State of relations with the US
By Javid Husain


NOW that the initial government-encouraged euphoria over the recent offer by Washington to sell F-16 aircraft to Islamabad has subsided to some extent and the heady feeling of being a major non-NATO ally of the US is being replaced by growing concerns over the fast developing US-India strategic partnership as evidenced by the US-India Defence Pact signed at the end of June and the subsequent Indo-US nuclear deal, time has come to take an objective and detached look at Pakistan-US relations.

Historically speaking, Pakistan’s relations with the United States have gone through several phases of close cooperation and estrangement. The current phase of close Pakistan-US relations began with the U-turn in Pakistan’s pro-Taliban policy in the wake of the events of 9/11 leading to the full resumption of the US economic and military assistance to Pakistan and its designation as a non-NATO ally.

Pakistan-US relations have seen many ups and downs, and there is no guarantee that the future course of this relationship is going to be any different despite the reassuring statements made from time to time in both Washington and Islamabad. The strength of this relationship obviously will depend on the convergence of the national interests of the two countries: the greater the convergence, the stronger with this relationship be.

Let us see what the US global and regional interests in South Asia are and the extent to which they converge with Pakistan’s national interests.

The over-arching US strategic objective since the end of the cold war and the collapse of the Soviet Union is to remain the predominant global power as it is now and to prevent the rise of another power capable of challenging its global supremacy. President Bush couldn’t have said it more unequivocally when he declared at West Point on June 1, 2002, “ America has, and intends to keep, military strengths beyond challenge, thereby making the destabilizing arms races of other eras pointless, and limiting rivalries to trade and other pursuits of peace.”

In other words, the main US strategic objective is to keep this world unipolar as long as possible and to block or at least to slow down the emergence of a multipolar world. US strategic objectives in various regions basically flow from the main goal of establishing the US global hegemony or Pax Americana.

Although it has almost become a cliche to say that the 21st century would be the Asian century, it still is a valid statement. Asia, currently with the second largest economy in the world (Japan), the fast growing economy of China with the estimated GDP of $1.78 trillion, with two of the biggest countries in the world in terms of population (China and India), with the fast growing military muscle of China, Japan, India and South Korea, with most of the world oil and gas reserves, and with the dynamic economies of the Asean and South Korea, is a continent which is destined to play an increasingly important role in international politics in the 21st century.

It is understandable, therefore, that the US would like to be actively involved in the security architecture in Asia. According to a senior US official quoted recently in New Delhi, “The worst outcome for the US is an Asia from which we are excluded... The key challenge for the US over the past 100 years has been to remain engaged everywhere and not allow any other industrial power to dominate a given region. If I were China, I would be working on kicking the US out of Asia. Right now, we have a lot of alliances but there is no architecture embedding us in Asia. This worries us.”

The US views China as posing in due course a challenge to its power and influence in Asia as the latter’s economic and military power grows further. Washington is therefore engaged in building up a security structure aimed at containing China. The US alliances with Japan and South Korea will play this role in the Far East. The developments of the past few years clearly indicate that the US has decided to build up India in the hope that it will ultimately emerge as a counterweight to China on the Asian continent and help in containing China on its southern periphery.

Conversely, India needs the support of the US for building itself up as a major global power and establishing its hegemony in South Asia. The fast growing strategic partnership between the US and India neatly dovetails the strategic objectives of a global hegemon and an aspiring regional hegemon. (In view of the recent Indo-China agreement establishing a strategic partnership between them, it remains to be seen how India will play its cards in dealing with the two contradictory partnerships.). India is also a big market for the US exports and armaments.

The landmark event in the fast developing US-India strategic partnership, in the wake of the announcement from Washington in March this year that the US intended to help India become a “major world power in the 21st century” was the signing in Washington on June 28, 2005, of “the new framework for US-India defence relationship” by the defence ministers of the two countries. This defence pact, which talks about the common belief of the two largest democracies in freedom, democracy and the rule of law, will support, and will be an element of, the broader US-India strategic partnership.

It commits the two countries to cooperation in missile defence, combating terrorism and violent religious extremism, preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, technology transfer and defence trade. It also mentions that the US-India defence cooperation in a short span of time had advanced to unprecedented levels unimaginable in 1995. There are already reports of the offer by the US to sell to India F-16 and F-18 aircraft, and the Patriot PAC-3 anti-missile system.

The US-India defence pact was soon followed by a nuclear agreement between the two sides, concluded during Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to the US. This would enable India to acquire nuclear reactors and technology for peaceful purposes in disregard of the restrictions imposed by the US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act and the guidelines of the nuclear suppliers’ group. Interestingly, the US officials commenting on the Indo-US nuclear deal have indicated that the Bush administration is unlikely to offer a similar deal to Pakistan.

In short, the US is developing its strategic partnership with India in pursuance of its grand design for Asia in which India is expected to play a key role. The concept of a strategic partnership implies an element of equality between the two partners. Consequently, India will expect the US to be sensitive to its ambition of emerging as a great power — something which the US has already conceded in the hope of establishing its hegemony in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region.

It is also likely, despite the assurances given by the US secretary of state to our foreign minister and by president Bush to our president, that the US in its efforts to build up India as a counterweight to China will ignore the requirements of a strategic balance in South Asia.

In contrast with the US-India strategic partnership, which is based on the convergence of the long-term fundamental interests of the two countries, the current Pakistan-US relationship has a shaky foundation. As far as common beliefs are concerned, Pakistan’s track record in practising democracy is far less appealing than that of India as we still appear to be groping for a democratic system which suits the genius of our people. Pakistan’s all-weather friendship with China has been a pillar of strength and security. It has neither the capacity nor the desire to counter China in any way. Therefore, it cannot help in fulfilling the most fundamental US strategic objective on the Asian continent of containing China.

The US willingness to build up India as a major power runs contrary to Pakistan’s consistent efforts to oppose Indian hegemony in South Asia. The wave of religious extremism, which has fractured and brutalized our society in the aftermath of the Afghan jihad against the Soviet occupation and the subsequent militancy in Afghanistan and Kashmir, remains a source of concern to the US as numerous articles and stories in its media indicate. As for the peaceful settlement of Kashmir, which is the core issue for Pakistan in its relations with India, the US interest does not go beyond mere verbal encouragement to the two sides to try to reach a negotiated settlement of all their differences as the recent pronouncement by President Bush during the visit of the Indian prime minister to Washington indicates. Its real objective is to prevent Pakistan from doing anything which would raise tensions in Pakistan-India relations.

It is true that the US appreciates the important role that Pakistan is playing in the war against terrorism and has rewarded us with economic and military assistance as well as the status of a major non-NATO ally. However, going through the articles and commentaries appearing in the US, one gets the uneasy feeling that Washington regards Pakistan both as a problem and as an important ally in the war against terror.

No wonder there is constant pressure on Pakistan to do more than what it has already done in ridding its society of the scourge of violent religious extremism, in combating which both the US and India are committed to cooperate under the US-India defence pact of June, 2005.

By now it is crystal clear that behind the facade of “dehyphenating” US relations with India and Pakistan as Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice described it or having “individual relationships” with these two countries as US Under-Secretary of State Nicholas Burns recently put it, Washington has decided to place its relations with India at a higher plane in terms of priority and importance than those with Pakistan.

The current US-Pakistan relationship, therefore, suffers from serious limitations and uncertainties. First of all, there is no question of an element of equality in an alliance between a superpower and a middle-ranking country like Pakistan. The grant of the non-NATO ally status to Pakistan basically means that it has accepted a subordinate role in the service of the US strategic interests in return for economic and military assistance. Secondly, the convergence of their strategic interests is currently limited to the war on terror in which we are playing a key role in collaboration with the US instead of Pakistan being a part of any grand US strategic design.

This makes the relationship extremely fragile and uncertain, especially keeping in view the internal societal convulsions through which Pakistan is passing and the past US track record. Thirdly, the promised sale of F-16 aircraft and other US military equipment to Pakistan may meet our essential needs for maintaining a credible deterrent. However, looked at more closely from the US point of view, it is meant to keep Pakistan, especially its military establishment, on a tight leash in the service of the US strategic interests in the foreseeable future.

This is the reality that we face behind the smokescreen of empty rhetoric and assurances which are full of sound and fury signifying nothing. It is time to face the realities as they are so as not to be confronted with disappointments and unpleasant surprises down the road. Our objective should be to adopt a new mix of internal and external policies which would safeguard our national interests and provide a more solid and durable foundation for our friendship with the US as we cannot afford to be on less than friendly and cordial terms with it.

It is axiomatic that we must keep our national interests supreme in the management of Pakistan-US relations. Therefore, while there are several factors relevant to Pakistan-US relations which we cannot change, there are others that we can modify to our advantage in strengthening this vital relationship. The promotion of a stable democratic order in Pakistan, based on national consensus, is one such factor which is not only desirable in its own right but would also help in bringing the two countries closer together. The same is true of improving the performance of the economy, raising the standard of human development in the country, particularly through increased attention to education and health, and ridding ourselves of the scourge of obscurantism, retrogression and religious extremism.

In the realm of foreign affairs, we need to broaden our options at the regional and global levels while persisting in our policy of friendship with the US. However, we should not develop our relations with it, marked as it as by serious limitations and uncertainties, at the expense of our friendly relations with neighbours such as China and Iran.

As the saying goes, one can choose one’s friends but not one’s neighbours. A coherent regional policy should be the central element of our over-all foreign policy. In particular, we should avoid a repetition of the strategic blunders of the 1990s when we pursued the pro-Taliban policy in Afghanistan which isolated us regionally and globally besides encouraging religious extremism and klashnikov culture in our society. We are still living with the disastrous consequences of that ill-conceived policy both internally and externally.

For a coherent regional policy
By Javid Husain


IN my last article on the state of Pakistan-US relations, I emphasized the need for Pakistan to adopt a coherent regional policy as the central element of our overall foreign policy. I would now venture to add that since the end of the Cold War, the absence of a well thought-out regional policy has been one of the fundamental weaknesses of our foreign policy.

Following the end of the cold war, Pakistan was faced with the serious challenge of coming to grips with the new international and regional scenario with a view to safeguarding and promoting its national interests.

The emerging global scenario was characterized by the victory of democracy and market economy, the trend towards regionalism as evidenced by the growth of the European Union and other regional organizations, the weakened bargaining position of the Third World nations, and emergence or anticipated emergence of new centres of power like the EU, Japan, China, Russia, India, Brazil and the Asean, and the growing importance of such global issues as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, human rights and the environment.

At the regional level, India propelled by economic reforms pulled far ahead of Pakistan in economic and military terms as the latter suffered from endemic political instability and the termination of US military and economic assistance. The India-China detente gathered speed as their relations developed, particularly in the economic and commercial fields. Afghanistan became embroiled in a civil war after getting rid of the Soviet occupation.

The Central Asian Republics and Azerbaijan, besides Afghanistan, joined the Economic Cooperation Organization to broaden their foreign policy and economic options and to reduce their dependence on Russia. Iran began the process of recovery from the ravages of the eight-year Iran-Iraq war together with a gradual process of reforms to provide a modicum of economic and cultural freedom to its people.

The Iraq-Kuwait war and the subsequent developments that brought Iraq down on its knees, further entrenched US power and influence in the Middle East, strengthened Israel’s security by eliminating Iraq as a possible threat, tightened the US stranglehold on the vast oil and gas resources of the region, and opened up possibilities for the US to give a new political and ideological orientation to the Middle Eastern countries. India’s political, economic and cultural relations with the Gulf countries gained considerably in strength.

This was the global and regional setting in which Pakistan had to steer its foreign policy during the 1990s and beyond. Let us see how good a job our policymakers did in dealing with these challenges.

At the global level, we failed as a nation to appreciate the importance of the growing trend towards democracy and the primacy of economic strength. Consequently, the 1990s were marked by political instability culminating in the military takeover of October 1999. The recognition of the primacy of economic strength basically would have required us to allocate a much higher proportion of our budgetary resources to economic and social development than to military expenditure. During most of the decade of 1990s, we did exactly the reverse according to the latest issue of the Pakistan Economic Survey.

On the average, during the 1990s, the government allocated 5.6 per cent and 4.7 per cent of the GDP respectively to defence and development expenditure. During 2004-05, the development expenditure amounted to only 2.9 per cent of the GDP. This was obviously the result of a misconceived national security policy which over-emphasized its military dimension at the expense of the political and economic dimensions.

We alienated ourselves regionally and internationally during most of the 1990s because of the mishandling of our Afghanistan and Kashmir/India policies. These policies, which were out of sync with the global environment, lacked any grand strategic design, vision or far-sightedness. The demands of these policies far outstripped our resources presenting us with the classic situation of a strategic overstretch. We were also faced with the danger of being branded as a terrorist state. The simultaneous pursuit of activist policies on both Kashmir and Afghanistan was obviously imprudent making these policies untenable in the long run. It was, therefore, just a matter of time before the force of circumstances would force us to change these policies.

Our pro-Taliban policy was particularly ill-conceived with disastrous consequences for Pakistan both internally and externally. Internally, this policy brutalized our society by promoting the klashnikov culture, encouraged obscurantism and tore apart the social fabric of the country by fomenting religious extremism. Externally, it damaged our relations with Iran and most of the Central Asian Republics besides creating misgivings even in China.

Interestingly, the pro-Taliban policy was partly justified on the basis of our desire to promote trade and economic links with the Central Asian Republics, precisely the countries with which our relations were being damaged by that policy. The Taliban’s policies tarnished the image of Pakistan. The process of regional economic cooperation launched through the expansion of the Economic Cooperation Organization in 1992, which looked so promising at that time, was virtually stalled during most of the 1990s primarily because of the clash of the Afghan policies of Iran and Pakistan.

The mere fact that the Taliban regime was recognized only by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE was sufficient to establish our isolation at regional and global levels. Our pro-Taliban policy was, therefore, not sustainable. However, our policymakers single-mindedly pursued it in total disregard of wiser counsel and strategic compulsions until they reached the precipice of 9/11. It was only then we brought about a U-turn in our policy to avert the impending disaster.

Our regional policy must be based squarely on a dynamic analysis of the power realities of the region within the framework of the prevailing global environment. Two considerations should reign supreme: we should never again allow ourselves to be isolated at the regional level and we should prevent the emergence of a situation where a regional country or group of countries can pose a threat to our security or our economic well-being.

In short, we should learn to build up alliances and coalitions at the regional level to counter an existing or emerging threat to our security instead of relying exclusively on the support of non-regional powers which in any case has not proved reliable in the past.

As long as our disputes with India are unresolved and its quest for regional domination continues, it would remain a potential threat to Pakistan’s security. We should neither exaggerate nor minimize the nature of this threat. In the past, our India policy has swung from one extreme to the other.

While Kargil reflected one extreme, the current unrealistic euphoria is another. An economic union with India, as some scholars suggest, would mean the loss of economic independence for Pakistan and may presage even the loss of political independence for the country. For a change, we should practise some moderation in our India policy.

We should definitely continue our policy of defusing tensions and undertaking confidence building measures with India (including trade on the basis of a level playing field) to reduce the risk of outbreak of an armed conflict and to build up a climate of mutual trust necessary for the resolution of outstanding disputes. While we should keep on pressing for an early settlement of these disputes, it would be unrealistic to expect that a satisfactory final settlement of the Kashmir dispute is around the corner. In fact, since the present power realities favour India and since the dispute carries heavy emotional and historical baggage on both sides, we should adopt a two-stage approach.

In the first stage we should aim at improvement in the human rights situation in the Indian-occupied Kashmir, demilitarization or withdrawal of the bulk of the Indian forces from the territory as the level of insurgency goes down and granting autonomy to its people. In the second stage covering a longer time frame, we should go for a final settlement of the dispute.

Friendship with both Afghanistan and Iran is a strategic imperative for Pakistan. In the case of Afghanistan, we should resist the temptation to get involved in its internal affairs while extending support and cooperation to it in the restoration of internal peace and in the gigantic task of economic reconstruction.

Iran has been a source of support to us in the past on critical occasions. We should not fritter away the friendship with this important brotherly country. In the present context, we should oppose any military action to deal with Iran’s nuclear issue which must be resolved through peaceful means. While our relations with the US have their own unique importance, we should, to use an American term, dehyphenate them from our relations with Iran. The Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline project which is in the interest of all the three countries should be pursued vigorously by us despite Washington’s reservations.

Generally speaking, Pakistan and Iran should develop their cooperation in all fields. It is true that the two countries are competitors in some areas. But they should not allow this competition to be transformed into confrontation, a mistake they committed in Afghanistan during the 1990s.

China has been Pakistan’s steadfast friend since the 1960s. It is difficult to exaggerate the critical importance of this friendship for Pakistan. While by and large this relationship is still sound, our economic and commercial relations with China compared with those of India are relatively weak and need to be developed further. We must build bridges of understanding and cooperation with Russia, which is an important player in our neighbourhood, besides developing relations with the Central Asian Republics and the GCC countries where we have lost ground to India during the past few years.

In keeping with the global trend toward schemes of regional economic cooperation, Pakistan must also engage itself in this process. At present, Pakistan is a member of both the ECO and the SAARC. But we need to be clear about our priorities where these two organizations are concerned.

The experience of the EU indicates the following conditions for the success of the process of regional economic cooperation and integration: economic complementarities, geographical proximity, cultural affinities and the absence of serious disputes among the member states. Out of the ECO and the Saarc, only the ECO fulfils these conditions. For Pakistan, therefore, the ECO should be the organization of choice for the purpose of regional economic cooperation and integration. It must, however, remain engaged in the Saarc but for more limited economic objectives.

The recent admission of Pakistan as an observer into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization was a welcome development because this will help us promote mutual understanding and strengthen our friendship and cooperation with China, Russia and the Central Asian Republics.

PAK US RELATIONS:

HISTORY:

The United States and Pakistan established diplomatic relations in 1947. The U.S. agreement to provide economic and military assistance to Pakistan and the latter's partnership in the Baghdad Pact/CENTO and SEATO strengthened relations between the two nations. However, the U.S. suspension of military assistance during the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war generated a widespread feeling in Pakistan that the United States was not a reliable ally. Even though the United States suspended military assistance to both countries involved in the conflict, the suspension of aid affected Pakistan much more severely.

Gradually, relations improved and arms sales were renewed in 1975. Then, in April 1979, the United States cut off economic assistance to Pakistan, except food assistance, as required under the Symington Amendment to the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, due to concerns about Pakistan's nuclear program.

Anti-Soviet Alliance in the Afghan War:

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 highlighted the common interest of Pakistan and the United States in peace and stability in South Asia.The incasion proved to be great threat for both Pakistan and US. As victory of Soviet Union meant that they will be crossing the borders to reach the Arabian Sea waters through Pakistan.And for USA their invasion meant further expansion of Soviet power in the region which was not acceptable to it.

In 1981, the United States and Pakistan agreed on a military and economic assistance program aimed at helping Pakistan deal with the heightened threat to security in the region and its economic development needs. With U.S. assistance - in the largest covert operation in history - Pakistan armed and supplied anti-Soviet fighters in Afghanistan, eventually defeating the Soviets, who withdrew in 1988. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was a 10-year war which wreaked incredible havoc and destruction on Afghanistan.

Nuclear Sanctions:
Recognizing national security concerns and accepting Pakistan's assurances that it did not intend to construct a nuclear weapon, Congress waived restrictions under Symington Amendment on military assistance to Pakistan. In March 1986, the two countries agreed on a second multi-year economic development and security assistance program. On October 1, 1990, however, the United States suspended all military assistance and new economic aid to Pakistan under the Pressler Amendment, which required that the President certify annually that Pakistan "does not possess a nuclear explosive device."

Nuclear Weapon Tests:

India's decision to conduct nuclear tests in May 1998 and Pakistan's matching response set back U.S. relations in the region, which had seen renewed U.S. Government interest during the second Clinton Administration. A presidential visit scheduled for the first quarter of 1998 was postponed and, under the Glenn Amendment, sanctions restricted the provision of credits, military sales, economic assistance, and loans to the government. An intensive dialogue on nuclear nonproliferation and security issues between Deputy Secretary Talbott and Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmad was initiated, with discussions focusing on CTBT signature and ratification, FMCT negotiations, export controls, and a nuclear restraint regime. The October 1999 overthrow of the democratically elected Sharif government triggered an additional layer of sanctions which include restrictions on foreign military financing and economic assistance. U.S. Government assistance to Pakistan was limited mainly to refugee and counter-narcotics assistance.

Post-9/11 alliance:

Pakistan's relations with US have reveived and regained strength since 9 /11.Pakistan moved decisively to ally itself with the United States in its war against Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda. It gave the U.S. a number of military airports and bases, for its attack on Afghanistan. This commitment of Pakistan helped USA alot in its war against terrorism.Being a major ally of US Pakistan gained various benefits and also recived praises on behalf of the US governmant at various occassions.

This Pak US partnership is in the larger interest of both the nations.Both Pakistan and US are facing the challenge to develop broad and deep relations that are not subject to downturn seen in the past.There is the need for more attention on the economic dimension of the relations between both the countries.A greater access to US market for Pakistani goods is desired and the direct investment by USA in the trade sector of Pakistan is needed. All this also requires public support and interaction between the people of the two countries so that they could better understand each other. History is very clear that the relations between both the countries have always been very tactical.The Cold War or Soviet Invasion in Afghanistan and War on Terror are included in this regard. Important is to develop a common mutual understanding that these relations become strategic. What is important is to immunise our relations from the ups and downs and shifts witnessed in the past.

It is important for both US and Pakistan to have strategic relations.As in it lies the interest of both the countries.Infact it wouldn't be wrong to say that its a good time of opportunity to impove the mutual relations in this increasingly interdependent world.

Future of US-Pakistan relations

AS President Bush heads for South Asia, a look at the strategic direction of US relations with India and Pakistan will be timely. In Pakistan, our self-image and worldview has been anchored in a belief that the rest of the world should look at India through our eyes.

For years we have measured others’ friendship on a scale of their relations with India. The fact is India has a place in the world, and its growing ties with the US only reflect this reality which we must not resent.

As for our own relations with the United States, while Washington may have loomed large in our foreign policy the reverse is not true and cannot be. Relations between a big power and a small country are always imbalanced, and those between Pakistan and the US have been particularly so, for many reasons.

Firstly, US-Pakistan engagements have been single issue relationships that have prospered in the neglect of some of their other vital interests. Secondly, being a weaker party, Pakistan’s loss has been heavier. Pakistan did not get the best value for its services as much of the US help was non-monetary by way of political support to military regimes which was no doubt priced into the deal. In more ways than one, the legitimacy for such regimes thus came at the country’s expense.

It is not a good idea to concentrate political power and determination of national interests and priorities in a single institution with a legitimacy problem. President Musharraf is to be commended for bringing a modicum of stability to the country and igniting a debate on the need for reforms. But this does not obscure the fact that while people may welcome, and indeed tolerate, for some time, military interventions in national affairs for damage control and stabilization, they would not endorse its long-term appropriation of political power.

Serious problems of the country require a fully fledged and autonomous political process, however imperfect, and also policies that rely on national effort at issue solving rather than on external help that may force us to make flawed compromises on our vital interests.

There has been another problem in the US Pakistan relationship. Pakistan has traditionally responded to regional impulses, and the United States to global dynamics. As a superpower it has also been neither compelling nor easy for the United States to harmonize its strategic and tactical goals, short- and long-term agenda, and global and regional interests.

As a consequence, US Pakistan ties have lacked continuity, a larger conceptual framework, and a broad shared vision. It is no wonder, then, that as soon as the United States achieved its objectives vis-‘-vis Pakistan in past engagements, US Pakistan policy consensus would break down.

The current US engagement with Pakistan shares some of the past weaknesses. But South Asia has changed due to the post Cold War world, globalization and the war on terrorism, and so has the basis of US relations with it. In the past, the region was the focus of US interest because of the threat from outside to inside. The threat now is from inside to outside to which, as the US sees it, Pakistan has contributed significantly both with its internal dynamics and external behaviour.

An unstable Pakistan fosters militancy, endangers its nuclear assets, raises the potential for conflict with India over Kashmir, and threatens its own internal cohesion. But India compels attention with the projection of its military power, marked economic and technological achievement and potential, its democratic structure, aspirations for a big power status, and as the likely balancer to a resurgent China and a factor of stability in South Asia and its periphery. It thus offers US great strategic and economic opportunities.

There are not only strategic incentives but compulsions as well for the US to woo India. America may have become the sole superpower but its grip over its allies has loosened. Europe has become too autonomous, and the Middle East is in the grip of a religious based revisionism making its future relations with the US uncertain.

If America is looking for a back-up sphere of influence and source of energy now, why not go to a country and a region that is seeking US help and patronage — India in realizing its big power ambitions, Pakistan in its salvation from chronic weaknesses and consequences of a profligate living, and Central Asia in balancing the weight and influence of China and Russia? The object may well be not only to facilitate the emergence of a Central and South Asian integrated market that will enhance the potential for US trade and investment but also pursue a policy of benign encirclement of China and containment of Russia by courting countries on their periphery.

But regrettably, Pakistan and Afghanistan are an impediment as potential source of instability and extremism that not only impact on global security but also threaten India, the centrepiece of future US policies, in the region.

For more than five decades, Pakistan has figured in US foreign policy in various forms — a staunch ally, a troublesome friend or a threat. Now, for the first time, it is all of these things. While India presents to the US a great opportunity, Pakistan is a big challenge. While India is an asset, Pakistan is a liability. Pakistan diminishes the prospects of US strategic interests in the region, and along with Afghanistan, it is at the root of policy issues the US faces in the region.

Afghanistan and Pakistan occupy a pivotal place in America’s war on terrorism specially the part aimed at the decimation of Al Qaeda and emasculation of the Taliban. The United States is doing so directly in Afghanistan but indirectly in Pakistan. Contrary to public perceptions of any American unhappiness with Pakistan’s support in the war on terrorism and Pakistan’s “anger” at incidents such as Bajaur, the two sides have so far been comfortable with the existing perimeters of their cooperation.

Statements to the contrary are for domestic consumption on both sides and meant as a pressure tactic. Pakistan is cooperating but may not want to know everything so as to retain the option of plausible deniability. But future troubles cannot be ruled out.

There will be other problems to come. Since US Pakistan relations have merged with Pakistan’s own reform effort, America’s evolving economic and strategic relationship with the region, the war on terrorism, nuclear proliferation and Iran, many variables have come to play on Pakistan, and may affect the country’s future.

The war on terrorism, for instance, has created as many problems for us as it has solved. Firstly, Pakistan may be played out of Afghanistan strategically. Secondly, it is clear the US is trying to create a new balance of power in Afghanistan unduly weighted against the Pashtuns, being seen as prone to extremist influences and more tolerant of the Taliban and, by virtue of their presence on both sides of the border, providing a sanctuary to them in Pakistan.

The tribal areas in Pakistan are already being treated by the Taliban as their alternative power base and they are radicalizing its culture by evoking religion, sub nationalism and anti-Americanism, to enlist their support for their continued resistance in Afghanistan. All this presents serious challenges for Pakistan. Apart from inflaming regional feelings in Pakistan it has incited tensions with the US-backed regime in Afghanistan which may have made common cause with Iran and India to exploit the Balochistan situation for their own purposes. The US plans for the region thus may be getting undermined by its own allies and by Iran which opposes the American fiat anyway.

As for India-Pakistan relations, India is pursuing a policy of maximum benefit at a minimum cost thanks to Pakistan’s self-restraint and US influence. India’s hope is that in time the so-called CBMs between the two countries will become their own reward, and that perhaps with increased economic and commercial exchanges, cultural interplay, and trends toward moderation in Pakistan, Pakistanis will develop a different perception of India and Kashmir.

India also hopes that other critical issues, such as energy, sharing of water resources, security, and good neighbourly relations, may eventually take precedence over Kashmir in defining the countries’ relationship, freeing India to find an internal solution to the dispute, facilitated by Pakistan’s diminished leverage and unforced concessions. There might be gains for Pakistan in the relationship with India, but not in Kashmir, whose centrality to India-Pakistan relations will have gradually eroded.

But if Pakistanis feel let down by continued lack of progress on the Kashmir dispute, the public, or at least the Islamist hardliners, may end up blaming Musharraf of a sell-out and America for weakening Pakistan’s hand in Kashmir. This might cause problems for US-Pakistan ties. If the US launches any military strike against Iran that will be another wild card and may well spell the end of US-Pakistan engagement.

The future of US-Pakistan relations is thus hostage to much uncertainty. To avoid damage, the US needs to be sensitive to Pakistan’s internal dynamics and larger strategic interests in the region. Pakistan will also need greater support for its economy and help with its educational reforms.

The present status of the relationship will of course look good when the Bush visit takes place. It is essentially a visit to India with Pakistan stop being an unavoidable obligation. In India, the visit will be a great draw even though the nuclear deal is not going anywhere as it does not have support in the Congress yet. But even without the nuclear deal the relationship should mean a lot to India.

Pakistan may end up signing the agreements in the fields of investment science and technology, education, container security and preferential access to goods produced in designated industrial zones, but there will be no movement on the free trade agreement. President Bush will of course say nice things about Islam and the Muslim world. The outcome of the visit to Pakistan may not look all that unimpressive, but there is little doubt that India will be the star of the show.


By Touqir Hussain

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[COLOR=Blue][B]The best way to predict the future is to invent it[/B][/COLOR]

By Touqir Hussain


THE debate focusing on US-Pakistan relations has been marked by great analysis but has left behind some troubling questions about our approach to the relationship. Pakistan’s ties with the US continue to be filtered through our perceptions of India. These perceptions have failed to break through our traditional assumptions of parity with our neighbour. But the growing gap between Pakistan and India is obvious to the rest of the world that deals with each country according to its own merits. This we regard as a great betrayal, which is how we perceive the recent Bush visit to the region.

Over time, our criticism of the US has accumulated many new themes as an idiom of resentment against our US-centric leadership and as an expression of nationalism under the impact of the Iranian revolution and the rise of religious extremism. Post-9/11, it has merged with the rising wave of anti-Americanism in the Islamic world.

Yet the dynamics of US-Pakistan relations and the discriminatory US approach to India and Pakistan have been at the heart of our feelings towards America. A brief history will explain the issues.

At the time of independence Pakistan was deeply conscious of the power disparity in the subcontinent and looked for ways to redress it. The viability of the state was at stake compelling Pakistan to look in the direction of the US, which in turn was trying to promote a strategic consensus of non-communist Asian states to check the expanding lines of communist influence.

Pakistan opted to become a close ally of the US as its assistance established a semblance of balance of power in the region. The US co-opted Pakistan because of its inability to woo India. Although the relationship did serve the critical interests of the two countries, from time to time it reflected the absence of a long-term policy based on a larger conceptual framework, a shared vision or continuity.

Both sides gave to it more than what they got. The United States strengthened Pakistan’s defence capabilities and potential for economic development that gave critical help in stabilising the emergent state. But in doing so it also helped encourage undemocratic tendencies in Pakistan, as US patronage of the military caused the latter to raise its national profile which came to dominate the country’s politics through a pro-western alliance of conservative forces, including the Islamists. The US itself did not escape the negative fallout which caused complications in its relationship with India and thwarted its opposition to Pakistan’s nuclear programme — two important strategic objectives from its perspective. The Pakistan-US alliance during the Afghan war prospered — though under the darkening shadow of the forces that would later come to threaten them both.

No wonder the relationship has never enjoyed broad-based public support or endorsement of the strategic community in the US except during the heady days of the Cold War. Afterwards it continued to face one stumbling block after another because of Pakistan’s relations with China, the issue of democracy and our nuclear programme. There was of course the theme that never went away, that is Indo-Pakistan tensions and concerns about an arms race in the subcontinent.

Over the years, many in the US Congress have had serious reservations about Pakistan. So the seeds for a de-hyphenated relationship go far back. Indeed the de-coupling of US relations with India and Pakistan had begun way back in 1962 at the time of the Sino-Indian war, and continued imperceptibly, working sometimes to India’s benefit, and sometimes to Pakistan’s. It remained an underlying determinant of US policy in South Asia until former President Bill Clinton brought it out into the open. So in essence the US has all along followed separate tracks in its relations with India and Pakistan, responding to different needs and rationales.

While as a superpower it was easy for the US to weave in and out of Pakistan, the latter became addicted to the relationship as it served more than our national interests. It served the ends of our political leadership and the elite, civilian and military, could not be weaned away from it. This dependency syndrome was fostered in part by the need to fall back on help from a big power to occasionally bail out the country from the ill effects of bad governance, and in part by fears stoked by America’s overwhelming power with which it often trampled on Third World countries that did not do its bidding.

The myth that nothing moves in these countries without US approval lives on. So does the corollary that everything wrong in these places is America’s fault, an impression instigated by the leadership itself to divert dangerous currents of social discontent and political opposition. So the relationship has undergone much distortion over the years.

While the US has often treated Pakistan unfairly, even in a highhanded manner, it must be said that the public grudge against America for not supporting Pakistan against India in 1965 and 1971 is misplaced. A close scrutiny of US treaty obligations to Pakistan leave no doubt that the historical US commitments were essentially in the context of a communist threat to Pakistans security.

The 1959 agreement on bilateral cooperation clearly says that in case of aggression against Pakistan, “the Government of the United States in accordance with the constitution of the US will take such appropriate action including the use of armed forces as may be mutually agreed upon and is envisaged in the joint resolution to promote peace and stability in the Middle East” in order to assist the government of Pakistan at its request.

The joint resolution on the Middle East speaks of only one eventuality of the US coming to the aid of a country under aggression, and that is in the event of communist aggression.

That was in the past but what about the present? President Musharraf has stimulated a debate on reforms, and thanks to the economic policies and management of Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz, Pakistan has registered an impressive growth rate. But credit should also go to the US and its allies for lending such critical support to these efforts. Yet the US-Pakistan engagement, and the military-dominated political dispensation, which feed on each other, have increased the potential for both good and harm for Pakistan.

Partly because of this alliance and partly because of some global forces that are shaping our history many powerful ideas that move men and define a nation’s life have come into play in Pakistan. These pertain to religion, nationalism, democracy, ethnicity and regionalism, and above all pressures for reform, modernisation and social consensus. The direction of change, however, remains unclear.

Pakistan’s role in the war on terrorism, for instance, has aroused strong feelings in tribal and feudal societies in smaller provinces stimulating regionalist tendencies. The war on terrorism, being seen as an assault on Islam, has also raised the profile of the Islamists complicating our debate about national priorities.

The two countries are conscious of this narrow focus on terrorism and are trying to make the relationship broad based and long lasting. This was the objective of the recent dialogue between the Pakistan foreign secretary and state department officials in Washington which reportedly went well. Broadened cooperation with Pakistan is geared to meets its reform requirements as well as the US objective of a stable and moderate Pakistan that seeks a cooperative and tension-free relationship with India and Afghanistan to promote America’s larger economic and strategic interests in the region.

As to the future, one can only speculate. My own view is that both Pakistan and the US are heading for a period of transition that will have some repercussions for their relationship. Both Bush and Musharraf will fade away. Pakistan’s internal dynamics are reaching a critical stage because of the 2007 elections, while in the US the Republicans are likely to lose their majority in the House in the 2006 mid-term elections and a Democrat will be making a strong bid for the White House in 2008.

These changes, along with the outcome of the Iraq war and the Iran crisis, may turn out to be watershed events in America affecting the war on terrorism and Washington’s approach to Pakistan.

Terrorism may in time be reduced to one of the regular threats that can be addressed with a range of normal military, intelligence, and foreign policy options. Pakistan’s cooperation in this war will still be needed but not so critically that the US may have to trump its other important interests. US dependence on Musharraf may well decrease as the scaled-down level of cooperation can equally be provided by a civilian leadership despite political constraints. Indeed Musharraf may himself become less compliant to US demands in the war on terrorism.

So the democratisation pressure by Washington will increase if the US feels that the present hybrid system and Pakistan’s potential de-politicisation threatens its stability and enhances the prospects of the Islamists. In any event, the US would not like to be identified too closely with Musharraf’s personal ambitions.

On the other hand, if Washington feels that it is the present system and not full democracy that ensures Pakistan’s stability and that Pakistan’s cooperation in the war on terrorism is still needed it will not rock the boat. For now, the army remains America’s best bet. But nobody knows what is going to happen in Pakistan in the future.

However, one thing is clear. The US cannot afford to walk away this time because its policies towards Pakistan have to be integrated with critical US policy choices in the region. India may offer the United States great economic and strategic opportunities, but it is Pakistan’s internal dynamics and relationship with India that have been at the root of challenges to US foreign policy in South Asia. The US will remain engaged though its pressure on Pakistan to conform to American policies in the region will increase.

Will the US agree to cooperate with Pakistan in the field of civilian nuclear energy? No, not now and even less so in future. Does this make the relationship any less valuable for us? Not as long as it continues to serve some other important national interests of ours. In a strange irony both Pakistan and US have historically been part of the problem and part of the solution for each other and this paradigm is unlikely to change.