Elusive peace process

By Dr Maleeha Lodhi

In a season of leaks in America, a news report from Washington indicates a renewed US effort to re-open talks with Taliban representatives aimed eventually at installing an Afghan peace process. The Reuters report makes public what was not widely known. But it does little to contradict the view that with Presidential elections just eighty days away, the Obama administration will hesitate in taking any foreign policy steps before November that could play into Republican hands – such as moving Taliban detainees from Guantanamo prison.

Nevertheless the public surfacing of this information offers an opportunity to assess where the hoped-for Afghan peace process is at the moment and identify obstacles in its path. According to the report, the US recently made a revised offer to release five Taliban prisoners in exchange for an American serviceman in Taliban custody. Under a changed sequence he is now required to be freed after all five Taliban detainees have been sent to Qatar. Earlier, American interlocutors had insisted that Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl should be freed in between the transfer of the five Taliban prisoners who would be moved from Guantanamo in two stages.

The report does not specify that this proposal was made over two months ago. It also does not mention the fact that the offer was conveyed through the Qataris as Taliban interlocutors refused to meet US special representative Marc Grossman when he visited Doha in June. The Taliban have yet to respond to the proposal. So far there is “radio silence” according to an American official who recalled that Taliban negotiators have all along insisted on the five detainees being released “on the same day”.

During a number of secret US-Taliban contacts in 2011 both sides saw the prisoner exchange as a starting point for formal negotiations. The swap was the key to other confidence building measures that were to pave the way for opening a Taliban office in Qatar. The CBMs involved Taliban acceptance of a travel ban on detainees once they were moved to Qatar. The Taliban were also required to issue a statement denouncing international terrorism. Agreement on this CBMs package was to precede the launch of formal peace talks.

But the Obama administration was unable to deliver on the prisoners for many reasons – lack of agreement within the administration on the move, opposition from the Pentagon and Congress as well as the administration’s reluctance in an election year to expend political capital to push the initiative through. Then other developments in Afghanistan intervened including the Quran burning incident at Bagram.

In March, Taliban spokesmen announced the suspension of talks accusing American officials on going back on promises. US efforts since to restart talks made no headway. As a result Washington’s plans to announce the Qatar office opening, first at the Bonn Conference in December 2011 and then at this year’s Chicago Summit did not materialise. Conflicting interpretations emerged about why the talks failed to resume.

The Taliban cited “inexplicable delay” on the prisoners when they broke off talks. They later accused American officials of changing the sequence of steps each side was to take for the prisoner swap. The US offered that it would first release two Taliban prisoners following the required 30-day notification to Congress. In deference to the Pentagon’s wishes, it would then wait for a sixty-day period to ‘test’ the Taliban’s conduct, before moving the remaining detainees. In return the Taliban were called on to release the American prisoner in the sixty-day period before the other three Taliban detainees were transferred to Qatar.

Calling these “new conditions” Taliban spokesmen rejected them as well as the American demand for a Taliban statement announcing their willingness to join ‘other Afghans’ in a peace dialogue and disavowing international terrorism before the transfer of prisoners. They also demurred over the travel ban.

American officials denied they changed the sequence, attributing the Taliban interpretation to ‘a misunderstanding’ on their part which also reflected differing conceptions of how preliminary negotiations should proceed. Talks remained deadlocked though indirect discussions apparently continued through the Qataris.

Then about two months ago the US communicated the amended proposal, reported last week by Reuters. But what does this renewed American effort really mean? Does it signal the administration’s willingness to move ahead despite the political constraints of campaign season in which both candidates have so far avoided talking about Afghanistan? Does it indicate that given the long process involved in the prisoner exchange (30 days plus another 60 day waiting period for the rest) administration officials calculate this will drag past the November 4 election so there may be little to lose politically in moving ahead? Some American officials argue that if the Taliban were to accept this offer – a big if as they have insisted on a one-time, prior release of all five leaders – the expected political flak would be offset by the administration’s ability to secure the release of the American soldier. As one American official explained rather hopefully the difference between the two sides was now only “ninety days.” Interestingly President Obama met last week with the parents of Sergeant Bergdahl.

The offer can alternatively be interpreted as a way to keep the Qatar process going while sowing divisions in the Taliban movement, which has seen bitter differences erupt over talking to the Americans. The leak could also be an effort by the Pentagon to scuttle the prisoner deal hoping this would rile Congressional members and provoke Republican opposition.

Whatever the motives behind the timing of the leak, the fate of the prisoners’ proposal remains uncertain. More significantly it does not square with other moves being considered by the administration or an approach that continues to give precedence to kinetic action over political strategy or diplomacy. Following last month’s Congressional moves urging the administration to declare the Haqqani network as a terrorist organisation, US officials indicate that they are now close to taking this decision. Considering the US believes this group has custody of Bergdahl how does it expect to proceed with the prisoner swap even if this takes place after the election? Moreover the Haqqanis are part of the Taliban that Washington also wants to negotiate with.

On this count as well as in its broader approach, the contradictions in American policy were laid bare during recent exchanges between senior US and Pakistani officials. Different parts of the Obama administration again made conflicting demands on Pakistan: action against the Haqqanis and help in bringing them to the bargaining table.

While US officials see no tension in this fight and talk strategy it remains a major impediment to establishing a peace process. Pakistan views this strategy to be dysfunctional to making substantive headway on Afghan reconciliation. Instead it has advocated the mutual reduction of violence to create conditions for peace talks. But it has waited in vain for signs of the US reconciling its two policy tracks by aligning its military mission with its stated political goal of negotiations.

As potential facilitator of a future peace process Pakistan finds itself being urged to ask one side to start talking while the other remains intent on fighting. This conundrum goes to the heart of present differences between the two countries despite recent attempts by both to extricate relations from non-stop crisis.

Also, despite President Obama’s call earlier this year for a ‘negotiated peace’ in Afghanistan this has not brought an end to internal rifts within his administration on the issue. The American military and intelligence communities continue to be mistrustful about ‘reconciliation’ efforts while Obama has done little to unify his administration behind this objective or evolve a coherent political strategy to achieve this.

All this makes prospects for serious peace talks rather bleak and out of step with the military drawdown proceeding apace as the 2014 transition looms. The peaceful withdrawal of western forces and post-2014 Afghan stability depends critically on progress towards a political settlement. But the latest US effort to re-engage the Taliban shows that this process hasn’t even got to the opening act.

Source: Elusive Peace Process