S Iftikhar Murshed

After the PML-N’s convincing victory in the May 11 elections, the party’s spirited foreign policy expert disclosed to a correspondent that the incoming government would review all agreements with Washington including the US troop withdrawal from Afghanistan. The potentially adverse fallout of this absurdly thoughtless statement was, however, contained by the prime minister-in-waiting – Nawaz Sharif – on Monday, when he told representatives of the international media that Pakistan would go the extra mile in facilitating the disengagement of the US-led forces from that war-ravaged country.
Since then, I have been thinking that Nawaz Sharif is an Afghanistan expert. Not one of the contemporary world leaders can match his Afghan experience. But, unfortunately, the affable PML-N chief lacks imagination and has never demonstrated an ability to think deeply into issues.
He needs to realise that the immediate foreign policy challenge that his government will be confronted with is Afghanistan. The fear expressed by analysts, of civil war in Afghanistan, could become a hideous self-fulfilling prophesy. The flames will engulf Pakistan’s tribal regions and this will be accompanied by a massive influx of Afghan refugees which our fragile economy cannot sustain.
The luxury of time is no longer available to Islamabad and, it will have to move fast in promoting an intra-Afghan dialogue if the impending catastrophe is to be avoided. Success in persuading the Taliban to settle their differences with the Kabul regime at the negotiating table will not only earn Pakistan the gratitude of the international community but could also trigger enhanced economic assistance which the country so desperately needs.
Though persuading the fiercely independent Afghan factions to talk to each other is stupendously difficult, this seemingly impossible feat was accomplished by Nawaz Sharif on three occasions in the past. Some of the warlords he interacted with have died but many others are still as powerful as they were before. They may have aged, but this makes no difference. An ancient Afghan proverb says: ‘The lion has become old, but people still fear him.’ The elements for jump-starting an intra-Afghan dialogue are embedded in the past which therefore need to be revisited.
The first Afghanistan spectacular pulled off by Nawaz Sharif was the Peshawar Accord. He corralled the leaders of the major mujahideen groups, minus the all-powerful Gulbadin Hekmatyar, into the governor house on April 14, 1992, and they eventually agreed on a three-phase mechanism for a peaceful political transition. Under this arrangement, Sibghatullah Mojaddedi, the head of the weakest faction, was to become president for two months from April 28 and then hand the baton over to Burhanuddin Rabbani for a four-month term. Phases one and two were successfully implemented.
The third phase envisaged the drafting of a constitution to be followed by elections in the six-month combined presidential terms of Mojaddedi and Rabbani. If the interim government failed to accomplish these tasks within the stipulated timeframe, Rabbani was to step down and hand over power to a jihadi council consisting of the leaders of the seven resistance groups.
But Rabbani’s assumption of power on June 28, 1992, began with the intense shelling of Kabul by Hekmatyar on the pretext that remnants of the communist army, as well as the ethnic Uzbek warlord Abdul Rashid Dostum were in control of the city. The Peshawar Accord unravelled when Rabbani refused to step down at the end of his four-month tenure and had his term extended for a further two years through a council he convened on December 29, 1992. This was roundly rejected by Hekmatyar and, within hours, the Afghan factions reverted to their favourite pastime of butchering each other with abandon.
Undaunted, Nawaz Sharif intervened yet again and, for the second time in less than nine months, was able to persuade the warring factions to talk to each other. Hekmatyar, Rabbani and the leaders of the other groups met in Islamabad on March 7, 1993. This resulted in a power-sharing accord under which Rabbani continued as president and Hekmatyar was appointed prime minister. The new arrangement was to last till July 1994 and, in this period, the regime was to draft a constitution, hold elections and create a national army.
So impressed were the warlords with the Pakistan prime minister’s sincerity that they flew to Mecca and vowed in front of the Holy Kaaba that they would abide by the terms of the Islamabad Accord. But despite this, turmoil returned with a vengeance and warlord zones were established across the length and breadth of the rugged and inhospitable Afghan terrain.
It was during Benazir Bhutto’s second term that the Taliban movement emerged from a madressah (seminar) in Maiwand, Kandahar, in August 1994. Their influence spread with the speed of lightning and by September 27, 1996, Kabul and two-thirds of Afghanistan came under their control. Immediately after the dismissal of the Bhutto government, I was appointed special envoy for Afghanistan with the mandate to bring the Taliban and the Northern Alliance to the negotiating table. This entailed shuttle missions between the Afghan groups but the pace gathered actual momentum after Nawaz Sharif’s return to power in February 1997.
Contrary to contemporary perceptions, Nawaz Sharif disliked the Taliban and was partial to the Northern Alliance. But despite this, in one of my meetings with Mullah Omar he said: “Your prime minister is a good man. Please tell him to be careful of the so-called religious parties in Pakistan and, in particular, Maulana Fazlur Rehman. He claims to know me but I have never met him.”
With this kind of acceptance by the Afghan groups, Nawaz Sharif was able to persuade Mullah Mohammad Rabbani, the president of the Taliban-controlled areas of Afghanistan and the Northern Alliance leader, Burhanuddin Rabbani, to initiate an intra-Afghan dialogue. The miracle happened when senior representatives of the Taliban and the Northern Alliance met in Islamabad from April 26 to May 3, 1998, to work out the modalities for an ulema conference which would be mandated to bring the Afghan conflict to an end. A breakthrough had almost been reached when the talks were derailed by the Hizb-e-Wahdat on prompting from Tehran.
This is the background. As the PML-N leader is poised to begin an unprecedented third prime ministerial term, he has to be clear in his mind that Pakistan’s only role is to persuade the Afghan groups to talk to each other. The Peshawar and Islamabad Accords, as well as the talks between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance in Islamabad, were spectacular achievements. But the current situation is far more complex.
For starters, President Karzai has been making preposterous statements and seems to be losing control of the situation. Second, towards the end of 2011, Ahmed Zia Masood, the brother of the legendary Ahmed Shah Masood, along with Ustad Mohaqiq of the Hizb-e-Wahdat, and Dostum established the heavily armed Northern Front of Afghanistan over which the Karzai regime does not exercise any control. Third, the Taliban have fractured and it is uncertain whether Mullah Omar still enjoys the same unquestioning fealty of his commanders.
These are the new ground realities and only a collegiate approach involving all the stakeholders can succeed in bringing the Afghan groups to the negotiating table. Nawaz Sharif’s wealth of experience can be of tremendous help, provided he thinks things through rationally. But that is a tall order.

The writer is the publisher of Criterion Quarterly. Email: iftimurshed@ gmail.com