Relations with China & US


Maqbool Ahmad Bhatty


HAVING started a 35-year diplomatic career with Washington, and concluded it in Beijing after having served in Moscow, New Delhi and London in between, one may feel qualified to form an opinion as to which of the two superpowers, the reigning one or the emerging one, should be given priority in our foreign policy concerns. One could simplify the task of evaluating the relative importance of these relationships by recalling the axiom that there are no permanent friends, only permanent interests. These interests are largely a function of geography and history.

Taking into account the geo-strategic location of Pakistan, and its role in history, we are destined to figure prominently in the march of history, as we are located at the junction of major cultures, where most of the major religions and civilizations were born, and which is home to over half of the world’s population.

The geographical factor figures both in terms of who one’s neighbours are and the endowment of natural resources, as well as of access to trading routes. Neighbouring countries are bound to be more of a day-to-day concern than many major countries that are far away. Here, the fundamental factor shaping our foreign policy has been the hostility of the largest country in South Asia that has yet to reconcile itself to the creation of Pakistan.

As the world has become a global village, thanks to technology and the growth of communication links — and one needs to take a global perspective to make a correct assessment of one’s challenges and opportunities — a high degree of awareness of the fast-changing world scenario becomes an important asset. The intellectual and power elite must develop this awareness, with a small group of specialists among politicians, academics and media persons acquiring the expertise to interact with their counterparts in other countries on an equal footing.

A well-educated and well-trained foreign service, backed by academics specializing in various areas of international affairs, functions as the first line of defence for protecting national interests. The armed forces step in only when avenues of peaceful settlement of disputes have been exhausted.

India, whose population is predominantly Hindu, failed to provide the basic safeguards to its Muslim population that was concentrated in certain well-defined parts of the peninsula. Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah sought to preserve its unity for two decades, but found the Hindu majority unwilling to reassure them, and its conduct after the 1937 elections aroused deep fears about the prospects of their rights being safeguarded, so that the demand for a separate homeland was articulated in 1940, and achieved within seven years.

Though the Indian leadership accepted the partition plan put forward by the British government in June 1947, it did so with the expectation that Pakistan would not survive for long, and did everything possible to curtail its existence. Pakistan’s foreign policy has been preoccupied mainly with saving its independence and sovereignty from the threat posed by a much larger and more powerful country that remained committed to the concept of “Akhand Bharat” (undivided subcontinent).

Ever since gaining independence, Pakistan’s most serious concern has been with self-preservation, which has meant carrying a disproportionately high defence burden. Jinnah had himself approached US President Truman in 1948, seeking aid in return for defence cooperation, and it was almost inevitable that when the US looked for allies to shore up its position in the Cold War, Pakistan responded whereas India preferred to build its global sphere of influence in the non-aligned world. Though China showed understanding of Pakistan’s compulsions, the Soviet Union turned hostile, and extended political and military support to India and Afghanistan.

Pakistan’s advantages from this alliance situation, mainly in acquiring advanced weapons for self-defence, had a flip side, as despite its Islamic moorings, it had to take positions partial to the West on such issues as the tensions over the Suez canal. Furthermore, despite the fact that India became a strategic partner of the Soviet Union after we joined the pacts, the US kept courting India, and together with the UK, rushed large supplies of arms to it after it precipitated a conflict with China, showing little regard for Pakistan’s sensitivities. The year that saw the US and Britain rush enormous quantities of weapons to India to fight China also saw Pakistan realize the error of putting all its eggs in the western basket.

The immediate consequence was US displeasure, manifested in the reduction of US aid, and an attitude partial to India during the 1965 conflict. China not only extended diplomatic support to Pakistan in the war in Kashmir, but also stepped in with emergency supplies of weapons when a western embargo on supplies to both affected Pakistan more seriously.

The popular perception in Pakistan after the conflict was that the US was not interested in Pakistan’s security and survival, whereas China was a more sincere and reliable power, with a stake in Pakistan’s safety and sovereignty.

Once the demarcation of their boundary in 1963 had removed the only likely source of conflict, the graph of Sino-Pakistan friendship moved upwards steadily, earning it the name of “all-weather friendship”. On the other hand, the relationship between Pakistan and the US was characterized by major ups and downs, on the basis of changing perceptions of the US.

For instance, Pakistan’s role as an intermediary between the US and China ushered in a friendly interlude, during Nixon’s presidency, though Washington did nothing to oppose India’s goal of detaching the eastern wing of the country in 1971. However when Mrs Gandhi proceeded to move Indian forces to the west in an effort to utilize its military edge to virtually wipe Pakistan off the map, the US moved to mobilize Soviet pressure to prevent India from attacking West Pakistan.

The final proxy conflict of the Cold War that took place in Afghanistan, which the Soviet Union occupied towards the end of 1979, saw the alliance activated as Pakistan played a pivotal role in supporting the Afghan struggle against this intervention. China also backed this struggle as part of its goal of ending Soviet encirclement. After the Soviet Union was forced to withdraw, the US also abandoned Afghanistan, leaving Pakistan to face the consequences in the shape of the chaos and civil war that followed.

The resultant vacuum provided Osama bin Laden with the opportunity to continue his jihad against US domination of the Islamic heartland, following its victory in the Gulf War of 1991.

With US post Cold War perceptions taking a U-turn, as Islamic resurgence emerged as the successor threat to communism, along with nuclear proliferation which was the other major US concern, Pakistan turned into a threat and became the most sanctioned country after 1990.

During a decade, when democratic governance prevailed, the US played down its ties with Pakistan, whereas, despite 40 years of an Indo-Soviet strategic alliance, India was perceived as a partner in its new agenda.

During the decade of the 1990s, China was the only power continuing with its comprehensive relationship with Pakistan, assisting it in maintaining its deterrence capability against the growing threat from India where an open demand was made for ending partition after its nuclear tests of May 1998. Indeed, as the BJP government invoked the threat from China to justify its agenda, Sino-Pakistan friendship was further cemented.

With Pakistan also carrying out nuclear tests after India, it attracted increased attention, though US inclination at that time was to pressure Pakistan over alleged support to terrorism in Kashmir, whereas the relationship with India was to be raised to new heights. This was spelt out clearly during President Clinton’s visit to South Asia in 2000. President Bush also put a premium on friendship with India when he assumed power in 2001. He perceived India as a counterweight to China.

Pakistan’s geo-strategic situation again transformed its role following the terrorist attacks against the US on September 11, 2001. President Musharraf took a courageous and wise decision to join the coalition against terrorism, and to extend logistic support as required in the coalition’s attack on Afghanistan after it failed to hand over Osama Bin Laden.

Although the Taliban regime was toppled within a month of the start of operations, their remnants and those of Al Qaeda remain active. Bin Laden and some of his top aides are still at large. The challenge of subduing terrorism and discouraging extremism is a major one for which Pakistan’s support will remain vital for many years to come. Therefore, the alliance relationship will continue. However, there is a religious dimension to US policies, which, for the foreseeable future, are likely to remain pro-Jewish, and anti-Islamic. Here, while favouring an enlightened and moderate approach, Pakistan must defend the core interests of the Islamic world, whether in political matters (as in Palestine and Kashmir), or in ideological or economic affairs.

The US is inclined to be domineering, basing its interests on its military might. It counts on regional hegemons, like Israel and India, to back the status quo. China, on the other hand, adheres to principles, and identifies with the interests and aspirations of the majority of mankind. The US will remain the most powerful nation, and its major role in shaping the world’s future will continue. We share many of its values and goals, but disagree on others. China is a neighbour that has always stood by us. We share most of its values.

As we look to the future, with many global changes demanding better management of our problems, and a more equitable sharing of the globe’s finite resources, we need to play a positive and responsible role, which is facilitated by greater reliance on multilateral institutions such as the UN. For us, an important principle to follow is not to allow ourselves to be used against trusted friends such as China.

The dictates of peace and justice are best served by letting principles prevail, particularly that of rejection of any acquisition of territory by force.