Parties:
Plaintiff: Clayton Coal Co. (seller)

Defendant: Cohen (buyer)

Facts:
On Aug 14th, 1926, plaintiff wrote a letter to defendant that they would enter into an agreement, providing that from Aug 14th, 1926 to Aug 14th, 1927, plaintiff supplied lump and slack coal to defendant and the price was fixed or depending on the market price. Defendant wrote down “Accepted” and signed and mailed the copied letter to plaintiff. But the plaintiff said they never received. After Aug 14th, 1926, defendants ordered both lump and slack coal from the plaintiff and that orders were filled at the prices mentioned in Aug 14th, 1926’s letter until on April 1927 when the defendants ordered slack coal and the plaintiff refused to fill the order.

Issue:
Whether the part performance can constitute a contract in this case?

Reasoning:
There was no formal acceptance of the contract.

It is unfair to plaintiff if the market price goes up, defendant will keep the contract as compulsory while the market price goes down, defendant said there is no binding contract, which leaves plaintiff under the binding of the contract while defendant has right to select. So there is no want of mutuality and that kind of part performance did not constitute it a valid contract between the parties.

Holding:
Judgment is in favor of plaintiff.

P/S: P appeals from summary judgment for D in Court of Common Pleas

Facts: P grocery chain and D armored car service entered into a contract for armored car service and the agreement later was amended to provide for the timely reimbursement of service-related losses. P brought a breach of contract action after it alleged that a robber stole one of P’s cash bags in D possession and D refused to reimburse appellant. P claims that D was in possession of the money bag when it was stolen, and the fact that no receipt was issued was immaterial and D claims that although they were in possession, they were not responsible for the bags until “the bags have been accepted and receipted for by its employees”, according to paragraph 5 of the contract.

Issue: Whether the court can excuse the non-occurrence of a condition, the issuing of a receipt, that is expressly stated in a contract.

Holding: the receipt provision was a condition precedent, but it could be excused if it was not a material part of the contract.

Outcome: REVERSED AND REMANDED, FOR P. The court remanded for a determination of the materiality of the receipt provision. The court also remanded to determine whether the forfeiture (not enforcing the receipt condition) would be disproportionate. Standard

Rule: To the extent that the non-occurrence of a condition would cause disproportionate forfeiture, a court may excuse the non-occurrence of that condition unless its occurrence was a material part of the agreed exchange. (Restatement 229)

Rationale: The P entered into the contract so that it would have a secure method to transfer their cash and checks. The requirement of the receipt was little more than an accounting device for the D, and did nothing to protect the P. To determine whether the fortitude is disproportionate is found in section 229, comment b: “In determining whether the forfeiture is "disproportionate," the court must weigh the extent of the forfeiture by the obligee against the importance to the obligor of the risk from which he sought to be protected and the degree to which that protection will be lost if the nonoccurrence of the condition is excused to the extent required to prevent forfeiture.”

__________________
"Tumhary nafs ki qeemat Janat hay isy Janat say kam qeemat pey na bechna."
"Jiyo to istarh ky log tum sy milny ko tarsy; maro to istrah k log tumharee mot par royain"

Facts: In 1909, Johnson and Acme Mills entered into a contract which stated that Johnson would deliver 2,000 bushels of wheat at $1.03 per bushel (to be paid upon delivery) to Acme Mills. Acme would provide sacks to Johnson to transport the wheat from the thresher to the mill. Johnson failed to deliver the wheat, and Acme sued to recover damages of $320, including $80 for the value of the sacks provided to Johnson.

Johnson admitted a breach of contract, but denied that Acme was damaged. In contracts of this type, the “vendee is entitled to damages against the vendor for a failure to comply and the measure of damages is the difference between the contract price and the market price of the property at the place and time of delivery.”

Procedure: Acme Mills is suing Johnson for damages equal to the wheat that was never delivered and for the sacks provided for that delivery. The lower court ruled for Johnson, with the exception of an $80 judgment for the costs of the sacks.

Issue: As the value of wheat fell below the value in the contract between the time of delivery and the time of the agreement, was Acme still damaged by the breach of contract?

Holding: The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s ruling, stating that “the appellant [Acme Mills], instead of being damaged by the breach of the contract, was actually benefited to the extent of about three cents per bushel.”

Analysis: The court decided that a breach of contract in a case involving the purchase and delivery of goods would only be recognized if the vendee was damaged. In essence, you can only sue for damages if the property is worth the same or more than you agreed to pay. In this case, Acme Mills would have been paying more than the wheat was worth, so the court ruled Acme was not damaged by failure to collect the wheat. (Johnson basically did them a favor by selling the wheat elsewhere).

__________________
"Tumhary nafs ki qeemat Janat hay isy Janat say kam qeemat pey na bechna."
"Jiyo to istarh ky log tum sy milny ko tarsy; maro to istrah k log tumharee mot par royain"

Parties:
Plaintiff: Agricultural Insurance Co.

Defendant: Constantine

Facts:
On May 7, 1942, at about 11:45 a.m., Mrs. Joseph Bova, Jr., parked her car at defendant’s parking lot, under the custody of defendant and received a ticket, which exempts defendant’s liability for loss or damage of cars, while Mrs. Bova denied she read the same or ever agreed to the terms printed on the ticket. At about 3 p.m. Mrs. Bova’s demanding the return of car was refused and on May 10, the car was delivered to the owner in a damaged condition. Plaintiff compensated Mrs. Bova $154.69 under the contract of insurance and sued defendant.

Issue:
Was the printed matter on the ticket a part of the contract of bailment?

Reasoning:
The court states that lacking the assent of bailor to the conditions printed on the ticket before delivering her car to the bailee, it cannot be a part of the contract of bailment. And bailor only considered the ticket is a token or receipt ostensibly for later identification of the bailed property, which cannot constitute a part of the contract.

Holding:
Judgment is for plaintiff.

__________________
"Tumhary nafs ki qeemat Janat hay isy Janat say kam qeemat pey na bechna."
"Jiyo to istarh ky log tum sy milny ko tarsy; maro to istrah k log tumharee mot par royain"

Facts: ATL hired Reed to be the primary actor in a play that was going to be filmed. ATL agreed to pay Reed £1050, plus £100 a week for board, plus air fare, etc. This was subject to a permit issued from the Ministry of Labour which was received Sept. 2, 1968. Sept 3, 1968 Reed’s agent repudiated his contract because of another contract he was accepting. Reed was acting in another role in an American play. ATL accepted his repudiation and could not find a replacement, the show closed.

Issue: Did the plaintiff rely upon the acceptance of the defendant to such an extent that the costs of both before and after the contract should be bore by the defendant’s breach?

Holding: The Defendant is liable for the damages resulting from ATL’s reliance on his performance both before the contract and after.

Rule: If a contract is broke and expenditures are wasted the breaching party must yield to the damages considered within the offer and acceptance.

Procedure: Master at trial accepted defendant’s liability, but rejected his contention that the only expenditures owed were before not after the contract. Judgment for plaintiff £2,750

Ct. Rationale: The defendant entered into the contract and broke it. The expenditures of ATL were “within the contemplation of the parties when the contract was signed,” and as a result of the defendant’s breach the expenditures were wasted, therefore he owes the expenditures before and after the contract.

__________________
"Tumhary nafs ki qeemat Janat hay isy Janat say kam qeemat pey na bechna."
"Jiyo to istarh ky log tum sy milny ko tarsy; maro to istrah k log tumharee mot par royain"

Avoidance of the K : Mutual Mistake

Relevant Facts: An estate representative conducted an auction sale of decedent’s property, but decided it would sell more quickly if broken into two pieces. One was i/d as lot 5 the other 6; 6 had a 20' strip of land adjoining it on the east side, five had the house thereupon. Df Ewing bought lot five but no satisfactory bid was received for lot 6 that day. The representative had indicated that the boundary was near the lilac bushes, but in fact was unknown and that nobody knew exactly where the boundary was. A week after the auction Pl bought the remaining lot. 2 yrs later Df began constructing a fence alongside the house. Pl had a survey completed and learned the property line was located w/i a foot of the house’s foundation, the eaves were on the Pl’s property.

Legal Issue(s): Whether the tr ct erred in ruling that any mistake concerning the location of the boundary line was unilateral mistake?

Court’s Holding: Yes, mutual mistake.

Procedure: Tr ct found for Pl to quiet title, Df appealed; Ct of App Reversed and remanded.

Law or Rule(s): A mistake is an unintentional act or omission arising from ignorance, surprise, or misplaced confidence. The mistake must be material or so substantial and fundamental as to defeat the object of the parties. A unilateral mistake is not normally grounds for the mistaken party.

Court Rationale: A mutual mistake occurs when both parties, at the time of signing, share a misconception about a basic assumption or vital fact upon which they based their bargain. Some cts require the parties to have the same misconception about the same vital fact or assumption. MM also includes situations in which the parties labor under differing misconceptions as to the same basic assumption or vital fact. The assumption of fact must be the same; otherwise two unilateral mistakes, instead of one, would result. Both Erhardt and Ewing mistakenly believed the boundary line was further east than it was. Neither intended that the property sold as lot 5 would fail to include the whole house. There was an unintentional act arising from ignorance, Ewing and Erhardt made a MM regarding the location of the boundary line.

The mere presence of a MM does not always afford relief. IF a party is aware that he has limited knowledge in respect to the facts related to the mistake, but treats his limited knowledge as sufficient, ~MM, but conscious ignorance and this bars relief. The extent of conscious ignorance depends upon the scope of the risk assumed. Neither party consciously assumed a risk that the line would run beneath the eaves of the house.

PER may be admitted to show by reason of MM the parties’ intent was not expressed in K. PER can be used to show true intent.

Plaintiff’s Argument: Df had knowledge at the time of sale that the boundary was unknown, and after Pl had a survey Df had encroached upon Pl’s property.

Defendant’s Argument: Df and representative Ked under MM that the boundary was located other than where it was.

__________________
"Tumhary nafs ki qeemat Janat hay isy Janat say kam qeemat pey na bechna."
"Jiyo to istarh ky log tum sy milny ko tarsy; maro to istrah k log tumharee mot par royain"

Note:

These case studies have been picked from foreign sources. Legal provisions may differ in our country. Don't rely on the rules which have been discussed in these case studies, just comprehend the method of these case studies.

__________________
"Tumhary nafs ki qeemat Janat hay isy Janat say kam qeemat pey na bechna."
"Jiyo to istarh ky log tum sy milny ko tarsy; maro to istrah k log tumharee mot par royain"

Daughtrey v. Ashe (1992)
Author: Richard

Facts: P purchased a diamond necklace from the D jeweler for $15k; D classified the bracelet diamonds as v.v.s, which is one of the highest ratings for quality, but he only told the P that they were nice; D also told P that if he was not satisfied he would return the purchase price to the P; included in the sale was an appraisal form which listed the value of the bracelet at $25k; 4 years later P discovered the diamonds were not of v.v.s. quality; D offered to refund the purchase price, but P demanded a replacement for the bracelet

P/S: The trial court found that the buyer had not proven that the appraisal was a term or condition of the sale nor a warranty, and denied relief for breach of warranty

Issue: Whether the D’s statement of the grade of the diamonds is mere opinion or whether is was more, thus qualifying it as an express warranty.

Holding: D’s description of the bracelet was more than opinion; it was intended to be a statement of fact. FOR P, reversed and remanded to determine the buyer’s damages.

Rule: Uniform Commercial Code § 8.2-313(2) provides that it is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the seller use formal words such as "warrant" or "guarantee" or that he have a specific intention to make a warranty, but an affirmation merely of the value of the goods or a statement purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or commendation of the goods does not create a warranty

Rationale: Court ruled that the D gave more than just his opinion on the value of the goods because he specifically described them as “H color and v.v.s. quality.” If one has superior knowledge and makes a statement about the goods sold and does not qualify the statement as his opinion, the statement will treated as a statement of fact. Therefore the description was an express warranty under Uniform Commercial Code § 8.2-313(2). Furthermore, the seller's affirmation of the diamonds' quality was a part of the basis of the bargain.

NOTES:
-- A statement made after the deal closes does not preclude that statement from constituting an express warranty as long as it is part of the basis for the bargain.

-- This post-closing statement is considered to be modification, and under the U.C.C., requires no separate consideration.

-- Courts do recognize the there is some room for seller’s to “talk up” their product without subsequently being held accountable under warranty theory

-- This is referred to as sales puffery

__________________
"Tumhary nafs ki qeemat Janat hay isy Janat say kam qeemat pey na bechna."
"Jiyo to istarh ky log tum sy milny ko tarsy; maro to istrah k log tumharee mot par royain"

hi Raz..do we actually follow the same pattern????it is so horrible,is it mandatory to add headings and write so many things..
and do let me know from where did you get these cases?
well i did find a case and wants to share it with you.just have a look and guide me ,is following way of solving the case also correct or not.it is very simple and without any heading..and there are questions in past papers like this too..



Question:
Alvin runs a business selling expensive cars. Last Monday he mistakenly placed a notice on one car indicating that it
was for sale for £5,000 when in fact its real price was £25,000. Bert later noticed the sign and, recognising what a
bargain it was, immediately indicated to Alvin that he accepted the offer and would take the car for the indicated
amount. Alvin, however, told Bert that there had been a mistake and that the true price of the car was £25,000. Bert
insisted that he was entitled to get the car at the lower price, and when Alvin would not give it to him at that price
Bert said that he would sue Alvin.
After Bert had left, Alvin changed the price on the car to £25,000 and subsequently Cat came in and said she would
like to buy the car, but that she would have to arrange finance.
On Tuesday Del came by and offered Alvin the full £25,000 cash there and then and Alvin sold it to him.
Required:
Advise Alvin, Bert, Cat and Del as to their rights and liabilities in the law of contract.

Answer:
This question requires candidates to analyse the problem scenario from the perspective of contract law paying particular regard to
the rules relating to: invitation to treat, offers, and option contracts. The scenario involves three distinct cases which should be
dealt with in turn in applying the following rules of contract law.
Alvin and Bert
The price notice on the car did not constitute a legal offer, it was merely an invitation to treat. As such it is not an offer to sell but
merely an invitation to others to make offers. The point of this is that the person extending the invitation is not bound to accept
any offers made to them as may be seen in Fisher v Bell (1961) in which it was held that having switch-blade knives in the window
of a shop was not the same as offering them for sale. Consequently Bert is not in a position to sue Alvin.
Alvin and Cat
An offeror may withdraw their offer at any time before it has been accepted and once revoked it is no longer open to the offeree to
accept the original offer. Also a promise to keep an offer open is only binding where there is a separate contract to that effect. This
is known as an option contract, and the offeree must provide additional consideration for the promise to keep the offer open. If not,
then the offeror can simply withdraw the offer under the normal rules relating to revocation of offers.
As Cat did not provide any consideration to form an option contract, Alvin is not bound to wait for her to return and can sell the
car to anyone else if he so chooses.
Alvin and Del
This is a perfectly ordinary contract. The fact that Alvin had previously contracted not to sell it, does not affect Del and he is entitled
to take good title to the car.

Well, there is no hard and fast rule for the pattern of the answer but we strive our best to produce the more refined and valuable pattern. It would be better to answer in heading-wise style but it is not mandatory. If you can explain clearly and correctly your stance with valid arguments without headings then it is ok. Besides, the format which I have presented here is just specimen, and can't be applied in each case. Headings / parts of the answer may vary from case to case. Presentation is an added advantage but concentration should on the correct solution. Presentation of the paper gets secondary importance. Relevance and correctness prevail.

I have posted the link in this F group "Case studies" where you can study other related cases too.



Hope I have answered your query.

__________________
"Tumhary nafs ki qeemat Janat hay isy Janat say kam qeemat pey na bechna."
"Jiyo to istarh ky log tum sy milny ko tarsy; maro to istrah k log tumharee mot par royain"