Military operations are not the solution. This is a multi-pronged issue, which needs a wholesome response. The issue is religious as well as political, strategic, economic and social. Therefore we need to find out a multi-pronged political and reconciliatory process.

The method of suicide bombings, an effective weapon for the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Afghan Taliban, was transferred to them by Al Qaeda. Previously, the Afghan Taliban considered videos and pictures impermissible, but now they consider it a very important medium to relay their messages. Similarly, the Internet is nowadays also a very effective weapon for the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban. This was also introduced by Al Qaeda. As such, Al Qaeda is on the driving seat. Therefore, by ignoring Al Qaeda we can neither think of reconciliation with militants nor solve the issue of militancy.

Tactics and preferences may differ even among members of a single party. To see this fact, we should observe the tactics of Aitzaz Ahsan and Babar Awan of the PPP. The same difference is also evident in the tactics and preferences of Mullah Omar, Hakeemullah Mehsud and Osama bin Laden. Local environments definitely affect the behaviour of all national, political and religious parties. Our political and religious parties support the issue of Kalabagh Dam in Punjab, but lobby against it in Sindh.

And the same differences can also be seen in the activities of Al Qaeda, the TTP and the Afghan Taliban. But not only ideology, the shared concept of jihad and Shariah, they also fight against common enemies. The difference is: Al Qaeda has been interested in taking on the US and its international allies, the Afghan Taliban have restricted their activities to Afghanistan while the majority of TTP members have a declared policy of "Pakistan first." Al Qaeda needs the help of the Afghan Taliban in Afghanistan and the TTP in Pakistan. The Afghan Taliban and their Pakistani counterparts also needed Al Qaeda.

Persistent instability and disturbance have turned this region into a centre for proxy wars among international and regional powers. State writ is non-existent on both sides of the Durand Line, where proxy wars among secret services are in full swing. It is difficult to tell friend from foe. In this situation, apart from Pakistani agencies, RAW, the CIA, Mossad, and the Iranian and Russian agencies are active in the area. Certainly, some of the militants would be fighting, knowingly or unknowingly, for the objectives of these agencies, but a clear majority of these people consisted of individuals who, under their ideology, are committed to fighting for this chosen cause as they consider it the only way to deliverance.

Inside Al Qaeda and the TTP, extremist elements have now taken over the reins. They consider fighting the US, along with its Muslim allies, as an act of faith. They demand that if fighting Soviet allies Babrak Karmal, Dr Najeebullah and their Muslim Afghan supporters was a jihad, then how come the current fight against US ally Hamid Karzai, and other Muslim leaders, is not holy war? Now the new thinking of first taking on Arab countries and Pakistan before attacking the US is also taking root. Along with this approach, the element of revenge is also becoming visible.

They think the Pakistani state has betrayed them. Previously, they only targeted government employees and army personnel, but now they think that everyone who opposes them is permitted to be killed. And under this very approach, new literature in different languages is being prepared and distributed.

Just like the Afghan Taliban, some of the Pakistani Taliban are intent not on fighting with Pakistan, but the majority of them now accede to the Al Qaeda approach. Apart from the Mehsud group, all jihadi and sectarian militants (the Punjabi Taliban) who had flocked to the tribal areas and are now returning to their hometowns have been infected with the Al Qaeda approach. As compared to the Afghan Taliban, Al Qaeda has a greater impact on these individuals.

In the beginning, it was claimed that there were no foreigners in the tribal areas. But proved wrong on this count, we took to find new pretences. It was propagated that Baitullah Mehsud was a US agent, but when targeted in US drone attacks we left the field. Now confusion is being created against the TTP and Hakeemullah Mehsud and their threats are called brags. Their capabilities are questioned. But after humiliating Americans by targeting the CIA station in Khost through an Arab suicide bomber, can we afford any underestimation of their capabilities? The suicide bomber's video film with Hakeemuallah Mehsud before setting off on the Khost mission is a clear evidence of close relations between the TTP and Al Qaeda.

In fact, the TTP's strength is the strength of Al Qaeda, and vice versa. The same is also true for Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban. Therefore, whatever is decided for one of these partners should also be extended to the other one. If power is used against Al Qaeda, we cannot hope for reconciliation with the TTP or the Afghan Taliban. Good wishes for the Afghan Taliban's victory will leave us unable to dismantle the TTP in Pakistan. The policy of reconciliation in one area and a military operation in another, fighting against one group and reconciliation with another is destined to destroy us.

By changing the contours and basic approaches of internal and external policies, we should find an inclusive political solution. Otherwise, we should be ready for dire consequences.



The writer works for Geo TV. Email: saleem. safi@janggroup.com.pk