The classical jurists, among Muslims, place laws on
the duality of good and evil. One should do what is good
and abstain from what is evil. Good and evil are
sometimes absolute and self-evident, yet at other times
merely relative and partial. This leads us to the five-fold
division of all judicial rules, both orders and injunctions.
Thus, all that is absolutely good would be an absolute
duty, and one must do that. Everything which has a
preponderant good would be recommended and
considered meritorious. Things where both these
aspects, of good and evil, are equal, or which have
neither of them, would be left to the discretion of the
individual to do or abstain from, at will, and even to
change the practice from time to time. This category
would be a matter of indifference to law. Things
absolutely evil would be objects of complete
prohibition, and, finally, things which have a
preponderance of evil would be reprehensible and
discouraged. This basic division of acts or rules into five
categories may have other subdivisions with minute
nuances like the directions on a compass in addition to
the four cardinal points of north, south, east and west.
308. It remains to define and distinguish between things
good and the evil. The Qur'an, which is the Word of God
and a revered Book by Muslims, speaks of these on
many occasions, and says that one must do the ma'ruf
and abstain from the munkar. Now, ma'ruf means a good
which is recognized as such by everybody and which is
considered by reason to be good, and therefore is
commanded. Munkr means a thing which is denounced
by everyone as having no good whatsoever and is an evil
which is recognized as such by everybody, and that which is considered by reason to be evil would be forbidden. A
very great part of Islamic morality belongs to this
domain, and the cases are very rare where the Qur'an
forbids a thing in which there is a divergence of human
opinion, such as the prohibition of alcoholic drinks, or
games of chance. But to tell the truth, the raison-d'etre
of law even in such cases is not concealed from
thoughtful, mature minds. In practice, this is a question
of confidence in the wisdom and intelligence of the
Legislator, whose directions in all the other cases have
occasioned nothing but universal approbation.