Our Indian agenda - Dawn

Hassan Razzaq · #1 Tuesday, May 22, 2012

Our Indian agenda(| 5/22/2012 12:00:00 AM)
MY last column (May 8) in this paper talked about the vicious cycle of untoward تکلیف دہ events and entrenched ۔ مورچے میں محفوظ negotiating postures blocking progress in the direction of genuine rapprochement مُفاہمت between India and Pakistan.

I felt that by contextualizing negotiating habits I would show history as their true and transient ۔ عارضی provenance کِسی شے; that, history need not be deterministic جبریتی۔ and that statesmen have often changed its course with visionary paradigm نمونہ shifts.

Admittedly, opinions differ on both sides of the divide if the time for sub continental reconciliation مصالحت ، has come.

Nevertheless, some positive trends are clearly discernible قابل امتیاز. Pakistan has a vociferous ۔ ہنگامہ خیز ۔ minority that clings چِمٹا to the post-1947 iron curtain with the same arguments as employed during the initial stages of nation-formation and state-building.

On the other hand, it is certain that Mu s h a r r a f `s Kargil incursion چَڑھائی was the last of its kind; the army has travelled far in grasping ۔ حَرصی regional and global strategic realities and more importantly, thenon-military dynamics of the social and economic sectors.

In India, unfortunately, the doctrine of a limited war under a nuclear overhang سر پر منڈلانا has not been finaHy abandoned. Even there, the sheer ۔ انحراف futility بے اثر ہونا of huge military confrontations in 1986 (Operation Brasstacks), 1990 (Kashmir uprising) and 2001-2002 (terrorist attack on Indian parliament) is convincing decision-makers that the prevailing strategic stalemate ۔ تعطل پیدا کر دینا cannot be easily overturned. It is also true that some Indian hawks, in an exact replica نقل of the Cold War, reduce it to a numbers game and wait for a tipping ضرب لگانا ۔ point when India would militarily prevail.

Economic factors too are beginning to underline the uses of a cooperative relationship. Eminent experts have written in this newspaper to urge Islamabad to take the most-favoured nation status (MFN) for India to its logical conclusion, albeit ہَر چَند ۔ اگَرچہ ۔ حالانکہ with negotiations on Indian nontariff barriers, visa restrictions and other issues. For India too, trade with Pakistan and perhaps later through Pakistan with Afghanistan and Central Asia, seems significant. The self-intoxicating phase of shining India has faded a little and though India still posts a healthy GDP growth rate, the economy is slowing down; the GDP growth actually fell from 9.83 per cent in Q2 2009 to 4.25 per cent in Q4 2011. India is also vulnerable to the recurring crises in the western system.

The arrogant argument that India does not need to transact business with Pakistan already looks flat. There is a fair chance of the current direct India Pakistan trade of $2.7bn rising to $6bn in the next few years though targets beyond that would require bigger political and economic decisions. So even if increasing trade is not exactly a game-changer, it should help create a more conducive ۔ مائل environment.

There has been talk in both the countries of `doables` ۔ قابل کارروائی, the low-hanging fruit, in particular Siachen and Sir Creek. On Siachen, the forthcoming meeting in June may turn out to be as unproductive as the one last June because of the Indian army`s veto on disengagement ۔ چُٹکارا۔. Its insistence insistence on the `authentication` of the Actual Ground Position Line or AGPL -the Saltoro ridge پہاڑی علاقہ is seen in Pakistan to be integrally بالکُل ۔ linked to high-cost projects portending پشین گوئی کرنا indefinite physical occupation. Pakistani planners would not overlook the possibility that India would use blood, treasure and technology to jeopardize ۔ نقصان پہنچانا ۔ خطرے میں ڈالنا Pakistan`s land link with China.

Pakistan will not undertake بیڑا اُٹھانا unilateral یَک طَرفَہ disengagement because of several apprehensions۔ ادراک ۔ سَمَجھ بُوجھ: India wants to dominate Pakistan`s northern areas and Shaksgam valley; Siachen is a triangular `strategic wedge ۔ کیل ۔ میخ ` between Pakistan and China, with the Karakoram pass being the primary focus; Indian ambitions to use Nubra valley and Siachen glacier`s Saser La pass for access to Central Asia; and finally, the belief that India will resume its northwest march the moment Pakistan lowers its guard.

The fact that Pakistanis cannot go up and take the Saltoro ridge and that the Indians cannot come down to implement the imputed تہمت لگائی منسوب کیا agenda should enable the political leadership to take the initiative to implement the once agreed disengagement. For potential future betrayals, there will be credible safeguards and iron-clad guarantees.

The Indian contention that Sir Creekcould not be settled on the basis of l914 maps led to a fresh state-of-the-art joint survey; its resolution is just a flourish of the pen away. Recently, Michael Krepon, a co-founder of Stimson Centre, hinted that `the continuing dispute over Sir Creek revolves around the extension of the land border seaward سمندر کی طرف `. This is surprising as both India and Pakistan are under the pressure of international law to determine soon the reference point on the land for their maritime بحری boundary and economic zones.

Pakistan should energise the discussion on mutual strategic restraint. Given the Indian preoccupation ۔ طرَفداری- گہری سوچ ۔ فکر with China, an across-the-board regime is impossible but considerable mutual assurance is achievable. India is now globally recognised as amongst the top military spenders. The more menacing دھمکی آمیز the Indian posture towards Pakistan, the greater would be Pakistan`s counter-action to fortify حِصار بَندی کرنا its `minimum deterrence deterrence `; it has already waded into the domain حلقہ اثر of `tactical tactical nuclear weapons`.

There should be no let-up کَم ہونا ۔ خَتَم ہونا ۔ تھَمنا in efforts to make Indian leaders aware of the perils of the growing militarisation of Indian policy towards Pakistanjust when the Pakistan Army was signalling support for a détente ۔ دشمنی میں کمی۔.

Notwithstanding inflexible negotiating habits, progress in many areas is possible as neither side now insists on any core issue: Kashmir from Pakistan, and Mumbai and overland overland transit to Afghanistan from India, being a pre-condition for it. A settlement of Jammu and Kashmir, however, remains indispensable ناگُزیر ۔ لازمی ۔ نہایت ضُروری to the quest for permanent peace. It may take time for ideas for a solution acceptable to India, Pakistan and the people of Kashmir to gain traction کھِنچاوٴ.

Kashmir remains the worst example of India treating ambition as entitlement as entitlement.

Nevertheless, the resumed dialogue should be nudged nudged towards renunciation ترک of violence by all concerned, progressive demilitarisation, retrenchment تخفیف ۔ کمی of laws incompatible with freedom and dignity, strengthening of Kashmiri state institutions and devolution of power to them from the centre, and freedom of trade intra سابقہ -Kashmir and with India and Pakistan. Progress in each and every subtheme will make it easier to proceed to the grand finale some day. • The write is a former foreign secretary.

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