The political tension between Pakistan and the United States is now easing because both sides have realised that they need to talk to each other through diplomatic channels on the contentious issues. The US has toned down its blame discourse and Pakistan has become more active at the diplomatic level. However, the scars caused by American public denunciation of Pakistan and Pakistan’s refusal to accept US interpretation of the terrorist attack in Kabul in September 2011 will not be easily removed.

Each side was blowing its trumpet without bothering to know how far its tune is being appreciated by the other side. The US campaign of Pakistan’s alleged connections with the Haqqani group did not convince Pakistan to reformulate its counter-terrorism strategies to US satisfaction. Pakistan responded by recounting its contribution for countering terrorism in the region and its human and material losses since September 2001. The US was not impressed by the Pakistani narrative.

The reason for the poor communication between Pakistan and the US is the inability of their top leaders to address each other’s concerns and problems. The US leadership refused to recognise the peculiar problems and concerns of Pakistan with reference to terrorism-related issues in the tribal areas, from across the Afghan border and in mainland Pakistan. The US insisted only on military action by Pakistan against the Haqqani group in North Waziristan. Pakistan’s civilian and military leaders were unable or unwilling to tackle the charge that Pakistan is a “safe-haven” for some terrorist groups and it pursues a selective approach for countering terrorism. They preferred to talk about their contribution to countering terrorism in the past.

One negative fallout of American propaganda against Pakistan is that India came out with criticism about Pakistan’s alleged ties with militant groups, although India did not insist on this issue. The Afghanistan government was more blunt and non-diplomatic in blaming Pakistan for the increased Taliban activity in Afghanistan. President Hamid Karzai directly accused Pakistan of sponsoring and controlling the Taliban that threaten Afghanistan. Its high officials claimed that the plan to kill Burhanuddin Rabbani was prepared by the Taliban in Quetta.

During the days of Musharraf, the Afghan government, including Hamid Karzai, campaigned against Pakistan. Later, the Afghan government moderated its stand and worked to improve relations with Pakistan. Now, encouraged by American tirade, the Afghan government returned to its old strategy of blaming Pakistan for its internal failures.

The problem with Afghan presidency and the Kabul government is that both are heavily dominated by Tajik and Uzbek (minority ethnic groups) and the Pashtuns that constitute almost half of Afghanistan’s population are underrepresented in all institutions of the state. The Tajik and Uzbek officials are opposed to a meaningful dialogue with the Taliban because any accommodation with the Taliban i.e. the Pashtuns will reduce Tajik and Uzbek domination of the power structure in Kabul. They are not therefore enthusiastic about accommodation with the Taliban. They would like to revive trouble with Pakistan so that attention shifts from dialogue to problems with Pakistan.

Blaming Pakistan for some trouble in Afghanistan could have been a credible charge if the Kabul government had a firm control of Afghanistan. But it is well-known that the Afghan government faces strong resistance from the Afghan Taliban that control several districts. Their power and confidence is on the rise as the Americans leave Afghanistan. All this cannot be blamed on Pakistan. The domestic sources of the Taliban challenges must be recognised by the Kabul government.

If extremism and terrorism is to be tacked in the region, Afghanistan, Pakistan and the US will have to work together. There is a need to take a holistic view of cross-border movement of the Taliban and other groups. This movement is two-way. If Afghanistan faces threats from the groups coming from Pakistani tribal areas, Pakistan’s security checkposts on the border and adjoining villages are attacked by the Taliban from Afghanistan.

It should be clear by now that unilateralism or public denunciation will not force Pakistan to engage in countering terrorism as demanded by Afghanistan and the US. They will have to work together to accommodate each other’s concerns. Pakistan is no less threatened by terrorism than Afghanistan. Looking at the recent Afghan and American statements, they do not seem to attach any importance to Pakistan’s security concerns. Rather they view Pakistan as a source of terrorism.

While hot and cold exchanges continue between Pakistan on the one hand and the US and Afghanistan on the other, Pakistan should undertake non-emotional and professional analysis of the future direction of extremism and terrorism in the region and its implications for Pakistani state and society ten years down the road. The underlying assumption is that most terrorist groups would continue with their violent activities even after the exit of the US. These groups are motivated by power agenda and narrow literalist vision of Islam combined with tribal traditions.

The Pakistan military has been in the tribal areas since 2003 and it has been conducting regular security operations since 2009. However, with the exception of South Waziristan, no tribal agency is fully under its control. In Kurram, despite various attempts, the security forces are unable to ensure security on the road linking this agency with Peshawar.

The key question is if the stalemate in the tribal areas represents the military’s incapacity to dislodge the Taliban and other militant groups or is it a policy of keeping pressure on the militants but not overwhelming them completely? If the latter is true, what are the goals of letting the militant groups survive?

Pakistan has up to the end 2014 to take full control of all tribal areas. Once US/NATO troops leave and there is internal strife in Afghanistan, Pakistani Taliban and other groups will join hands with their Afghan counterparts to fight the Kabul government. Pakistan will lose tribal areas completely to militancy that will also embolden their allied militant groups in mainland Pakistan.

If Pakistan wants to insulate itself from the negative fallout of post-2014 strife in Afghanistan rather than become a party to it, its security establishment must first establish its primacy in the tribal areas. It will have to prove that it can bring all groups and areas under its effective fold rather than tolerating them with the hope that some militant groups will play Pakistan's game when it is free-for-all in Afghanistan.

Source
Triangular tensions | Pakistan Today | Latest news, Breaking news, Pakistan News, World news, business, sport and multimedia