen was considered so irrelevant piece of land that the Simla Agreement, while drawing the Line of Control, did not consider it significant enough to demarcate the territory beyond the map coordinate known as NJ9842. The Indian armed forces crept into Siachen in 1984 and moved on to the Saltoro Range to the west. Realising that India had come so close to Skardu, Pakistan too sent its troops up to the Saltoro Range. A misplaced adventure by the Indian army to climb up an undemarcated glacier and to hang-on there sowed a powerful seed of mistrust that has been a cause of later happenings like Kargil.

Moreover, unprovoked Indian invasion of Siachen resulted in the activation of highest battle ground of the world. Until the ceasefire in 2003, Siachen remained one of the world’s most tense battle zones, where the Indian and Pakistani armies confronted each other over the disputed territory for over two decades. Siachen is 20,000 feet above sea level. The Indian and Pakistani troops have fought there in temperatures of around minus 60 degrees Celsius. Ever since Siachen’s occupation by India, both counties have exposed their troops to environmental hardships; more have died or have been maimed because of inhospitable climatic conditions than due to direct military combat. India has incurred higher human and economic cost of maintaining a garrison at Siachen.

It is unfortunate that despite numerous efforts by Pakistan over the previous several years, the Siachen issue could not be resolved and troops from both sides are suffering; though everyone has been saying that it should be resolved. A tentative agreement has already been worked out.

Pakistan did not start this conflict. India moved into the area and occupied the higher peaks on the Saltoro Range. India aggressed; its military should not have been at its present location. Pakistan has all along been trying to end the conflict; but it cannot do it unilaterally. At the same time, India has no incentive to withdraw. Indian army is the main hurdle; to justify its continued occupation, it tries to attach fairy tale strategic significance to the territory that it now occupies. For any meaningful initiative for durable peace between India and Pakistan, demilitarisation of Siachen could be a starting point. Pakistani side has proposed a solution: the undemarcated areas under the Simla Agreement become zones of disengagement with both sides withdrawing their troops without prejudice to their pre-Siachen conflict positions.

The president’s current visit, although it was not explicitly stated, was about consolidating the recently refreshed confidence building measures (CBM), which have been cautiously embarked upon by the government and non-government entities from both sides. Despite no Indian concessions on non-tariff barriers, Pakistan has ceded a major concession to India by according it the status of Most Favoured Nations (MFN). The business communities of both states had been inching towards a viable framework during the last one year or so. If even playing field is provided by removing the NTBs by India, both India and Pakistan, could benefit mutually from enhanced trade; both have much to sell to one another.

A reciprocal visit by Dr Singh towards the end of this year would help in maintaining the momentum. The short meeting between the two produced a rather comprehensive framework for further movement. All that could be, was mentioned in the Indian Foreign Secretary’s press briefing. Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affair’s spokesperson recently commented: “The Siachen is, as you know, already part of the dialogue process. There is nothing new about it. As far as Pakistan is concerned, we have always maintained that all issues between Pakistan and India should be resolved, especially the core dispute of Jammu and Kashmir. That continues to be our policy. All the bilateral issues including Siachen, Sir Creek, are part of the dialogue agenda. We hope that as this dialogue process moves forward, our two countries will be able to move beyond the CBMs because it is important for them to settle these issues and move forward.”

The challenge is to strive towards reducing tensions and resolving as well as managing the conflicts, while understanding clearly that complexities involved in Pak-India relations cannot be simply wished away.

n The writer is a retired Air Commodore and former assistant chief of air staff of the Pakistan Air Force. At present, he is a member of the visiting faculty at the PAF Air War College, Naval War College and Quaid-i-Azam University.

Email:khalid3408@gmail.com

April 16, 2012
By Tanvir Ahmad Khan

Pakistan’s steadfast defence against the Indian army’s occupation of positions on the Saltoro ridge of the spectacular 78-kilometre long Siachen glacier is sustained by an impressive network of roads and paths. The Gayari camp — where an avalanche has tragically buried 138 men under masses of snow — was a vital base in this intricate design. The catastrophe has brought the Siachen issue under the spotlight again.

Responses range from anguished questions of why Pakistan was fighting for a frozen wasteland to succinct — if rather deterministic — narration of strategic factors that block a peaceful settlement. Impassive to human losses, a former Indian army chief brushed aside the humanitarian concerns of an Express News anchor and declared that having “climbed the wall” ( the Saltoro ridge ), India would maintain the glacier’s partition.

The basic facts can be summarised easily. The 1949 Karachi agreement and the 1972 Simla agreement created the present Line of Control up to the map reference point NJ 9842 beyond which it, for Pakistan, ran to the Karakoram (KK) pass. Free of any military presence till India launched Operation Meghdoot exactly 28 years ago (April 13, 1984), Siachen was traditionally under Pakistani oversight. Complacent because of the injunctions of the Simla agreement against any territorial change in Jammu and Kashmir by force and the forbidding terrain, Pakistan lost valuable time in assessing the Indian thrust into Siachen.

It then mounted a superhuman effort to stabilise the situation, even as the initial tactical advantage had enabled the Indian army to capture positions on the ridge; the valorous Pakistani contingent was still a week short of it. This counter-move was not futile; it relatively secured the Gyong La pass sub-sector, though the Indians had already taken the Sia La and Bilfond La passes. Restricting Indian control of the Gyong La pass stopped further Indian marches; the area overlooks the Shyok and Nubra river valleys. The 1989 Rajiv Gandhi- Benazir Bhutto agreement was implicitly cognisant of an enduring stalemate. It was not fanciful; earlier in April 1989, the two sides had disengaged in the Chumik glacier.

India justified its incursion by citing non-existent Pakistani designs on a vast swath of land between NJ 9842 and the KK pass. Subsequently, it refused to implement the disengagement agreement on the grounds that, beginning with the meeting of military commissions in August 1989, Pakistan had consistently declined to “authenticate” positions actually held by the two armies. Wikileaks has confirmed that the veto came from the Indian army.

The Siachen story has its heroic moments for both the countries but it would, nevertheless, be remembered in history as an example of Man’s perversity. It may not be a low hanging fruit ready to be plucked, but all the elements that seem to put it beyond the peacemakers are amenable to mutually satisfactory solutions. The most reassuring aspect of the Siachen reality is that neither side can proceed with any great despatch to deceive the other side during demilitarisation and withdrawal. The Indian army’s contention that Pakistan would somehow escape the carefully crafted, executed and monitored process of disengagement to seize the coveted Saltoro heights is as disingenuous as its contention in 1984 that it had pre-empted Pakistan’s scheme to militarise the entire stretch to KK pass.

Given the history and the distrust, it would be hard work spread over at least one whole season, to implement a fair operational sequence of measures that progressively reduce troops and dismantle forward bases, while every detail is jointly monitored. Satellite imagery would be available for the asking from several sources. India has excellent alternatives to place on international record the cherished Actual Ground Positions Line (AGPL); Pakistan can similarly reiterate that the Indian ingress was a grave violation of the letter and spirit of the Simla agreement. The different perspectives could henceforth come under rubric of ‘disputed territory’. A joint action plan for environmental restoration of the battered glacier, its scientific study and its tourism potential would eliminate fears of either side violating terms of disengagement. At a fraction of the present cost, India and Pakistan can agree to install long-term land-based, aerial and satellite monitoring.

When it blocks conversion of Siachen into a potential peace park, the Indian army is rightly suspected of ulterior motives in retaining the present tactical advantage for a future westward power projection. This will rule out any unilateral reduction of forces on the Pakistani side. If the Indian political leadership grasps the fact that vainglorious dreams of exploiting this advantage strategically are entirely ephemeral, it may still summon the necessary will to accept disengagement by discussing Pakistan’s non-paper of June 2011 earnestly. The wild flowers that give the glacier its name can blossom again to celebrate peace and not to mark funerals of brave men from either side.

The Express Tribune

April 17, 2012
Dr Maleeha Lodhi

It was in April twenty-eight years ago that the seeds of the Siachen conflict were sown. This April nature struck a cruel blow when an avalanche hit the area, burying 139 Pakistani soldiers and civilian workers. The tragedy is a poignant reminder of the need to settle a long-standing, costly dispute.

Because facts have been sparse in recent TV discussions of Siachen it would be useful to recall the dispute’s military, political and diplomatic history. One way to do this is to ask ten key questions even if they are not exhaustive.

1. What is the source of the dispute?

Agreements between Pakistan and India that followed the wars of 1948 and 1971 did not demarcate or determine a dividing line in Kashmir’s northeastern reaches – one of the world’s most inhospitable and desolate regions. The July 1949 Karachi agreement established a ceasefire line, which after minor modification became the Line of Control under the 1972 Simla Agreement. This went as far as a point known by its grid reference NJ9842, south of the Siachen Glacier. From here on, the agreement said, the line continues “thence north to the glacier”. The area beyond NJ9842 was not delineated because it was deemed too harsh and inaccessible for habitation. Neither side at that time thought the region had any military or strategic importance. It was not anticipated that the glacier would later become a contentious issue and that modern mountain warfare or shifting strategic calculations would make it disputed.

In the mid 1970s Pakistan began to allow international mountaineers and expedition teams to visit the glacier’s peaks. Pakistan’s administrative control of the area also received cartographic backing. International map publishers started showing the Line of Control proceeding north-eastward towards the Karakorum Pass and the Siachen area in Pakistani territory. Because of the treacherous terrain Pakistan established no permanent posts. Only scouting missions periodically went there.

How did the conflict start?

With India occupying key peaks in April 1984 in a major airborne operation named ‘Meghdoot’. A failure of intelligence meant that Pakistan discovered this and dispatched troops only to find Indian forces occupying almost all the high ground positions along the Saltoro range. Pakistan’s efforts to dislodge the Indians did not succeed. Both sides gradually came to deploy more soldiers and create more posts.

2. When did diplomatic efforts start to resolve the conflict?

Soon after the first clashes. But it wasn’t until the December 1985 meeting in Delhi between General Ziaul Haq and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi that a serious effort was made to pursue a settlement. Since then twelve rounds of talks have taken place, the last in May 2011.

3. Was agreement for military disengagement ever reached?

Yes, in the fifth round held in June 1989 after the advent of Benazir Bhutto’s government and an upswing in relations with India. The joint statement issued after talks on June 17, 1989 outlined the core elements of a settlement: “There was agreement by both sides to work towards a comprehensive settlement, based on redeployment of forces to reduce the chance of conflict, avoidance of the use of force and the determination of future positions on the ground so as to conform with the Simla Agreement and to ensure durable peace in the Siachen area”. It added: “the army authorities of both sides will determine these positions”.

4. How significant was the June 1989 breakthrough?

It produced the outlines of a solution. For the first time the Indians agreed to relocate forces away from the disputed heights although in subsequent talks between military officials in 1989 differences emerged over where they would pull back. The language ‘redeployment of forces’ rather than ‘withdrawal’ was a Pakistani concession aimed at enabling Rajiv Gandhi to sell the agreement to his military and to political opponents in an election year. The agreement was endorsed by Prime Ministers Bhutto and Gandhi during the latter’s July 1989 visit to Islamabad.

5. Was Pakistan keen to turn this understanding into an agreement?

Absolutely. Pakistan’s defence secretary was mandated for the sixth round of talks in November 1992 to discuss modalities for implementation of the 1989 agreement.

6. What prevented an accord?

Indian backtracking on the 1989 understanding and subsequently changing the terms for a settlement largely on the urging of its military, which continues to oppose a pullout. The 1992 talks ended in deadlock when Delhi insisted on ‘complete’ authentication of ‘current’ positions prior to redeployment and sought to reopen previously settled issues. Pakistan saw this as resiling from the 1989 agreement that obliged both sides to stand down to pre-1972 positions. Pakistan held that India violated the Simla agreement by occupying an area that may have been undemarcated, but was under Pakistan’s administrative control. The Simla Agreement prohibited unilateral alteration of the status quo whatever the differing legal interpretations.

7. Has ‘authentication’ been the main sticking point?

Yes. The 1989 joint statement made no mention of marking ‘current positions’, referring only to determining ‘future positions.’ Pakistan rejected authentication because a) it meant legitimising an illegal act and b) provided India the basis for a legal claim in negotiations later to delineate the area beyond NJ 9842.

India’s demand for authentication of an Agreed Ground Position Line (AGPL) on the map and on the ground rested on the argument that this would provide a legal or diplomatic safeguard if Pakistan later went back on commitments and captured the Saltoro ridge. Other than being a vehicle to formalise ‘current positions’, authentication has, over the years, served as an alibi for the Indian army to resist military disengagement. Former Indian officials have argued that withdrawal from Siachen will facilitate Pakistan’s access across Saltoro to the Karakoram Pass on the Chinese border. In what reflects the defence establishment’s thinking, they have also presented a strategic rationale for the LOC’s delineation beyond NJ9842 that provides India both a key location on the Chinese border and permanent control of heights overlooking Gilgit and Baltistan.

8. Were there other missed opportunities in the 1990s?

Possibly. In the November 1992 talks Pakistan showed readiness to record ‘present’ positions on an annexure to the agreement provided the main text contained the proviso that this would not constitute the basis for a legal claim or justify any political or moral right to the area. But the Indians insisted on ‘complete’ authentication and exchange of maps. Pakistan refused. Thereafter the January 1994 talks explored ideas about a Zone of Complete Disengagement based on an Indian non-paper. Delhi continued to press for acceptance of the AGPL before demilitarisation. The dialogue began to run out of steam. The mid 1990s saw BJP leaders calling to retain Siachen for ‘strategic and security reasons’ while Pakistan started to link Siachen to resolving Kashmir.

9. Did the 1999 Kargil episode have implications for talks on Siachen?

Inescapably. Any escalation of tensions or confrontation inevitably sets back diplomatic efforts, but Kargil did more. It gave Delhi an added how-can-we-trust-Pakistan justification to toughen terms for a Siachen settlement and put Islamabad in the dock for violating the Simla accord. It helped the Indian army argue that disengagement would risk Pakistan seizing the posts it vacated.

10. Did the last round in May 2011 make progress?

No. Pakistani officials detected a hardening in the Indian position. Delhi insisted that the line beyond NJ 9842 be delineated before any disengagement or withdrawal. This reversed the sequence proposed by Pakistan and earlier agreed by India: disengagement and moving outside the zone of conflict followed by talks on demarcation. A package proposal was conveyed in a Pakistani non-paper handed during the twelfth round. This reiterated redeployment and joint monitoring of the disengagement process. It also reiterated that once withdrawal schedules were prepared, ‘present’ and ‘future’ positions could be incorporated, subject to the earlier proviso. The talks ended in an impasse.

This unedifying diplomatic history should not however dampen efforts for a settlement but instead intensify the search for imaginative ways to untie the Siachen knot. Not only will this end a confrontation that exacts such a high price but it will also set a powerful precedent to solve other more vexed disputes.

-The News