Mindset in intelligence analysis — Dr Fawad Kaiser

Problems are not limited to how analysts perceive and process information; it is very difficult, at best, to be self-conscious about the workings of one’s own mind

Mindset is not a phenomenon unique to intelligence; it is part of the natural functioning of the human cognitive process, and it has been shown across a broad range of fields ranging from medicine to stock market analysis. How many times do we see situations in which completely probable premises, based on solid expertise, have been used to construct a logically plausible forecast with a virtually unanimous conclusion that turned out to be dead wrong? In how many of these instances it is determined, retrospectively, that the problem was not in the logic but in the fact that one of the premises was given unchallenged confidence? The commonly prescribed script for shortcomings in intelligence analysis and notorious intelligence ‘failures’ is a major increase in expertise. The data show that expertise itself is no protection from the common analytic pitfalls that are endemic to the human thought process.

Notorious intelligence failures are usually caused by failures of analysis, not failures of collection. Received information is discounted, misinterpreted, ignored, rejected or overlooked because it fails to fit a set mental model or mindset. The signals seem to get lost in the noise. Analysts should remain open to new experience and recognise when long held pervasive views or conventional wisdom need to be revised in response to an ever-challenging world. Intelligence analysis is fundamentally a mental process but understanding this process is hindered by the lack of conscious awareness of the workings of our own minds. Today, there is greatly increased understanding that intelligence analysts do not approach their tasks with empty thoughts. They start with a set of assumptions about how events normally transpire in the area for which they are responsible.

Intelligence studies pose a serious challenge to conventional wisdom. Data shows that expertise itself is not immune from common analytic biases that are inherent to the human thought process. This point has been reiterated in many fields besides intelligence analysis. A review of historic intelligence failures demonstrates that analytic black holes fooled the experts as much as anybody. Indeed, the data shows that when experts fall victim to this cognitive ether, the effects can be inflamed by the confidence that attaches to expertise both in their own view and in the perception of others.

How can intelligence analysis be improved? Different traditional approaches are used in pursuing this goal, including collecting more and better information for analysts to work with, changing the management of the analytical process, increasing the number of analysts, providing language and area studies to improve analysts’ substantive expertise, fine-tuning the relationship between intelligence analysts and intelligence consumers, and modifying the types of analytical tools. However, analysis is, above all, a mental process. Traditionally, analysts at all levels devote little attention to improving how they think. To masterfully succeed in the problem of improving analysis, it is critical to better understand, influence and guide the mental processes of analysts themselves.

Problems are not limited to how analysts perceive and process information; it is very difficult, at best, to be self-conscious about the workings of one’s own mind. Forms of expectation dictate analysts, subconsciously, on what to look for, what is important and how to interpret what is seen. These combinations form a mindset that predisposes analysts to think in certain ways. A mindset is attached to a screen or lens through which one perceives the outer world. There is a tendency to think of a mindset as something wrong, to be avoided. Favouring this line of argument, one should have an open mind and be influenced only by the facts rather than by preconceived notions. There is no such thing as ‘the facts of the case’. There is only a very selective subset of the overall body of data to which one has been assigned that one takes as facts and decides is relevant to the question at hand.

Intelligence analysts should be self-aware about their reasoning process. They should think about how they make judgments and reach conclusions, not just about the judgments and conclusions themselves. Judgment is an integral part of all intelligence analysis. While the optimal goal of intelligence collection is substantiated knowledge, this goal is seldom reached in practice. The analyst commonly works with incomplete, ambiguous and often contradictory data. The ultimate nature of judgment remains a mystery but is possible, however, to identify different strategies that analysts employ to process information as they prepare to pass judgment. Analytical strategies are important because they influence the data one attends to. They determine what the analyst emphasises, which inevitably affects the outcome of the analytical process.

The process of analysis itself reinforces this natural function of the human brain. Analysis usually involves creating models, even though they may not be labelled as such. Analysts set forth certain understandings and expectations about cause-and-effect relationships and then process and interpret information through these models or filters. Intelligence agencies show that, too often, newly acquired information is evaluated and processed through the existing analytic model, rather than being used to reassess the premises of the model itself. The detrimental effects of this natural human tendency stem from the raison d’être of agency created to acquire special, critical information available only through covert means, and to produce analysis integrating this special information with the total knowledge base.

These observations should in no way shrink the value of expertise. On the contrary, intelligence analysis biases the view. The main difference is that one expert gets to enhance their reputation in media and news, while the other works behind closed doors in which the main recipients are members of the intelligence thinker’s most challenging audience: the politicians and policymakers.

The subtext that comes through is that information and expertise are essential and that the effort has to start with a clear understanding of the inherent strengths and weaknesses of the primary analytic mechanism — the human mind — and the way it processes information, making intelligence probing the special science of analysis. Intelligence analysts and officers cannot eliminate the pitfalls mental processes set for them but what can be done is to train people how to look for and recognise these mental obstacles, and how to develop procedures designed to offset them. Intelligent analysts can compensate for the human mind’s limitations in dealing with complex problems that typically involve ambiguous information, multiple players and fluid circumstances by staying self-conscious about their reasoning processes and thinking about how they make judgments and reach conclusions, not just about the judgments and conclusions themselves.

The mind is poorly ‘wired’ to deal effectively with both inherent uncertainty and induced uncertainty. Tools and techniques that gear the analyst’s mind to apply higher levels of critical thinking can substantially improve analysis on complex issues where information is incomplete, ambiguous and often deliberately distorted. Such intellectual devices include techniques for structuring information, challenging assumptions and exploring alternative interpretations.

To achieve the clearest possible image, analysts need more than information; they also need to understand the lenses through which this information passes. These lenses are known by many terms: mental models, mindsets, biases or analytic assumptions. What is required of analysts is a commitment to challenge, refine and challenge again their own working mental models, precisely because these steps are central to sound interpretation of complex and ambiguous issues.

The writer is a member of the Diplomate American Board of Medical Psychotherapists Dip.Soc Studies, member Int’l Association of Forensic Criminologists, associate professor Psychiatry and consultant Forensic Psychiatrist at the Huntercombe Group United Kingdom. He can be reached at fawad_shifa@yahoo.com

http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default...-12-2013_pg3_2