Who votes against the vote?
Harris Khalique

There is a last-ditch effort underway for getting the 2013 general elections postponed and the civilian-led political process that began in 2008 derailed. Or maybe we will see another effort between the time when skies are clear of the smog generated by Dr Tahirul Qadri and when elections are announced to take place – who knows? Having participated in different movements, and being a student of Pakistan’s political history, my ability to get excited by the rhetoric of revolution without any plausible theory or doable plan to back it up is restricted. Also, after seeing the rise and fall of self-proclaimed messiahs and self-righteous demagogues over the years, their convening capacity to gather people in thousands fails to impress me anymore.
After all, we are the sixth most populous country in the world. But what did get me thinking is the sudden rise of Qadri and his acceptability by a certain kind of people even before the Imran Khan fad was fully over. Who are the people in Pakistan who desist the democratic political process? Is it only about institutions or a mindset or both? What are the reasons for these people not agreeing to settle for a democratic, civilian-led political dispensation and then struggle within the broad parameters set in a federal constitution where parliament is supposed to be supreme?
Over the course of our history, you will find that there always has been an over-influential and over-powerful minority that tries really hard and succeeds many times in distracting us from the democratic path. However, the type and composition of that minority has changed twice since 1947. Meaning thereby that the anti-democracy sentiment has always remained alive and strong, but its champions have changed.
Pakistan’s western wing, the successor state of original Pakistan and our country today, saw a massive transfer of population just after independence. An estimated eight million people arrived and six million left. This constitutes one of the greatest migrations in human history. Not all immigrants were influential but those who were influential in the bureaucracy and politics of the newly founded state were mostly immigrants. Elections mean numbers, majority opinion and majority rule. The immigrant elite enjoyed far more political power and executive authority if there was no counting of people. It suited them to find ways to block the democratic process and the new general elections for as long as they could. Besides, the Punjabi elite, while wanting to run its own affairs without being dominated by the immigrant elite including the civilian bureaucracy, did not want democracy at the federal level either because that would have meant the domination of East Pakistan.
Therefore, while we see provincial elections taking place before 1970, the first general election for parliament took place 24 years after independence. Of course, the dominant West Pakistani political forces, both civilian and military, refused to accept the election results. That was the first contradiction Pakistan saw which had two sides to it – first between the native and the immigrant and the second between Punjabis and Bengalis. It was all about not accepting the majority principle and caused initial hindrances to the democratic process in Pakistan and finally the dismemberment of the country. We find strong remnants of this thinking from the early years of the country surviving to this day.
The second and most significant contradiction to emerge in the republic was between the soldier and the citizen. In order to rein in the majority Bengalis and the rowdy Sindhis, Baloch and Pakhtuns, the military was encouraged by the Punjabi and immigrant elite politicians aided by the bureaucracy of the initial years – the protégé of the British Indian civil service – to take part in matters beyond the military’s capacity and mandate. Sooner than later, the sword arm took charge of the rest of the body as well. The four stints of military rule in the country gradually raised the differences between citizens and soldiers to an insurmountable degree. Political parties, journalists, writers, trade unionists and students have struggled against their own army on several occasions to restore democracy and civil liberties.
At the same time, there is a constant propaganda about the inefficiency, corruption and incompetence of civilian politicians, which began with Gen Ayub Khan in 1958 and continues to this day. We conveniently forget that, while being in power directly for more than half of the country’s history and indirectly whenever the grip of politicians loosened, the military hasn’t done tremendously well in governing the country for which it is neither mandated nor trained. Barring individual heroics, the institution’s involvement in political affairs compromised its ability to deliver that for which it gets trained and equipped. The military’s involvement in business, industry, trade and real estate has only sharpened the divide between the soldier and the citizen. But there is a strong lobby that favours military rule, for there are people whose economy and polity benefit when a popular opinion is discounted.
The latest contradiction to emerge and fortify in recent years is between the affluent urban middle class and the rest of the population of Pakistan. The urban middle class, although dominated by certain linguistic groups but generally including all ethnicities except the Baloch, despise a democratic political process. Traders, businessmen, whatever remains of industrialists, bankers, accountants, senior civil servants, military officers, engineers, doctors et al, do not like politicians, political parties, elections and the process of negotiations between different stakeholders in a normal democratic way, which looks chaotic from the outside but has a definite internal logic to it. This class has readymade management solutions to deep political problems faced by the country and society.
They are in a hurry to fix everything and actually believe that a long-drawn political process can either be cut short or circumvented. A part of them still likes military rule or a military-backed technocratic government because it creates an illusion of order. Since there is no negotiation between competing interests and only the singular interest of the dictator or a dictatorial clique prevails, there is no disorder in the short run. Also, it gets a bigger share in power and gets its economic interests served better when, for instance, the prime minister is handpicked like Shaukat Aziz. There is no left wing dictatorship in sight anyway, is there? So whenever there is an unrepresentative government, the affluent urban middle class gets what it doesn’t deserve.
In today’s Pakistan, the affluent urban middle class finds it hard to say that it wants dictatorship because social conditions within the country and political consensus internationally do not permit making such a statement. Therefore, it continues to degrade the nascent democratic system in Pakistan and clamours for fixing it unconstitutionally, with measures to be taken from outside parliament.
While those of us interested in sociology are very well aware of the conservative nature of the larger middle class in classical terms when it comes to making political choices and safeguarding their economic interests, we also know that a bourgeois democracy favours them in the long run. But in the unique conditions of Pakistan, the middle class we have produced neither favours nor has the patience for a complete democratic transformation to take place. Maybe when the middle class increases in number, its tactics would change. Until then, the interests of Pakistani masses articulated through the vote will remain at odds with the interests of the affluent urban middle class.
The writer is a poet and author based in Islamabad.
Email: harris.khalique@gmail.com