Afghanistan's Taliban
War without end
Oct 25th 2007 | KABUL
From The Economist print edition
Not winning, but not losing either
THE first flakes of snow are settling in the high passes along Afghanistan's eastern border. Within a few weeks the infiltration routes from Pakistan will be blocked to the Taliban, and the upland areas of Afghanistan will become unsuited to guerrilla warfare until the spring thaw.

Despite the Taliban's bold predictions of an apocalyptic “spring offensive” earlier this year, the NATO commanders leading the fight against them feel they were on the front foot during the summer. Since January almost 6,000 people have been killed, a 50% increase on last year. They included 200 NATO soldiers and more than 3,000 alleged Talibs. Insurgent violence is up by 20% on 2006. NATO claims this is largely because its forces have pushed into areas formerly held by the Taliban.


Nonetheless, as NATO's defence ministers gathered this week in Noordwijk in the Netherlands, few observers doubt that the Afghan insurgency has years to run. The Taliban seem to have enough recruits, as well as a refuge and logistical base in Pakistan's lawless tribal areas. They also have enough funds, an estimated 40% coming from the drug trade.

“The only way the Taliban can be defeated is with strong Afghan government, strong Afghan security forces and a wedge driven between the insurgents and the people,” says NATO's commander in Afghanistan, General Dan McNeill. He accepts that NATO's role is that of stopgap, as billions of dollars go into building the Afghan security forces.

An estimated 20-30% of the population in the south support the Taliban. The number of Taliban fighters lies between 6,000 and 20,000. Some 6,000 Taliban have been reported killed since 2005, with no sign that the loss has dented the insurgents' capability. Western diplomats generally accept that killing Taliban fighters will not, by itself, end the insurgency.

Suicide-bombings were all but unknown in Afghanistan until 2005. This year has seen more than 120. Roadside bombings are also increasing, as the Taliban adopt the tactics that have worked for Iraqi insurgents. NATO commanders claim this is a sign of desperation. British and American special forces have focused on attacking the Taliban leadership. In May they killed the Taliban's ground commander in the south, Mullah Dadullah Akhund. By one estimate, more than 50 mid-level commanders have been killed in Helmand province alone.

Local tribal elders say that the Taliban has taken severe punishment in the south. In Helmand there are reports of a lack of local willingness to fight for the Taliban. There is much talk of prising away “moderate Taliban” through negotiation. But Taliban fighters are now appearing in previously placid provinces such as Herat, Wardak and Badghis. General McNeill admits that NATO's nearly 35,000 troops are not enough to take and hold all parts of the country. In Noordwijk, a number of countries responded to America's plea for more soldiers, not so much for combat but to help train Afghan forces.

The insurgency now has more clearly the form of a single, loosely co-ordinated insurrection spanning western Pakistan and southern and eastern Afghanistan. NATO is publicly divided. The Taliban, too, are fragmented. Far from being the monolithic Islamists they were in 2001, they now span various groups with differing motivations. Alongside the diehard madrassa-trained Talibs are growing numbers of foreigners with al-Qaeda links. Less committed, so-called “tier-2” fighters are drawn to fight for many reasons: unemployment; to protect illegal opium crops; or to obey tribal loyalties.

Local politics also infects the insurgency. In Helmand, for instance, the Itzakzai tribe, feeling excluded from power since 2001, are big Taliban supporters. Many Afghans in the south would support any force offering a real hope of security and justice. On those counts, neither the Taliban nor the corruption-plagued Afghan government and its Western backers have yet made a convincing case.