Ties with India


If one were to believe the Pakistani foreign minister, everything is hunky dory as far as relations with India are concerned. A possible solution, or at least major change on Kashmir, is within sight and ties are on a firm and sure footing. We have also heard that the peace process is irreversible and that many confidence-building measures (CBMs) have been initiated and that more are in the pipeline. However, of late, there have been parleys on Siachen and on Sir Creek. To the first -- again if Islamabad is to be believed -- a solution is said to be in sight. But if one looks at the voices emanating from India, the issue seems as irresolvable as before. As for Sir Creek, both sides have agreed to exchange data such as maps and a joint monitoring has also been carried out. Coming on to the issue of CBMs, the much-touted links between Kashmiris on both sides of the Line of Control are in tatters -- with no real indication of whether the bus service between Muzaffarabad and Srinagar even remains in operation (it was severely disrupted by the Oct 8, 2005, quake, though). The only real CBM has been the re-opening of a long-closed rail link connecting Karachi with Jodhpur in Rajasthan. Again, the much-hyped re-opening of a Pakistani consulate in Mumbai and an Indian one in Karachi (which would provide a massive service to many visa-seekers from the city who otherwise have to spend time and money to travel to Islamabad) seems to have gone nowhere -- the consulates were to re-open in early 2006 but the delay (initially caused by Pakistan being unable to find a suitable location for its consulate in Mumbai) has apparently gone unnoticed by both governments.

One is constrained to speak generally on this matter after reading a report in a wire service that quoted Doordarshan as saying that in its annual report India's Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) had blamed Pakistan for its "failure" in dealing with cross-border terrorism. The Doordarshan report further said that this was responsible for stalling the peace process and that as a result ties between the two countries remained "well short of their potential". This is in sharp contrast to the optimism President Pervez Musharraf expressed before an OIC summit meeting earlier this month when he said that ties between the two countries were making "reasonable progress". In fact, a senior member of the Indian union cabinet also recently spoke on the same lines saying that the peace process was on a sound footing and that there had been considerable progress in ties.

Of course, the MEA's annual report raises several questions. The most obvious is that what is the definition of 'progress' that functionaries from both sides keep talking of. Apparently, the general public seems to have a very different notion of this progress, and that is fine because laypeople do not see an issue in the same manner as foreign office diplomats or ministers. However, has there been any real movement forward as far as bilateral ties are concerned? Surely a good way to gauge the meaning of 'real' in this case would be whether the improvement in ties has benefited the people of both countries in any tangible and material way since the peace process after all is for their sake. The other question is if New Delhi has a different face for domestic consumption on Pakistan and another, very different one, for international opinion. If the MEA annual report is to be taken at face value, then it sharply differs with Islamabad's general assessment of the ongoing peace process. This disconnect -- if it does indeed exist -- may bode ill for the future.

Chomsky on India-Pakistan relations

By Michael Shank

Q: Pakistan's Foreign Minister Khurshid Mahmood Kasuri cites a change in India-Pakistan relations, agreements have been forged requiring a pre-notification of missile testing, and both countries will soon engage in a fourth round of composite dialogues. What else needs to happen to provide a positive tipping point in Indo-Pak relations?

A: There are a couple of major problems that need to be dealt with. One of them, of course, is Kashmir. The question is, can they figure out a joint solution to the Kashmir conflict? There are other questions: about energy integration, for example, pipelines going from Iran to India. India and Pakistan are now joint observers of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, which, if it works, will tend to bring about closer integration of the Asian countries altogether. So is Iran, and the Central Asian states, China of course, and Russia too. So basically the whole region except for South Korea has joined. And Japan probably won't join.

Meanwhile India-China relations are certainly improving. They're better than they were 20 or 30 years ago. There are now some joint energy projects. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation was China-initiated but there's also an India-initiated programme by the former [Petroleum and Natural Gas] minister Mani Shankar Aiyar. He had been initiating similar plans for Asian integration. And China and Pakistan have pretty close relations so through that connection India and Pakistan may overcome some of their conflicts.

In general the conflicts in the region, the internal conflicts, most of them have been softened, so they're less sharp than they were in the recent past. This is partly because of economic integration, partly because of the danger of confrontation, partly because of outside enemies. All of them want to become integrated with the west Asian energy producing system. That brings them together as well through joint projects.

So I don't know if there's an actual tipping point. But I think there is a gradual improvement of relations and a willingness to put aside what could be major tensions, like a terrorist operation in Mumbai or something attributed to Pakistanis. There are attempts at reconciliation, which is a healthy development. Now Kashmir is going to be a difficult one.

Q: Do you think Kashmir is a territorial issue or an issue related to secular or religious identity?

A: Yes, obviously there is the identity factor in it. The Muslim population and the Hindu population do separate on those lines. Does that mean they have to be broken up? Not necessarily. There are 160 million Muslims living in India. There has been tension and some serious atrocities but it has been over the centuries a reasonably integrated society. There are real dangers. The Hindu nationalist danger is certainly serious.

Q: Do you think the Pakistan and Indian diaspora in the United States or the UK are doing anything to escalate tensions?

A: For some reason, which I don't entirely understand, that's a very general fact about diaspora communities. In fact, almost every one I know of. For example the Jewish community in the US, its organized part, is much more rabid and extreme than Israel. The Irish community in south Boston was much more extreme than Northern Ireland. Take, say, the Armenian genocide. All Armenians want to have it recognized but the pressure for having national declarations is mostly coming from the diaspora. Within Armenia itself, people have other concerns. For example they would like friendly relations with Turkey.

I suspect that the tendency towards a kind of extremism in diaspora communities may have something to do with keeping them unified. Otherwise they would tend to assimilate. In the home country they're not going to assimilate, you don't have to prove you're an Armenian or Israeli or Irish. But if you're in the US and you want to maintain some kind of cultural identity as a group it's going to have some relation to the home country. And often more extreme positions are taken than in the home country because of the need to maintain identity. The one that I know best is the Jewish community but, as far as I know, others are much like it.

So yes, going back to your question, what I've seen of the Indian diaspora -- I don't know much about the Pakistani diaspora -- is that it tends to be more extreme, more pro-BJP than the native population would. At least that's what I've seen.

Q: India is attempting to renegotiate its nuclear agreement with the US, specifically to remove a US legal requirement that it halt nuclear cooperation if India tests another nuclear weapon. If India is successful in renegotiating that agreement, what are the implications for Indo-Pak relations?

A: As soon as the US made the agreement with India, that had immediate and predictable implications. This agreement was in serious violation of American law, the export law from the early 1970s that was passed after the Indian test ["Smiling Buddha" in 1974]. It was also in violation of the rules of the two major international organisations, one that controls, or tries to control, nuclear material exports, the other that tries to control missile technology exports.

There are two nuclear missile control regimes, and they both require notification before anybody's going to do anything that would be inconsistent with their rules. And the US did neither, didn't even notify them.

It's a sharp blow against two of the elements of the international system that's trying to prevent proliferation of nuclear technology, weapons technology, and missile technology. It was predictable that as soon as the US broke it someone else would break it too. And shortly after, China approached Pakistan with sort of a similar agreement. I don't know exactly where it stands now but it's clear that's what they would do.

Russia will probably do the same and others will do the same. Once you open the door others are going to follow. And that is a serious blow to the whole non-proliferation system.

That's why there's a very serious critique of the US agreement with India within the disarmament community. People like Gary Milhollin, for example, very sharply criticised it. Michael Krepon who's the founder of the Stimson Centre and a major specialist, has an article in a recent issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists warning that this could very well lead to the breakdown of all nonproliferation systems. Milhollin also said for the US it is being done partly just for commercial reasons. It opens exports markets in India. In fact, Condoleezza Rice testified in Congress to that effect: that it would have commercial value to the United States. Milhollin suggests, if I'm remembering correctly, that the main exports might be military jets. That's exactly what we don't want because that's going to again be a trigger for escalation. India gets more advanced offensive military forces, Pakistan will want the same, and China will want the same.

Q: You mentioned the existence of extremism in the diaspora, but looking internally within South Asia, how much has the US-Pakistan alliance in the so-called war on terror been responsible for the rise of extremism in Pakistan?

A: I'm not sure it has. These are very complex problems internal to Pakistan. For example, is the United States concerned about acts inside Iran from groups based in Pakistan? It's probably fostering them. One has to be a little cautious when talking about terrorism. From the US point of view, there's good terrorism and bad terrorism. And Pakistan has its own problems. Musharraf has to walk a very delicate line, also with regard to allowing some democratic opening in the country, which is not easy.

Q: If extremism is on the rise in South Asia, which a lot of people say it is, how does one go about undermining extremism, in this case religious extremism?

A: In India and Pakistan there is a very dangerous development. One of the roots of the BJP is a quasi-fascist Hindu extremist movement. And for India that is extremely dangerous, as is Muslim extremism, as is Christian extremism in the United States. These are very dangerous movements. They are not inherently destructive. They could take a constructive path but that's not the way they usually develop.

How do you combat them? The same way you combat any other dangerous movement: education, organisation, looking at the issues that make them arise. Often they arise out of real or perceived oppression, as a reaction to it. So, for example, take Islamic radicalism. A large measure of it was a reaction to the fact that secular nationalism was destroyed -- partly because of its own internal corruption, partly because of external force.

When you destroy the opportunities for secular alternatives to develop, people aren't going to give up. They may turn to religious movements for identity. That's one standard reaction to oppression and a loss of opportunity.

You can see it happening very clearly in the Islamic world, the Muslim world. In fact, the United States and Israel both fostered religious extremist movements in an effort to undermine secular nationalism. Hamas, for example, is an outgrowth of the Muslim Brotherhood, which was supported by Israel as an attempt to undermine the secular PLO. Hizbollah was the direct result of the Israeli conquest of part of Lebanon, in an effort to destroy the PLO -- and ended up with Hizbollah on their hands.

The US has almost always tended to support the most extreme religious fundamentalist group in the region. Take Saudi Arabia, the oldest and most valued ally of the United States and also the most extreme Islamic fundamentalist state. By comparison, Iran looks like a flourishing democracy. And there are good reasons for it. I don't mean good in a moral sense. There are understandable reasons.

Similarly, inside Pakistan, the Ziaul Haq regime, which did drive the country towards religious extremism, was very strongly supported by the US and its Saudi ally. During those years, the Reagan years, that's when Saudi Arabia was developing its network of madressahs, religious extremist schools. Ziaul Haq was introducing Islamic extremism in the higher educational system, in social life, and so on, fully supported by America because this was part of their global policies.



The writer is a doctoral student at the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University. A longer version of this interview first appeared on Foreign Policy In Focus (www.fpif.org).

__________________
Time is like a river.
You cannot touch the same water twice,
because the flow that has passed will never pass again.
Enjoy every moment of life.

I have learnt silence from the talkative, toleration from the intolerant, and kindness from the unkind; yet strange, I am ungrateful to these teachers.

A retreat on Kashmir?

By Javid Husain

THEY say that a clever general in the face of a defeat declares victory and retreats. General Musharraf’s handling of the Kashmir issue in the aftermath of the setback at Agra and 9/11 reminds one of this well-known saying.

Since 9/11, General Musharraf’s policy on Kashmir has been marked by a series of retreats from Pakistan’s historically recognised position so that it is now quite close to India’s position which basically has remained unchanged. At this rate we should get ready in the near future for a settlement of the Kashmir dispute on Indian terms. The irony is that General Musharraf and those around him will try to sell it to the nation as a historic achievement. This sell-out, of course, would be a tragedy of historic proportions.

Let us see the developments on Kashmir in perspective since the Lahore declaration to which Pakistan’s military brass apparently had taken umbrage. The declaration, inter alia, reaffirmed the commitment of both sides to the principles and purposes of the UN charter, reiterated their determination to implement the Shimla agreement in letter and spirit, and called for the intensification of efforts to resolve all outstanding issues including the issue of Jammu and Kashmir.

The Lahore Declaration, which was signed by the prime ministers of Pakistan and India during the Indian prime minister’s visit to Pakistan in February 1999, was a development of extraordinary importance. It was signed by an Indian prime minister on Pakistani soil after having travelled to Lahore in a bus to inaugurate the Delhi-Lahore bus service. The symbolic importance of the event could not be exaggerated.

The fact that this development took place after the nuclear explosions were carried out by India and then by Pakistan in May 1998 to restore strategic balance in the region showed that India had not only come to terms with a nuclear Pakistan but also recognised the imperative of strengthening peace and coming to a resolution of outstanding disputes for the progress and prosperity of the peoples of the two countries.

It is pertinent to mention that the signing of the Lahore Declaration was followed by the designation by the two prime ministers of special representatives to try to resolve the Kashmir dispute through back channel diplomacy. While the details of the talks between the two representatives (Mr Niaz A. Naik from the Pakistan side and Mr R.K.Mishra from the Indian side) have not yet been made public authoritatively, it is understood that the two special representatives did have a number of meetings in New Delhi and Islamabad until the process was interrupted by the Kargil conflict. (The first meeting between the two special representatives took place in New Delhi at the end of March 1999.)

The assumption of power by General Musharraf’s military government in October 1999 widened the gulf of mistrust between Pakistan and India because Musharraf’s role as the architect of the Kargil operation in his capacity as the COAS was well-known to the Indian side. It took Islamabad and New Delhi two years to resume the process of dialogue at the highest level when President Musharraf and Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee met in Agra in July 2001.

The Agra summit failed to issue an agreed declaration although progress towards drafting the document was made at the level of foreign secretaries and foreign ministers. Each side blamed the other for the failure. Be that as it may, the net result was the inability of the two sides to reach an agreed document on bilateral relations at the Agra summit.

The year 2002 was marked by a state of confrontation between India and Pakistan as the former resorted to coercive diplomacy in the wake of the terrorist attack on the Indian parliament in December 2001. The situation gradually eased in 2003 leading ultimately to the issuance of a joint statement on January 6, 2004, after the meeting between President Musharraf and Prime Minister Vajpayee in Islamabad on the the sidelines of the Saarc summit.

The key paragraph of the joint statement read as follows: “Prime Minister Vajpayee said that in order to take forward and sustain the dialogue process, violence, hostility and terrorism must be prevented. President Musharraf reassured Prime Minister Vajpayee that he will not permit any territory under Pakistan’s control to be used to support terrorism in any manner.”

The two subsequent paragraphs talked about the agreement of the two leaders to commence the composite dialogue in February 2004 and their confidence that “the resumption of the composite dialogue will lead to a peaceful settlement of all bilateral issues, including Jammu and Kashmir, to the satisfaction of both sides.”

The joint statement reflected a diplomatic retreat for Pakistan as compared with the Lahore Declaration. Whereas the Lahore Declaration in the preamble talked about the commitment of the two sides to “principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations”, there was no such reference in the joint statement of January 6, 2004.

Further, the joint statement clearly recognised Jammu and Kashmir as a bilateral issue in contrast with the Lahore Declaration which considered it as an “outstanding” issue. The net result of these two changes was that Pakistan virtually agreed to foreclose the option of referring the matter to the United Nations.

The Lahore Declaration had recognised that the resolution of all outstanding issues, including Jammu and Kashmir, was essential for an environment of peace and security. In contrast with this provision, the joint statement fails to establish any link between the resolution of the Jammu and Kashmir issue, on the one hand, and the environment of peace and security or normalisation of relations between the two countries on the other.

But perhaps the most damaging aspect of the joint statement from Pakistan’s point of view was the paragraph on the issue of terrorism which virtually gave the impression of Pakistan’s acquiescence in Indian allegations of cross-border terrorism against Pakistan combined with a reassurance by Musharraf to prevent support to any terrorist activity from any territory under Pakistan’s control.

The process of diplomatic retreat by Pakistan on the Jammu and Kashmir dispute has not stopped with the joint statement of January 6, 2004. General Musharraf in a desperate attempt to make progress towards the settlement of the Kashmir issue has announced Pakistan’s willingness to deviate from Pakistan’s traditional stand based on UN Security Council resolutions calling for a plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir to settle the issue. Of course, he has stressed that his gesture was conditioned on similar flexibility from India which considers Jammu and Kashmir as its integral part. New Delhi so far has failed to show the required flexibility.

More recently, General Musharraf has floated his four-point formula for a settlement of the Kashmir dispute involving demilitarisation of Kashmir whose boundaries will be delineated on both sides of the LoC, autonomy for the region, a joint supervisory mechanism including the representatives of India, Pakistan and Kashmir, and easy movement of people and goods across the LoC to make it irrelevant. According to latest reports from New Delhi, India is mulling over the four-point formula.

If a settlement of the Kashmir issue is reached on the basis of General Musharraf’s four-point formula, it would mean the discarding by Pakistan of the UN Security Council resolutions calling for a plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir enabling the people of Kashmir to exercise their right to self-determination and the virtual acceptance of India’s contention that Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of India and its rejection of any redrawing of the boundaries.

The people of Kashmir would definitely gain from demilitarisation, autonomy and easy movement across the LoC. As for the joint supervisory mechanism, what Pakistan would gain in Indian-held Kashmir, it would lose in Azad Kashmir.

Such a settlement in effect would be a major retreat from Pakistan’s recognised position on the Kashmir issue which is based on the relevant UN Security Council resolutions while it would be quite close to the well-known Indian position on the issue.

There is a further risk that since General Musharraf’s four-point formula is the opening gambit in the process of substantive negotiations while India is sticking to its original position, the general would be forced to make further concessions before a settlement is reached.

If Musharraf continues to show the desperation that he has displayed so far, the ultimate settlement is likely to be more or less on Indian terms with a fig leaf to cover the historic retreat by Pakistan on the general’s watch.

President Musharraf has made three cardinal mistakes in the process of negotiations with India. Firstly, he has shown extreme desperation in reaching a settlement with India on the Kashmir issue which has been interpreted by India as the sign of a weak hand. India has taken full advantage of this perceived weakness, forcing Musharraf to make concessions even before the process of substantive negotiations could begin as reflected by the joins statement of January 6, 2004.

Secondly, the general has shown his hand by presenting the four-point formula at the very beginning of the process of negotiations while India is keeping its cards close to its chest. Now, at best, the settlement would be somewhere between Musharraf’s formula and the well-known Indian position.

Thirdly, Musharraf has chosen a moment for the final settlement on Kashmir when India enjoys overwhelming advantage over Pakistan politically (democracy in India versus military rule and political instability in Pakistan), economically, militarily and internationally. The essence of strategy is to bring one’s opponent to the point of decision at the time and place of one’s own choice, not of the opponent’s preference. Our military rulers starting from the East Pakistan crisis of 1971 have shown a knack of rushing for a decision at the time and place of India’s choice. General Musharraf seems to be following this historic pattern.

Finally, one may ask whether General Musharraf, the legitimacy of whose rule is questionable, has the mandate of the people to reach a final settlement with India on the Kashmir dispute.

It would be better for him and the nation if in the negotiations with India he would limit himself to steps which would ameliorate the living conditions of the Kashmiri people on both sides of the LoC (e.g. autonomy, demilitarisation, respect for the human rights of the Kashmiri people and easy movement across the LoC) while leaving the task of negotiating a final settlement with India at an opportune time to a democratically-elected government in Pakistan.

The writer is a former ambassador.
E-mail: javid_husain@yahoo.com

__________________
Time is like a river.
You cannot touch the same water twice,
because the flow that has passed will never pass again.
Enjoy every moment of life.

I have learnt silence from the talkative, toleration from the intolerant, and kindness from the unkind; yet strange, I am ungrateful to these teachers.

A slow-down with India?

By Tanvir Ahmad Khan

THERE are growing fears that a new factor is insidiously creeping into the India-Pakistan peace process which may impact negatively on its substance if not the form. The present political turmoil in Pakistan is producing a climate of opinion in India against pursuing the dialogue earnestly.

The Indian government has been notably careful that it is not seen as making things difficult for President Musharraf. This is as much indicative of the Indian appreciation of the so-called unilateral “concessions” made by him on the more intractable issues between the two states as of a new maturity in bilateral relations. Despite this restraint, the Indian approach to the negotiations may be conditioned by the larger perspective in which India considers the Pakistani scene.

First, there is the view that even if it is imprudent for India to demonstrate support for Pakistan’s quest for greater democracy, it should not strengthen President Musharraf’s hands in his bid to win another presidential term while continuing as the chief of army staff. India, it is argued, should not permit tangible progress in the negotiations that Musharraf can exploit politically.

Proponents of this view would want Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to defer his visit to Pakistan for some time. This postponement is construed as a significant step as Pakistan had, rightly or wrongly, calculated that the visit would energise the peace process and help lift it above the plateau into which it has settled down after the initial spurt of confidence-building measures.

There were, indeed, some clouds of uncertainty over the composite dialogue even before trouble erupted in Pakistan but Islamabad had apparently hoped that Manmohan Singh would come this spring or summer and blow them away.

Secondly, there is the argument that India should, in its long term interest, simply wait to see if there is a significant change in the decision-making structure of Pakistan. This caution can translate into months of inactivity as the constitutional and legal processes of resolving Pakistan’s current political dilemma, possibly by federal and provincial elections, would stretch into the next year.

In India, as in Pakistan, observers have not ruled out the possibility that the beleaguered president of Pakistan may opt for a marked hardening of his regime and not for a more inclusive democratic dispensation. If Musharraf re-emerges as an unassailable strong man, India would need a different negotiating posture than in the case of a new power sharing arrangement featuring any of the mainstream political parties.

Third, the Pakistani crisis is also reviving the influence of the Indian lobby that wants to use it as an opportunity to damage Pakistan. Given a free hand, this lobby would pursue a multi-pronged campaign the most striking aspects of which are not difficult to read. It would make a compromise on Siachen impossible and intensify efforts to erode Pakistan’s position in the Northern Areas. It may seek Indian interference in Balochistan and in the tribal belt of Afghanistan.

The Indian comments at the Asia-Europe moot in Hamburg about the growing instability on both sides of the Durand Line would tempt this lobby to pressurise Manmohan Singh to adopt a harder posture towards Pakistan.

Fourth, India may intensify the propaganda that Pakistan’s nuclear capability can fall into irresponsible hands. India has shown considerable skill in focusing the concerns of the non-proliferation lobby on Pakistan.

Its success in getting its own ambitious nuclear programme differentiated from that of Pakistan has once again been underscored by the most recent observations of the US Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns. Arguing forcefully against India’s continued isolation in the nuclear field, he has emphasised the need for “a more integrated world, where India is working with the rest of the international community for civilian nuclear power”. The forthcoming G-8 summit is often mentioned as the milestone for India’s arrival in that integrated world.

In India too, the coalition government has to watch the BJP and its more strident communalist allies with concern as its position has weakened in recent provincial elections. When Mr Vajpayee travelled by bus to Lahore for talks with Mr Nawaz Sharif, he had the support of BJP in his desire to claim a place in history as the principal architect of an epoch-making settlement with Pakistan. His programme in Lahore was rich in symbolism: the followers of Hindutva were prepared to bury their historical opposition to the partition of India.

The outcome of proposed negotiations on Kashmir was uncertain but there were indications of a relatively imaginative Indian approach to the issue. The evidence for it was not confined to the weak and rather romantic narrative popularised by Ambassador Niaz Naik. The Kargil war left India with a wound that has not healed and a powerful lobby insists that any settlement with Pakistan should take place on much stiffer Indian terms.The next general election in India is not that far away and campaigning in state elections already carries its overtones. Manmohan Singh may not wish to expose his flank by appearing to be too conciliatory to Pakistan at this point of time when Pakistan’s bargaining power is weakening.

In March this year, the mood in the Pakistan foreign office on the dialogue with India was upbeat. Foreign Minister Khurshid Kasuri’s legendary optimism which partly reflects the political needs of the Pakistani regime had touched an all time high even as his Indian counterpart reacted with a notable tightening of semantics.

Foreign Secretary Riaz Mohammad is wary with words but even he thought that 2007 could be a watershed in transforming the bilateral relationship. Both of them could have reflected their honest assessment of the parleys as well as their hope that India too would share the desire to make the 60th anniversary of independence a real turning point in regional history.

The objective situation between the two countries is, however, mixed. On the positive side, the two sides have reached an accord on nuclear risk reduction that may conceivably be a humble beginning for a more comprehensive strategic restraint regime in the fullness of time.

The 60-year old dispute on the delimitation of frontier in Sir Creek has moved a little closer to settlement with the completion of a joint survey of the area. So far arguments were based on competing interpretations of old maps dating back to early 20th century.

The joint survey provides useful data for exploring a mutually satisfactory solution though it is highly unlikely that India would accept the traditional Pakistani view of the frontier being at the eastern edge of the Creek. It may, however, remain constructively engaged in talks as an indefinite deferment of the determination of the maritime border does not serve Indian interests either.

On the negative side, the Indian position on the expected demilitarisation of the dizzy heights of the Siachen glacier has perceptibly hardened. It has become one of those rare cases where the Indian military has asserted itself and virtually pre-empted the political inclination to bring about disengagement of troops unless Pakistan signed on the dotted line.

On Kashmir, Musharraf has scaled down Pakistan’s expectations to an extent that no elected political leader could ever have done. His government has been inching towards a settlement on terms that India would accept as not too far from its own bottom line. A noticeable hurdle has been the slow progress in New Delhi’s efforts to reach an understanding with various Kashmiri groups even within the Indian-held Kashmir.

As many as four working groups headed by eminent Indians have been busy identifying measures that can enable the Kashmiri militants to shift from an armed struggle to an autonomy-based political solution. But autonomy itself has resisted definition and the working group led by former Supreme Court judge, Saghir Ahmad, has made little headway in formulating constitutional provisions that would satisfy even the political factions that accept Indian sovereignty over the state.

The Hindu communal forces in Jammu are able to orchestrate fears about the long term consequences of what Musharraf calls “self-rule”. It must be admitted that on the Pakistani side too, some people are apprehensive of a so-called “sell-out” on Kashmir. They are beginning to hope that the present turmoil would leave Musharraf much too weak to make a precipitate agreement on Kashmir that future generations would regret. India would carefully measure Musharraf’s ability to deliver on Kashmir.

March was also the month when Pakistan drifted into an avoidable period of unrest because of a controversial move to remove the Chief Justice of Pakistan. India has found General Musharraf amenable to making substantial concessions on contentious issues like Kashmir and, therefore, has nothing to gain from his loss of power, partially or completely. But the two factors taken together — the Pakistani turmoil and Manmohan Singh’s domestic problems — may simply lead to a loss of momentum in the India-Pakistan peace process. The schedule of meetings approved by their foreign ministers not very long ago may be observed with even less and less serious business being transacted.

Neither India nor Pakistan can attain their full potential without taking their current peace process to a logical and happy conclusion. But there is a serious danger that this process may slow down. India does not have a sense of urgency about it anyway. Now the Pakistani side faces a more difficult task of carrying conviction with its own people because of the sharpening of internal contradictions. Men of goodwill in both the countries should work together to achieve an honourable and equitable settlement that is immune to domestic political stresses.

The writer is a former foreign secretary.

__________________
Time is like a river.
You cannot touch the same water twice,
because the flow that has passed will never pass again.
Enjoy every moment of life.

I have learnt silence from the talkative, toleration from the intolerant, and kindness from the unkind; yet strange, I am ungrateful to these teachers.