War in the shadows

ALL people of goodwill desire peace between Pakistan and India. Given their historical animosities, a close relationship is probably unachievable in the foreseeable future. But a `cold` peace, which does not eliminate their fundamental differences but enables coexistence and cooperation, is possible.

Unfortunately, even such a `cold` peace is unlikely to be realised so long as India and Pakistan continue to wage their wars in the shadows.

A lot has been written and said about Pakistan`s support to insurgencies in Afghanistan and Kashmir.

Not much has appeared about India`s longer and wider role in clandestine warfare against its neighbours, Sri Lanka, Nepal and particularly Pakistan. A quick viewing of a Facebook video of a recent lecture delivered by Ajit Doval, India`s ex-spymaster and now the national security adviser, should set all doubts about India`s clandestine wars at rest. Mr Doval calls Pakistan the `enemy`; extols Indian intelligence`s ability to compromise and in filtrate the Kashmir insurgency; crows about the beheading of Pakistani soldiers by the TTP and advocates a policy of `defensive offense` against Pakistan.

Actually, India`s shadow wars against Pakistan commenced in 1971 when it actively trained and financed the Mukti Bahini to fight the Pakistan Army in East Pakistan, laying the ground for India`s eventual military intervention to break up Pakistan. Even after the Simla Agreement, bomb blasts continued in Karachi and other Pakistani cities to keep Pakistan destabilised and defensive. New Delhi has missed no opportunity to support Baloch, Pakhtun and Sindhi `nationalists` and other dissidents in Pakistan.

Indira Gandhi`s attack on Amritsar`s Golden Temple created an opportunity for Pakistan to pay India back in its own coin. But its support for the Khalistan insurgency was also a `defensive offensive` move to neutralise the threat of an Indian attack at the behest of its Soviet ally which Pakistan, in collaboration with the US, had pinned down in Afghanistan. India`s `warrior` prime minister was assassinated by her Sikh guards.

Eventually, after president Zia`s demise, the Khalistan insurgency was brutally put down by India. There is considerable speculation to this day whether the incoming PPP government released a list of Sikh insurgents to the Indians.

Even as the Khalistan insurgency died, Pakistan was offered its own `opportunity of the century`as the East Pakistan revolt was called by the Indians -to secure self-determination for the Kashmiris. In December 1989, the Kashmiris revolted at the rigged elections there. On 20 December, hundreds of peaceful Kashmiri demonstrators were mowed down by Indian security forces, unleashing an armed struggle for freedom. Pakistan`s intelligence agencies, fresh from their success in backing the mujahideen in Afghanistan, opted to support the religious parties, instead of the indigenous Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, to lead the Kashmiri struggle.

Under the pressure of the insurgency, India agreed in 1994 to discuss a Kashmir settlement with Pakistan. India`s Foreign Secretary offered a settlement based on `autonomy plus, independence minus` for occupied Kashmir. Unfortunately, Pakistan was not quick enough to press its advantage and secure a good deal for the Kashmiris. India used the time to infiltrate and compromise the insurgency (as Mr Doval boasted). Some jihadi groups, like Al Faran, resorted to kidnapping and killing foreigners. This was the initial step in India`s campaign to transform the Kashmiri struggle from a legitimate liberation struggle into a terrorist movement.

When the US, after 9/11, launched its war on terrorism, India`s principal aim became to equate the Kashmiri struggle with global terrorism and Al Qaeda. New Delhi got its chance when `terrorists` attacked the Indian parliament in December 2001.

Despite the fact that Pakistan`s culpability was unproven, a commitment was extracted from president Musharraf`s government that Pakistan would not allow its territory to be used for `terrorism` against others. Acceptance of this `obligation` was interpreted as an admission of Pakistan`s culpability.

The Kashmiri struggle was over for all intents and purposes.

When Pakistan, under US pressure, attempted to curtail support to the Kashmiri `jihadi` groups, some of them who had developed connections with Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban turned on their Pakistani patrons. Hence the two attempts on the life of former president Musharraf. However, some groups, like the Lashkar-e-Taiba, although outlawed and aggrieved with the government, refrained from attacking the Army or Pakistani targets and maintained their focus on India. They demonstrated their extensive capabilities in the Mumbai terrorist attack.

India, for its part, had already unleashed its socalled `defensive offense` policy against Pakis-tan. Under the auspices of the Afghan intelligence directorate, headed by a member of the Northern Alliance, with which India had developed close relations during the civil war against Mullah Omar`s Taliban, India set up bases (in the guise of consulates) close to the Afghan-Pakistan border to sponsor and support the Balochistan Liberation Army.

When the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) emerged from the embers of the Red Mosque operation, Afghan and Indian intelligence were quick to seize the opportunity to infiltrate and utilise some of its elements, particularly Baitullah Mehsud`s kin, against Pakistan and its armed forces. This has been openly admitted by Afghan intelligence. As Doval noted, there have been 40,000 Pakistani casualties attributed to the TTP`s acts of terrorism.

The situation in Balochistan and Fata became murkier due to rumours about the sponsorship of the anti-Iran Jundullah by certain Western agencies and the spate of recent attacks against China by the East Turkmenistan Independence Movement (ETIM), which was co-located with the TTP and other terrorist groups in North Waziristan and adjacent areas of Afghanistan.

Thus, for Pakistan, the Zarb-e-Azb operation against the TTP and its associates became an imperative, first and foremost, to protect the homeland, but also to prevent damage to its strategic relationship with China. It may be an added bonus that this campaign, which has also damaged all other militant groups in North Waziristan, has had a beneficial effect on Pakistan`s relations with the US and Afghanistan.

However, Pakistan will have to defeat India`s secret war against Pakistan if it is to defeat the TTP.

It is difficult to expect a change in Indian policy while people like Mr Doval are in charge.

The key to defeating India`s designs is to secure the full confidence and cooperation of the Afghan government and utilise the influence of China, America and Russia to isolate and attack the T TP and its associated groups, especially Al Qaeda and ETIM, and deny India the bases and facilities to operate against Pakistan from Afghan territory.

It is only when the wars in the shadows are terminated that conditions may emerge for some form of normalisation between Pakistan and India. • The writer is a former Pakistan ambassador to the UN.

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__________________
"But screw your courage to the sticking place,
And we'll not fail." _Shakespeare, 'Macbeth')

AS Pakistan grieves the loss of its children in Peshawar, a national consensus has emerged to fight and destroy the TTP terrorists responsible for this latest atrocity. The Pakistan Army will no doubt intensify its ongoing campaign against these terrorists and should be extended all possible support. Hopefully, Pakistan’s political leaders will suspend their power games to address this clear and present danger to the country’s security and progress.

This massacre is another reminder that over the past 30 years, Pakistan has been the principal victim of terrorism. It experienced the Indian-sponsored bomb blasts in the 1970s; the Soviet-Najibullah attacks during the 1980s; Shia-Sunni violence during the 1990s; and Al Qaeda and TTP terrorism over the last decade.

Until the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan, terrorism was an ‘external’ threat for Pakistan; it was ‘internalised’ due to two strategic mistakes: Pakistan’s sponsorship of Islamic extremists against the Soviets, in collaboration with the US and its allies, and the subsequent decision to support religious militants, rather than the indigenous Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front, during the 1990s Kashmiri uprising against Indian occupation.

The ghosts of these strategic mistakes continue to haunt Pakistan in its current battle against the TTP. Al Qaeda emerged from the detritus of the anti-Soviet Arab and other foreign fighters. It has masterminded many of the worst terrorist attacks against Pakistan. It attracted rebellious militants from Uzbekistan, Chechnya and Xinqiang, and spawned several of the current components of the TTP.

Today, there is an opportunity to build a genuine global consensus to eliminate terrorism.
To eliminate the TTP and its ilk, Pakistan needs to implement a well-considered plan to capture or kill these terrorists. It must also take bold measures to counter the causes for the emergence and existence of violent extremism in Pakistan: ignorance, greed, fear and poverty.

The hate and bigotry being spread from Pakistan’s pulpits and madressahs; the corruption that allows terrorists to roam the streets and infiltrate institutions; the crimes that generate financing for terrorist organisations; the fear which provides them impunity from prosecution for their crimes, and the absence of employment which results in recruits for their ranks, must all be addressed through comprehensive and courageous policies.

Hopefully, the national unity generated by the Peshawar atrocity will enable the government and the security forces to formulate and execute such policies. As a first step, all political parties should be required to openly condemn the TTP and its associates and break any links they may have with them.

However, terrorism is not merely an internal social and political issue within Pakistan. It has a vital external dimension which requires to be honestly addressed by Pakistan and the ‘international community’.

To do so, it should be recalled that most of today’s terrorist organisations mutated from insurgent groups initially sponsored by one or more states against adversaries. This holds true for the Tamil Tigers, Al Qaeda, the TTP, the Haqqanis, the IMU, the Etim and the Islamic State. Both Western and domestic commentators often focus on Pakistan’s support to militant groups in Afghanistan and Kashmir. But this is a ‘game’ which several states have played or are still playing against each other.

Global efforts to eliminate terrorism have foundered so far as rival powers have sought to outlaw groups threatening them while excluding others they themselves sponsor or support. The UN has not even agreed on a definition of ‘terrorism’.

Today, there is an opportunity to build a genuine global consensus to eliminate terrorism from Pakistan, this region and internationally. Each of the major powers have a stake in combating terrorist groups that pose a threat to their national security. The Etim targets China; the IMU aims to destabilise Central Asia; the Chechens threaten Russia. The US is targeted by Al Qaeda, the IS and their associates. Iran faces IS and Jundullah. Saudi Arabia is battling Al Qaeda and potentially threatened by the IS. Pakistan confronts the TTP and the Balochistan Liberation Army, both supported by Afghan and Indian intelligence.

In building such a global consensus, there are new possibilities for agreements between Pakistan and Afghanistan and perhaps even with India.

President Ghani appears genuine in his desire to rebuild a close relationship with Pakistan. If so, Pakistan should do all possible to help in stabilising Afghanistan and supporting the Afghan ‘unity’ government. Pakistan has offered to help reconciliation in Afghanistan if Kabul desires this. In exchange, President Ghani (and the US) has offered to target the TTP’s safe havens in Afghanistan.

The extent of Pakistan’s influence over the Afghan Taliban, led by Mullah Omar, is uncertain, especially in the wake of Zarb-i-Azb, which has reportedly disrupted not only the TTP but also the Haqqanis. Any inter-mediation involving the Afghan Taliban should be made conditional on their openly breaking their links with the TTP, Al Qaeda and associated terrorist groups such as the Etim.

In any event, the ‘strategic value’ — if any — of the Afghan Taliban for Pakistan pales in significance when weighed against the importance of Islamabad’s strategic relationships with China, the US and Afghanistan.

Kabul’s cooperation will help to also end Indian support to the TTP and BLA. However, it would be wise for both countries to evolve an understanding for mutual restraint in Kashmir. If the Modi government holds back from the planned steps to change occupied Kashmir’s current status and allows genuine democratic rights to the Kashmiris, Pakistan should do all possible to restrain the ‘Kashmir Jihad Council’ from any provocative actions.

Such regional arrangements with Afghanistan and India could be broadened to include other ‘stakeholders’: Iran, Saudi Arabia, China, Russia and the US. Cooperation can be extended to jointly combating Etim, IMU and the IS.

The challenge cannot be underestimated. It is difficult for states to surrender tactical assets and advantages. It is even more difficult to eliminate groups motivated by local and national grievances and religious convictions, however misplaced. Today, all the major militant and terrorist groups feed off the same narrative: injustice and suppression of Muslims across several geographies. Part of a global consensus must offer an effective counter to this narrative and erode its appeal to disaffected Muslim youth across the world.

OIL remains the world’s most critical commodity. It has fuelled the industrial age. For over a century, oil politics has been almost synonymous with geopolitics; the cause of numerous wars and revolutions.

The recent sharp drop in oil prices is a boon to all who import and consume oil. Besides the individual consumer, the price decline has ameliorated the foreign exchange and budgetary fortunes of major oil importers like China, India and Pakistan and could assist in global economic recovery. It has reduced the earnings of major oil exporters, both Opec and non-Opec members.

To a considerable extent, the decline in oil prices has been driven by the laws of supply and demand. Oil (and gas) production has been expanding significantly over the last decade. A major contributor to this has been US shale oil and deep sea production which became viable due to high prices (over $100 per barrel) and technological developments.

The price downturn began with the no-growth in Europe and growth slowdown in China (from 9.5pc to 7pc from 2010 to 2014), India (from 7pc to 4pc over the same period) and Brazil (from 6pc to 2pc). The insipid US economic recovery, fuelled largely by its own oil and cheap gas production, was insufficient to contribute to higher demand. The growing availability of alternate sources of energy — cheaper gas in the US, subsidised wind and solar power (as part of the shift to ‘green’ economies) — further depressed oil demand.

Under the circumstances, it would have been expected that the traditional ‘swing’ producer, Saudi Arabia, would have brought the market into balance by cutting its own sizable production and leading other Opec and non-Opec members to do the same. In fact, Riyadh not only maintained but added 100,000 barrels to its production in the midst of the initial major dip in prices two months ago. This has driven prices further down to below $70 per barrel for the benchmark Brent Crude. At the recent Opec meeting in Vienna, the Saudi oil minister was sanguine, observing that this was not the first time that oil markets had been out of balance.

Most policymakers are wondering for how long this period of cheaper oil will last.
There is considerable speculation about the rationale for the Saudi policy. The most reasonable explanation is that Saudi Arabia aims to preserve its market share by obliging less competitive producers — shale and deep sea oil and alternate energy — off the market. The average breakeven price for shale extraction in the US is $45 per barrel, whereas Saudi costs are less than $5. With prices of around $60 per barrel, production of shale oil and deep sea oil will become considerably less profitable or non-profitable.

Some US shale producers have already shelved expansion plans; several are likely to face shutdown if lower price trends persist. Deep sea production and exploration will also come under pressure as would alternate energy suppliers, unless they obtain state subsidies. Conversely, Saudi Arabia, with $1 trillion in reserves, can sustain lower prices for a considerable period.

Western commentators have conjectured that the Saudi policy pushing lower oil prices is also designed to inflict additional economic pain on its principal regional rival, Iran, as well as Russia, Iran’s major ally in the current sectarian conflicts engulfing Iraq, Syria and the Levant.

A few believe Riyadh is pursuing this course independently, in defiance of the US, to demonstrate its unhappiness with the US overtures to Iran, and to demonstrate its influence in the world economy. Others say that the policy of inflicting further economic pressure on Iran and Russia enjoys Washington’s blessings.

Indeed, the Obama administration’s priority at this time is to secure a favourable deal with Iran on its nuclear programme and cooperation in stabilising Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. Containing Putin and a resurgent Russia in Ukraine and elsewhere is another objective. Whether low oil prices will help to achieve the desired outcomes is an open question.

In any case, cheaper ‘gas’ prices at US pumps and reduced home heating bills will be popular with American consumers; they could also enhance the economic recovery under way in the US. The misfortune of US shale oil producers will not cause Obama any heartache since most are based in the so-called ‘red’ states which are not likely to vote for the Democratic party in the foreseeable future. Reduced shale oil production may also ease pressure on Obama to approve the controversial north-south Keystone pipeline which faces opposition from environmentalists in his party.

The main questions in the minds of businesses and policymakers are: how far down will oil prices go and how long will this period of cheaper oil last?

It is safe to say that lower oil prices are unlikely to prevail over the long term. With growing populations, industrialisation and urbanisation in the developing countries, demand for oil will continue its secular rise until and unless alternate energy sources become much cheaper.

The global oil economy, despite the ‘green’ goals, will be around for several decades. The current lower prices will drive significant production off market and, more importantly, slow down exploration and investment aimed at additional and alternate energy production. Thus, over the medium term, demand will once again come into balance with supply and may even exceed it. Higher oil prices should be expected to return.

For the short term, the price trend cannot be predicted precisely; but some of the indicators to watch for are: a) how rapidly will Riyadh need to replenish its reserves if oil prices remain around $60 to $70 per barrel; b) the extent of production cutbacks brought about by the lower oil price; c) the growth outlook in major economies, especially the US, China, Japan, India and Europe; d) potential disruption of supply from ‘fragile’ producers, eg Libya and Nigeria, and from the Gulf due to spreading turmoil; e) the outcome of the talks between Iran and the West; and f) the denouement of the Ukraine crisis and Russia’s response to economic pressure.

To mix metaphors, consumers should make hay while the sun shines and use this window of cheaper oil to prepare for a future of expensive energy.

The title of Oscar Wilde’s novel about late 19th-century British society also aptly sums up the most essential requirement for the effective governance of nations and states. History testifies that peoples, nations and empires rose to greatness when they were well governed and decayed and declined when they were not.

By this yardstick, Pakistan is in dire straits. The evidence of its serial mis-governance almost since its birth are palpable.

Today, Pakistan’s democracy is dysfunctional, its economy stagnant, its society divided between the few rich and the mass poor. Justice, jobs and security are unavailable for a growing population of uneducated and alienated youth.

Meanwhile, Pakistan’s leaders, caught in petty power plays, have no vision or plan for national development. Pakistan — the world’s sixth most populous country — was not invited to any of the three summits held in Asia earlier this month, illustrating its decline and marginalisation.

The demands for reform made in the recent protest movement led by Imran Khan and Tahirul Qadri have been lost in the political melee.

The commission of inquiry into electoral fraud will only scratch the surface. It is unfortunate that the opportunity was not seized to promote wider and more essential governance reform to ensure that Pakistan can survive and prosper as a modern state.

There are at least 10 areas that need to be addressed urgently.

One, politics. The feudal and unequal structure of Pakistan’s society is a major obstacle to representative democracy and economic development.

Repeatedly, elections have thrown up political leaders who are mostly ignorant, arrogant and corrupt.

Rules and mechanisms can be created to set high standards for political office and ensure that decent and qualified people of modest means can be elected to political office.

Pakistan’s leaders have no vision or plan for national development.
Two, law and order. Pakistan has become a violent place, afflicted by terrorism, criminal gangs and political thuggery. The state must re-establish its monopoly of coercive power.

The armed forces have a self-evident but not solitary role. Given honest purpose and adequate resources, the country’s security apparatus can be cleansed and modernised to reassert state authority.

Three, the judicial system. The concept of an independent judiciary acting as a check on executive power has either failed at critical moments in Pakistan’s history or been perverted to individual or political purpose.

Without hope of securing fair or timely justice, ordinary people have had increasing recourse to illegal and extra-legal, often violent, means for the settlement of disputes. A simpler system for the dispensation of justice and a modality for oversight of the judiciary would help in restoring the rule of law.

Four, local government. The daily lives of most people are deeply affected by the quality and responsiveness of local governments.

The present system is custom-made for corruption. Emulating successful examples, such as the Swiss communes and the panchayats of yore, and adhering to the rule of ‘subsidiarity’ — allowing as many decisions as possible to be taken at the lowest possible level — can simplify the administration of the entire country.

Five, the bureaucracy. Pakistan inherited a fairly good bureaucratic system from the British but has proceeded to politicise, corrupt and destroy it. It should be discarded and a new one created.

A modern state needs a functionally qualified, impartial and decisive bureaucracy, free of avarice and political fear or favour, to ensure its efficient administration and development. There is no dearth of Pakistanis within and outside the country who can form the core of such a new bureaucracy.

Six, government finances. The government is broke because only a small fraction of income earners — mostly the salaried class — pay their taxes. Successive governments have shied away from broadening the tax base and utilising coercive measures of tax collection because the delinquents either belong to the political class or have political connections.

A fair and effective system must be quickly implemented. Likewise, huge savings can be made by restructuring or privatising the 20-plus loss-making state corporations that are bleeding amounts equal to the country’s entire budget deficit each year.

Seven, human development. Pakistan’s growing population of the young, uneducated and unskilled is an economic and social liability, feeding radicalism and crime. A skilled population would be its greatest asset, generating income and consumption and accelerating economic growth. Education and skill creation should be Pakistan’s highest priority and deserve vastly expanded budget support.

Eight, infrastructure. Most of Pakistan’s physical infrastructure — transport, energy, irrigation — is over 50 years old. Economic growth and investment will continue to be constrained without modern infrastructure.

The greatest impediment to infrastructure development, apart from the paucity of resources and long-range planning, is the system of kickbacks and corruption surrounding public projects. An investment authority, free of political affiliation, should be constituted to oversee the effective and planned execution of infrastructure projects.

Nine, agriculture. Pakistan’s vast potential in food and agricultural production has been neglected. With its large population, agricultural production in Pakistan can be enlarged significantly by small farmers, not large conglomerates. This would also ease the unemployment and urbanisation challenges. What is required? Land reform, to entitle small farmers, and technological and financial support to enable them to succeed.

Ten, industrialisation. Local manufacturing industries are essential to create jobs, substitute imports, enlarge exports and propel growth and general prosperity. For once, we should follow Mr Modi by proclaiming a ‘make in Pakistan’ slogan. To succeed, it will be necessary to review Pakistan’s trade and investment regime which does not offer sufficient incentives and protections to domestic producers.

The ten tasks outlined here may appear too daunting at first sight. Yet, with serious and bold leadership, a planned and sequenced endeavour can be launched to implement the governance reforms that are vitally needed to save Pakistan from further decline and eventual political and social collapse.

To start, agreement should be reached to establish a high-level commission to identify the reform agenda. It could set up committees composed of reputable experts in each area to propose the reforms and the modalities for their implementation.

Unfortunately, it is not evident who can convince Pakistan’s political establishment of the importance of being earnest.

PAKISTAN’S ‘war on terrorism’ is over four months old. What has been achieved? What remains to be done?

The Pakistan Army’s Operation Zarb-i-Azb in North Waziristan has cleared most of the agency of the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan and other terrorist and militant organisations. While the TTP was the main target, other groups co-located there — Al Qaeda, the Haqqanis, Uzbeks and Uighurs — have also come under attack and been obliged to vacate North Waziristan. The ‘infrastructure of terrorism’ which existed there — training camps, arms caches, communications facilities — has been destroyed.

Over 3,000 less publicised operations have been conducted in Pakistan’s major and minor cities to round up TTP and other terrorists. More than 4,000 terrorists have been killed and hundreds captured in these operations. As a result of the military pressure, the TTP has split into several factions. Some of them have disavowed violence against Pakistan.

The TTP and its affiliates are ‘on the run’, as evident from the sharp decline in the frequency of terrorist attacks. The Wagah bombing against the soft target of innocent civilians had all the hallmarks of an act of desperation. Most importantly, Pakistani public opinion is firmly behind the anti-terrorist campaign. The Wagah slaughter has strengthened this domestic consensus.

Many of Pakistan’s security challenges are linked to the situation beyond its borders.
Several imposing internal challenges remain. Some heavily forested and inaccessible areas of North Waziristan remain to be fully cleared of terrorist bands hiding out there. This will involve tough military operations. Some of the terrorists still have to be smoked out from their urban hideouts. Sectarian violence by extremist groups allied to the TTP has been contained but not eliminated.

The anti-terror gains will be sustainable only if these are followed by a political, social and economic programme that halts the financing of terrorism, counters the TTP’s narrative, addresses legitimate grievances, creates jobs and infrastructure and promotes the eventual reintegration of past or potential terrorist recruits. This must be a high priority for Pakistan’s civilian and military leaders.

However, the major remaining challenges facing Pakistan’s war on terrorism have an external dimension.

The TTP and most of its leaders and affiliates have escaped to ‘safe havens’ in Afghanistan. It is uncertain whether the rump US-Nato forces or the Afghan National Army have the capacity or the inclination to restrain the cross-border raids by the TTP and its affiliates against Pakistan. Unless they do so, Pakistan may need to exercise its right of ‘hot pursuit’ to root out these militants from their Afghan safe havens. This is a crucial issue where Islamabad expects the cooperation of the new Kabul government, the US and others interested in stability in Afghanistan, Pakistan and the region. In exchange Pakistan can offer full support to the Afghan ‘unity government’ and, if it desires, assistance in promoting reconciliation within Afghanistan.

In this context, Pakistan, for its part, should accord high priority to breaking the links between Mullah Omar and the Haqqanis with the TTP, Al Qaeda and their affiliates, such as the East Turkmenistan Independence Movement.

Pakistan’s commitment to defeat Etim is vital, given its strategic relationship with China. It is sad that during President Ashraf Ghani’s recent visit to China, the Afghan Directorate of National Intelligence — which was caught red-handed last year collaborating with the TTP, to which Etim has strong links — has attempted to shift the blame for Etim’s activities on to Pakistan. This will fail to sow mistrust between Pakistan and China. But such continued mischief by the Afghan intelligence agency cannot but perpetuate mistrust between Islamabad and Kabul.

Likewise, the politics of counterterrorism with India is complex. Obviously, Pakistan should do everything possible to rein in pro-Kashmiri jihadis such as the outlawed Lashkar-e-Taiba from undertaking violent adventures against India. At the same time, Pakistan must require the Indians to halt their clandestine support for elements of the TTP and the Balochistan Liberation Army from Afghan territory. Instead of circulating baseless allegations against Pakistan for using the LeT as a proxy, as a recent Pentagon report did, the US should be working overtime to broker an understanding between Pakistan and India to eschew support for terrorist violence against each other.

Unfortunately, the Modi government’s objectives and actions in India-held Kashmir have not made such an understanding for mutual restraint easier. Protests have erupted in Kashmir with increasing frequency against India, including for Delhi’s indifference to Kashmiri suffering during the summer floods and the recent drive-by shooting of innocent Kashmiris.

If the BJP’s aims to instal a Hindu chief minister in Srinagar and trifurcate the region (into Ladakh, Jammu and the Kashmir Valley) are implemented, the history of the aftermath of the 1989 elections may repeat itself: massive Kashmiri Muslim protests, Indian repression, militant violence, Indian accusations against Pakistan and a full-blown Pakistan-India crisis with all its attendant dangers.

To address internal terrorism and the Afghan and Indian dimensions of counterterrorism, Pakistan needs tranquil and friendly ties with Tehran. Despite their other preoccupations, Pakistan’s security forces must regain full control in Balochistan and expel Jundallah and allied Sunni extremist groups operating against Iran. There is little doubt about covert external support to both the BLA and the anti-Iran groups. Tough security measures and muscular diplomacy should be deployed by Pakistan to eliminate such external subversion.

The international community has obviously not yet evaluated the complex and evolving dynamics of terrorism in this region. It is vital that the major powers, especially the US, China and Russia, understand and respond to these complex dynamics.

The counterterrorism agenda in this region should incorporate: defeating and destroying the TTP and its Al Qaeda and Etim associates; severing their links with the Afghan Taliban; promoting Afghan reconciliation through talks supported by Pakistan, Iran and the major powers; evolving an understanding for mutual restraint between Pakistan and India and retraction of the BJP’s dangerous strategy in Kashmir, and an end to eternally inspired subversion against Iran.

Pakistan, which is engaged in the largest and so far most successful anti-terrorist operation in the region, is not the ‘problem’; it can be a significant part of the ‘solution’ to regional and global terrorism.

IN an opinion piece last year, Henry Kissinger observed that over the next couple of decades a nuclear war was likely to take place between India and Pakistan. The nuclear factor was in play in four major and one minor India-Pakistan crises: in 1987, 1990, 1998, 1999 and 2002.

In 1987, when an Indian army chief launched the Brasstacks military exercises along Pakistan’s exposed desert borders, Pakistan responded by deploying its forces in the north where India was vulnerable. Prime minister Rajiv Gandhi’s agreement to a mutual stand-down no doubt also took into account the informal threat from Islamabad to bomb India’s nuclear reactors in case Pakistan was attacked. (After the crisis ended, the Pakistan-India agreement not to attack each other’s nuclear facilities was jointly formulated in one day.)

In January 1990, when the anti-Indian insurgency erupted in Kashmir and India threatened Pakistan, a conflict was forestalled by US intervention. The US acted when it learnt that Pakistan had begun to arm its nuclear-capable aircraft.

The operation of mutual deterrence between India and Pakistan is being eroded.
During the night of 26-27 May 1998 — the night before Pakistan conducted its nuclear explosions in response to India’s tests — Pakistani radar detected unidentified aircraft flying towards its territory. Islamabad issued warnings of instant retaliation to India and relayed these to the US and Israel. This may have been a false alarm; but it illustrates the danger of accidental conflict in the absence of real-time communications.

During the 1999 Kargil war, the nuclear dimension was implicit, given that the crisis occurred a year after the India-Pakistan nuclear tests.

During the 2002 general mobilisation by India and Pakistan, the director general of the Pakistan Armed Forces Special Plans Division enunciated its nuclear ‘doctrine’ in a news interview. The ‘doctrine’ envisaged that Pakistan would use nuclear weapons if: it was being militarily overwhelmed; its nuclear or strategic weapons or facilities were attacked; and it was subjected to an enemy blockade.

The projection of this doctrine, including at a UN news conference by this writer in July 2002, sparked a fall in the Indian Stock Exchange, the evacuation of foreign personnel and embassy families from New Delhi and a demarche by Indian business leaders to prime minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, and reportedly led to the Indian agreement for a mutual drawback of forces.

The operation of mutual deterrence displayed in 2002, however, is being eroded by several developments.

One, the conventional military balance is becoming progressively unfavourable to Pakistan. India is engaged in a major arms build-up. It is the world’s largest arms importer today. It is deploying advanced and offensive land, air and sea weapons systems. Pakistan’s conventional capabilities may not prove sufficient to deter or halt an Indian attack.

Two, India has adopted the Cold Start doctrine envisaging a rapid strike against Pakistan. This would prevent Pakistan from mobilising its conventional defence and thus lower the threshold at which Pakistan may have to rely on nuclear deterrence.

Three, Pakistan has had to deploy over 150,000 troops on the western border due to its involvement in the cross-border counterterrorism campaign in Afghanistan, reducing its conventional defence capacity against India.

Four, the acquisition of foreign nuclear plants and fuel, made possible by the Indo-US civilian nuclear cooperation agreement, will enable India to enlarge its nuclear weapons stockpile significantly. To maintain nuclear balance, Pakistan has accelerated production of fissile materials. Both nuclear arsenals are now large and growing.

Five, given its growing conventional disadvantage, and India’s pre-emptive war fighting doctrine, Pakistan has been obliged to deploy a larger number of nuclear-capable missiles, including so-called ‘theatre’ or tactical nuclear-capable missiles. The nuclear ‘threshold’ is now much lower.

Six, the Kashmir dispute — once described by former US president Bill Clinton as a nuclear flashpoint — continues to fester. Another insurgency is likely to erupt, certainly if the Bharatiya Janata Party government goes ahead with its platform promise to abrogate Article 370 of the Indian constitution (which accords special status to Jammu & Kashmir). A renewed Kashmiri insurgency will evoke Indian accusations against Pakistan and unleash another Indo-Pakistan crisis.

Seven, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has obviously decided to adopt an aggressive posture towards Pakistan, no doubt to appeal to his hard-line Hindu constituency. The recent ceasefire violations along the Line of Control are an ominous indication of such belligerency.

Eight, India is reportedly involved in supporting the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan and the Baloch Liberation Army to destabilise Pakistan internally.

Nine, India has terminated the ‘composite dialogue’ with Pakistan. Its precondition for talks — an “absence of violence” — is impossible for Pakistan to meet.

Ten, the US and other major powers evince little interest in addressing the combustible mix of live disputes, terrorist threats, conventional arms imbalance and nuclear weapons in South Asia.

During the parallel dialogue initiated by the US with Pakistan and India following their 1998 nuclear explosions, Pakistan proposed a ‘strategic restraint regime’ with India which would include mechanisms to resolve disputes, including Kashmir; preserve a conventional arms balance and promote mutual nuclear and missile restraint.

India rejected the concept of a mutual restraint regime.

The US at first agreed to consider Pakistan’s proposal. However, as their talks with India transitioned from restricting India’s nuclear programme to building a “strategic partnership” (against China), the Americans de-hyphenated policy towards Pakistan and India, opened the doors to building India’s conventional and nuclear capabilities and disavowed any interest in the Kashmir dispute. Currently, Indian belligerence is bolstered by US pressure on Pakistan to halt fissile material production and reverse the deployment of theatre nuclear-capable missiles.

If a South Asian Armageddon is to be prevented, it is essential to build a structure of stable deterrence between India and Pakistan and find ways to deal with Kashmir and other outstanding disputes. Reviving consideration of a strategic restraint regime would be a good place to start.

GEOGRAPHY, shared history, ethnicity, religion, culture and economic interdependence dictate that Pakistan’s relationship with Afghanistan — good or bad — will always be close and intense. Neither country can disengage from the other, even if it wished to.

Since Pakistan’s independence, the relationship has witnessed periods of friction as well as of close cooperation. Problems in the relationship have almost always arisen from interference in each other’s internal affairs. Pakistan’s support to liberate Afghanistan from Soviet occupation, and the generous refuge offered by Pakistan to millions of Afghans, was the high point in the relationship. The period after the US intervention and the ouster of the Afghan Taliban by the US with the support of the Northern Alliance, has witnessed some of the lowest points in the relationship, including border clashes between Pakistani and Afghan forces.

With the departure of the mercurial Hamid Karzai, the withdrawal of most US-Nato forces from Afghanistan, the installation of the Ghani-Abdullah ‘unity’ government in Kabul, and the vacation of Pakistan’s territory by most of the Afghan Taliban, conditions may now exist for a new rapprochement between Islamabad and Kabul.

There are current compulsions in both capitals to realise such a rapprochement. In Kabul, the main preoccupation is to preserve the ‘unity’ government and to prevent the Taliban insurgency from gaining momentum against an Afghan National Army (ANA) which has yet to be tested as an independent fighting force. US drone and air strikes on insurgent positions, as being currently demonstrated in Iraq and Syria, may not be sufficient to halt advances by the insurgents.

Conditions may now exist for a rapprochement between Islamabad and Kabul.
The larger danger is that if factional and ethnic divisions revive in Afghanistan, the ANA, like the Iraqi army, could collapse in the face of a determined Taliban onslaught. This danger will grow as the US-Nato presence begins to thin out further.

For its part, Pakistan too requires Kabul’s cooperation to defeat the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and put down the Balochistan Liberation Army insurgents. Pakistan will need to address the new leaders in Kabul with due regard to their political and personal sensitivities.

By all accounts, Ashraf Ghani is an intellectually arrogant and prickly personality, yet amenable to flattery. He seems to have a ‘chip on the shoulder’ regarding Pakistan. Having been parachuted into Afghan politics from the Washington-based World Bank, Ghani does not have a ‘natural’ constituency within Afghanistan, even among his fellow Pakhtuns. He is dependent on the support of disparate Afghan warlords, like Rashid Dostum. President Ghani may thus have limited authority to negotiate with the several power centres in Afghanistan including the Taliban.

On the other hand, Abdullah Abdullah, the chief executive, has a significant power base within the Northern Alliance and a political acumen acquired through his long involvement in Afghanistan’s faction-ridden politics. If the ‘unity’ government collapses, Pakistan may be able to preserve relationships with some of the Pakhtun factions but will require an interlocutor with Abdullah’s credentials to build relationships with elements of the Northern Alliance.

Pakistan can play an influential role in bolstering the new Kabul government, politically and economically, arresting the momentum of the Afghan insurgency and promoting reconciliation within Afghanistan.

At this stage, it would be wise for Pakistan to make some gestures of goodwill towards Kabul. In the economic field, these could include: easing transit trade; expanding imports from Afghanistan, including thro*ugh credit facilities; encouraging investment in Afgha*n*istan and reopening discussions on the TAPI gas pipeline. On the security side, Pakistan could revive cross border coordination and intelligence exchanges and offer larger training facilities to the ANA.

Most importantly, Pakistan can offer to convince the Afghan Taliban to make a clean break with Al Qaeda and the TTP; accept cessation of hostilities with the ANA and, despite their rejection of the Afghan elections, open a dialogue with Kabul for a power-sharing agreement.

Simultaneously, through quiet diplomacy with Iran, Saudi Arabia, Russia and China, Pakistan could help to build regional support for the Kabul government and its reconciliation with the Afghan insurgency.

While extending its support for peace and development within Afghanistan, Pakistan should seek reciprocal support from Kabul for its vital national interests and respect for its ‘red lines’.

The first among these red lines is the presence of the TTP leadership and insurgents in Afghanistan and the support they have been receiving from Afghan and Indian intelligence. The TTP, which has aligned itself with both Al Qaeda and the Islamic State, and includes jihadist rebels from Central Asia, Russia, China and some Arab countries, is now a common threat not only to Pakistan but the entire region. To support and sponsor this group is to threaten the security not only of Pakistan but the entire region, including Afghanistan itself

Pakistan should ask Kabul and the US to uproot and expel all TTP elements from their ‘safe havens’ in Afghanistan. If the Afghan security forces are unable to do so, the remaining US-Nato forces in Afghanistan should undertake the operations against the TTP, including air strikes and ground operations. And, as the US has done in Iraq and Syria, Pakistan should reserve the right, under the anti-terrorism resolutions of the Security Council, to strike at the TTP wherever it is located, within or outside Pakistan.

Similarly, Pakistan should call upon Kabul to expel the Baloch separatists operating from Afghan territory under the sponsorship, guidance and collaboration of Indian and Afghan intelligence, and to shut down their safe houses and safe havens. In this context, the closure of the several Indian ‘consulates’ near Pakistan’s border would be a visible indication of the goodwill of the new Afghan government.

Finally, Kabul, the US and other regional powers should respect Pakistan’s sensitivities vis-à-vis India. Given the adversarial ties between the latter two, forging of a military alliance between Afghanistan and India is an issue of strategic concern for Pakistan. Islamabad cannot be expected to remain benign towards a neighbour which is in military alliance with its enemy.

The endeavor to revive a fraternal relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan can succeed only if leaders in both countries focus on their long-term common interests and accommodate each other’s sensitivities and vital national interests.

SINCE independence, Pakistan’s relations with Moscow have been mostly adversarial. Pakistan was America’s “most allied ally”. India aligned with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Moscow’s veto in the UN Security Council to block Kashmiri self-determination, the U2 flight from Peshawar, Soviet support in 1971 for India’s war to dismember Pakistan and Islamabad’s collaboration with the US in the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan punctuated the hostile relationship.

Although the hostility slowly dissipated after the collapse of the Soviet Union, friendship eluded Moscow and Islamabad, for several reasons: Russia’s continuing defence relationship with India, Pakistan’s support for the Afghan Taliban — and by extension their Chechen and Uzbek associates —Moscow’s alignment with the Northern Alliance and Pakistan’s post 9/11 alliance with the US.

However, the new ‘Cold War’ in Europe, ignited by the Ukraine crisis, has profound strategic implications not only for Europe but also for other ‘theatres’ where Russia’s interests and objectives intersect with those of the US and Europe. Sino-Russian relations have become dramatically closer. Moscow is reasserting its role in the Middle East. It is also likely to do so in East and South Asia.

Pakistan-Russia relations have been evolving in positive directions during recent months. Pakistan is acting against Central Asian terrorists. As India has moved closer to the US, Russia has warmed to Pakistan. The closer Sino-Russian relationship has reinforced this trend. There are clear recent signs that Moscow is now open to substantive security collaboration with Pakistan. Russia’s aims are: to secure Pakistan’s cooperation to stabilise Afghanistan, combat Chechen and Central Asian terrorist groups present in the region, compensate for India’s tilt towards America and thereby retain leverage in New Delhi.

There are many areas where mutually beneficial cooperation can be promoted between Islamabad and Moscow.
There are a number of areas where mutually beneficial cooperation can be promoted between Islamabad and Moscow.

Afghanistan: Over the past year, quiet talks between Pakistan, China and Russia have been under way to consider ways to stabilise Afghanistan. Russia’s old relationship with the Northern Alliance and influence with Iran; Pakistan’s influence with the Pakhtuns and the Afghan Taliban; and China’s financial and economic capacity can be a powerful combination to promote reconciliation and peace in Afghanistan as the US disengages from that country.

Indo-Pakistan: As India’s major defence partner and a member of BRICS, Moscow continues to enjoy considerable, if reduced, influence in India despite New Delhi’s tilt towards the US. Russia desires Indo-Pakistan normalisation to prevent a disastrous conflict, limit American influence and develop new avenues for energy, trade and industrial cooperation with the South Asian region. Given the new global political alignments, Moscow’s mediation between India and Pakistan could be more even-handed and effective than the skewed policies presently pursued by Washington.

Defence: Russia’s defence industry is still among the best in the world. Moscow may now be willing to lift its self-imposed embargo on defence supplies to Pakistan. The dimensions of such cooperation will depend considerably on Pakistan’s ability to pay for defence equipment and, to a lesser extent, on the vigour of New Delhi’s anticipated objections.

Oil and gas: Russia is the world’s largest producer of oil and gas. The expertise of Russia’s Rosneft and Gazprom can contribute significantly to developing Pakistan’s oil and gas potential, onshore and offshore. Western sanctions have enhanced the incentive of these giant Russian companies to find new frontiers of cooperation.

Gas supplies: In the wake of the Western embargoes, Russia is looking for alternate markets for its abundant gas production. Its $400 billion gas deal with China has been the most prominent response. Moscow is also interested in building gas supply routes to India and Pakistan. Russian gas could be added to supplies from the proposed TAPI pipeline. New pipelines can be built to Pakistan and India through China. Russia’s Gazprom could also help in executing the projected Iranian gas pipeline to Pakistan (and India).

Nuclear reactors: So far, Russia has refused to supply nuclear power reactors to Pakistan due to the restrictions imposed by the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group on non-members of the NPT — with the significant exception of India. It is possible that in the new strategic circumstances, and in exchange for appropriate safeguards, Russia, like China, may consider the sale of nuclear power plants to Pakistan, especially if India acquires its new plants from the US.

Trade: If Afghanistan can be stabilised, it would open the way for expanded trade between Pakistan, Central Asia and Russia. While Pakistan requires Russian oil, gas and industrial products, Pakistan can be a competitive source of agricultural and textile goods to Russia. Pakistan could also offer Russia trade access to India in exchange for its help in normalising Pakistan-India ties.

Industrialisation: Russia retains some of the industrial prowess of the Soviet Union. It can modernise the Soviet-supplied Pakistan Steel Mills. Similar cooperation can be pursued in a number of ‘high-tech’ sectors, such as biotechnology, aviation and space, where Russia possesses competitive capabilities.

In some areas — such as Afghanistan, Indo-Pakistan normalisation and counterterrorism — the objectives of the US and its allies are convergent with Russia’s. In other areas — energy, defence, nuclear generation — opposition can be expected from the West to Pakistan-Russian cooperation. India may also object, although its opposition may not be decisive.

While Pakistan no longer requires, nor is likely to receive, US arms supplies or nuclear power plants, its ability to resist Western objections to cooperation with Moscow could be constrained by its financial and trade dependence on the West. Pakistan’s financial stress may also restrict its ability to pay for Russian supplies of defence and other equipment.

Pakistan needs to identify realistic goals for its new relationship with Russia, evolve sustainable ways to minimise its financial vulnerability (including greater financial integration with China) and deploy adroit diplomacy to capitalise on the emerging global and regional strategic realities. Of course, while its politicians squabble on the streets, adding to the country’s turbulence, it is difficult for Pakistan to devise well-considered policies to exploit the Moscow option or other strategic opportunities.

THE election of Narendra Modi as prime minister and geopolitical developments — particularly the US pivot to Asia and the Russia’s new Cold War with the West — have revived India’s prospects of achieving Great Power status. In quick succession, Modi has visited Japan’s ‘nationalistic’ prime minister; hosted China’s president; and will be received this week by the US president in Washington.

The US obviously wishes to embrace India as a partner in containing a rising China, responding to a resurgent Russia and fighting ‘Islamic terrorism’.

It is prepared to bend over backwards to secure India’s partnership. During his Washington visit, Modi is likely to be offered the most advanced American defence equipment; military training and intelligence cooperation; endorsement of India’s position on ‘terrorism’; investment, including in India’s defence industries; nuclear reactor sales; support for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, and a prominent role in Afghanistan after US-Nato withdrawal. There will be no mention of the Kashmir dispute, nor of past or current human rights violations in India.

The reticence, if any, in this love fest is likely to emanate from India rather than the US. While seeking all the advantages of a strategic partnership with the US, India is unwilling to relinquish the benefits of its relationships with Russia, China, Iran and other power players.

India’s evolving relationship with China is complex. Both Asian giants see the benefits of trade and investment cooperation and want to ‘democratise’ the post-Second World War economic order dominated by America. During President Xi Jinping’s recent visit China offered to invest $20 billion in industrial parks including in Modi’s home state of Gujarat and to support India’s infrastructure development.

The most proximate impediment to India’s quest for Great Power status remains Pakistan.
Yet, there are obvious limitations in the Sino-Indian relationship. Memories of its defeat in the 1962 border war with China still rankle in India. The border dispute has been managed but not resolved. There is expectation of future strategic rivalry, felt more strongly in India than China. New Delhi wishes to become China’s military and economic equal in Asia and the world. In particular, India desires an end to China’s strategic relationship with and support to Pakistan — a price Beijing is unwilling to pay.

Without compromising its strategic options, China is prepared to adopt a benign posture towards India, in part to prevent its incorporation in the US-led Asian alliances around China’s periphery. As some Chinese officials put it: “When you have the wolf [US] at the front door, you do not worry about the fox [India] at the back door.” If India does eventually emerge as a US strategic partner, Beijing will exercise its options to neutralise it including through greater support to Pakistan. For the present, China’s advice to Pakistan is to avoid a confrontation with India.

The complexity of the Sino-Indian relationship was on display during President Xi’s visit when news surfaced of a face-off between Chinese and Indian troops on China’s border with India-held Kashmir. It is unlikely that the Chinese would have instigated the incident while their president was in India. According to Indian sources, the “robust” Indian troop deployment to confront Chinese border forces could only have been authorised by the Indian prime minister. Was this then a demonstration of Modi’s muscular credentials meant for his hardline domestic constituency or perhaps a message of common cause to the US on the eve of Modi’s Washington visit?

The new Russia-West Cold War over Ukraine will enhance the ability of India (and other non-aligned countries) to play the two sides against each other. But it will also lower the tolerance of both protagonists for third-party positions that are seen as inimical to their vital interests.

So far, the Russians have been quite accommodative of India’s developing relationship with the US and the growing diversification of India’s huge arms purchases away from Russia.

Until now, Moscow has maintained its undeclared embargo on defence supplies to Pakistan in deference to its long-standing relationship with India. However, given India’s closer relationship with the US, Russia’s reinforced strategic cooperation with China, and the slow divorce between Pakistan and the US, the Russian reticence towards Pakistan, and its emotional bond with India, are receding. Moscow is now more likely to adopt a more ‘balanced’ posture towards India and Pakistan on defence and other issues, including Afghanistan.

The most proximate impediment to India’s quest for Great Power status remains Pakistan. So long as Pakistan does not accept India’s regional pre-eminence, other South Asian states will also resist Indian diktat. India cannot feel free to play a great global power role so long as it is strategically tied down in South Asia by Pakistan.

India under Modi has maintained the multifaceted Indian strategy to break down Pakistan’s will and capacity to resist Indian domination.

This strategy includes: building overwhelming military superiority, conventional and nuclear, against Pakistan; isolating Pakistan by portraying it as the ‘epicentre’ of terrorism; encouraging

Baloch separatism and TTP terrorism (through Afghanistan) to destabilise Pakistan; convincing Pakistan’s elite of the economic and cultural benefits of ‘cooperation’ on India’s terms.

In this endeavour, India is being actively assisted by certain quarters in the West.

Insufficient thought has been given in New Delhi and Western capitals to the unintended consequences of this strategy. It has strengthened the political position of the nationalists and the Islamic extremists in Pakistan. Islamabad’s vacillation in confronting the TTP was evidence of this. Further, the growing asymmetry in India-Pakistan conventional defence capabilities has obliged Pakistan to rely increasingly on the nuclear option to maintain credible deterrence.

The combination of unresolved disputes, specially Kashmir, the likelihood of terrorist incidents and a nuclear hair-trigger military environment, has made the India-Pakistan impasse the single greatest threat to international peace and security.

New Delhi’s bid for Great Power status could be quickly compromised if another war broke out, by design or accident, with Pakistan.