June 2, 2012
A.G Noorani

PRIME Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani’s plea for Asian unity, which he made at the annual conference of the Boao Forum for Asia in China on April 2, has gone almost unnoticed. But it merits serious reflection.

He said: “If we do not establish a regional harmony based on trade, investment and economic growth, we fear we will remain hostage to the past.” The 21st century, he added, was the “Asian century” and Asia’s role in the global economic order has changed rapidly. He cited some recent steps such as tariff liberalisation with China, a new transit trade agreement with Afghanistan, steps towards most-favoured nation status for India, and regional projects in gas pipelines and communication as factors that will alter the regional situation radically.

This will be a sign that the countries affected have fully realised the need for “regional harmony”, as the prime minister put it. In this, Asia has sadly been lagging behind the other continents. Europe has its Council of Europe, the Americas have their Organisation of American States and Africa, a latecomer, established its African Union (established as the Organisation of African Unity). African states are no more united than Asian states. But not only did they set up a regional organisation, despite the hiccups they saw to it that it worked. Why are Asians so backward, then?

In January 1949 the prime minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, convened an 18-nation Conference on Indonesia at New Delhi. The participants included Afghanistan, Australia, Burma, Ceylon, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Lebanon, Pakistan, the Philippines and Saudi Arabia. Among the tasks set before the conference were “to frame and submit to the Security Council proposals which would, if accepted by both parties concerned, restore peace immediately to Indonesia and promote the early realisation of freedom by the Indonesia people.”

The conference also passed a resolution on January 23, 1949, which is seldom recalled. “The conference expresses the opinion that the participating governments should consult among themselves in order to explore ways and means of establishing suitable machinery, having regard to the areas concerned, for the purpose of promoting consultation and co-operation within the framework of the United Nations.”

This remained a dead letter. Shortly before he died in January 1966, on the conclusion of the conference at Tashkent with President Ayub Khan, Nehru’s successor Lal Bahadur Shastri proposed, on Dec 18, 1965, the formation of an Asian Organisation.What has emerged, instead, are sub-regional groups of which the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) has proved the most successful and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (Saarc) the least. Both experiments yield the same lesson. The former languished for quite some time because of Indonesia’s policy of confrontation with Malaysia over a territorial dispute. Kashmir keeps India and Pakistan apart. As long as they do not settle this, the Saarc will proceed as sluggishly as it has been doing since its establishment a quarter of a century ago. The highly successful Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) has flourished because China and Russia buried the hatchet.

For the first few years after independence, Pakistan and India voted together on a host of issues in the United Nations’ General Assembly. They are not the only offenders in their discord on the Asian continent. Territorial and other disputes abound in other areas of Asia as well and far more violently, too.

Saddam Hussein’s Iraq set the record. He first attacked Iran in 1980 with tacit support from his American backers. When he turned on Kuwait in 1990 the United States scented an opportunity. As Mohamed Heikal, the distinguished Egyptian journalist, shows in his magisterial work Illusions of Triumph, there was every likelihood of an intra-Arab solution; Saudi Arabia did not rush to denounce Iraq but the US secretary of defence, Dick Cheney, rushed to Riyadh on Aug 6, 1990, to persuade King Fahd to accept American troops on his soil. The far-reaching consequences of this move need no elaboration.

The region underwent radical change. American troops quit Saudi Arabia but American presence is a grim reality in the Gulf, and in Afghanistan. It is the same story as the East India Company exploiting Indian rulers’ differences to occupy India, which Zulfikar Ali Bhutto aptly recalled in a perceptive essay.

The 1949 vision of an Asian Organisation faded. But Asians have quietly settled for second-best — sub-regional bodies, from the Gulf Cooperation Council to the SCO, which has proved so successful that other states are queuing up to secure membership.

The SCO comprises China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. President Asif Ali Zardari and India’s external affairs minister, S. M. Krishna, are due to attend its summit at Beijing on June 6 and 7. Pakistan, India, Iran and Mongolia, which enjoy observer status, have been pressing for full membership for three years. Afghanistan is expected to join as an observer. Turkey is set to be accepted as a dialogue partner, while Sri Lanka and Belarus acquired that position in 2010.

A summit at which leaders from all these countries, as well as Presidents Hamid Karzai and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, are present has a significance far beyond what even the founders of the SCO imagined.

The remarks made on May 23 by China’s vice foreign minister, Cheng Guoping, reflect the SCO’s confidence: “We welcome relevant countries to become members of the SCO. The relevant countries should work hard towards political, legal and technical preparations [for membership]. The relevant work is going on about expansion of membership. The decision should be made through consensus and consultation, and no timetable should be set. That is to say, when the conditions are ripe, the decision should be made through consensus.”

The SCO aims “to build a new type of state-to-state relations and a more just and equitable international order.” It is expected to issue a political statement that will stress its opposition to increasing western pressure on Iran.

The future lies in linking up such diverse bodies as the Saarc, the SCO and Asean.

The writer is an author and lawyer based in Mumbai.
-Dawn

By Tariq Fatemi

Recently, American think tanks have claimed that Pakistan and China entered into a new understanding in mid-February for the construction of another nuclear reactor in Pakistan, which in their view, would violate Beijing’s commitment to the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).

While China has strongly denied this, a few facts about proliferation in South Asia need to be recalled. India’s nuclear test in May of 1974 generated huge concern, prompting Pakistan and regional countries to galvanise world opinion in favour of South Asia being declared a nuclear weapons free zone. Over subsequent years, Pakistan made other proposals aimed at keeping the region — which had already seen more than its share of conflicts — safe from this scourge. India, however, chose to ignore these initiatives. Consequently, Pakistan initiated its own programme and succeeded in emulating India when the latter carried out fresh tests in May 1998. And yet, Pakistan did not abandon hopes of managing this “scourge”, offering to India the Strategic Restraint Regime, containing three interlocking elements of nuclear restraint, conventional balance and dispute settlement. To Pakistan’s regret, this comprehensive proposal has failed to evoke any response from its neighbour. While the merits of Indian policy could be debated, the attitude of many major powers continues to puzzle Pakistanis and others interested in restraining proliferation in South Asia.

India’s huge market for nuclear technology beckons many a reactor manufacturer, but surely, governments should take a more measured and responsible view, which is why the Bush Administration’s decision in 2005 to offer a civilian nuclear deal to India was so shocking. It ridiculed not only US domestic laws, but called for exemption from provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the NSG that virtually destroyed the very rationale of these global understandings. This has been followed by bilateral agreements by others for supply of nuclear technology to India that calls into question their commitment to the concept of non-proliferation, as the US-India deal excluded from safeguards eight Indian reactors suitable for weapons-grade plutonium production. Similarly, the 13 breeder reactors have been left out of safeguards and to leave no ambiguity, the Indian prime minister has affirmed that no part of India’s nuclear programme would be placed under safeguards if it was of a strategic nature. The US, however, claims that these concessions to India serve the cause of global non-proliferation.

Notwithstanding, Pakistan’s modest nuclear cooperation with China continues to draw criticism from the US, with Pakistan being accused of engaging in nuclear proliferation and China of violating its commitments to the NSG. Yet, it is well known that Pakistan and China signed a 30-year civil nuclear cooperation agreement in September 1986. Subsequently, additional agreements were entered into prior to China joining the NSG in 2004, under whose provisions it has been engaged in building nuclear reactors in Pakistan. Consequently, China is under no legal bar to assist Pakistan meet its massive energy needs. Nor is Pakistan under any obligation to end its cooperation with China, especially as all of Pakistan’s nuclear reactors for power generation, including those planned for the future, would be under safeguards. As Mark Hibbs of the Carnegie Endowment pointed out in a recent piece, there is nothing in the NSG guidelines that prevents continuing Sino-Pakistan cooperation as “the NSG guidelines are voluntary understandings of governments”. And Mark Krepon, a well-known expert in this field, has emphasised: “The NSG has become less consensual and the NPT weaker”, as a result of the US-India deal.

Pakistan is convinced that if NPT signatory states, such as France, Russia, the UK, Japan and the US, can offer nuclear technology to India, a non-NPT signatory state, the US and its allies have little moral standing to suggest that Pakistan and China refrain from similar cooperation.

Published in The Express Tribune, April 3rd, 2013.

Few times ago, American think-tanks have claimed that Pakistan and China entered into a new understanding in mid-February for the construction of another nuclear reactor in Pakistan, which is their view, would violate Beijing's commitment to the Nuclear Supplies Group(NSG).

While china has strongly denied this, a few facts about proliferation in South Asia need to be recalled. India's nuclear test in May of 1974 generated huge concern, prompting Pakistan and regional countries to galvanize world opinion in favor of South Asia being declared a nuclear weapons free zone. Over subsequent years, Pakistan made other proposals aimed at keeping the region - which had already seen more than its share of hurdles and conflicts - safe from this scourge. India, however, chose to ignore these initiatives.

Consequently, Pakistan initiated its own program and succeeded in emulating India when the latter carried out fresh tests in May 1998. And yet, Pakistan did not abandon hopes of managing this scourge, offering to India the Strategic Restraint Regime, containing three interlocking elements of nuclear restraints, conventional balance and dispute settlement. To Pakistan's regret, this comprehensive proposal has failed to evoke any response from its neighbor. While the merits of Indian policy could be debated, the attitude of many major powers continues to puzzle Pakistanis and others interested in restraining proliferation in South Asia.

India's huge market for nuclear technology beckons many a reactor manufacture, but surely, governments should take a more measured and responsible view, which is why the Bush Administration's decision 2005 to offer a civilian nuclear deal to India was so shocking. It ridiculed not only US domestic laws, but called for exemption from provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the NSG that virtually destroyed the very rationale of these global understanding. This has been followed by bilateral agreements by others for supply of nuclear technology to India that calls into question their comment to the concept of non - proliferation, as the US - India deal excluded from safe guars eight Indian reactors suitable for weapons - grade plutonium production.

Notwithstanding, Pakistan's modest nuclear cooperation with China continues to draw criticism from the US, with Pakistan being accused of engaging in nuclear proliferation and Chine of violating its commitments to the NSG. Yet, it is well known that Pakistan and China signed a 30-year civil nuclear cooperation agreement in September 1986. Subsequently, additional agreements were entered into prior to China joining the NSG in 2004, under whose provisions it has been engaged in building nuclear reactors in Pakistan.
Pakistan is convinced that if NPT signatory states, such as France, Russia, the UK, Japan and the US, can offer nuclear technology to India, a non - NPT signatory state, the US and its allies have little moral standing to suggest that Pakistan and China refrain from similar cooperation.

http://www.thefrontierpost.com/category/40/

April 16, 2013
Adeela Naureen and Umar Waqar



With DMK President M. Karunanidhi’s decision to quit both the Union Cabinet and the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA), the political environment in India has taken another turn. The anti-Sri Lanka sentiment has grown stronger. He has argued that continuing in the government and the alliance would do great harm to the Sri Lankan Tamils.

Of late, the Sri Lankans visiting or staying in India have been harassed, assaulted and booed, especially in southern India. As reported by The Hindu, “a Buddhist monk from Sri Lanka was assaulted by three unidentified persons on board the Tamil Nadu Express, just as it arrived at Chennai Central Railway Station. This is the second such attack in three days, the first being on a monk at the Big Temple in Thanjavur.” Recently, Sri Lankan cricketers participating in the IPL matches were barred from playing in Chennai by the AIDMK-led government of Jayalalitha.

Why has Sri Lanka and its people become a target and victim of Indian hate and undue pressure? It is important to understand India’s treatment to its smaller neighbours, who happen to challenge its hegemony and try to maintain their sovereignty in the geographically Indo- Centric South Asia.

The Delhi- Colombo relationship has seen many ups and downs, most of the time remaining uneasy. According to Ceylon Today, “India enjoyed a highly cordial relationship with leaders such as Sirimavo Bandaranaike, unrepentantly pro-India, and disliked with equal zeal, the likes of Presidents J. R. Jayewardene and R. Premadasa, who did not consider it important to play a submissive role to the regional power. That's another snag India finds in the leadership of President Mahinda Rajapaksa.” However, it is not as simple as stated by the newspaper.

Nevertheless, India’s hostility towards Sri Lanka is deep-rooted in history and culture. Valmiki's Ramayana, and its context of struggle between Rama and Ravana, is essentially ingrained in Indian psyche and folklore - Sri Lanka is the symbol of eternal villainy and cannot be pardoned for whatever happened to Sita, as Ravana wilfully decided to stay on the wrong side of Indian history.

In modern history and not long ago, Sri Lanka was a paradise on earth. Highly educated and enterprising people, Sinhala and Tamils, lived side by side with peace and prosperity. It boasted to be the best in human resource development in South Asia and was a tourist paradise.

But the reflection of brightness across the Palk Strait was too much to bear for the Indian establishment. Thus, a plan was chartered in the South Block to sow the seeds of terror and hatred between the majority Sinhala and minority Tamils, which morphed into the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE), or the Tamil Tigers, with RAW’s trademark stamped on its forehead.

According to Wikipedia, “From August 1983 to May 1987, India, through its intelligence agency, the RAW, provided arms, training and monetary support to six Sri Lankan Tamil militant groups, including LTTE. During that period, 32 camps were set up all over India to train these militants. Four hundred and ninety five LTTE militants, including 90 women, were trained in 10 batches. The first batch of Tigers were trained in Establishment 22 based in Chakrata, Uttarakhand.

“The second batch, including LTTE intelligence Chief Pottu Amman, was trained in Himachal Pradesh. Velupillai Prabakaran himself visited the first and the second batch of Tamil Tigers to see them training. Eight other batches of LTTE were trained in Tamil Nadu.”

Indeed, the RAW’s dirty game of supporting LTTE has continued till recent times. At its peak, the militant group had turned into a ruthless war machine.

Referring to Wikipedia, “The military wing consisted of at least 11 separate divisions, including the conventional fighting forces, Charles Anthony Brigade and Jeyanthan Brigade; the dreaded suicide wing called the Black Tigers; naval wing Sea Tigers, air wing Air Tigers, LTTE leader Prabhakaran's personal security divisions, Pandian regiment and Ratha regiment; auxiliary military units such as Kittu artillery brigade, Kutti Sri mortar brigade, Ponnamman mining unit and hit-and-run squads like Pistol gang. Charles Anthony Brigade was the first conventional fighting formation created by LTTE. The Sea Tiger division was founded in 1984, under the leadership of Thillaiyampalam Sivanesan alias Soosai.
“LTTE acquired its first light aircraft in the late 1990s. Vaithilingam Sornalingam, alias Shankar, was instrumental in creating the Air Tigers. It carried out nine air attacks since 2007, including one last suicide air raid targeting the Sri Lanka Air Force Headquarters, Colombo, in February 2009.

“It is the only terrorist-proscribed organisation to acquire aircraft. LTTE’s intelligence wing consisted of Tiger Organisation Security Intelligence Service aka TOSIS, run by Pottu Amman, and a separate military intelligence division.”

Anyway, thousands of people lost their lives in the civil war and Sri Lanka became a basket case of governance. The RAW through its stronghold in Tamil Nadu played the dirty game by arming and equipping LTTE and bleeding Sri Lanka white.

The most hilarious episode of this double-face Chanakya strategy was ‘Operation Cactus’ where the Indian army intervened in Sri Lanka in the garb of a peacekeeping force to help the government fight against the warring LTTE.

What happened to ‘Operation Cactus’ is another story of the failure of this Indian adventure with its epitaph written with the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi. Ironically, Thenmozhi Rajaratnam, alias Dhanu, who carried out his assassination, and Sivarasan, the key conspirator, were among the militants trained by RAW in Nainital, India (Wikipedia).

The grand finale of the LTTE crisis was played in the time of President Rajapaksa, whose leadership inspired the Sri Lankan military to win a grand victory against it and reunite Sri Lanka as one entity. The RAW’s last strongholds in Jaffna (Kilinochchi and town of Mullaitivu) fell in May 2009 with the President declaring victory.

The current anti-Sri Lanka sentiment in Indian polity is, therefore, born out of frustration of inability to keep a small but proud nation of Sri Lankans humiliated through kinetic means. The Indian intelligence apparatus has now resorted to massive employment of non-kinetic war against Sri Lanka where politico-diplomatic pressure, economic arm twisting, including cheap tactics of targeting Sri Lankan cricketers and tourists, and psychological operations through print and electronic media have become the chosen tools of the Indian statecraft.

Sri Lanka, however, has developed strong ties with other regional countries like Pakistan, China and Bangladesh, who have supported it in difficult times and continue to do so even after itss victory against scourge of terror. Indeed, Sri Lanka once again is bound to find its well deserved place in the comity of nations.

The writers are freelance columnists based in Zimbabwe. Email: yalla_umar@yahoo.com

http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-ne...inions/columns

“The Indian Ocean area will be the true nexus of world powers and conflict in the coming years. It is here that the fight for democracy, energy independence and religious freedom will be lost or won.”
(Robert D. Kaplan)

The Indian ocean once regarded as a ‘neglected ocean’ has, today, become the hub of political, strategic and economic activities because of the presence of conventional and nuclear vessels of the major powers in the area and because of its own economic and strategic significance. The Indian Ocean has 36 States around its littoral belt. In addition, there are eleven hinterland states e.g, Nepal and Afghanistan, which though landlocked, are keenly interested in the Indian Ocean politics and trade.

The ocean contains several important minerals: 80.7% of world extraction of gold, 56.6 % of Tin, 28.5 % of manganese, 25.2 % nickel and 77.3% natural rubber. Highest tonnage of the world goods, 65% of world oil, and 35% of the gas, located in the littoral states, passes through it. The region today is an arena of contemporary geopolitics. Strategically the Indian Ocean occupies a crucial importance, especially because of the presence of major powers in the region and potential of the regional powers, three being nuclear powered: Pakistan, China and India.

That is why key regional powers are placing great reliance on the deployment of fleet missile submarines and SLBMs for second strike capability as well as for maintain balance of power in order to deter hegemony of any power whether territorial or extra-territorial. USA has established its naval base in the Indian Ocean at Diego Garcia which poses a threat to the regional states as well as stands to protect the US’ vital interests in the region. Political relations in and around the Indian Ocean can have significant implications for the US as far as its new “Asia Pivot” strategy is concerned. The new US Strategic Guidance 2012 has linked the US economy and security to developments in the Indian Ocean, elevating India to the position of a long-term strategic partner serving “as a regional anchor” in the region. The official documents also declare Iran and China as two potential states most susceptible to using asymmetrical means to counter US’ areas of interest. The Indo-US collusion in the Indian Ocean has made Pakistan and China wary of their semi-hostile overtures, hence ensuing strategic competition in the region and employment of resource-dependent strategies to counteract and counterbalance the enemy state’s maneuvers.

World is said to be entering Geo-energy era in which questions of energy security (security of demand and security of supply) will condition both inter-state relations and may lead to re-configuration of world power hierarchy. Energy security will play decisive role in creating conflict and co-operation situations.

The Country which holds paramount position in the Indian Ocean is likely to control the flow of energy not only to the East Asia, the future center of the world economic power, but also to other regions. Currently, USA, the world’s mightiest naval power is dominating the region and the regional states, especially China, is trying to balance US power in the region in order to protect its interests with regard to its growing economy and energy needs. The question why it is so important to dominate the Indian Ocean can also be answered by highlighting the fact that oil is shipped from the Persian Gulf to almost entire world via the Indian Ocean, and through the Straits of Malacca to China, Korea, and Japan. If another [power] holds the lifeline, oil-importing countries will suffer severe blows. Because [the U.S.] strategy is to hold sway over the oil route, the US has in recent years showered attentions on India, Vietnam, and Singapore, all of which lie on that route.

Pakistan’s only coastline is on the Indian Ocean, which is therefore a vital access point for trade and specifically for energy supply. Pakistan’s major interests in the Indian Ocean are preventing India from dominating the areas closest to Pakistan itself, and protecting its vital import and export routes. Pakistan by itself can do relatively little about India’s naval presence in the Indian Ocean; therefore, it has turned to two things: developing its naval power and having large external balancers. The United States is probably not looked on by Pakistan as a reliable partner in shoring up its Indian Ocean security, especially in light of the high profile of the Indian Ocean in the growing U.S. security dialogue with India. The more important balancer is China. Pakistan stands to benefit from the “string of pearls,” and has therefore handed over the operational rights to China. Pakistan’s economic stake in Indian Ocean security, like India’s, is considerable: its fragile balance of payments is dependent on sea trade; 95% of its trade and 100% of its oil import is transported through the Indian Ocean. As such Pakistan’s main goal is to neutralize India as well as secure its economic and Energy interests and at the moment it is doing in alliance with China and at the same time improving its Naval and military power.

As the Indian Ocean is a hub of energy, India is seeking to enhance its involvement in the region, seeking to increase its influence from the Plateau of Iran to the Gulf of Thailand. India is soon to become the world’s fourth-largest energy consumer, after the United States, China, and Japan -- is dependent on oil for roughly 33 percent of its energy needs, 65 percent of which it imports, and 90 percent of its oil imports could soon come from the Persian Gulf. Another reason behind developing naval power is India’s “Hormuz dilemma,” its dependence on imports passing through the strait, close to the shores of Pakistan’s Makran coast, where the Chinese are helping the Pakistanis develop deep-water ports. To protect its vital interest as well as to establish itself as a super-power, India is enlarging its navy in the same spirit. With its 155 warships, the Indian navy is already one of the world’s largest, and it expects to add three nuclear-powered submarines and three aircraft carriers to its arsenal by 2015, making India’s a Blue Water Navy. The critical objectives of India in establishing its navy are not economic and security but also “strategic autonomy” this policy is in harmony with Indian goal of achieving the super power status and it is in this context that we see India ever now and then opposing the presence of extra regional powers in the Indian Ocean. For India, presence of extra regional powers creates tension in the region which is detrimental to its sensitive interests, India wants to replace those powers and make it dominant in the region.

Among the latest developments which Indian Navy has effected is the inauguration of the Indian Navy’s latest naval base - INS Dweeprakshak - in the Lakshadweep Islands under the Southern Naval Command on 1st of May 2102. It is meant to face Chinese ‘string of pearls’ strategy to cut-off India from the other nations of the Indian Ocean. We can gauge the extent of India’s anxiety to project itself as an emerging super power by looking at its spending in this aspect of power. India is planning to spend almost $45 billion over the next 20 years on 103 new warships, including destroyers and nuclear submarines. By comparison, China’s investment over the same period is projected to be around $25 billion for 135 vessels. Indeed, as India extends its influence east and west on land and at sea, it is bumping into China which is also concerned about protecting its interests throughout the region and is expanding its reach. The paramount concern animating Chinese interests in the Indian Ocean is energy security, an imperative that has been widely debated in media and academic studies. It is facing “Malacca Dilemma” (that is China’s too much dependence on this strait and conversely USA’s objective to control this strait politically to manipulate China’s energy needs.) It is no exaggeration to say that whoever controls the Strait of Malacca will also have a stranglehold on the energy route of China. Excessive reliance on this strait has brought an important potential threat to China’s energy security. The Straits of Malacca is without question a crucial sea route that will enable the United States to seize geopolitical superiority, restrict the rise of major powers, and control the flow of the world’s energy. The Chinese government hopes to eventually be able to partly bypass that strait by transporting oil and other energy products via roads and pipelines from ports on the Indian Ocean into the heart of China.

The Chinese government has already adopted a “string of pearls” strategy for the Indian Ocean, which consists of setting up a series of ports in friendly countries along the ocean’s northern seaboard like, Gwadar, Pakistan, a port in Pasni, Pakistan, 75 miles east of Gwadar, which is to be joined to the Gwadar facility by a new highway; a fueling station on the southern coast of Sri Lanka; and a container facility with extensive naval and commercial access in Chittagong, Bangladesh. The Chinese government is also envisioning a canal across the Isthmus of Kra, in Thailand, to link the Indian Ocean to China’s Pacific coast -- a project on the scale of the Panama Canal and one that could further tip Asia’s balance of power in China’s favor by giving China’s burgeoning navy and commercial maritime fleet easy access to a vast oceanic continuum stretching all the way from East Africa to Japan and the Korean Peninsula. Besides this strategy, China is cultivating its relations with the countries of the region through aid, trade and defense agreements. One important factor pushing China to built alternative routes is the fact that Indian navy, soon to be the third largest in the world after those of the United States and China, will function as an antidote to Chinese military expansion.

PLA Navy has also been expanding itself and reconfiguring its role in view of changing circumstances and the growing importance of the Indian Ocean. The PLA Navy has progressively increased its maritime influence by transforming itself from a coastal defence navy to a force capable of sustained open-ocean operations, which is reasonably commensurate with China’s super-power status.

One of the biggest Challenges USA is facing in the world politics is in the Indian Ocean where both China and India are emerging as the major maritime and economic powers and posing challenge to USA’s many decades long hegemony. The task of the U.S. Navy will therefore be to quietly leverage the sea power of its closest allies -- India in the Indian Ocean and Japan in the western Pacific -- to set limits on China’s expansion. One of the major aims of USA is to reduce and slow down the increasing Chinese FDI in the regional countries and excite the areas of conflict. As it is obvious, USA is exciting regional states’ interests to obstruct China’s expansion in the South China Sea as well as in East China Sea to limit Chinese FDI and push countries away from Chinese Camp. USA does not want the region to be dominated by any single state because that would seriously jeopardize USA’s long term economic interests as well as disturb the balance of power in the region.

This is specially in view of the shifting of economic center from the west to the east. If controlled by any [Asian] nation, key choke points in the Indian Ocean, including the Strait of Malacca, the Strait of Hormuz, and Bab el Mandeb, could tilt the balance of trade further towards Asia. Piracy in the Strait of Malacca demonstrates what can happen when free and secure access through a choke point cannot be ensured. But USA’s dilemma is that it cannot prevent or block supply to China and India since it would dampen world economy, but it can monopolize energy supply by controlling Central Asian states. Another Dilemma of USA is that it cannot altogether sideline Chinese Navy. USA seizes every opportunity to incorporate China’s navy into international alliances; as U.S.-Chinese understanding at sea is crucial for the stabilization of world politics in the twenty-first century. Nevertheless, to achieve objectives in the region, USA plays upon the India-china problem to its own advantage. It continues to engage India with itself as part of its strategy of encircling China. As a part of its strategy, it encourages India to establish relations with South-Eastern and Central Asian states. Its purpose is to contain Chinese influence. USA is also enhancing its naval presence in the region which is recognition of the fact that this region is gaining central position in world political affairs. It is in this context that the US’ “Asia pivot” strategic shift should be understood and analyzed.

Iran is the other emerging power of the Indian Ocean with control of the most crucial Strait of Hormuz, a transit passage which can potentially be the cause of triggering conflict in the region. As highlighted above, this transit route is responsible for the supply of oil to most of the world. Where control of this route is strategically significant for US, it is arguably a more crucial for Iran to hold its control over it and use it as a tool in extending its power as well as use it as leverage to bargain with USA and its allies over Iran’s nuclear issue. Whether or not Iran would choose to block the Strait is a moot question; however, it is obvious in many of Iran’s official statements that Iran does consider this option as practically viable as far as maintenance of deterrence is concerned. Responding to the onset of the European Union’s oil embargo with a defiant show of military strength and renewed threats to close the Strait of Hormuz, Iran signaled to the West that it would not be a passive victim of economic warfare. On the other hand, preserving the security in the Strait of Hormuz is a priority of Iran’s defensive deterrence strategy in the Persian Gulf. Iran’s policy there would certainly be a measured and rational one, based on taking full responsibility and taking into account the region’s geo-political realities, but in no way letting others jeopardizing its legitimate interests.

The discussion shows that Indian Ocean has assumed a central place in the strategies of the major powers of the world and the regional powers also. Like a microcosm of the world at large, the Indian Ocean region is developing into an area of both ferociously guarded sovereignty (with fast-growing economies and militaries) and astonishing interdependence (with its pipelines and land and sea routes). And for the first time since the Portuguese onslaught in the region in the early sixteenth century, the West’s power there is in decline, however subtly and relatively. Although USA is trying to give it a new boost and reconfiguring it, it might not be able to assert its dominant position in the region. The Indians and the Chinese are likely to enter into a dynamic great-power rivalry in these waters, with their economic interests as major trading partners locking them in an uncomfortable embrace; while Pakistan will continue to assert its position by establishing alliance with China and by building its own capacity, especially naval power.

In view of the circumstances and geo-political realities, USA will have to change its posture from that of dominance to a sort of indispensable relationship with the regional powers, including Iran and Pakistan. It may, in future, act as a ‘balancer’ between China and India. What is becoming obvious as things unfold is that no single state would be able to dominate the region singularly; therefore, a sort of multilateral set up will have to be established whereby each country can “equitably” pursue its goals.

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Pakistan and Afghanistan have since long been endeavoring to cobble a viable political and diplomatic relationship but the lack of willingness to back up these efforts by steps in commerce and economy is hampering their efforts.

After the 1965 Afghan Transit Trade Agreement ran into snags in the last several decades on account of increase in smuggling and adverse effects on the Pakistani industry and business, both Afghanistan and Pakistan felt need for renewing terms and conditions for bilateral and transit trade. Being a landlocked country and having passed through decades of war with the former Soviet Union on its northern frontiers, Afghanistan direly needed to promote its trade through Pakistan.

Although Iran had been trying to provide a cost effective infrastructure for Afghanistan’s trade with the outside world, the latter, on account of multiple economic and political considerations, had a natural tilt towards Pakistan. With the help of India, with which Iran had, at that time, cordial relations in the wake of chill in its relations with Pakistani over policy regarding the post-Soviet Afghanistan, Tehran not only set up and operationalized its Chabahar Port but also arranged a road and railway line from its port city of Chabahar to Afghanistan’s Islam Qala border point to provide an efficient passage way to the Afghan traders. However, most of the Afghan businessmen preferred trade through Torkham and Kandahar points along the border with Pakistan because, besides other considerations, Peshawar and Quetta provided a lucrative and the closest markets for the Afghan fresh and dry fruits. That is why the Afghan government had been trying hard to convince Pakistan on renewal of the trade agreement. As both countries were in good terms with the United States, the Afghan government also tried to convince Washington to play its role in promoting transit trade with Pakistan. The United States and NATO, which had their forces deployed in Afghanistan, also wanted to revive the Silk Route and promote trade linkages between Central Asia and South Asia.

At the second trilateral talks in 2009 in Washington, Pakistani President Asf Ali Zardari and his Afghan counterpart, Hamid Karzai, in the presence of Hillary Clinton, the then US secretary of state, announced to begin talks on signing a memorandum of understanding on promotion of transit trade, ‘which would ultimately allow India to use the Wagah-Torkham route for promotion of its trade with Afghanistan.’ In October 2010, the Pakistani cabinet approved the Afghanistan Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement. Later, the Pakistani Finance Minister Amin Fahim and his Afghan counterpart, Anwarul Haq Ahadi held talks under the mediatory efforts of Richard Hollbrook, the US special envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, at which they agreed to allow Afghan trucks to reach goods to Wagah border and Karachi and Gwadar Ports. Both sides also set up a joint chamber of commerce in November 2010 to expand bilateral trade.

However, under the pressure of its media and the political parties, particularly the religious parties, Pakistan did not agree to allow India to pass its exports to Afghanistan through the Pakistani territory ‘because of security reasons,’ albeit it allowed for India-Afghan trade through sea, as per the previous transit arrangements. Pakistani officials also said that their transit agreement was with Afghanistan, not India. This decision annoyed the Afghan government and Kabul accused Islamabad of denying cargo access of Afghanistan to Wagah border. Later, Pakistani officials favoured Afghanistan’s trade with India but said that Indian trucks would not cross the Pakistani territory. That they would unload the goods at Wagah border from where the commodities would be carried to Torkham border in Pakistani trucks. Pakistan also raised the issue of bank guarantees for Afghan transit trade with India.

For its part, Pakistan is interested in promoting trade and economic relations with the Central Asian republics. In July 2012, Kabul and Islamabad agreed to expand Afghanistan Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement to Tajikistan. Under the agreement, Tajikistan would use Pakistan’s Karachi and Gwadar ports for its trade with the outside worlds. Similarly, Pakistan would be able to have trade with Tajikistan under same terms as with Afghanistan. At that time, both Pakistan and Afghanistan described it as first step toward establishing a north-south trade corridor between Central Asia and South Asia.

However, due to mutual mistrust and cross interests, the two sides have, in recent times, been giving a lukewarm shoulder to the mutual transit trade transactions. While Pakistan is not willing to include India in its bilateral arrangement with Afghanistan, the latter is reluctant to accept Pakistan’s demand to expand the mechanism to Tajikistan.
On February 5, this year, Janan Musazai, the spokesman of the Afghan Foreign Ministry, said Pakistan wanted inclusion of a third country in the transit trade agreement to which Afghanistan was opposed. He also expressed the hope that ‘Pakistan will remove hurdles in implementation of the agreement.’

Afghanistan, Pakistan and Tajikistan were supposed to attend a tribal conference on the issue in Dushanbe earlier this year. However, the conference could not be held as Afghanistan did not send its representative to the meeting. On March 16, a spokesman of the Pakistani Commerce Ministry said, “Kabul is under the influence of New Delhi and it is hesitant to facilitate Pakistan in having trade access to Tajikistan.” In those very days, reports appeared in newspapers that Pakistani traders faced great hurdles in reaching their goods to Tajikistan via Afghanistan. According to these reports, Pakistani traders had to pay three-time higher taxes on transportation of their goods to Tajikistan and these goods were being taken to Tajikistan as Afghanistan’s products.

The transit trade might prove a step that would not only boost trade linkages and economic growth of the regional countries but also help in ensuring political stability in the region. If both countries set aside their mutual political different - and their false egos indeed - such a trans-regional trade corridor can be developed to the benefits of all the concerned countries and their poverty stricken people, which might not only include Pakistan, Afghanistan, India and Tajikistan, but also the other countries of South Asia and Central Asia, including Bangladesh, Maldives, Sri Lanka, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. The history of Silk Route will definitely take its course. The sooner the better it will be for all the regional states. End

(The author is a freelance journalist based in Islamabad - hadimayar@yahoo.com)

http://www.thefrontierpost.com/category/40/

South Asian nuclear dynamics

May 28, 1998 was a watershed moment in the South Asian regional political discourse when, Pakistan restored the strategic balance, by conducting six nuclear tests in response to India’s five nuclear tests, codenamed ‘Pokhran II’. It was expected by local and international observers that the overt ‘nuclearisation’ of India and Pakistan would introduce new dynamics in the India-Pakistan bilateral relations and conflict resolution, where nuclear restraint would have a prominent role to play in their future relations.
The existence of nuclear deterrence has since played a major role, among other factors, in the prevention of a full scale war. The hope of this nuclear dissuasion, preparing likely grounds, for further improvement of relations between the two new nuclear states, however did not materialise. There has been virtually no progress on important issues pertaining to existing CBM’s, doctrinal restraints, conflict resolution, arms control measures and a common vision for regional strategic stability has remained elusive. As we stand today looking back at 28th May, many developments have taken place on the nuclear front which was not envisaged 17 years earlier.
Before moving to assess the post 1998 nuclear developments in South Asia, it would be pertinent to mention two assumptions prevalent in the strategic thinking at the time of overt ‘nuclearisation’ of South Asia. Both proved to be false, resulting in the prevalence of the existing nuclear environment in the region.
The first assumption was that the strategic cultures of both Pakistan and India will absorb the Western notion of deterrence, which rejects the use of warfare as a foreign policy tool among the nuclear antagonists. What we have witnessed in the India-Pakistan context is the extensive use of deterrent signalling to avert conflict, but not the doctrinal preparations for fighting a supposed limited conflict under a nuclear overhang. As a response to India’s new doctrinal formulations variously termed Cold Start or Proactive Strategy, aimed at responding to perceived challenges from its western neighbour, Pakistan has come up with its own new war fighting concept that envisages rapid deployments of conventional forces, coupled with introducing short range tactical nuclear weapons to achieve strategic effects.
The second assumption was about the trajectory of global power politics in South Asia, in the post 1998 period, in particular the role of United States regarding its willingness and scope of intervention to prevent conflict between India and Pakistan. This assumption was more prevalent in Pakistan than India, as Islamabad did not predict two later developments at the time of its nuclear testing. One was the military presence of United States in Afghanistan, sharing a common border with the West. The second was the strategic shift of United States, towards India aimed at limiting the growing Chinese influence in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions.
Concepts such as the possibility of achieving political ends through ‘limited war’ under the nuclear overhang and gradual up gradation of US-India strategic ties , thereby enhancing Indian position in the region as opposed to in 1998, played an important role in shaping existing nuclear policies of India and Pakistan.
From a Pakistani standpoint, it can be argued that some aspects of an existing deterrent equation have had a stabilising effect on strategic stability. Examples of this are the development of dual use cruise missiles, multiple delivery systems as opposed to the situation in May 1998 and developments of sea based deterrence capabilities. Other aspects are destabilising Indian efforts towards operationalising ballistic missile defense capabilities, lack of Indian interest in pursuing dialogue on nuclear and conventional issues and improving political relationships.
Pakistan should also critically evaluate the existing deterrent environment in the region, its responses and a restrictive environment it wants to prevent from emerging in future. Regarding this last formulation of preventing a negative environment, two scenarios can be envisaged. The first is regarding the depletion and stretching of Pakistan army as a result of continuing internal security challenges, as a result of proxy war conducted by both India and Extra-Regional Forces (ERF). The increasing imbalance of conventional forces vis a vis India, will increase Pakistan’s reliance on nuclear weapons which is not desirable as conventional deterrence forms a formidable leg of overall strategic deterrence. Thus, weakening of conventional deterrence should be a scenario that Pakistan must prevent from materialising by challenging the proxy war efforts at its source. The second scenario to prevent is the breakdown of nuclear command and control, for all the three land, sea and air nuclear forces, as result of disruptive attacks from both conventional and unconventional sources. In particular the areas of concern are cyber and cruise missile attacks, on command and control centers. Such, critical improvements in cyber defenses and surveillance capabilities are required to prevent such a scenario from emerging in future.
In conclusion, nuclear deterrence in the region will continue to face formidable technical and political challenges. Both politics and technical factors may erode an already fragile peace settlement in the region, as opposed to the situation in May 1998, where arms race rather than strategic restraint will shape the course of nuclear resistance in South Asia, in the coming years. Resumption of nuclear testing in the subcontinent in the future is a scenario that cannot be entirely ruled out.
http://nation.com.pk/columns/03-Jun-...clear-dynamics

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Modi’s Silence: Bad for India, Bad for the Region!

The recent wave of religious violence in India and the resulting communal tensions present a worrying trend not only for India, but for South Asia more broadly. In recent months, Indian Muslims and low caste Hindus in particular have been the targets of multiple attacks by Hindu extremists for perceived religious transgressions. The Hindu nationalist group Shiv Sena has held protests to shut down book launch events and music concerts, that posed a challenge to their extremist ideology. Far from a fringe element, right-wing Hindu nationalist groups like Shiv Sena, Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), and the Vishwa Hindu Parishad appear to be gaining traction in mainstream Indian politics. Left to continue, this trend not only threatens India’s plans for economic growth and global influence, it poses a much more immediate threat to regional peace as it reinforces dangerous Islamist narratives in Pakistan and Bangladesh that posit an inherent conflict between Hindus and Muslims, and sidelines progressive voices in those countries. Left unchecked, this new wave of Hindu nationalism in India could spark a self-reinforcing cycle of instability in the region.

Indian writers and intellectuals have recently been returning prestigious awards in protest of what they are calling a “climate of intolerance.” Among the incidents they cite is the killing of a 77 year old former vice chancellor of Karnatak University, Malleshappa Madivalappa Kalburgi, whose criticism of idol worship and superstition angered right-wing Hindu groups such as the Bajrang Dal, Vishwa Hindu Parishad and Sri Rama Sene. In September, a 50-year old Muslim man in the northern state of Uttar Pradesh was lynched by an angry mob suspected of slaughtering a cow (considered sacred by Hindus) and consuming beef. His son was also beaten and remains in critical condition.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi has been strongly criticized for remaining silent in the face of this growing number of religiously motivated attacks. Last month, Modi finally spoke out about this wave of intolerance, but his remarks were tepid at best, calling the lynching of a Muslim man for eating beef “unfortunate.” Modi’s lackluster response to terrorism cloaked in religious terms, draws many parallels to his time as the Chief Minister of Gujarat, which witnessed the 2005 Hindu-Muslim riots in the state, claiming the lives of over 1,000 people, mostly Muslims. Then, as now, Modi’s silence is troubling.

Some have tried to paint Modi’s governing party, BJP, losing in the most recent elections in one of India’s most populous states, Bihar, as a popular repudiation of religious extremism. However, there is reason to believe that this is based more in wishful thinking than political reality.

Shortly before the BJP suffered defeat to a coalition challenge in Bihar, they were also defeated at the Kalyan-Dombivali civic polls by Shiv Sena, the far-right Hindu nationalist party that was behind the October attack against the head of an Indian think tank which hosted a book event for former Pakistani Foreign Minister Kasuri. Shiv Sena’s sensational “ink attack” was quickly seized upon in Pakistan, where the foreign ministry claimed the group represented “Indian ambitions” in the region. Shiv Sena responded with glee, saying that “Pakistan’s appeal from the international community against Shiv Sena is a stamp on our pure nationalism.” As each side hardens, hopes for regional peace begin to fade.

By contrast, the Prime Ministers of Pakistan and Bangladesh have given much more outspoken responses to extremist violence in their countries. Pakistan’s Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, recently declared that he would defend any religious minority, especially those victimized by his country’s Muslim majority. Bangladesh’s Prime Minister, Sheikh Hasina, recently gave similar assurances to religious minorities in her country while attending an event for Duga Puja, the largest Hindu festival in Bangladesh.

Shortly after being elected Pakistan’s prime minister in 2013, Nawaz Sharif spoke hopefully about his desire to pursue better relations with India. Riding high on strong public support, it briefly looked like Nawaz might be able to pull off something that had eluded his predecessor: boosting bilateral trade by extending the Most-Favored Nation status to India. Hopes were quickly dashed, though, as nationalist elements on both sides worked behind the scenes to derail any deal. Since then, Pakistan-India relations have fallen to dangerous lows, exacerbated in part by Pakistan’s refusal to prosecute jihadi militants from Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jamaat-ud-Dawa that are believed to be involved in terrorist attacks in India; but also by Hindu extremists in India whose actions have fueled Pakistani fears about Indian designs on regional hegemony. In a candid speech at the Jinnah Institute, an Islamabad think-tank, former Indian Foreign Minister Salman Khurshid lamented that while it was far-sighted of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to attend the oath-taking ceremony of Prime Minister Modi, Modi’s BJP-led government failed to seize on these overtures and pursue a path to peace. Khurshid alleged Modi was still learning to be a statesman, and these challenges to India’s secular ethos were deeply concerning and require real leadership.

Unlike Pakistan, Bangladesh has been more successful in building closer ties with India, but it too finds itself under attack by Islamists whose attempts to discredit the government regularly include accusations that Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and her Awami League party are Indian puppets. Opposition parties, including the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and Jamaat-e-Islami, have a history of undermining governments through allegations of collusion with the Indians. More concerning, however, is the use of anti-Indianism by terrorist groups such as al-Qa’ida whose literature includes a lengthy call to action for jihad against the government of Bangladesh, accusing Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and her secular Awami League party of trying to “eliminate every trace of Islam” and turning Bangladesh into “an Indian outpost,” thus further calling on local Muslims to “organize ourselves for a popular and inclusive intifada” to replace the secular democratic government with an Islamist theocracy. Similar rhetoric has also been used by Jamaat-e-Islami, whose Pakistani leader recently accused Shiekh Hasina of “victimizing all those resisting Indian influence in Bangladesh.”

Modi’s failure to quickly and forcefully condemn Hindu extremism is creating an atmosphere of fear and insecurity for the nation’s religious minorities. It is also empowering Islamist extremists by reinforcing their anti-Indian rhetoric, adding to regional instability. As India is poised to have the largest population of Muslims of any country in the world by 2020, religious extremism presents an imminent threat not only to India’s internal stability, but to that of its neighbors. It’s time for Modi to take a bold stand for religious tolerance and communal harmony. By doing so, he can demonstrate the leadership so desperately needed for repudiating divisiveness within his own borders, and working to stabilize the region.

Source: Modi’s Silence: Bad for India, Bad for the Region!

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The world is changed by your example, not by your opinion !