The spin-off of the Iran nuclear deal

by Asif Ezdi

The interim nuclear deal agreed between Iran and the P5+1 in Geneva a week ago has the potential to become a watershed of historic proportions. It could end not only the decade-long nuclear confrontation between Iran and the west but also the three-decade old enmity between Iran and the US, which has been the major constant in the Middle East for a generation.

Not only Israel, but Saudi Arabia and the US’ other Arab allies in the region have also been deeply unsettled. Their worry is not only that Iran could be left with the ability to develop nuclear weapons capability at a later time but also that Washington might be willing now to accommodate Iran’s regional interests in the Middle East at the cost of old allies.

For its part, the Iranian leadership seems to have concluded that the nuclear programme it has been pursuing so far has become a hindrance rather than a help in the achievement of its political and strategic goals in the region. Those goals remain largely unchanged but to achieve them without imposing unbearable hardship on the population, Tehran has now adopted what Khamenei has described as a policy of “heroic flexibility”.

Besides reshaping the Middle East, an accord on Iran’s nuclear programme will have a big impact on South Asia, Afghanistan and Central Asia. Many of the countries of these regions and those with stakes there are already deliberating how they need to reposition themselves in anticipation of the coming changes. We need to do the same in Pakistan.

In particular, we need to keep an eye on India, which has a long-standing policy of strategic encirclement of Pakistan by building close political and economic ties with our two western neighbours, Afghanistan and Iran. India has long enjoyed the use of Afghan soil to export terrorism and subversion to Pakistan and is now seeking to entrench itself deeper in that country with Washington’s support and encouragement.

With Iran, India developed a close partnership during the period of Taliban rule in Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001, especially after the attack on the Iranian consulate in Mazar-e-Sharif in which several members of its staff were killed. Now that the Afghan government and the US are trying to engage the Taliban in reconciliation and peace talks, Delhi hopes once again to reactivate its partnership with Tehran to deny the Taliban a share of power in Kabul.

India now sees a major opportunity to achieve its strategic goals in the region. Last Tuesday, the country’s national security adviser chaired a strategy session of senior officials on intensifying engagement with Iran. The key project that Delhi hopes will open a gateway for the economic penetration of Afghanistan and Central Asia is the development of the Iranian port of Chabahar and road and rail connections linking the port with the Delaram-Zaranj Highway that India built in Afghanistan in 2008. Indian officials and experts are being sent to Iran shortly to speed up work on the port.

India has been working on this project for many years. Its aim is to provide an alternative to the Karachi port, through which most of Afghanistan’s external trade is presently routed and to outflank the Gwadar port that Pakistan is developing with Chinese assistance. Pakistan has little to worry about from the Chabahar project because Karachi will continue to provide the shortest, fastest and most economic transit route to Afghanistan even after Chabahar is fully developed.

What is worrisome, however, is the thinking of our own government on opening our transit routes to India. That is exactly what the PML-N election manifesto promises. Besides, the Nawaz government is also talking to Delhi on the import of Qatari gas from India, as well as 500MW of electricity.

The policy confusion of the Nawaz government is even more striking on the question of the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline. Before this year’s parliamentary elections, the PML-N denounced the inauguration of the project by the two countries in March this year on the grounds that it would create an intractable problem in Pakistan’s relations with Washington. Since coming into power, the Nawaz government has been trying to convince Washington that the project does not really breach the US sanctions law. The US naturally thinks that they are better qualified to interpret their own law.

The application of this law remains unaffected by the interim nuclear deal. But American opposition to the project is not just because of their law. They were against the project even before it was passed and their reasons are political and strategic, rather than purely legal. Even if the sanctions are lifted following a comprehensive agreement on Iran’s nuclear programme, there is no guarantee that Washington will automatically give up its opposition to the project.

The US has instead been pushing the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (Tapi) gas pipeline project, which Washington hopes will jump-start the ‘New Silk Road’ plan for the region. That strategy, it bears recalling, is designed to help India expand its influence in Afghanistan and Central Asia by promoting regional economic cooperation under Indian leadership, opening up transit routes through Pakistan for India and promoting trade in goods and energy between India and Central Asia.

Another complicating factor is the question of India’s participation in the Iran-Pakistan pipeline project. Originally, the gas pipeline was to terminate in Pakistan. India stayed away and instead explored the possibility of a direct under-water deep-sea pipeline from Iran to India bypassing Pakistan. The Indian fear was that a pipeline running through Pakistan would give leverage to its arch-enemy, besides giving a boost to the Pakistani economy, and that Pakistan would be in a position to cut off supply in a crisis.

Delhi later agreed to join the project after the proposed deep-sea pipeline was found not to be feasible. But in 2009, a year after it signed a nuclear deal with the US, India withdrew from the Iran-Pakistan pipeline project, citing pricing issues and “security” concerns stemming from the fact that the pipeline would pass through Pakistan. After last week’s interim nuclear deal over Iran’s nuclear programme, Delhi is again showing interest – unofficially – in participating in the project. A day earlier, Ali Majedi, Iran’s deputy minister for international and commercial affairs, said that Iran expected India to overcome its doubts and join the project.

Majedi added that “even China can join this pipeline”. Were that to happen, it would be a game-changer and give the project a new strategic dimension, a nightmare for India. But the Chinese are not likely to consider participation before the final nuclear agreement on Iran’s nuclear programme is concluded and peaceful conditions are established in Balochistan, which is why India may intensify its effort to destabilise the province.

India’s past role in the pipeline project has been that of a spoiler. Its intentions this time are not any different. Despite this problem and the other difficulties such as the issues of financing and pricing, there is no excuse for the confusion on our side which is manifested in the countless contradictory statements issued by our ministers.

Last Thursday, Petroleum Minister Khaqan Abbasi added to that confusion when he said that following the interim agreement over Iran’s nuclear programme, the situation was now appropriate for implementing the project and declared that Pakistan would find a way to complete it within a year. This is the most optimistic – and unrealistic – statement so far and the shortest timetable for the completion of the project.

It is also perplexing considering that US sanctions remain in full force, funding for the project has still not been found and the price needs to be re-negotiated with Iran. The minister’s pronouncements have done little for the credibility of the government. It would have been far better – and more reassuring – had he instead given a statement on the difficulties holding up progress on realising the project and the steps that the government intends to take to overcome them.

The writer is a former member of the Pakistan Foreign Service. Email: asifezdi@yahoo.com

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