The Kargil Conflict1999

[Muskan Ghuman]

Book Review

The Kargil Conflict1999: Separating Fact from Fiction

Dr Shireen M Mazari’s book - The Kargil Conflict1999: Separating Fact from Fiction – is comprehensive Pakistani analysis of the Kargil conflict, based on military and other sources, it is in fact the first Pakistani effort to provide a rationale regarding the Kargil operations.

Based on interviews with key military personnel in Pakistan involved in that conflict, as well as the available writings on the subject on a host of related factors, the author’s analysis addresses the various aspects of what remains a highly controversial, ongoing debate. Indeed the relevance of the book lies in the very fact that it tackles frontally, a range of ticklish issues that have so far been treated as disparate elements by various writers, but are integral to the understanding of the Kargil conflict. Such as: the designs behind the Indian forward policy that has been underway since its 1984 military occupation of Siachin and was manifested during the Kargil operations; the assumptions on the part of Pakistan and its response; the contradictions within the Indian propaganda line and the Western misperceptions based on such contradictions; as well as the outcome at the tactical and strategic levels for both countries in what became “the first publicised military exchange between Pakistan and India after the nuclearisation of South Asia” and thus also the focus of far greater international comment and analysis than in earlier Indo-Pak conflicts in the same region.

The author takes up the catalogue of myths woven into controversial speculations and, with substantiated facts, examines their background to show how,
“Pakistan got sucked into an ever-widening conflict as a result of pre-planned Indian actions … which had incrementally escalated as a result of India raising the military, political and diplomatic ante.”

The resultant misperceptions arose as much from mis-applied western theories, “with no understanding of the South Asian psyche or the South Asian situation” as by “deliberate misstatements” from reputed American theorists to insinuate that Pakistan was prepared to use nuclear-tipped missiles at the time of Kargil, or as claimed by Pakistani politicians like Ms Bhutto that there was a “Kargil Plan” presented to her by those at the helm of military affairs. Personages in authority refuted these assertions, as the author has shown through interviews and by on-the-record statements. Pakistan’s former Chief of Army Staff, General Jehangir Karamat has termed the alleged “Kargil plan” as “incorrect”. Statements made by the Indian Army Chief at the time of Kargil, General V.P. Malik, who at a Conference in the USA, attended also by the author, publicly rebutted the allegation that Pakistan had planned to use nuclear-tipped missiles. India’s former Army Chief categorically termed as untrue any such allegation, stating, “if there had been any such development, the US would have informed India and that India’s own intelligence would have also picked it up.” Instead, the more dangerous development that subsequently came to light through exposures in the Indian media in June 2000 was that it was India that had actually deployed at least five, nuclear-tipped missiles, including the Agni, for retaliatory strikes during the Kargil conflict.

Through a deft handling of inter-related aspects spread over space and time, the author presents an authoritative case for Pakistan’s Kargil response that claims attention. The book examines the key developments along the Line of Control (LOC) in the post-Simla period, encompassing issues such as the shaping up of India’s forward policy strategic doctrines following its militarisation of the Siachen Glacier, the nuclearisation of South Asia that in turn has shaped Western perceptions, the dynamics of the struggle of the Kashmiri Mujahideen since 1989, the operations of the Kargil Conflict itself, with its political, military and external dimensions, leading to the circumstances surrounding the Pakistani withdrawal.

Importantly, against a detailed background of an illustrated military geography of the Kargil conflict area, the author has addressed controversies related to differing cartographic versions, the deliberated confusion by the Indian side over terminologies such as posts and picquets, and has thrown up the motivated Indian misinterpretations of radio intercepts leading them to mis-portray developments on ground.

The author traces the developments of Siachen-related seven rounds of official talks – the last being held in the post-nuclear phase on November 6, 1998, by which time the BJP, with its militarist, Hindutva creed was in power, and totally reversed the fundamental principle on which a decade-long talks were held, namely, the principle of disengagement based on mutual withdrawal.

Lessons from the illegal Siachen occupation and to the Kargil conflict are aplenty. Such as the fact that bilateral talks are not a barrier to India’s ambitions, which used dialogue to buy time to legitimise its military advantage in political terms, in the face of Pakistan’s lack of an aggressive response, both militarily and politically.

The author assesses how the Indian Prime Minister’s bus journey to Lahore in February 1999 was part and parcel of the “camouflage to military plans in the making.” A detailed examination of events show how the Pakistani side’s purely defensive formations held at bay the massive onslaught of the Indian military might that was operationally equipped for high-altitude conditions. As the author has noted, India formulated its nuclear doctrine after the Kargil operations. The significance of that doctrine lies in its “expansive strategic operational parameters for India in the form of “Southern Asia”, as well as a substantive nuclear force reflecting a triad of weapon systems. So, in many ways, Kargil was the strategic turning point for nuclear India, after which it came overtly in asserting its aggressive and expansive military agenda. The doctrine was formally confirmed as the official doctrine in January 2003.”

On the other hand, Pakistan’s tactical successes were not translated into strategic gains due to the lack of clarity over policy, despite the fact that Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was given a number of briefings on India’s offensive operations and what could be the Pakistani response. So while the Kargil episode “showed a tactical ingenuity and boldness in its execution – especially given the difficult terrain and inhospitable climatic environments … the whole event revealed critical shortcomings and lacunas in the Pakistani political decision-making system … the whole episode was essentially a series of incremental steps on both sides, that, in a highly combustible politico-diplomatic environment produced a sharp, localised war.”

The author states that among the lessons learnt is the need to overcome systemic deficiencies in civilian institutions/bureaucracies for institutionalised national responses in critical times. And from the military point of view, for future preparedness, the author suggests that the planning and operational conduct of the Kargil conflict should be critically discussed in military training institutions at all levels.

The book, divided into seven short, crisp and fact-laden chapters, is accompanied by useful illustrative appendages, such as: an annotated chronology of key developments in Pakistan-India relations from March 1998-June 2003, that serves as a useful index of time-related events; six appendices of documentary evidence; photographs of the key political and military players of the period that tell their own stories; as well as compiled sketches of the various stages of the Kargil military operations.

Reference:
Institute of Strategic Studies of Pakistan