Seeds of conflict
M. Zaidi | Opinion | From the Newspaper
Jan 9th 2012

WHEN the Americans lost interest in Afghanistan after the defeat of the Soviets, the face of the Af-Pak region changed forever. It turned the Arabs in Afghanistan, and extremists in this country and in Pakistan, into new regional actors.

This new Afghan jihad was to lay the seeds of insecurity in the region for years to come. Only the most extremist parties were supported by American cash, such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hizb-i-Islami. The Mujahideen soon started a bloody, internecine war which would tear Afghanistan apart. Hekmatyar was bitterly opposed by Ahmed Shah Masud, who had become the defence minister in Kabul under Burhanuddin Rabbani, who had followed Sibghatullah Mujaddedi as president.

Ethnic rivalries between the Tajiks, Pakhtuns and Hazaras soon started coming to the fore and war erupted. In January 1993, Kabul was shelled heavily by Hekmatyar against the solidly entrenched Masud, causing huge casualties on both sides and on the civilian population.

By 1994, the country had become a set of principalities, with Rabbani as the president holding only Kabul and the northeast of the country, while the west — particularly Herat — was controlled by Ismael Khan.

Six northern provinces were administered by Uzbek Gen Rashid Dostum, and central Afghanistan was in the hands of the Hazaras. The predominantly Pakhtun south presented an even more chaotic picture: there was one large fiefdom in Jalalabad, a small area adjacent to Kabul controlled by Hekmatyar and numerous commanders ruling the south.

The emergence of the Taliban in Pakistan’s madressahs was a consequence of this anarchy. They nominated Mullah Omar as their spiritual leader, signifying their resolve to enforce minimalist, short-term agendas. The Taliban soon became permanent players in Afghan power politics by seizing Kandahar in 1994, Herat in 1995 and Kabul in 1996, with many Pakhtun warlords surrendering voluntarily.

Eventually, they faced stiff resistance and were in May 1997 routed at Mazar-i-Sharif. They had, by then, dispensed with attempts to win over public opinion by calling loya jirgas and had become absolutist in disposition, with their own dogmatic strain of the Sharia evoking popular sentiment against them.

This harsh ideology also provided an overarching umbrella for Al Qaeda’s affiliation and permeation within 10 ranks of the Talibs, with the conflict becoming an ethnic blood feud between the Pakhtuns and the non-Pakhtuns of Masud’s Northern Alliance, also called the United Front.

Masud relied mainly on Tajiks drawn from the Panjsher valley, but also commanded the support of Herat’s Ismael Khan, the Hazara commanders in central Afghanistan, and Gen Rashid Dostum. When the Taliban captured Mazar-i-Sharif in 1996, they had gained control of most of the country, with the Northern Alliance squeezed into a small area in north-eastern Afghanistan and around Kabul.

By 1996, Osama bin Laden had already established himself as a threat to the Americans, with his continued logistical, financial and human resource support to the Taliban ingratiating him greatly towards them. This ‘Afghan Arab’ presence resulted in the formation of Al Qaeda, which was given control of Taliban training camps in eastern Afghanistan. Not coincidentally, global jihadist ideals began to permeate the ranks of the Taliban. Between 1996 and 2001, Al Qaeda training camps churned out an estimated 30,000 militants from around the world.

On Aug 7, 1998, Al Qaeda launched its first attacks on the Americans by bombing its embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, killing 224 people and wounding nearly 5,000. Barely a day later, the Taliban annexed Mazar-i-Sharif and much of northern Afghanistan, massacring more than 4,000 Hazaras, Tajiks and Uzbeks.

America retaliated by launching 75 cruise missiles at Al Qaeda-controlled training camps in eastern Afghanistan. It also tried to have Bin Laden handed over by exerting diplomatic pressure on the Taliban government.

By this time, though, Al Qaeda had organised Arab and North African fighters into a special unit called Brigade 555, which acted as a reserve offensive force in the Taliban’s campaign against the Northern Alliance; the organisation also enlisted the support of extremist groups such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Chechen fighters from the breakaway republic of Chechnya, and Uighur Muslims from China’s eastern province of Xinjiang.

On Oct 12, 2000, Al Qaeda attempted to sink the American destroyer USS Cole in Aden, killing and wounding US sailors. The US put pressure through UN resolutions to demand the extradition of Bin Laden and guarantees from the Taliban state of Afghanistan for not providing sanctuary to terrorists.

The December 2000 UN Resolution 1333 asked for an arms ban on the Taliban and the closure of training camps, as well as seizure of their foreign assets. Another resolution was passed on July 30, 2001. Security Council Resolution 1363 put a monitoring system in place along Afghanistan’s borders to ensure a UN-administered arms embargo.

All these resolutions came to naught. In retaliation, the Taliban destroyed ancient Buddha statues in Bamiyan, and enforced stringent laws on UN and aid agencies.

The Northern Alliance reorganised itself more effectively in 2001 against the Taliban, while coming to an agreement with former monarch Zahir Shah to hold an emergency loya jirga to elect a new government. Al Qaeda could not let this go unchecked, and accomplished its most important assassination to date: that of Ahmed Shah Masud, who was killed on Sept 9, 2001. Then, on Sept 11, 2001, the twin towers were struck by planes.

The invasion of Afghanistan and the first withdrawal of the US was to usher in the evolution of the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Pakistan. It remains to be seen what the withdrawal from the second engagement brings.

The writer is a security analyst.