New paradigms in Asia
By A.G. NOORANI

INDIAN Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to China last month signified a major resolve by both sides to contain their differences on the boundary dispute and other issues and move towards a stable political equation between the two countries.

Involved here is not only the bilateral relationship between India and China but also China’s policy towards South Asia; specifically, towards Pakistan.

On the bilateral plane Dr Singh made his trip against a background of a 20-day face-off between the troops of both countries along the Line of Actual Control (LOAC) in Ladakh some months ago which was defused by an understanding announced on May 5, 2013. Dr Singh sensibly called it “a localised problem”. India had belatedly initiated a series of steps to bolster its military strength and the infrastructure along the entire LOAC.

The agreement on border defence cooperation, signed in Beijing during the visit, does not touch that issue. It seeks only to buttress the matrix of four agreements on the boundary concluded in the last 20 years, which provided for confidence-building measures (CBMs) and mechanisms for a solution to the major dispute.

The agreement of Sept 7, 1993 concerned maintenance of “peace and tranquility” along the LOAC. As per its terms, to the existing joint working group on the boundary set up in 1988 were added diplomatic and military experts from both sides.

On Nov 29, 1996 came an agreement on CBMs “in the military field” along the LOAC.

On June 24, 2003 the working group was capped by ‘special representatives’ to explore “from the political perspective of the overall bilateral relationship the framework of a boundary settlement”.

The quest for a political settlement was carried forward in an agreement on April 11, 2005 which laid down some “political parameters and guiding principles for a boundary settlement”. Another agreement on Jan 17, 2012 established “a working mechanism for consultation and coordination” in the border areas.

A retired Indian ambassador P. Stobdan calls the 2013 agreement “a rehash” of the previous ones. But an important one hit a cul-de-sac. Under the agreement of 1996, the parties pledged themselves to arrive at “a common understanding of the alignment” of the LOAC by “clarifying” the alignment in those segments on which these perceptions differed. Maps would be exchanged to indicate each side’s “perceptions of the entire alignment” of the LOAC. The process was two-fold: clarify the alignment and confirm it. India wanted to delineate the LOAC on the ground; China was sceptical.

The maps were duly exchanged on the middle sector, in Uttar Pradesh. But India moved the process unrealistically to the western sector. China rejected India’s map. It had made it plain, since April 1960, when Zhou En-lai met Jawaharlal Nehru in New Delhi, that it would not discuss the area to the west of the Karakoram Pass since it was under Pakistan’s control.

The next move now is to devise a framework agreement for a settlement ignoring the fact that a political dispute requires settlement at the summit, be it the boundary or Kashmir.

Dr Singh’s visit was preceded by that of China’s new prime minister, Li Keqiang, to India and Pakistan last May. He said in Islamabad: “China has always given priority to the ties with Pakistan.”

This brings us to China’s policy towards South Asia on which there is a lot of misunderstanding. In Beijing, Dr Manmohan Singh sought to allay China’s anxieties about India’s relations with the US, in the context of the latter’s containment policy, and also to register India’s concerns about China’s entente with Pakistan.

In a speech on Oct 24, he said “Frankly, old theories of alliances and containment are no longer relevant. India and China cannot be contained and our recent history is testimony to this. Nor should we seek to contain others…. Therefore, we should engage with each other in a spirit of equality and friendship and with the confidence that neither country is a threat to the other….

“Our strategic partnerships with other countries are defined by our own economic interests, needs and aspirations. They are not directed against China or anyone else. We expect a similar approach from China.” The expectation of reciprocity was expressed clearly.

India’s fears are as unreal as any fears in Pakistan about India’s growing friendship with China, for the latter’s interests in Pakistan are deeply rooted. They will endure, even though China has moved away from its support to the UN resolution on Kashmir. In China’s perception not only are they not incompatible with its friendship with India, but are fully in harmony with it.

The policy was set out nearly a decade ago by Zhao Gancheng, director of South Asia Studies at the Shanghai Institute for International Studies, who wrote in a publication in 2005. “From the Chinese point of view, the core of South Asian security lies in a continuous reconciliation between India and Pakistan, and by the same token, the core of China’s South Asia policy may also lie in a proper handling of its relations with the two great neighbours.”

He added that “new ideas of security” were called for and warned that new problems of “power politics” can arise.

Last May, Hu Shisheng, director, South Asia and Southeast Asian Studies, Chinese Institute for Contemporary International Relations, Beijing wrote in an Indian weekly: “Building a cooperative and harmonious neighbourhood is a must for China to be accepted as a benign rising global power. The Chinese dream cannot materialise if both the country and its neighbours spend sleepless nights. In fact, China needs to take initiative to promote relations not just between China and its neighbours but among the neighbours themselves.”

The Chinese move on and think anew, unlike South Asia.

The writer is an author and a lawyer based in Mumbai.