Federal Legislative List
PART II
1. Railways.

2. Mineral oil and natural gas; liquids and substances declared by Federal law to be dangerously inflammable.

3. Development of industries, where development under Federal control is declared by Federal law to be expedient in the public interest; institutions, establishments, bodies and corporations administered or managed by the Federal Government immediately before the commencing day, including the Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority and the Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation; all undertakings, projects and schemes of such institutions, establishments, bodies and corporations, industries, projects and undertakings owned wholly or partially by the Federation or by a corporation set up by the Federation.
[12]

[4. Electricity.

5. Major ports, that is to say, the declaration and delimitation of such ports, and the constitution and powers of port authorities therein.

6. All regulatory authorities established under a Federal law.

7. National planning and national economic coordination including planning and coordination of scientific and technological research.

8. Supervision and management of public debt.

9. Census.

10. Extension of the powers and jurisdiction of members of a police force belonging to any Province to any area in another Province, but not so as to enable the police of one Province to exercise powers and jurisdiction in another Province without the consent of the Government of that Province; extension of the powers and jurisdiction of a police force belonging to any Pronvice to railway areas outside that Province.

11. Legal, medical and other professions.

12. Standards in institutions for higher education and research, scientific and technical institutions.

13. Inter-provincial matters and co-ordination.]

[13]

[13. Council of Common Interests.

14. Fees in respect of any of the matters in this Part but not including fees taken in any court.

15. Offences against laws with respect to any of the matters in this Parts.

16. Inquiries and statistics for the purposes of any of the matters in this Part.

17. Matters incidental or ancillary to any matter enumerated in this Part.]

Dear Brother Thanks for your kind information.I am in confusion kindly help me as FPSC has not updated its schedule for Psychological Tests & Interviews on its website.Kindly guide me what is the sequence centers for Psychological Tests & Interviews.I am anxiously waitinf for your reply.
Thanks.

A candidate make following story from this title. It is his good effort.

Story Title
A table and three chairs in a room. 2 persons sit on chairs and one is raising his hand in air. A flask along with 3 cups were on table

Story:

Ahmed,Ali and omer are best friends. They are bright students of their college and always participated in extracurricular activities.The district is organizing a bait-bazi competition and they decided to participate on behalf of their college. They divided famous poets like Iqbal, Faiz, Qateel shafai,Ghalib etc among each other and memorizing their ishaars. In free time, they go to common room and practice for competition. For good practice, they start bait-bazi and give tough time to each other. in the given picture, Omer is reading the beautiful shair of Allama Iqbal "khudii ko kar buland itna" and he became emotional and raised his hands in air.
hence our young generation must read the Iqbal's poetry to wake their eager spirit and to understand the concept of self reliance.


Correction

excellent solution dear.

bright, extra-curricular, r suitable words.

khudi ko kar buland itna, concept of self reliance; these sentences show healthy expressions.

u write "he became emotional" it is not correct.

u should write in this way;
"he became excited and raised his hand"

Try to use proper and simple words.

Moreover u can write ur merits in character of any person; e,g;

Ahmad, Ali and umer r very efficient, obedient, passionate and cofident .
They r very social........................................

__________________
People will always throw stones in your path, it depends on you whether you make a wall of difficulties or a bridge of success.
Fail to Plan is Plan to Fail.

Ijaz bhai


as u told questions regarding botany history agricULTURE

Can u kindly post questions related o

Eco---
Indian History----any other questions
Journalis---
Sociology----
ISL----
Int lAW
muslim Law
current affairs????

Kindly if u cud tel us questions on these they will help us alot
i ll be grateful 2 u bro----

Regards

__________________
“The greatest discovery of all time is that a person can change his future by merely changing his attitude.”

China’s Ambassador In Pakistan:

Asia Needs A New Security Concept


On The Eve Of Pakistan President’s Visit
China’s Ambassador In
Pakistan: Asia Needs A New
Security Concept

As China’s leadership honors Pakistan by inviting the Pakistani president to
open Asian Games 2010, China’s ambassador to Pakistan says China’s role
in Asia cannot be denied, that China invests in Asia more than any other
continent, and that disputes must be appropriately managed and resolved
according to international norms.
6
H.E. Mr. LIU JIAN, Chinese
Ambassador to Pakistan | 12 November
2010 |

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan—In the large context of deepening trends towards a multi-polar world and economic globalization, new changes have taken place in the economic and political landscape of Asia. Overall, the pursuit of peace, stability, cooperation and development is the defining feature of the situation in Asia. China's ties with its Asian neighbors have indeed gone through historic changes, which are characterized by good-neighborliness, mutual trust and mutually beneficial cooperation. In a nutshell, China's relations with its Asian neighbors have been growing and moving forward. This is a fact that no one can alter. Political Relations This year, China has had high-level visits and exchanges with almost all Asian countries. If we count the important regional multilateral meetings attended by major Chinese leaders, such high-level exchanges number more than 60. In addition, Chinese Foreign Minister has exchanged nearly 20 visits with his Asian counterparts. This year, centering on "Friendship Year", China held a host of commemorative activities in various forms with such neighbors as Indonesia, Vietnam, Myanmar and India respectively to celebrate the 60th anniversary of diplomatic relations. This year, China's relations with ASEAN have built on past success and broken new ground. At the just-concluded 13th China-ASEAN Summit, Premier Wen Jiabao and ASEAN leaders agreed that China-ASEAN relations are the most pragmatic, extensive, comprehensive, vibrant and fruitful strategic relations. They also agreed to continue to pursue peaceful development through friendly cooperation and the integration building in East Asia. Regarding the differences or disputes between China and some neighbors on certain issues, China always holds that they should be appropriately managed and resolved through dialogue and consultation based on facts and in accordance with the basic norms governing international relations. Economic Cooperation Over the past two years, Asian countries have played an important 7 role in helping Asia to lead in an economic rebound and made East Asia a major engine for world economic growth. In trade, from January to September this year, the trade volume between China and other Asian countries exceeded US$640 billion, up by 38% year-on-year. China remains the biggest export market for other Asian countries. We have scaled up assistance to countries in South Asia, like Pakistan, Bangladesh and Afghanistan. We gave preferential tariff treatment to 70% of imports from Bangladesh and Afghanistan, in order to reduce trade imbalances. In investment, the Chinese statistics show that in the first quarter of this year, China's non-financial investment in Asian countries grew by 102% year-on-year, and Asia has now hosted more Chinese-invested enterprises outside China than any other region in the world. In infrastructure and connectivity, China actively supports the Master Plan on ASEAN connectivity, and is seeking to cooperate with East Asian countries in developing roads, railways, navigation routes and ports in the region. We also step up our participation and cooperation in other mechanisms. In financial cooperation, the ASEAN +3 have established a regional foreign exchange reserve pool of US$120 billion and a regional Credit Guarantee and Investment Facility of US$700 million. China has signed bilateral currency swap agreements amounting to 360 billion RMB yuan with Malaysia, Indonesia and the ROK. Development is a common task for

China and other Asian countries. China will stay committed to an opening-up strategy of mutual benefit and win-win progress, work together with other Asian countries and help and support each other to jointly push for the recovery and growth of the Asian economy.

Regional Stability China believes that a new security concept should be established with mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination at its core; one that recognizes, respects and rises above national differences in terms of ideology, values, social system and development stage. China has played an active and constructive role in addressing hotspot issues. And it is dedicated in its effort to seek peaceful resolution of disputes over territory, territorial sea and maritime rights and interests through friendly negotiations. The overall situation in the South China Sea is stable, albeit there are some disturbances. To maintain peace and stability in the South China Sea, refrain from expanding, complicating or internationalizing the disputes and avoid conflicts and tension in this region serve the common interests of China and 8 other countries in the region. China believes that disputes in the South China Sea should be resolved peacefully through bilateral negotiations between the parties directly involved. Pending a solution, we can shelf the disputes and engage in joint development. China is ready to work with the parties concerned to follow through with the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, build up mutual trust and promote cooperation. The Parties to the disputes have agreed on a host of important principles in peacefully resolving the disputes. And some parties to the disputes share the view that forces from outside the region should not be involved in the disputes. As a close neighbor to the Korean Peninsula, China has followed closely the development of the situation there and has made persistent efforts to encourage the parties concerned to meet each other half way and improve their relations to uphold peace and stability in Northeast Asia. We are of the view that to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula through the Six-Party Talks, address the concerns of various parties in a balanced manner and set up a Northeast Asia peace and security mechanism will fundamentally reduce problems and disputes in the region and will contribute to enduring peace on the Peninsula and in Northeast Asia. China will continue to work with the parties concerned and the international community, and play a constructive role in denuclearizing the Peninsula and uphold peace and stability on the Peninsula and in Northeast Asia. Cultural Exchange China enjoys geographical proximity and an enduring and strong historical and cultural bond with other Asian countries, which have laid a solid basis for China to carry out social, cultural and people-to-people exchanges and cooperation with its neighboring countries at the right time. As China advocates an open and inclusive concept on civilization, it believes that it is important to vigorously facilitate social, cultural and people-to-people exchanges among Asian nations with different cultural background and political systems on the basis of fully respecting the cultural tradition, social system and development path of individual countries. This will further enhance understanding, friendship and mutual trust between the people of China and its neighboring countries. And it will consolidate public support for friendly relations between China and its neighbors. Cultural and people-to-people exchanges between China and its neighboring countries have been most robust in recent years. More and more people are traveling between China and other Asian countries. Chinese immigration authorities registered in 2009 a total of 21.6898 million inbound and outbound visits made by people 9 from Asia. In 2009, more than 160,000 students from other Asian countries came to study in China. We have established annual youth exchange mechanisms with Pakistan, Japan, Vietnam, Mongolia and India. We have set up more than 100 Confucius Institutes in Asia and Chinese Culture Centers in the ROK, Japan and Mongolia. "Happy Spring Festival" and other external cultural exchange programs are well-received among governments and people of neighboring countries. We encourage exchanges and visits between media organizations of China and other Asian nations to increase media coverage about each other and enhance mutual understanding.

China-Pakistan Relations
China and Pakistan are good neighbors, close friends and trusted brothers. The China-Pakistan relationship stood the test of time and continued to enjoy a sound and stable development in recent years. High level visits are frequent. Bilateral cooperation in such fields as trade, energy, transportation, telecommunications and infrastructure continues to expand and deepen. There are thousands of Chinese engineers and workers in Pakistan who are working hard for the country's economic development despite difficult condition. The Chinese government and people, over the years, have been providing unselfish and unconditional help and support to Pakistan. In light of the great loss of lives and property inflicted by the floods that have hit Pakistan since late July, the Chinese government has pledged a total of 250 million US dollars humanitarian assistance to Pakistan. The Chinese people also have been lending a helping hand in a variety of ways to help their Pakistan brothers. A Chinese reconstruction survey delegation visited the flood-affected areas in Pakistan recently and assured China's all-out support of the reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts of the brotherly country. Apart from the achievements that we have jointly made over the years, we have more potential to explore in terms of trade, investment, defense, people-to-people contacts and others. Next year will mark the 60th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between our two countries. Taking into account our special relations and our strategic partnership of cooperation, China is ready to work with Pakistan to take the opportunity of the 60th anniversary to further expand our friendly cooperation and to bring our bilateral relations into a new high.

Grameen's Yunus in cash scandal
By Syed Tashfin Chowdhury

DHAKA - Claims that Muhammad Yunus, who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts in Bangladesh to provide small loans to the poor, diverted as much as US$100 million in funds from international donors to his own companies are being investigated by the Norwegian government.

While the Norwegians insist that no criminal activity has taken place, International Development Minister Erik Solheim said it was "totally unacceptable that aid is used for other purposes than intended", according to a BBC report.

The transferred aid was to have been given to the poor as micro-loans by Grameen Bank, which was founded by Yunus in the early 1980s and won the Nobel prize alongside him in 2006. The



money was transferred in 1996 to Grameen Kalyan, one of Yunus's other companies, which has nothing to do with micro-credit loans.

Fueling public concern and anger over Grameen Bank and the now large micro-loan business in Bangladesh, a claim was filed on Thursday against Yunus and 12 others by the manager of the Sirajganj district branch of Social Islami Bank, claiming payment of 40 million takas (US$567,000).

Grameen Bank has declined to make a detailed response to media inquiries since the scandal broke earlier this week with the airing of an investigative documentary Fanget i Mikrogjeld (Caught in Micro debt)", on NRK, the national Norwegian television channel.

A Bengali newspaper, Kaler Kantho, on December 2 quoted a bank executive, M Shahjahan, as saying the allegations were "false. The bank will release a detailed statement on the affairs soon."

Grameen Bank said Yunus is out of the country and is due back on December 10. An employee of the bank told Asia Times Online: "He is out of the country on an international tour and will definitely have answers once he returns."

An English-language newspaper, The Daily Star, reported on December 3: "The bank is already working on the issue, but since it was a matter happening about 14 years ago, it is taking some time to get all the facts together."

The scandal has renewed argument over whether micro-credit organizations in Bangladesh are really motivated toward alleviating poverty or are purely profit-making business ventures.

According to Bdnews24.com, a Bangladeshi online news agency, the claim by Social Islami Bank says various loans amounting to around 10 million takas were taken from the bank by Grameen Udyog, a concern of Grameen Bank, and Ganaswasthya Grameen Textile Mills, which jointly run a business named Textile Projects. The claim said the loans were taken to build up capital and thus production.

As the loans remained unpaid, additional charges worth 40 million takas had accumulated. The manager told Bdnews24.com that he filed the case at court on instructions from more senior executives.

The documentary that sparked the scandal quotes Professor Jonathan Morduch from New York University saying: "Grameen Bank received $175 million in subsidies to give tiny loans to poor people."

Never before published documents, currently available at bdnews24.com website, detail how Yunus transferred about 7 billion takas from a fund accumulated through foreign grants from Norway, Sweden and Germany, to the account of Grameen Kalyan, which was set up and controlled by Yunus, in 1996.

Bdnews24.com reported that when the Norwegian embassy, Norwegian aid agency Norad, and the Economic Relations Division in Bangladesh, part of the Ministry of Finance, found out about this in the late 1990s, they demanded that Yunus return the money to Grameen Bank. However, the Nobel laureate reportedly paid back less than $30 million of the $100 million. The remainder still remains with Grameen Kalyan.

The secret documents, consisting of correspondence between Yunus, the Norwegian ambassador to Bangladesh Hans Frederik Lehne in 1997 and Norad director general Tove Strand Gerhardesn, also suggest that Yunus breached an agreement on loans.

Debt under the carpet
Bdnews24 reported that, during a meeting at the Grameen Bank office on December 3, 1997, the Norwegian Embassy came to know about a deal between Grameen Bank and Grameen Kalyan. The deal, which became effective from December 31, 1996, involved the transfer of 3.9 billion takas.

Following this, the Norwegian Embassy in Dhaka wrote a letter, dated December 15, 1997, and signed by Ambassador Lehne, to Yunus, noted that in line with that deal, Grameen Bank transferred all funds, donated as "revolving funds" through foreign grants, up to December 31, 1996, to Grameen Kalyan, which at the same date transferred the amount to Grameen Bank as a loan.

While citing 1.927 billion takas, out of 3.914 billion takas, as part of a "revolving fund for housing loans" according to an agreement between the governments of Bangladesh and Norway to support the Grameen Bank Phase IV project, the letter stressed: "The agreement [between Grameen Bank and Grameen Kalyan] concerning these transactions has not made provisions for any interest rates to be charged for this part of the loan, nor any terms of repayment."

In the letter, the Norwegian Embassy expressed its concern about how it was "not informed" about the deal between the two organizations, while further adding that it "was contrary to the quoted clause of the agreement between the governments". The letter further noted that, as of December 31, 1996, Grameen Bank accounts did "not reflect that any revolving fund for housing loan is in operation in Grameen bank".

After stating that the government of Norway did not enter into an agreement with the Bangladesh government to provide funds to Grameen Kalyan which in turn would lend to Grameen Bank, the embassy through the letter expressed, "uncertainty about future repayment of the loan to Grameen Kalyan, since it is not regulated by the agreement. The agreement is also silent about Grameen Bank's use of the loan from Grameen Kalyan."

Referring to the agreement between Grameen Bank and Grameen Kalyan "as a change which affects two agreements between the two governments to support Grameen Bank", the embassy asked Yunus for a written explanation about "why Grameen Bank entered into the agreement with Grameen Kalyan, and of the consequences for the owners of Grameen Bank and the beneficiaries of the housing loans."

Lost in communication
Yunus replied to the letter on January 8, 1998, seeking to explain that the deal between Grameen Bank (GB) and Grameen Kalyan (GK) could help in managing financial resources and assets effectively in order to provide the maximum benefits to Grameen's customers, while also ensuring maximum transparency and responsibility of the revolving funds.

While comparing the earlier system with the changed one, he wrote: "But since in the earlier approach the fund was available within the same management structure, in spite of the policy compulsion to revolve it, there remained the possibility that the required financial discipline to recover the money and exercise appropriate caution to effectively monitor the loan operation, may not be enforced." He reasoned that GK could be the company that exclusively managed the revolving fund.

"We believe that the new arrangement does not in any way violate any of the clauses of the agreement between Norway and [the] Government of Bangladesh, rather it strengthens professionally the financial operation of GB for eradication of poverty," Yunus said in his letter, while pointing out that the directors of the bank took the decision within the scope of its agreement with the donors. "It in no way threatened to interfere with the successful utilisation of the grant [and] that is why we did not think of informing the donors."

On charging interest for the housing portion of the loan given to GB, Yunus said in his letter. "Adding interest on this loan would have made the fund costly for the GB to transfer it to the borrowers at the existing rate of eight percent."

He added, "The issue of adding interest can be reviewed if deemed appropriate by the lending and borrowing organization." Through the decision, "more efficient and prudent fund management and accountability on the part of GB" would be ensured.

Yunus admitted in the letter that while the foreign grant money had increased the liquidity of the funds that could be used for micro-credit loans, GK's establishment through endowment funds had widened the scope for initiating new projects through which poverty alleviation could be addressed, which was the initial purpose of the Social Advancement Fund which had accumulated through grants from Norway, Sweden and Germany and of which



the 1.9 billion taka revolving fund was a part.

However, Bdnews24.com highlighted his statement in the letter where he mentioned: "With gradual higher interest rate charged, (…) more and more money will have to be paid out as taxes in future," leading to the controversy.

Not being totally satisfied with the letter, the embassy wrote to the government of Bangladesh alleging that Grameen Bank transferred money from Norad and other international donors to various enterprises outside Grameen Bank. Following this, Yunus wrote in a personal letter to Norad director general Tove Strand Gerhardsen on April 1, 1998: "We are struggling to resolve it. But I think it is not making much progress."

Yunus went on: "If the people, within and outside government, who are not supportive of Grameen, get hold of this letter we'll face real problems in Bangladesh."

Informing Gerhardsen about a visit by Yunus to Oslo on April 29 and 30, 1998, where he was invited by Norwegian telecoms group Telenor and the Worldview International Foundation to discuss a joint venture project in mass education in Bangladesh, Yunus requested a meeting with Gerhardsen "for a few minutes so that I get a chance to explain the seriousness of the matter." He concluded the letter with: "Sorry to bring up all these matters to you. But I have no option left."

The investigative documentary says after revealing the documents and the incidents: " ... And Norad, the Norwegian Embassy and the Bangladeshi authorities kept their mouths shut."

The documentary was directed by Tom Heinemann, a Danish award-winning journalist, who told Bdnews24.com that although he had tried to talk to Yunus for the past six months, "he didn't want to talk to me."

While Grameen Bank has declined to comment on the fund transfer claims, staff speculated that the incident is a "conspiracy by a certain influential group which still bears a grudge against the Nobel laureate for his intentions to launch a political party soon after returning to Dhaka after receiving the Nobel prize in 2006." Yunus later dropped the idea of entering politics.

Following the television documentary, Norwegian authorities told the BBC that they have no suspicion of tax fraud or corruption committed by Grameen Bank. International Development Minister Erik Solheim told the BBC that he had asked the Norwegian Agency for Development Co-operation for a full report on the matter. "At the same time it is important to stress that we are firm believers in micro-finance as a tool in the fight against poverty," he said.

The vicious micro-credit cycle
Through the innovation of micro-credit innovation, the poor, who lack capital, employment, collateral or credit history, are given tiny loans through which they can start small businesses. As the business improves, the loan-taker is supposed to repay the loan in instalments.

The micro-credit revolution began soon after the organization that became Grameen Bank gave out its first micro-credit loans in 1976 to Sufia Khatun at Jobra village in Chittagong, Bangladesh. It gained global popularity after Yunus with Grameen Bank won the 2006 Nobel Peace Prize "for their efforts to create economic and social development from below".

While micro-credit has spread to other parts of the world, the non-government micro-finance sector in Bangladesh has grown to be dominated by GB, the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee, the Association for Social Advancement and Proshika. Some commentators and financial experts believe that due to the lack of accountability, these institutions are gradually becoming profit-making loan-sharks.

Heinemann told Bdnews24.com that he stumbled on the fund transfer information after gaining interest on micro-finance. Along with his film crew, Heinemann travelled to most of the villages described in Grameen Bank's publicity literature as "success stories".

He told Bdnews24, "In Jobra, we meet the daughter of the famous original loan taker, Sufia Begum. In 'Hillary Village', where the former first lady of the USA [and now US Secretary of State] Hillary Clinton declared her support for both Mohammad Yunus and Grameen Bank, the crew meets poor people who have gained nothing but more debt due to micro-credit.

"Each one had multiple loans in various micro-credit banks and organizations and had had a hard time trying to pay back their loans. Some had sold their house, others had their tin-sheets pulled off their houses to cover the weekly payments," he said, while adding that noted social scientists such Thomas Dichter, Milford Bateman and Jonathan Morduch have all converged on one notion: "After 35 years of micro-credit there is no evidence that [it] lifts millions out of poverty."

Heinemann told Bdnews.24 that the international version of his documentary will contain interviews from Andhra Pradesh in India, where numerous suicides have been reported amongst micro-credit loan takers, leading to question the success of micro-credit in alleviating poverty.

In a feature about the shady side of micro-credit, published in the Bangladeshi daily New Age on August 28, 2009, Mohiuddin Alamgir wrote about the fate of Sufia Khatun, the first Grameen Bank loan taker. "Last year, her [Sufia's] funeral was conducted through generous contributions of fellow villagers as she had nothing left after paying the interest for the loan when she still breathed."

In the same feature, Alamgir pointed out that the average interest rate charged by the micro-financing institutions in Bangladesh for small loans ranged from 25% to 35%. Criticizing micro-credit institutions in Bangladesh for having political ambitions and business interests, economists and experts who were interviewed further expressed their concerns that micro-credit loans are actually leading to more poverty for the loan-takers.

In the documentary, Dr Qazi Kholiquzzaman Ahmad, an economist and chairman of Palli Karma Sahayak Foundation (PKSF), a body that monitors micro-finance, described micro-credit as a "death trap" for the poor.

Professor Abu Ahmed, of the economics department in Dhaka University, blamed the government for the irregularities of the micro-credit organizations.

"Although Yunus through GB had initiated the micro-credit revolution, the irregularities increased over the past decade as, while new organizations began operations, there was no government body overseeing their operations," Abu told Asia Times Online. "Rather than slandering Dr Yunus's image, government policies need to be analyzed, as it has let the micro-credit sector mutate into a 'micro-credit industry'."

Anu Mohammad, professor at the economics department of Jahangirnagar University in Bangladesh, told Asia Times Online that although most micro-credit financing institutions had become "corporate successes by initiating businesses following the combination of foreign grant funds with the unprecedented amount of capital accumulated", they all failed at achieving poverty eradication, the primary motives behind micro-credit financing.

Citing his own research, he said, "Only 5-10% of loan-takers consist of success cases. However, these households cannot be described as impoverished as they have other sources of income.

"Over 50% of loan-takers have been plunged into serious financial quagmires as weekly instalments are regular and repressive, when these households are usually facing deficit income. Most loan-takers ultimately seek further loans from village loan sharks to repay the micro-credit loans."

Fearing the controversy surrounding GB and Yunus will very likely tarnish the global image for Bangladesh, he added: "This was inevitable. The lack of transparency and accountability always gave these organizations the leeway to operate in the ways they wished. Their operations and transactions are always shrouded in mystery. However, through their local and international influence, such organizations always manage to keep intact their public image as society's saviours. That phase is gradually coming to end though."

Syed Tashfin Chowdhury is a senior staff writer at New Age in Dhaka.

@rishzzz

Questions about Eoc..., journalism, Sociology,ISL, Int law. Muslim law

I dont have any idea about them as these r not my optional.

But i suggest u to prepare them in this weay;

1. Prepare that syllabus which u cram for written portion.

Make short keys of ur notes. Cram them. No need to cram figures, statics, dates. Only prepare those facts and figures wehich r very impiortant.

2. Also study that material which u left during written prepration.

Previous questions of current affairs asked in 2009 r of no use for u.

U should prepare current affairs comprehensively.

I wil try to share more questions about indian history. Actually now i m out of my city. I wil share more questions about psyche and interview in 2 to 3 days INSHALLAH.

__________________
People will always throw stones in your path, it depends on you whether you make a wall of difficulties or a bridge of success.
Fail to Plan is Plan to Fail.

Pipeline project a new Silk Road
By M K Bhadrakumar

An American diplomatic cable that puts Washington to shame originated from the United States Embassy in Ashgabat last December, portraying Turkmen President Gurbanguli Berdymukhamedov as "vain, suspicious, guarded, strict, very conservative, a practiced liar", a good actor who can be vindictive but isn't a "very bright guy" and is wary of his intellectual superiors.

The WikiLeaks revelation is not likely to please Berdymukhamedov. Yet the irony is that it is this allegedly insecure, mediocre, mercurial politician with a racy private life who is set to make the critical difference between the success and failure of the US strategy in Afghanistan.

The significance of the signing of the inter-governmental agreement over the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India



(TAPI) gas-pipeline project on Saturday in Ashgabat cannot be underestimated. It is a unique Silk Road project that holds the key to resolving many complicated issues in the region.

The project is ostensibly about the transportation of the huge Caspian energy reserves to the world market, but it is also about the stabilization of Afghanistan, fostering of Pakistan-India amity, bonding of Central Asia and South Asia and the overall consolidation of US political, military and economic influence in the strategic high plateau that overlooks Russia, Iran and China.

Ashgabat tips its hand
TAPI is tiptoeing to center stage in the geopolitics of the region primarily due to the pressing need for Ashgabat to find new markets for its gas exports. With the global financial downturn and the fall in Europe's demand for gas, prices crashed. Russia cannot afford to pay top dollar (“European prices”) for the Turkmen gas, nor does it want the 40 bcm (billion cubic meters) of Turkmen gas it previously contracted to purchase.

Ashgabat faces an acute dilemma. Turkmenistan traditionally produces around 70 bcm of gas annually. The volume dropped to 40 bcm this year. Roughly 10 bcm goes to Russia and 12 bcm each to Iran and China. The gas revenue has dramatically fallen and the Turkmen political system is under pressure.

Several large gas fields are coming on line in Russia, which will reduce its need for Turkmen gas. The Yamal Peninsula deposit alone is estimated to hold roughly 16 trillion cubic meters of gas. Yamal can easily feed both the North Stream (55 bcm at full capacity) and South Stream (63 bcm at full capacity) pipelines and still have a surplus.

Meanwhile, Turkmenistan is sitting on the world's fourth-largest gas reserves and plans to increase its gas production to 230 bcm per year by 2030. It desperately needs to find markets and build new pipelines independent of the Soviet-era pipeline system that binds it to Russia.

The South Yolotan field, 350 kilometers to the southeast of Ashgabat, is potentially one of the world's largest natural-gas deposits, with reserves anywhere between 4 and 14 trillion cubic meters. Ashgabat awarded Chinese, United Arab Emirates and South Korean companies with contracts worth US$9.7 billion last December to develop the field. Also, Caspian offshore fields contain another estimated 6 trillion cubic meters (and 12 billion tons of oil). Three American majors - Chevron, ConocoPhillips and TXOil - are bidding for two offshore blocks (out of 32 licensed blocks).



Thus, Berdymukhamedov is being driven by a combination of factors to adopt an energy-export diversification policy. In the recent months, he evinced interest in trans-Caspian projects, but it is a problematic idea since Russia and Iran have so far insisted that such projects require the consent of all riparian countries and this requires a settlement over the status of the Caspian Sea. Besides, Turkmenistan has unresolved territorial disputes with Azerbaijan.

In November, a second Turkmen-Iranian pipeline came on stream and there is potential to increase exports up to 20 bcm. But there are limits to expanding energy ties with Iran or to using Iran as a regional gas hub while the US-Iran standoff continues.

All this compelled Berdymukhamedov to robustly push for TAPI. The projected 2,000-kilometer pipeline, at an estimated cost of $7.6 billion, traverses Afghanistan (735 kilometers) and Pakistan (800 kilometers) to reach India. Its initial capacity will be around 30 bcm but that could be increased to meet higher demand. India and Pakistan have shown interest in buying 70 bcm annually. The pipeline will be fed by the Dauletabad field, which used to supply Russia.

Berdymukhamedov did smart thinking in accelerating TAPI. This is an enterprise whose time has come. Russia cannot easily browbeat him. The US has lined up the Asian Development Bank for the project's funding. An international consortium will undertake the construction of the pipeline.

The pipeline can be easily extended to the Pakistani port of Gwadar and connected with European markets. In short, without appearing to be leaning too far toward the West, Ashgabat is loosening Russia's stranglehold on its gas and oil exports and developing leverage in its dealings with Moscow in future.

Russia can't stop it
Moscow has kept its thoughts to itself, but the geopolitics of the TAPI pipeline are rather obvious. The US is succeeding with a major Silk Road project connecting the Central Asian region with the Western market, while bypassing Russian (and Iranian) territory.

The security of the pipeline is going to be a major regional concern. The onus is on each of the transit countries to secure the pipeline. Part of the Afghan stretch will be buried underground as a safeguard against attacks and local communities will be paid to guard it. But then, Kabul will expect the US and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to provide security cover, which, in turn, leads to the formalization of the long-term Western military presence in Afghanistan.

Without a doubt, the project leads to an overall strengthening of US influence in South Asia. The US put heavy pressure on Pakistan and India to spurn the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) project. Delhi unabashedly buckled under the US pressure. Pakistan showed some degree of defiance and is still keeping its options open.

There have been occasional threatening noises that Pakistan will turn IPI into an IPC (Iran-Pakistan-China) pipeline. However, the US is offering TAPI as an alternative bone for Pakistan to chew so that it won't be left with much zest to press ahead with the IPC pipeline in any tearing hurry. In sum, Moscow should realize that short of playing a spoiler's role, TAPI might go through.

Pakistan has strong reasons to pitch for TAPI. It is in critical need of staving off an energy crisis. The TAPI pipeline can be operational as early as 2013-14. During 2008-2009, Pakistan's demand for natural gas began outstripping its production by a shortfall of 203 mmcfd (million cubic feet per day). Pakistan's share from TAPI is pegged at 1325 mmcfd (the same as India's).

Pakistan also hopes to get a hefty amount from India as transit fee. Then, there are the downstream economic benefits such as industrial expansion, job creation, etc. Most important, Pakistan sees that TAPI heavily involves the US and its comfort level is high whenever Washington becomes a stakeholder in fostering the normalization of its troubled relationship with India.

As Susan Elliot, the US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State on South and Central Asian Affairs, put it: "The pipeline's route may serve as a stabilizing corridor, linking neighbors together in economic growth and prosperity. The road ahead is long for this project but the benefits could be tremendous and are certainly worthy of the diligence demonstrated by those four countries so far."

The TAPI pipeline is in actuality a Silk Road connecting Central Asia to the West via the Pakistani port of Gwadar. It makes Pakistan the US gateway to Central Asia. Pakistan rightly estimates that alongside this enhanced status in US regional strategy comes a US commitment to help the Pakistani economy develop and to buttress Pakistan's security needs in the long term.

US beckons, India follows
India's "diligence" in TAPI also rests on multiple factors. Almost all the reservations that Indian government officials mouthed from time to time as reasons for lack of interest in IPI hold good for TAPI - security of the pipeline, uncertainties in India-Pakistan relations, cost of the imported gas, self-sufficiency of India's indigenous gas production, etc. But the Indian leadership is visibly ecstatic about TAPI.

First and foremost, powerful Indian business interests in the petrochemical industry are involved. An interesting feature of the project is that the four governments have agreed to "outsource" execution and management of the $7.6 billion project. That is a lot of pork.

India's energy-pricing policies are opaque and Delhi heavily subsidizes its private industry, which develops indigenous gas production. Now, Delhi will be negotiating its gas price separately with Ashgabat. That is certain to be the mother of all negotiations, involving two partners who are notoriously placed at the very bottom of the world ranking by Transparency International.

Indian Petroleum Minister Murli Deora is already grandstanding. At Saturday's ceremony in Ashgabat, he said: "Without doubt, pricing of gas is one of the most important issues. It needs to be appreciated that Turkmen gas would have to compete with other forms of gas in the markets of the buyer countries, including indigenous gas. Being at the tail-end of the project, India will incur the maximum risk with regard to safety of supply."

In strategic terms, India realizes that TAPI is a US-sponsored regional enterprise and, unsurprisingly, it is eager to participate in it. India would also weigh the advantages of a long-term US involvement in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Any project that makes Pakistan a stakeholder in regional security and stability would interest India. To quote Deora, TAPI is the "new Silk Route between Central Asia and South Asia" and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has described it as a "peace pipeline" in the region.

Again, TAPI signifies a step forward for the Indian quest for access to Afghanistan and Central Asia via Pakistan. India will factor in that TAPI forms part of the US regional policy focusing on the stabilization of Afghanistan, and the realization of the project may incrementally persuade Pakistan to do course correction on its support to militant groups. The project certainly offers India useful avenues of bilateral interaction with Pakistan, which can lead to bigger dialogue processes.

Indeed, the doomsday predictions are that the security situation in Afghanistan does not give any scope for the realization of the pipeline. But this is also a chicken-and-egg situation. TAPI can as well be viewed as the missing link that fosters an India-Pakistan consensus over settlement in Afghanistan. But then, in order to grasp the complicated thought, we must also take note of other subtle shades in the big picture.

India-Pakistan back channels on Kashmir are being quietly revived under US watch, and with Pakistan holding off from stirring up the uprising in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, calm has been restored. The Indian interior minister has been emboldened to speak about a "Kashmir solution" in the coming few months. There is talk in the air about the next round of talks between the Indian and Pakistani foreign ministers.

In sum, Berdymukhamedov is leading TAPI into the limelight against the backdrop of new stirrings. Who says he isn't a "very bright guy"? The calendar for the pipeline's completion coincides exactly with the 2014 timeline for the end of the US combat mission in Afghanistan.

Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar was a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service. His assignments included the Soviet Union, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey.

@Interview aspirants

U focus more on these issues with regard to current affairs.

1. Afghan war;

Mistakes of US and Nato forces in afghan war

Lisbon treaty and its critical analysis.

How to find solution of Afghan crisis

2. Obama’s visit to India and its impact over Pakistan
.
3. Causes and expected effects of republican's victory in US.

4. Changing relations of nato and Russia and their impact

5. Nature and contours of pak US relations. Why do both countries need each other? Effect of IND o US relations over pak us relations.

6. Pak china relations and future of their relation.

7. Types & causes of terrorism in pak and solution.

8.Target killing in Karachi--causes and solutions

9. Nature of china india relation and their future

10.Balochistan issue.

11. SCO-a challenging org of USA.

12. Nature of Pak-India relation and how these relations should ideally be keeping in view the changing trends of world economy.

13. US china relation and their future.

14. Iran nuclear issue and its possible solutions.

15. Structure of FATA and problems thereof

16. ECO challenges and opportunities

17. Issues b/w pak & India e.g Sir Creek,Siachin, Wuler Barrage, Kishanganga lake, Baglihar dam etc.

18. Basis and future of us india relations

19. New great game- an introduction

20. Palestine issue current scenario and suggested solution.

21. Globalization-a blessing or curse.

22. Global warming- a glimpse over Kyoto protocol and Copenhagen conference. Impacts of global warming & how to tackle it.

23. Pakistan’s progress in corruption from 42nd to 34th position.

24. power crisi.causes and short term, midterm and long term solutions.

25. OIC and SAARC, two failed organizations.

26. Structure and success story of ASEAN.

27. WTO

29. North and south Korea tension

30. Continuing problem in Darfur, Sudan

31. Enlargement in security council

32. Increasing tension between Muslims and west

33. Kashmir issue

34. Problems of Muslim Ummah

35. Agriculture, Industry and Education of Pakistan, their problems, solutions

__________________
People will always throw stones in your path, it depends on you whether you make a wall of difficulties or a bridge of success.
Fail to Plan is Plan to Fail.

Europe: The New Plan
December 21, 2010 | 1000 GMT
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Europe: The New Plan

By Peter Zeihan

Europe is on the cusp of change. An EU heads-of-state summit Dec. 16 launched a process aimed to save the common European currency. If successful, this process would be the most significant step toward creating a singular European power since the creation of the European Union itself in 1992 — that is, if it doesn’t destroy the euro first.

Envisioned by the EU Treaty on Monetary Union, the common currency, the euro, has suffered from two core problems during its decade-long existence: the lack of a parallel political union and the issue of debt. Many in the financial world believe that what is required for a viable currency is a fiscal union that has taxation power — and that is indeed needed. But that misses the larger point of who would be in charge of the fiscal union. Taxation and appropriation — who pays how much to whom — are essentially political acts. One cannot have a centralized fiscal authority without first having a centralized political/military authority capable of imposing and enforcing its will. Greeks are not going to implement a German-designed tax and appropriations system simply because Berlin thinks it’s a good idea. As much as financiers might like to believe, the checkbook is not the ultimate power in the galaxy. The ultimate power comes from the law backed by a gun.

Europe’s Disparate Parts

This isn’t a revolutionary concept — in fact, it is one most people know well at some level. Americans fought the bloodiest war in their history from 1861 to 1865 over the issue of central power versus local power. What emerged was a state capable of functioning at the international level. It took three similar European wars — also in the 19th century — for the dozens of German principalities finally to merge into what we now know as Germany.

Europe simply isn’t to the point of willing conglomeration just yet, and we do not use the American Civil War or German unification wars as comparisons lightly. STRATFOR sees the peacetime creation of a unified European political authority as impossible, since Europe’s component parts are far more varied than those of mid-19th century America or Germany.

* Northern Europe is composed of advanced technocratic economies, made possible by the capital-generating capacity of the well-watered North European Plain and its many navigable rivers (it is much cheaper to move goods via water than land, and this advantage grants nations situated on such waterways a steady supply of surplus capital). As a rule, northern Europe prefers a strong currency in order to attract investment to underwrite the high costs of advanced education, first-world infrastructure and a highly technical industrial plant. Thus, northern European exports — heavily value added — are not inhibited greatly by a strong currency. One of the many outcomes of this development pattern is a people that identifies with its brethren throughout the river valleys and in other areas linked by what is typically omnipresent infrastructure. This crafts a firm identity at the national level rather than local level and assists with mass-mobilization strategies. Consequently, size is everything.
* Southern Europe, in comparison, suffers from an arid, rugged topography and lack of navigable rivers. This lack of rivers does more than deny them a local capital base, it also inhibits political unification; lacking clear core regions, most of these states face the political problems of the European Union in microcosm. Here, identity is more localized; southern Europeans tend to be more concerned with family and town than nation, since they do not benefit from easy transport options or the regular contact that northern Europeans take for granted. Their economies reflect this, with integration occurring only locally (there is but one southern European equivalent of the great northern industrial mega-regions such as the Rhine, Italy’s Po Valley). Bereft of economies of scale, southern European economies are highly dependent upon a weak currency to make their exports competitive abroad and to make every incoming investment dollar or deutschemark work to maximum effect.
* Central Europe — largely former Soviet territories — have yet different rules of behavior. Some countries, like Poland, fit in well with the northern Europeans, but they require outside defense support in order to maintain their positions. The frigid weather of the Baltics limits population sizes, demoting these countries to being, at best, the economic satellites of larger powers (they’re hoping for Sweden while fearing it will be Russia). Bulgaria and Romania are a mix of north and south, sitting astride Europe’s longest navigable river yet being so far removed from the European core that their successful development may depend upon events in Turkey, a state that is not even an EU member. While states of this grouping often plan together for EU summits, in reality the only thing they have in common is a half-century of lost ground to recover, and they need as much capital as can be made available. As such variation might suggest, some of these states are in the eurozone, while others are unlikely to join within the next decade.

And that doesn’t even begin to include the EU states that have actively chosen to refuse the euro — Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom — or consider the fact that the European Union is now made up of 27 different nationalities that jealously guard their political (and in most cases, fiscal) autonomy.

The point is this: With Europe having such varied geographies, economies and political systems, any political and fiscal union would be fraught with complications and policy mis-prescriptions from the start. In short, this is a defect of the euro that is not going to be corrected, and to be blunt, it isn’t one that the Europeans are trying to fix right now.

The Debt Problem

If anything, they are attempting to craft a work-around by addressing the second problem: debt. Monetary union means that all participating states are subject to the dictates of a single central bank, in this case the European Central Bank (ECB) headquartered in Frankfurt. The ECB’s primary (and only partially stated) mission is to foster long-term stable growth in the eurozone’s largest economy — Germany — working from the theory that what is good for the continent’s economic engine is good for Europe.

One impact of this commitment is that Germany’s low interest rates are applied throughout the currency zone, even to states with mediocre income levels, lower educational standards, poorer infrastructure and little prospect for long-term growth. Following their entry into the eurozone, capital-starved southern Europeans used to interest rates in the 10-15 percent range found themselves in an environment of rates in the 2-5 percent range (currently it is 1.0 percent). To translate that into a readily identifiable benefit, that equates to a reduction in monthly payments for a standard 30-year mortgage of more than 60 percent.

As the theory goes, the lower costs of capital will stimulate development in the peripheral states and allow them to catch up to Germany. But these countries traditionally suffer from higher interest rates for good reasons. Smaller, poorer economies are more volatile, since even tiny changes in the international environment can send them through either the floor or the roof. Higher risks and volatility mean higher capital costs. Their regionalization also engenders high government spending as the central government attempts to curb the propensity of the regions to spin away from the center (essentially, the center bribes the regions to remain in the state).

This means that when the eurozone spread to these places, theory went out the window. In practice, growth in the periphery did accelerate, but that growth was neither smooth nor sustainable. The unification of capital costs has proved more akin to giving an American Express black card to a college freshman: Traditionally capital poor states (and citizens) have a propensity to overspend in situations where borrowing costs are low, due to a lack of a relevant frame of reference. The result has been massive credit binging by corporations, consumers and governments alike, inevitably leading to bubbles in a variety of sectors. And just as these states soared high in the first decade after the euro was introduced, they have crashed low in the past year. The debt crises of 2010 — so far precipitating government debt bailouts for Ireland and Greece and an unprecedented bank bailout in Ireland — can be laid at the feet of this euro-instigated over-exuberance.

It is this second, debt-driven shortcoming that European leaders discussed Dec. 16. None of them want to do away with the euro at this point, and it is easy to see why. While the common currency remains a popular whipping boy in domestic politics, its benefits — mainly lower transaction costs, higher purchasing power, unfettered market access and cheaper and more abundant capital — are deeply valued by all participating governments. The question is not “whither the euro” but how to provide a safety net for the euro’s less desirable, debt-related aftereffects. The agreed-upon path is to create a mechanism that can manage a bailout even for the eurozone’s larger economies when their debt mountains become too imposing. In theory, this would contain the contradictory pressures the euro has created while still providing to the entire zone the euro’s many benefits.

Obstacles to the Safety Net

Three complications exist, however. First, when a bailout is required, it is clearly because something has gone terribly wrong. In Greece’s case, it was out-of-control government spending with no thought to the future; in essence, Athens took that black card and leapt straight into the economic abyss. In Ireland’s case, it was private-sector overindulgence, which bubbled the size of the financial sector to more than four times the entire country’s gross domestic product. In both cases, recovery was flat-out impossible without the countries’ eurozone partners stepping in and declaring some sort of debt holiday, and the result was a complete funding of all Greek and Irish deficit spending for three years while they get their houses in order.

“Houses in order” are the key words here. When the not-so-desperate eurozone states step in with a few billion euros — 223 billion euros so far, to be exact — they want not only their money back but also some assurance that such overindulgences will not happen again. The result is a deep series of policy requirements that must be adopted if the bailout money is to be made available. Broadly known as austerity measures, these requirements result in deep cuts to social services, retirement benefits and salaries. They are not pleasant. Put simply: Germany is attempting to trade financial benefits for the right to make policy adjustments that normally would be handed by a political union.

Europe: The New Plan
(click here to enlarge image)

It’s a pretty slick plan, but it is not happening in a vacuum. Remember, there are two more complications. The second is that the Dec. 16 agreement is only an agreement in principle. Before any Champagne corks are popped, one should consider that the “details” of the agreement raise a more than “simply” trillion-euro question. STRATFOR guesses that to deliver on its promises, the permanent bailout fund (right now there is a temporary fund with a “mere” 750 billion euros) probably would need upwards of three trillion euros. Why so much? The debt bailouts for Greece and Ireland were designed to completely sequester those states from debt markets by providing those governments with all of the cash they would need to fund their budgets for three years. This wise move has helped keep the contagion from spreading to the rest of the eurozone. Making any fund credible means applying that precedent to all the eurozone states facing high debt pressures, and using the most current data available, that puts the price tag at just under 2.2 trillion euros. Add in enough extra so that the eurozone has sufficient ammo left to fight any contagion and we’re looking at a cool 3 trillion euros. Anti-crisis measures to this point have enjoyed the assistance of both the ECB and the International Monetary Fund, but so far, the headline figures have been rather restrained when compared to future needs. Needless to say, the process of coming up with funds of that magnitude when it is becoming obvious to the rest of Europe that this is, at its heart, a German power play is apt to be contentious at best.

The third complication is that the bailout mechanism is actually only half the plan. The other half is to allow states to at least partially default on their debt (in EU diplomatic parlance, this is called the “inclusion of private interests in funding the bailouts”). When the investors who fund eurozone sovereign debt markets hear this, they understandably shudder, since it means the European Union plans to codify giving states permission to walk away from their debts — sticking investors with the losses. This too is more than simply a trillion-euro question. Private investors collectively own nearly all of the eurozone’s 7.5 trillion euros in outstanding sovereign debt. And in the case of Italy, Austria, Belgium, Portugal and Greece, debt volumes worth half or more of GDP for each individual state are held by foreigners.

Assuming investors decide it is worth the risk to keep purchasing government debt, they have but one way to mitigate this risk: charge higher premiums. The result will be higher debt financing costs for all, doubly so for the eurozone’s more spendthrift and/or weaker economies.

For most of the euro’s era, the interest rates on government bonds have been the same throughout the eurozone, based on the inaccurate belief that eurozone states would all be as fiscally conservative and economically sound as Germany. That belief has now been shattered, and the rate on Greek and Irish debt has now risen from 4.5 percent in early 2008 to this week’s 11.9 percent and 8.6 percent, respectively. With a formal default policy in the making, those rates are going to go higher yet. In the era before monetary union became the Europeans’ goal, Greek and Irish government debt regularly went for 20 percent and 10 percent, respectively. Continued euro membership may well put a bit of downward pressure on these rates, but that will be more than overwhelmed by the fact that both countries are, in essence, in financial conservatorship.

Europe: The New Plan
(click here to enlarge image)

That is not just a problem for the post-2013 world, however. Because investors now know the European Union intends to stick them with at least part of the bill, they are going to demand higher returns as details of the default plan are made known, both on any new debt and on any pre-existing debt that comes up for refinancing. This means that states that just squeaked by in 2010 must run a more difficult gauntlet in 2011 — particularly if they depend heavily on foreign investors for funding their budget deficits. All will face higher financing and refinancing costs as investors react to the coming European disclosures on just how much the private sector will be expected to contribute.

Leaving out the two states that have already received bailouts (Greece and Ireland), the four eurozone states STRATFOR figures face the most trouble — Portugal, Belgium, Spain and Austria, in that order — plan to raise or refinance a quarter trillion euros in 2011 alone. Italy and France, two heavyweights not that far from the danger zone, plan to raise another half-trillion euros between them. If the past is any guide, the weaker members of this quartet could face financing costs of double what they’ve faced as recently as early 2008. For some of these states, such higher costs could be enough to push them into the bailout bin even if there is no additional investor skittishness.

The existing bailout mechanism probably can handle the first four states (just barely, and assuming it works as advertised), but beyond that, the rest of the eurozone will have to come up with a multitrillion-euro fund in an environment in which private investors are likely to balk. Undoubtedly, the euro needs a new mechanism to survive. But by coming up with one that scares those who make government deficit-spending possible, the Europeans have all but guaranteed that Europe’s financial crisis will get much worse before it begins to improve.

But let’s assume for a moment that this all works out, that the euro survives to the day that the new mechanism will be in place to support it. Consider what such a 2013 eurozone would look like if the rough design agreed to Dec. 16 becomes a reality. All of the states flirting with bailouts as 2010 draws to a close expect to have even higher debt loads two years from now. Hence, investors will have imposed punishing financing costs on all of them. Alone among the major eurozone countries not facing such costs will be Germany, the country that wrote the bailout rules and is indirectly responsible for managing the bailouts enacted to this point. Berlin will command the purse strings and the financial rules, yet be unfettered by those rules or the higher financing costs that go with them. Such control isn’t quite a political union, but so long as the rest of the eurozone is willing to trade financial sovereignty for the benefits of the euro, it is certainly the next best thing.