RELATIONS between Israel and Turkey, already rocky, have worsened. On September 2nd the Turkish government formally expelled the Israeli ambassador who, as it happened, was back in Israel. Military links have been suspended. Turkey’s prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, is to go to Egypt—the first visit at such a level for 15 years—to sign new military and economic agreements. Mr Erdogan may even visit the Gaza Strip, which Israel continues to blockade since it is still governed by Hamas, the Islamist movement that officially rejects Israel’s existence. That would be a real poke in Israel’s eye.

Turkey’s moves against Israel followed the publication by the UN on September 2nd of a report on Israel’s attack on a flotilla bringing aid to Gaza in May 2010, when Israeli commandos killed eight Turks and one Turkish-American. The report upheld the legality of Israel’s blockade of Gaza, and hence its boarding the flotilla outside territorial waters, but found Israel’s methods “excessive and unreasonable”.

Israel agreed to adopt the report “with reservations”. Its officials quietly exulted over the legal vindication for the blockade and the right to board, at least in principle.

Turkey’s president, Abdullah Gul, called this ruling “null and void”. Mr Erdogan said “it means nothing to us.” In a statement attached to the report, the panel’s Turkish representative, Özdem Sanberk, said that “common sense and conscience dictate that the blockade is unlawful.”

The report urged Israel to make an “appropriate statement of regret” and offer damages to the victims’ families. Turkey has demanded an unequivocal apology. But Binyamin Netanyahu, Israel’s prime minister, said Israel would not apologise for its soldiers defending their lives.

Traders in both countries were relieved to learn that Mr Erdogan’s decision will not yet affect non-military commerce. Israeli statistics show two-way civilian trade rising steadily in the past three years, despite the political rift. Today it is worth more than $3.5 billion a year; Turkey is Israel’s sixth-largest trading partner.

Defence ties between the two countries have weakened during this period, and there are fears of lay-offs in Israeli companies if existing contracts are broken. In recent years Israel has upgraded hundreds of Turkey’s American-made tanks and supplied electronic systems to American-made Turkish military aircraft. Turkey uses Israeli-produced drones against Kurdish guerrillas. But once-frequent joint training exercises are a thing of the past. Israeli aircraft train over Bulgaria and Cyprus and have conducted war games with Turkey’s neighbour and traditional rival, Greece. Mr Erdogan noted ominously on September 6th that Turkish warships would “display themselves more often” in the waters of the eastern Mediterranean.

Israeli-Turkish relations have suffered in part because of Mr Erdogan’s determination to reduce his generals’ influence on foreign policy. In the past, keeping Israel close has allowed the army to cosy up to America. But the rise to power of Mr Erdogan’s mildly Islamist Justice and Development (AK) party and the exposure of mischief by soldiers—from coup plotting and corruption to incompetence in the field—has changed that. Cooling relations with Israel was a part of it. Israel’s assault on Gaza in late 2008 and early 2009 enraged many of AK’s pious supporters. And AK was and remains keen to have warmer relations with the Arab and Muslim worlds.

The Turkish government has no intention, however, of upsetting its NATO allies. It has agreed to host the radar component of a proposed NATO nuclear missile defence shield, a project that is aimed mainly at Iran, with which Turkey has a tricky relationship. And Turkey has turned against Bashar Assad’s regime in Syria, though Mr Erdogan has not explicitly told the Syrian president to go, nor has he downgraded relations with Damascus.