Ideological states

THE March 23 celebrations included the usual exhortations that Pakistan is an ideological state. Ideologies represent unique sets of guiding ideas adopted by countries for the main life domains: economic, political and cultural. Countries progress only by adopting effective ideologies. All countries follow some ideology. So, presenting Pakistan as an ideological state is redundant. The issue is whether it follows an effective and distinct ideology.

Most countries consider economics and politics as public domains, where states intervene extensively through secular policies based on democracy and capitalism. They consider culture as a private domain where citizens follow personal traditions with states intervening when traditions break laws. Those fussing about ideology today are mainly the few countries that buck the silent consensus on democracy-cum-capitalism, eg, North Korea, Cuba and Iran. Their politics and economics are guided by different ideologies. Even culture is considered public domain there. Such countries are generally doing poorly culturally, economically and politically.

Pakistan’s case is unique. It is perhaps the only ideology-obsessed country yet to even define its ideology clearly let alone implement it. Ideologies include four levels. Values prescribing ideal behaviour represent their foundations. State structures built on these foundations represent the second level. Economic structures prescribe how resources are controlled. Political structures prescribe how state power is exercised.

We have yet to define our creed clearly.
Policies, the third level, provide guidance for different governance domains. The final level includes procedural details for implementing policies. Successful ideologies provide values which remain valid timelessly, structures which remain robust in the long run but policies and procedures which can change immediately as required invariably by changing situations over the millennia.

Viewing ideology so, Pakistani ideology seems incomplete since it contains little discussion on fundamental values and structures. The Pakistani ideology flag-bearers include two sub-camps. Nationalists use Pakistani ideology only for justifying India’s partition based on the two-nation theory. A theory which argues, however correctly, that Muslims constitute a separate nation becomes an ideology only if it also presents unique values, structures and policies for economically and politically running Pakistan differently than India.

In reality, both countries follow capitalism and democracy and overlap hugely culturally, beyond religion. Thus, one can understand Muslim arguments for partition in the two-nation theory based on fears of possible future marginalisation in united India. One also marvels at the success of this pre-emptive nationalism given that most national movements fail even after decades of actual oppression.

However, it is difficult to accept that Pakistani nationalists then or now have enunciated any distinct ideology covering all four ideological levels through the two-nation theory. In reality, Pakistani ideology post-1947 is merely a convenient strategy for trying to unite Pakistanis around an Islamic identity given Pakistan’s ethnic divisions even though Muslims are as divided sect-wise as Pakistanis are divided ethnically. For nationalists, Pakistani ideology is a book with glossy covers but pages kept deliberately blank since details may divide rather than unite.

Pakistani Islamists, the second sub-group, recognise this incomplete ideology and hence demand Islamic laws to complete it. However, they lack vision and ideas. Instead of presenting a comprehensive ideology they largely focus on the fourth level — detailed procedures from past eras. They insist that those too are timeless.

Religious texts mostly focus on timeless values guiding individual human behaviour. Ironi*cally, several secular ideologies are using similar values to brainstorm alternative ideologies given the enormous problems increasingly created by neoliberal capitalism, today’s dominant ideology. Religious verses are largely silent about economic and political structures and policies, probably to allow people in different epochs to decide these issues mutually given their specific situations based on the timeless values provided. Similarly, according to majoritarian belief, the Prophet (PBUH) designated neither a successor nor a specific succession modality. Subsequent Madina-based caliphs were each appointed differently (the consistent principle being that operational military commanders never seized power even when commotion erupted).

Thus, the challenge facing Pakistani ideologists is to enunciate clear politico-economic structures and broad but flexible policies that can work today based on the clearly timelessly valid basic Islamic values rather than championing inflexible minute procedures. Unfortunately, they cannot even enunciate how interesting policies like profit-loss financing will work today where governments are often the biggest borrowers, but usually for non-profit endeavours. Anything more profound seems beyond their capacities. Hence, Pakistani ideology will remain an empty slogan in their hands.



Published in Dawn, April 2nd, 2015