April 23, 2012
Shamshad Ahmad

At the Second Nuclear Summit in Seoul last month, as well as at the First Nuclear Summit in Washington in April 2010, Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani made a strong case for non-discriminatory access to nuclear technology for peaceful uses, including nuclear power-generation, to meet our growing energy and development needs.

In presenting Pakistan’s case on both occasions, Gilani tried to alleviate the unfounded fears about Pakistan’s nuclear security by citing its four-decade-long experience of safe and secure operation of nuclear power plants, a highly trained manpower and a well-established safety and security culture. He also apprised the world leaders of the measures implemented by Pakistan, as any other nuclear-weapons state would do, to strengthen the safety and security of its nuclear installations and materials.

Pakistan meets every criteria-based benchmark to become a member of the Nuclear Supplier’s Group and other export control regimes on non-discriminatory basis. But this reality is not what the world’s nuclear arbiters would have found palatable. Their whole attention in recent years has been on redefining the nuclear issue. The focus now is not on nuclear “disarmament”; it is on nuclear “terrorism” and on countries considered “troublesome” in their reckoning. The casualty in the process is the goal of “nuclear zero.”

The current global nuclear order inspires no confidence in the non-proliferation agenda being followed by the big powers in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner, with scant regard for “general and complete disarmament” as envisaged in Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The real problem in the global disarmament architecture is the persistent rhetorical stance on the part of major NPT powers, especially the US and Russia, which possess 25 percent of the world’s nuclear arsenals. What they are really saying is that they can have their weapons forever but everyone else may not.

President Obama has himself acknowledged this bleak reality by saying that he “may not live long enough to see a nuclear-free world and that the United States will maintain a nuclear arsenal as long as these weapons exist.” To our friends in the Western world, the nuclear question has traditionally been one-dimensional. The symptom, not the disease, is their problem. Their undivided focus on non-proliferation has been only as a concept which they have ingeniously adapted to their own intent and purpose. Partial arms limitation or arms reduction arrangements are no substitute for the avowed “general and complete disarmament.”

While undue restrictions on development of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, a right guaranteed under the NPT’s Article IV, continue to be applied, strengthening the monopoly of a few over nuclear technology, country-specific waivers are being allowed for self-serving reasons. These short-sighted policies for access to nuclear technology in disregard of equitably applicable criteria are clear circumvention of the global non-proliferation regime. They not only force others to look for ways outside the treaty but also allow the possibility of such arrangements leading to diversion of nuclear material for military purposes.

Against this murky backdrop, it is not sufficient just to look at the two nuclear security summits held within a span of two years as major developments affecting the nuclear strategic issue. Both NSS events were guided by a narrowly-based nuclear security-related agenda focusing not on the larger non-proliferation goals but on diversionary “nuclear security” issues under the alibi of building a new global consensus on securing nuclear materials, facilities and technologies. Whatever the stated motivation, the real purpose of this new process was only to use the perceived “terrorist threat” to further tighten the noose for the have-nots’ access to nuclear materials and technology.

With the participation of 47 states and related UN agencies, the Washington Summit laid out a global strategy “to secure vulnerable nuclear materials, break up black markets, detect and intercept materials in transit, and use financial tools to disrupt illicit trade in nuclear materials.” The short communique reaffirmed highest-level political commitment of participating states to the objectives of nuclear security. A Work Plan was also adopted outlining specific measures to be taken by participating States on a time-bound basis.

Even if the Washington strategy works to secure vulnerable nuclear materials against unauthorised use or capture and disrupt their illicit trade in black markets, fears and concerns over the risks of a disastrous nuclear conflict remain unaddressed. The future of the world remains hostage not merely to one act of terrorism but also, and to a larger degree, to one accident or one strategic miscalculation. In that sense, nuclear dangers abound on many fronts. All told, there are currently nuclear weapons materials in more than 40 countries, some “secured by nothing more than a chain-link fence.”

The Washington strategy might perhaps serve to reinforce the already existing systems, and tighten the legislative controls and administrative mechanisms on export controls. But to be effective, its applicability must be non-selective and non-discriminatory, and in dealing with the countries known to possess nuclear capability, a criteria-based approach by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) will be needed to ensure a properly accountable and verifiable civil nuclear cooperation. Another stark reality being conveniently ignored in the NSS process is that today it is the biological and chemical materials that are more vulnerable and can be used as a vehicle of terrorism.

The Seoul Summit, as a follow-up to the Washington strategy, was a non-starter from the very beginning. Differences of approach were clearly visible between the two camps. As against the US-led group of NSS proponents, non-aligned countries including Egypt, Malaysia, Indonesia, India, Pakistan and South Africa considered nuclear security as a national responsibility, rather than an international one.

The NSS advocates wanted an ambitious additional menu of measures in the field of nuclear security. But non-aligned countries looked at this approach as too “selective” a multilateral process and expressed preference for a voluntary global mechanism in which the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) had a central role to play and it should be inclusive rather than exclusive. Countries like Iran, Syria, Venezuela and Cuba, which were kept out, should be involved in the process. China shared the non-aligned countries’ approach.

In a communique long on general commitments but short on specifics, the 58 delegates at the Seoul Summit just reiterated a joint call to “secure all vulnerable nuclear material in four years” and backed the “essential role” of the IAEA in “facilitating international cooperation”. Analysts described the actual results as modest and noted that nothing binding was adopted. For Obama, the whole process had to be choreographed so that his re-election prospects do not diminish.

On the other hand, the expediency-led world continues to witness an erosion of arms control and disarmament measures, reversal of non-proliferation policies of the key powers, violation of treaty obligations and weakening of UN disarmament institutions. As a result, there are clear differences of perspective, approach and modalities among states to promote international and regional peace and security through disarmament and non-proliferation.

Meanwhile, lack of progress towards nuclear disarmament and advocacy by a few powerful states of doctrines such as pre-emption, cold start, development of new nuclear weapons and development and deployment of destabilising systems like the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) systems are perpetrating tensions at the regional and global levels.

Also lack of progress in the resolution of long-standing regional disputes, emergence of new forms of conflicts emanating from power asymmetries, as well as economic and social disparities and injustices, continue to obstruct the objective of equal security for all.

The writer is a former foreign secretary. Email: shamshad1941@yahoo. com

-The News

April 24, 2012
By Yuriko Koike

At 7.39am on April 13, North Korea fired a missile (which it called a satellite launch) in the face of opposition from almost the entire international community. In a perverse way, the world got its way, because the vehicle exploded a minute after takeoff, its debris falling harmlessly into the sea.

North Korea typically goes silent after such episodes: ‘failure’ does not exist in its political lexicon, so it cannot be reported or discussed. The country’s media routinely meets any failure with outpourings of patriotic music and bombastic praise for the regime.

But this time was different. Behind the scenes in North Korea, failure does have consequences. In the coming weeks, we will most likely learn of a purge of those responsible. Indeed, the engineers and scientists involved in the launch probably put their lives on the line.

Moreover, North Korea could not deny failure this time, because the regime invited international media to attend the event — even allowing foreign reporters into the mission-control room — in order to legitimise it as a ‘satellite’ launch and not a weapons test. The ‘failure’ could not be concealed, so it was quickly admitted.

What was supposed to be a celebration of the 70th anniversary of the late Kim Jong-il on April 15, and of the regime’s new beginning under his successor, his youngest son, Kim Jong-un, ended up being a funereal salute. Supposedly ordinary people in Pyongyang told foreign media, with a practised spontaneity, that “success is born of repeated failure”.

That is a chilling sentiment. The missile launch is believed to have been a legacy of Kim Jong-il, who fervently believed that the North’s survival required it to develop nuclear and biochemical weapons. So the failed missile launch probably means that a resumption of nuclear testing is inevitable, following tests in 2006 and 2009.

However, radioactive elements, such as Krypton-85 or Xenon-135, were not detected in the atmosphere after previous tests. Just as the North called the recent missile a ‘satellite,’ an underground explosion caused by conventional explosives cannot be used as a bargaining chip unless it is called a ‘nuclear test.’ The next one probably will occur as soon as 500-1,000 tonnes of dynamite have been secured.

The failed launch also marked a security fiasco for the North, as a South Korea think tank obtained the final orders for it. These instructions casually referred to Kim family business, indicating that “the teachings should be executed by Kim Kyong-hui” (Kim Jong-il’s sister), that “Kim Kyong-hui and Kim Jong-un should take care of the family,” and that “Kim Kyong-hui should handle management of all assets inside and outside the country”.

Foreign media often focus on Kim Kyong-hui’s role as the wife of regime insider Jang Sung-taek, but, as Kim Jong-il’s sister, she has been firmly in control of personnel changes since her brother’s death. Of the 232 members on Kim Jong-il’s funeral committee, she was listed 14th; her husband was 19th. She is routinely ranked higher than her husband in terms of protocol. Indeed, Jang Sung-taek’s promotion to general was her decision.

Dynastic concerns

The problem is that Kim Kyong-hui is in poor health, owing to years of alcohol abuse. Moreover, she is so capricious and self-centered that even Kim Jong-il had trouble keeping her in check. Due to her poor health, it is unclear how long she will be able to continue advising Kim Jong-un, now surrounded by military personnel in their seventies and eighties who supported past generations. He needs advisers closer to his own age, but none is at hand.

Dynastic concerns now seem to be paramount for the regime. Speculation is growing, for example, about whether Kim Sol-song — the second daughter of Kim Jong-il’s third wife — will be appointed when Kim Kyong-hui is no longer able to perform her duties.

Before his death, Kim Jong-il reiterated that at least three nuclear reactors should be built. He also warned that China, despite being North Korea’s closest ally, is also the country that merits the most caution. North Korea, he insisted, must not allow itself to be used by China.

When Kim Il-sung (the “Eternal Great Leader”) died in 1994, Kim Jong-il relied on his father’s teachings to reinforce his authority. Indeed, there is no way of knowing whether his ideas and policies throughout his reign were actually Kim Il-sung’s. Perhaps Kim Jong-il’s “Ten Principles for the Establishment of the One-Ideology System” should now be viewed as an official document that stipulates which instructions are to be followed when, where, and by whom. In that case, his successor, the callow Kim Jong-un, can claim to be bound to do as he was told.

North Korea routinely pushes the international community around. But the North is itself being pushed around by the teachings of a ghost, conveniently used by the people who remain in charge in Pyongyang. How long will the rest of the world allow themselves to be pushed around by a ghost?

— Project Syndicate, 2012

Yuriko Koike is Japan’s former minister of defence and national security adviser.
Source: Gulf New

April 26, 2012
Faryal F Khan, Gujrat

It is unfortunate that America is patronizing India and transferring nuclear technology to it, contrary to its own declared policy and ignoring the similar needs of other countries. India’s recent 5000km-range Agni-V nuclear-warhead carrying missile’s test was not only endorsed by Washington but got kudos ‘in the name of competing China in the region.’ Though world has not objected to it, but inside India there is strong resistance against it. As the renowned Indian journalists, such as Kuldip Nayar, Jawed Naqvi, Praful Bidwai and Aijaz Zaka Syed, has in their recently published articles pointed out that New Delhi is suppressing resistance as India’s southern part is witnessing severe anti-government protests under the People’s Movement against Nuclear Energy (PMANE) against the building of nuclear power plants like the Kudankulam Atomic Power Project (KK-NPP) in the Tirunelveli district of Tamil Nadu state, who fear Japan’s Fukishuma-like disaster that may take place in the one million population area.

Thousands of fisher-folk, farmers, traders and other resident surrounded the KK-NPP, and organized massive demos in Chettikulam, Idinthakarai & Kanyakumari. Over 300 senior citizens kept a day-long fast and wrote a letter to the Japanese PM requesting him not to open nuclear cooperation negotiations with India. The Indian government is accusing the movement of being supported by foreign organizations and is also trying to whip up communal divide, playing the communal card – by publicly stating that it is the Christians who are opposing the nuclear plant, while the Hindus are suffering from power cuts. The government is also resorting to increased power cuts in the surrounding area, to build up resentment among the general population against the struggle and protest. According to S P Udayakumar, the member of the Movement, “the nuclear plant is unsafe” and “the safety analysis report and the site evaluation study have not been made public. Protesters said that even advanced countries like Germany have decided to shut down all its 17 nuclear reactors through which the country gets 23% of its energy. India must learn to listen to the voice of people and adhere to HR practices. It has long been victimizing people in Kashmir, Assam, Nagaland and other parts of India. World should take stock of the situation and must stop to transfer nuclear technology to India until they improve their nuclear safety measures.

Fukishuma like disasters if occurred in neighboring India would certainly affect the population in Pakistan, and it must be a matter of concern for the inhabitants of subcontinent to raise a voice against it. Thankfully, Pakistan has not a single complaint so far despite fears created by the terrorists and hostile foreign media, but keeping in view the government should take measures in order to avoid such mishaps within the country.

April 26, 2012
Asim Ali

At the April 2012 annual session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, held in New York, Pakistan again contended that one of the impeding factors behind global disarmament and non-proliferation efforts was the “pursuit of selectivity, discrimination and double standards by major powers in the area of non-proliferation, for commercial and strategic considerations.”

Earlier, at the Nuclear Security Summit, held in late March 2012 in Seoul, South Korea, Pakistan pleaded for access to nuclear technology for “peaceful uses on a non-discriminatory basis” assuring the international community that “Pakistan has taken effective measures … to enhance nuclear security.”

In demanding access to nuclear technology on a non-discriminatory basis Pakistan was making a thinly veiled reference to the 2008 US-India civil nuclear deal, contending that Pakistan “qualifies to become a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and other export control regimes.”

Why is the international community reluctant to grant Pakistan access to nuclear technology and accord Pakistan membership to nuclear cartels – in particular the Nuclear Suppliers Group? Pakistan is currently facing a significant crisis in its energy and water sectors. With 15-20 hours of rolling blackouts, Pakistan clearly needs alternative sources of energy, which may rightly include access to nuclear energy.

An argument could be made that in recent years the NSG has been bending its own rules for national security and dubious financial reasons. In a NSG meeting in Vienna in 2008, the United States won special exemptions for its ally, India, that was deemed by many in the then-Bush neoconservative foreign policy circles to be a reliable ‘hedge’ against a rising China. Being outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), as well as the NSG, India is barred from being sold anything, even civilian nuclear reactors. But the US used its diplomatic clout at the NSG to allow even the potential export of enrichment technology needed to make weapons-grade uranium and plutonium.

In response, at the NSG meeting held in New Zealand in 2010, China argued that since the US opened the door for India, it was going to sell nuclear reactors to Pakistan. This raised two specious concerns: 1) Can Pakistan be trusted given its record of nuclear proliferation? And 2) Will the Sino-Pakistan deal undermine the fragile global nuclear non-proliferation regime?

When we examine both arguments against the power-politics exhibited by the NSG and the monetary motivations surrounding the US-India Civil Nuclear Deal, it unequivocally points to the disingenuousness of those self-proclaimed purveyors of global security and non-proliferation.

The power-politics behind the NSG’s “preferential treatment” of certain states raises important questions about the ambitious vision that Obama had outlined in his famous Prague speech on global nuclear disarmament where he proclaimed “America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapon.” The selective interpretation of NSG rules clearly does not bode well for the existing anti-proliferation framework and nuclear disarmament diplomacy.

If anything, the current modus operandi of the NSG is an expression of how hypocritical much of the present arms control process is. The NPT is the cornerstone of the current set-up. Signed in 1970 to lock in the five states that had already tested a bomb – the US, Britain, Russia, China and France – and keep others out, it was also meant to commit these five countries to gradual disarmament, but that has never really happened.

Countries, like India, Pakistan and Israel, risked sanctions and refused to sign the treaty, while others, like North Korea, Syria, and now possibly Iran, joined, but went ahead with bomb development in secret. When India detonated its first test bomb, in 1974, the NSG was created as a mechanism to bolster the NPT treaty.

But making nuclear weapons exclusive just made them all the more desirable and they came to be defined by many as a symbol of grandeur almost divorced from any military purpose. Emerging nations like Pakistan then felt, with its nuclear tests in 1998, that they had no choice but to do the same in order to be taken seriously at the international level.

Contemporary nuclear arms control is not being used to make the world a safer place but to shore up an existing network of dominance. And now that it suits the US to have a nuclear-capable India as a strategic counter-balance to an increasingly confident China, suddenly the international protocols governing nuclear trade could be bended. China, in turn, has seized the opportunity to strengthen its own ally, Pakistan.

Pakistan naturally would like the benefits of being able to undertake civilian nuclear trade with the international community, despite not being a signatory to the NPT. And so not surprisingly Islamabad has sought a nuclear pact with Washington along the lines of the Indian deal, which included safeguards to prevent civilian technology from being put to military uses. However, the then-Bush administration refused such a nuclear pact citing Islamabad couldn’t be trusted to abide by the rules given Pakistan’s “questionable” nuclear proliferation record.

Under the Obama administration, however, the line hasn’t been so clear. When the Pakistan government reiterated the demand at a ministerial level “strategic dialogue” with the US, it was again rebuffed. Yet a number of players in the Washington policy circles have made a case for a civilian nuclear pact with Pakistan, especially as Islamabad’s support remains crucial to winning the war in Afghanistan. Thus, the nuclear non-proliferation efforts in South Asia remain subordinated to economic or geopolitical preferences of leading states, with the discourse on non-proliferation (and access to nuclear technology) itself being articulated in false binaries about “good” versus “bad” proliferation.

The writer is a doctoral candidate in the department of political science, University of Western Ontario. Email: ali.asim@gmail.com
-The News

April 28, 2012
Malik Muhammad Ashraf

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), comprising 11 articles, has three components or pillars: Non-proliferation, Disarmament and the right of the non-nuclear states to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. In the domain of nuclear non-proliferation, the Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) have undertaken not to transfer to any recipient nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and not to assist a non-nuclear weapon state to manufacture or acquire such weapons. The non-nuclear states have pledged not to receive nuclear weapons and other explosive devices from any source or accept assistance for the manufacture of such weapons or devices.

In regards to disarmament, the signatories to the treaty have affirmed the desire to ease international tensions and strengthen international trust so as to create, someday, the conditions for a halt to the production of nuclear weapons and a treaty in general for a complete disarmament that liquidates, in particular, nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles from national arsenals.

The third pillar of NPT recognises the right of the non-nuclear states to the acquisition of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes under the incisive glare of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), provided they can prove verifiably that they are not engaged in developing nuclear weapons.

Ostensibly, all these objectives of the NPT are beyond any reproach. But the reality is that during the 42 years of its existence, the NPT has failed to stop nuclear proliferation or in evolving a credible mechanism for disarmament. According to the former IAEA chief, Mohamed ElBaradei, there are 35 to 40 states that possess the knowledge to develop nuclear weapons, in addition to 13 others who have installed facilities for enrichment of weapons grade uranium. Israel beyond doubt is an undeclared nuclear power. North Korea, Iran, Iraq and Libya have been pursuing nuclear weapons programmes though South Africa and Libya have abandoned them under international pressure. India and Pakistan, the two countries who have not signed the NPT, have also become nuclear weapon states with justifications of their own.

The failure of the NPT to prevent nuclear proliferation and achieve its objective of disarmament is mainly attributable to the breach of the treaty provisions by the NWS and some intrinsic inadequacies in the treaty itself. The NSW under the treaty committed not to provide nuclear technology or weapons to any other state or use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear state. However, in violation of this commitment, the US that has been crying hoarse from every convenient rooftop to urge the non-signatory states to join the NPT, has provided nearly 180 B61 nuclear bombs to Belgium, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands and Turkey for use. The US also targeted its nuclear warheads at North Korea, a non-NWS from 1959 until 1991. Former Secretary of Defence UK, Geoff Hoon explicitly invoked the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons in response to a non-conventional attack by ‘rogue states’. In January 2006, President Jacques Chirac of France indicated that an incident of state-sponsored terrorism in France could trigger a small-scale nuclear retaliation aimed at destroying the rogue state’s power centres.

The failure of the NSW to bring about a major reduction in their nuclear arsenal, to halt the production of nuclear weapons, the inability to hammer out a treaty on general and complete disarmament and their reluctance to agree on complete disarmament within a prescribed timeframe has also contributed to lack of progress in this regard. This has angered many non-nuclear states and also provided justifications to many of them to develop nuclear programmes of their own.

The dilemma with the third pillar of the NPT is that a commercially popular light water reactor nuclear power station uses enriched uranium fuel, which has either to be enriched by those countries themselves or purchased from the international market. The countries concerned can easily switch to a nuclear weapons programme if they so desire, leading to the spread of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. That perhaps explains why in 2004 the US declared the prevention of further spread of uranium enrichment and plutonium as a major pillar of its non-proliferation policy and why it has been pressurising a number of countries, including Pakistan, to sign the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT).

Nevertheless, the issue still remains unresolved and even the process to negotiate has not taken off. The sticking point is that while the US, UK and Japan favour a treaty that limits future production of fissile materials, other states including Pakistan believe that the treaty should also address fissile materials already produced and stockpiled. Pakistan holds the view, and rightly so, that a fissile material treaty which does not address existing stockpiles will “freeze existing asymmetries” that threaten its security and therefore is unacceptable. This, undoubtedly, is a manifestation of its concern regarding regional rival India who possesses much larger stockpiles of fissile material. It maintained the same principled position in the first committee meeting of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in 2009 and 2010, because of which a deadlock persists. Islamabad’s position is likely to prolong a 14-year-old stalemate in the CD; the UN operates on a consensus basis, and the US, Japan, Australia and several other countries have announced that they would support moving negotiations for a fissile material treaty to another forum if the deadlock in the CD continued.

The apprehensions expressed by Pakistan have proved true. The US has violated the NPT by entering into an agreement with India — a non-signatory state of the NPT — for the transfer of civilian nuclear technology to prop it up as a counterbalance to China, and to exploit its lucrative market. The UK and France have also followed suit. India has agreed to accept IAEA supervision for only 14 nuclear reactors out of 22. Pakistan views it as a discriminatory act and in view of its Indo-centric security paradigm, has a considered opinion that India will utilise this to enhance its nuclear capability and that might lead to a nuclear arms race in the region.

In view of the foregoing facts, no person in his right mind can believe that the NPT will achieve its objectives in the foreseeable future unless the NWS abandon their discriminatory and self-serving policies and learn to abide by their international commitment. Until then the idea of a nuclear-free world will remain an elusive dream.

The writer is a retired diplomat, a freelance columnist and a member of the visiting faculty of Riphah Institute of Media Sciences, Riphah International University, Islamabad. He can be reached at ashpak10@gmail.com
-Daily Times

April 30, 2012
By Tanvir Ahmad Khan

Interestingly, the first news that I got of India’s successful launch of the long-range Agni V missile on April 19, came in a phone call from a journalist in faraway Warsaw, who wanted a Pakistani perspective on it. Apparently, the 5000 kilometre range was creating ripples within a radius that would take in Eastern Europe, Russia and much of China. Launched from Nicobar Island, Agni V could knock at Australia’s door.

Reactions from Washington and Beijing were notable for pragmatism. America set aside its usual rhetoric about proliferation—used aggressively only few days earlier when Pyongyang carried out a failed test of a long-range delivery vehicle; it virtually welcomed another big step taken by India towards balancing China’s strategic power. On its part, the Chinese decided not to be alarmed by the Indian capability to attack even the great economic hub, Shanghai, and declared that as two large developing nations, India and China “are not competitors, but partners”.

In the absence of any formal reaction from Pakistan I told the Polish journalist that Agni V made no material difference to the existing India-Pakistan balance of power or terror. Its expected operational deployment by 2014 would certainly peg India’s power projection several notches higher. As a technology demonstrator, it showed that India could build inter-continental ballistic missiles with a range of up to 10,000 kilometres. The test also augured well for India’s ambitious Space programme. India would expect its western supporters, including the United States, to consider it as a further attribute of power entitling it to be a permanent member of the UN Security Council.

It did not seem appropriate to me to add caveats to Pakistani sang-froid about Agni V; a cool and serene April morning in Islamabad is no time for apocalyptic images. A quick recourse to Indian sources, however, provided a glimpse into the ecstasy that accompanied India’s latest chariot of fire. This celebration of the culture of power seemed more important than the physical parameters of the test — the range, payload, accuracy, use of solid fuel. In the final analysis, peace is threatened more by the increasing militarisation of imagination in the region than by the tools of war. In Asia, by now, China, India, Pakistan, Iran and North Korea have well developed missile programmes while Japan has high capability without any overt military purpose. Much depends on how these states translate their advances into strategic ambitions.

India’s rise to the status of a major power is assured. What is still not clear is how it would conduct itself in international affairs. Since strategic planners in both, India and Pakistan belong to the realistic school, Pakistan has already built up a formidable deterrent capacity. A sizeable nuclear arsenal is backed by a wide range of missiles. Apart from a further extension of Agni’s outreach, the next frontier for India is the development of anti ballistic missile systems, an enterprise in which it could expect support from Israel and the United States. Pakistan’s cruise missile provides an answer for now. India’s defence budget has major annual leaps. According to Jane’s Defence Weekly, India’s aggregate defence procurement spending between 2011 and 2015 would exceed $100 billion. Pakistan cannot afford this arms race and would probably respond by improving its current delivery systems and by enlarging its tactical weapons programme. Its posture on Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) may further harden.

There are good reasons for Pakistan not to be alarmed by Agni V. As the strategic calculus pioneered by the Cold War goes, it is reasonably secure. Pakistan’s test of Hatf IV Shaheen 1A — a missile with an undisclosed extension of range and greater accuracy than an earlier version of it — on April 25 testifies to the robust programme in hand; the test did not seem to belong to the category of tit-for-tat tests. What should be of concern is that strategic advances may make resolution of outstanding issues more difficult.

India is in a transition from a soft state to a hard state. It may increasingly interpret conflict resolution as an exercise to be undertaken only on its terms. Locked in action and reaction, South Asia can drift away from what it needs most — a culture of peace that demands that regional states abandon the use of force, overt or covert, or the threat to use force in solving problems left behind by history. Neither side can constrain military acquisitions of the other but both of them can jointly accelerate the processes by which their respective power, conventional or nuclear, is not considered a menace. Given the geography, new feats in nuclear weapons and missile technology should be a reason to deepen and expand the recently held conversation between President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.

The Express Tribune

May 28, 2012
By Adil Sultan

In January 1972, at a meeting in Multan, then President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto made the momentous decision to develop nuclear weapons that could ensure Pakistan’s territorial integrity and provide security against existential threats that emanated mainly from India. On the 14th anniversary of Pakistan’s nuclear tests, it may be useful to analyse the role of nuclear weapons in national security and how safe these weapons are from external threats.

The term ‘national security’ is a broad concept and its remit goes beyond military power. Other elements of national power, including geography, geostrategic environment, economy, diplomacy, demography, and most importantly, the leadership play equally important roles in strengthening national security interests. No single element of national power can alone guarantee safeguarding of national interests.

Nuclear weapons are a vital part of Pakistan’s military strategy. They have not only helped neutralise the military disadvantage as a result of the increasing conventional disparity vis-à-vis India, but have also prevented several wars in the region. In the first 25 years of its existence, Pakistan fought three full-scale wars with India, which eventually led to its dismemberment in 1971. In the following 40 years since work on the nuclear weapons programme started and subsequently when Pakistan acquired nuclear capability, there have been no wars between the two neighbours, except for the 1999 Kargil crisis that does not fall under the category of a conventional war.

Due to the existence of an effective nuclear deterrence, India, despite having a qualitative and quantitative edge in conventional military hardware, was restrained from waging wars in 1985-86 (Brasstacks), 1990 (Kashmir uprising), 1999 (Kargil conflict), 2001-02 (military stand-off), and 2008 (Mumbai attacks). From the economic perspective as well, the cost of three wars far outweighs the money spent on developing and maintaining nuclear weapons capability.

Contrary to the ‘engineered misperceptions’, the acquisition of nuclear deterrence have in fact reduced the imperative for maintaining conventional military parity vis-à-vis India, thus significantly lowering defence expenditures.

Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence was conceived with a focus on deterring future wars with India. It does not take into account the multitude of internal and external threats being faced by it today. In order to transform its threat perception from being mainly India-specific, Pakistan needs to redefine its national objectives that must be consistent with its national power potential. Nevertheless, existence of nuclear capability does provide inherent strength and guarantee that the country cannot be treated like states, which do not have the military means to defend themselves.

The safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons has been a focus of international attention especially after 9/11. Several Western scholars continue to churn out scenarios depicting Pakistan as a fragile state, incapable of handling its nuclear assets.

While these concerns are mainly politically motivated, nevertheless, Pakistan has put in place an effective command and control system. Over 20,000 people are guarding Pakistan’s nuclear assets to ensure that they do not fall into the wrong hands. Likewise, the system also caters for all possible external threats to obviate the likelihood of damage or sabotage.

The history of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme is a story of national resilience and tremendous sacrifices. Safeguarding it against external threats — both intellectual and physical — is a national responsibility.

Nuclear weapons combined with other elements of national power are an instrument of policy to safeguard national security interests. Possession of nuclear weapons offers significant edge in terms of enhanced political stature and diplomatic relations. It is up to the state and the leadership to formulate a strategy to exploit this potential.

The Express Tribune

May 31, 2012
Momina Ashier
Exclusive Article

Pakistan and India, the only two nuclear states of South Asia, share a relationship of conflict and cooperation. For the past three decades, India and Pakistan have been engaged in a nuclear rivalry that is both a symptom and a cause of their bilateral discord. India’s decision to acquire nuclear weapons and demonstrate its nuclear weapons capability in 1974 resulted in the Pakistani adoption of a nuclear weapons program. When in May 1998 India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests, abandoning nuclear ambiguity for overt nuclear weapons capability, international community raised concerns that each step up the nuclear ladder by India and Pakistan introduces a new tension in their troubled relationship. The apprehension possesses that nuclear expansion between these two states will threaten the international security generally and South Asian regional stability particularly.

In South Asia, modernization of the weapons stems from the threat perceptions prevailing in the region. US has always showed concerns that Pakistan and India are racing to modernize, expand, and operationalize their nuclear deterrent capabilities. Generally US vows for a non-proliferation nuclear policy towards South Asia. However, the nuclear policies towards South Asia slightly varied in times of different US leaders. The Clinton administration’s nonproliferation goals were “first to cap, then over time reduce, and finally eliminate weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery in South Asia”. Moving away from the Clinton administration’s nuclear policy toward South Asia, the Bush administration decided not to try to persuade India and Pakistan to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) or to give up their nuclear weapons programs. However, President Obama’s expressed desire about a nuclear-weapon-free World. Realistically, however, the movement proposing ‘nuclear zero’ has failed to receive substantial support in India or Pakistan. Both states’ strategic environments discourage initiatives for their denuclearization. In the Pakistani case, the United States weighed its nonproliferation concerns against other geostrategic interests. Pakistan borders on Iran, Afghanistan and China, and is close to the Gulf and neighbors the resource rich Central Asian Republics.
The United States hoped to revive its cold war pattern of friendship with Pakistan, and to use Islamabad as a stabilizing influence in the region. In the Indian case, the flourishing India’s economy gave the United States an unprecedented opening to gain economic and diplomatic advantages. The U.S. did not, however, implement tangible, targeted, and sustained sanctions against India’s nuclear weapons program. On the contrary, the U.S. agreed to reschedule India’s external debt, increased its economic assistance to India, and for a few years continued to supply nuclear fuel to India’s nuclear reactors. The U.S. provision of unconditional military, economic, and technological assistance to countries with active nuclear weapons programs highlighted the contradictions between its declared and operational nonproliferation policies.

The Obama administration takes care to ensure that its course corrections give a feeling of satisfaction to India without adding to the concerns of Pakistan and China. Common bilateral ideals and interests are the motivating factors between US and India.

US for sure is not practicing its non-proliferation policy, contrary practicing a prejudiced nuclear policy towards Pakistan. The partnership with India has extended beyond nuclear issues. As the New York Times recounts, “the American and Indian militaries increased joint exercises; exchanged trade delegations; their companies won expanded access to the other’s markets; and U.S. officials began to talk up India as a rising great power in a new century”.

US presents justification for this biased approach by pointing the Pakistan’s nuclear security system, he shows concerns that terrorism is increasing in Pakistan thus non state actors are a great threat to the nuclear weapons. Pakistan says that nuclear weapons are not like conventional weapon that can be easily stolen and Pakistan’s standard operating programs are not easy to understand. General Tariq Majeed said that such timid episodes are being created to push Pakistan to sign NPT, CTBT and FMCT and for that reason US is using misinformation against Pakistan’s military agency, intelligence and government. US didn’t find any loophole in Pakistan’s nuclear system. US is just forcing Pakistan as he wanted to have India hegemony in the region for its own strategic interests in the region.

After 123 Agreement India is importing nuclear energy from US, and enjoying assistance of NSG. Pakistan is not enjoying any waiver like this. Indian agreement with the IAEA was a pre-condition for the implementation of the
Indo-US civil nuclear deal and allows the 45-member NSG to supply material and technology for India’s ambitious nuclear power programme. India due to NSG is signing different accords with Russia, Britain, Australia, Canada and many other states and can increase its fissile material. The NSG granted the waiver to India in 2008 allowing it to access civilian nuclear technology and fuel from other countries. The implementation of this waiver made India the only known country with nuclear weapons which is not a party to the NPT and NSG but is still allowed to carry out nuclear commerce with the rest of the world. Nevertheless US seek to change this criterion of NSG by removing the condition of NPT in order to fix India in required criteria for membership.

India the most hostile neighbor of Pakistan, after all these strategic pacts is swiftly increasing its nuclear stockpiles. Currently India is having twenty nuclear plants and it is looking forward to expand its nuclear programme. However Pakistan on other hand is not enjoying such strategic pacts. All the nuclear reserves which India is filling after civil nuclear deals with many countries can be used for military purposes. US overtly speak for India as a hegemonic regional power and he is doing his best to fortify Indo-US strategic ties.

Pakistan has showed grave concern over Indian continuous nuclear expansion and its desire to achieve the second strike capability through nuclear submarine, As Indian nuclear expansion is disturbing the balance of regional nuclear deterrence.

As US remained fail to practice its non-proliferation policy towards South Asia, in result New Delhi and Islamabad failed to negotiate and execute a bilateral arms control agreement or treaty, which could prevent a nuclear arms race and decrease the mistrust between them.

U.S. objectives in South Asia have been inconsistent, the tools used to carry out U.S. nonproliferation policy, incentives or sanctions were based to satisfy US own interests in the region. Thus, punitive measures were inconsistently applied and proved ineffective. US never implemented its nuclear non-proliferation policy in its true sense conversely persuading a discriminatory policy towards Pakistan by giving nuclear incentives and signing nuclear accords with India. This discrimination is forcing Pakistan to increase the number of its nuclear weapons and to seek nuclear technology from countries other than US, as a result US is provoking a nuclear arm race in region.

The article is contributed to pkarticlshub.com

Eric S. Margolis 5


The United States and the two feuding Koreas could blunder into a real war unless both Pyongyang and Washington cease provoking one another.

Last week, two nuclear-capable US B-2 stealth bombers flew non-stop from America to South Korea, and then home. These ‘invisible’ aircraft can carry the GBU-43/B MOAB 13, 600kg bomb that is said to be able to blast through 70 meters of reinforced concrete, putting North Korea’s underground nuclear facilities and its leadership’s command bunkers under dire threat.

Earlier this month, US B-52’s heavy bombers staged mock attack runs over South Korea - within minutes flying time of the North - rekindling memories of the massive US carpet bombing raids that devastated North Korea during the 1950’s Korean War. The US-South Korean-Australian war games in March were designed to train for war with the North. The US media ignored these provocative exercises, but, as usual, North Korea went ballistic, foolishly threatening to attack the US with long-range missiles it does not yet possess.
We have grown jaded over the years by North Korea’s threats and chest-beating. But its recent successful nuclear test and work on a long-ranged missile have begun to add muscle to Pyongyang’s threats. No sooner was the new young North Korean leader, Kim Jong-un, in power than the US, South Korea and Japan began testing him.

More important, the US-South Korea defence treaty calls on Washington to militarily intervene if war erupts between North and South Korea. Given present tensions, a border fight on the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ), commando raids by North Korea’s 110,000-man special forces, air or naval clashes could quickly lead to full war.

North Korea has repeatedly threatened to flatten parts of South Korea’s capitol, Seoul, using 11,000 heavy guns and rocket batteries hidden in caves along the DMZ. The North Korean commandos and missile batteries are tasked with attacking all US airbases and command headquarters in South Korea. The 28,500 US troops based in South Korea will also be a primary target.

North Korea’s medium-ranged missiles are aimed at US bases on mainland Japan, Okinawa and Guam. Its tough 1.1-million man army is poised to attack the South. Massive US airpower would eventually blunt such an advance, but that would mean moving American warplanes from the Gulf and Afghanistan. The US air force’s stocks of bombs and missiles are perilously low and its equipment showing heavy wear and tear.

The US has become accustomed to waging war against small nations whose ‘threat’ has been wildly overblown: Grenada, Somalia, Iraq and Libya. The last real war fought by the US, against Vietnam, was an epic defeat for American arms. North Korea is not an Iraq or Libya.

North Korea’s air force and navy would be quickly destroyed by the US and South Korean air power within days of the war. But taking on its hard as nails army will be a serious challenge if it fights on the defensive.

Pentagon studies show that invading North Korea could cost the US up to 250,000 casualties. So it would be clearly tempted to use tactical nuclear weapons. But North Korea vows to nuke Japan if the US goes nuclear. And there is the threat of Chinese intervention.

The US would be wise to back off from this confrontation and lower tensions with North Korea. America’s empty treasury cannot afford yet another war, having already blown $2 trillion on the lost wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Its armed forces, bogged down in the Mideast and Afghanistan, are in no shape to fight a real war in Korea. Just moving heavy armour and guns there would take months.

Now might be a good time for Washington to ease, rather than keep tightening sanctions on North Korea. Pyongyang’s real objectives are to gain a non-aggression treaty with the US and direct normal relations. Washington won’t hear of this, though it deals with other repellent regimes. American neocons are determined to overthrow North Korea’s regime, fearing it will send advanced arms to Israel’s Mideast foes.

Military forces on the Korean Peninsula are on hair-trigger alert. Flying B-2’s near the North is almost daring it to attack. Diplomats, not air force generals, should be running this largely manufactured crisis.

The writer is an award-winning, internationally syndicated columnist. His articles appear in the New York Times, International Herald Tribune, Los Angeles Times, Times of London, Gulf Times, Khaleej Times and other news sites in Asia. He is a regular contributor to The Huffington Post, Lew Rockwell and Big Eye. He appears as an expert on foreign affairs on CNN, BBC, France 2, France 24, Fox News, CTV and CBC.

http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-ne...k-of-war-rises

By:Bennett Ramberg


Following North Korea’s February 12 nuclear weapons test, the UN Security Council adopted tough penalties on Pyongyang. Along with a new round of financial sanctions, the council beefed up inspections of suspect cargo to and from the country and took steps to halt illegal activities by Pyongyang diplomats – all intended to squeeze North’s nuclear and missile programmes.

But the sanctions do not address the more serious questions raised by North Korea’s doubling down challenge threatening pre-emptive nuclear strikes on the United States as well as threats against South Korea and Japan: To keep tensions from boiling over, should Washington let Pyongyang pout and rant with little additional pushback, banking that time will force the poor, isolated country to return to the bargaining table? Or, given the regime’s penchant for risk-taking, ought the United States itself double down and return its nuclear weapons to South Korean soil leaving no doubt that it remains committed to Seoul’s defence by whatever means? Alternatively, should South Korea, concerned that Washington’s economic challenges and fatigue with global leadership may fray its commitment to the South’s defence, move toward nuclear weapons? Would either tack dangerously incite Pyongyang or make it more prudent?

These questions are not simple or easy to answer, but attempting to do so gives a starting point to plot the future. On balance, placing US nuclear weapons back in South Korea may be the best end point to reduce risks.

It may be years before North Korea can hit the US with a nuclear missile. South Korea does not have that luxury.

Pyongyang has responded to the new sanctions with its customary bluster against South Korea, military demonstrations and leadership visits to frontline forces. More ominously it added cancellation of the armistice agreement that ended the Korean War, cut communication links with South Korea coupled with the nuclear threats against the United States.

At other times Washington might have treated North Korea’s rhetoric as so much puffing. But with both Pyongyang’s nuclear and long-range missile programme advancing, President Barack Obama told ABC news that although the North “probably can’t” make good on its threat to hit the US homeland “we don’t like margin of error.” The result, the president signed off on Pentagon plans to add an additional 14 missiles in Alaska by 2017 to the 30 that possibly could – the programme’s reliability remains in question – defend the country against such a strike.

While it may be many years before the North can hit the US homeland with the required long-range nuclear-armed ballistic missile, South Korea does not have that luxury. Pyongyang’s arsenal today contains shorter-range rockets capable of striking South Korea. Presumably Kim’s scientists are working hard to develop a warhead that could fit on to such delivery systems. In the interim the South must evaluate whether a defence strategy geared toward a conventional-armed adversary is capable of dealing with an emerging nuclear one.

Rather than steer a separate course, Washington counsels South Korea that the security relationship remains strong buttressed by some 28,000 American troops in the South in addition to the offshore US nuclear umbrella housed in Guam, Okinawa and at sea available to deter and fight if needed. To demonstrate the commitment, with aircraft launched from Guam and Missouri, the US Air Force conducted a nuclear-capable B-52 and B-2 flyover of the South in recent military exercises that included nuclear-armed warships. At the conclusion of the naval exercises, South Korean officials reported the vessels would “stay a while” to impress Pyongyang about Washington’s nuclear commitment.

“A while” does not make for a permanent presence. History suggests that a layered nuclear deployment may offer more impact and reassurance, with the location of US nuclear weapons both in and out of the European theatre during the Cold War being a prime example.

History has spoken: Every diplomatic understanding to constrain North Korea has failed.

Such denuclearisation was not to be. North Korea’s recent test stimulated yet more debate in Seoul. In Washington, even before Pyongyang’s recent test, the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee formally called upon the Pentagon to review the option of an American nuclear presence in the South.

Such an appraisal must weigh alternatives and objections against the acute vulnerabilities South Korea could confront without a US nuclear presence and the fact that no missile-defence system can perform to perfection. Absent the return of nuclear weapons, South Korea will be open to North Korean nuclear intimidation and more risk-taking dismissive of the credibility of Washington’s offshore nuclear forces. The absence could encourage Pyongyang to pursue military acts and dare Seoul: “Respond and look what we have.” In the normal course of tensions, North Korea’s arsenal could bully.

A return of nuclear weapons to South Korea will no doubt butt against the argument that they’ll impede the diplomatic effort to reverse Pyongyang’s nuclear programme. However, history has spoken: Every understanding to constrain North Korea – the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, the 1992 peninsula denuclearisation accord, the 1994 Agreed Framework, the 2005 Six-Party Talks agreement to end the programme – has failed along with the North’s 2012 consent to suspend nuclear and missile tests for Washington’s food aid.

Rather than hope for a North Korean non-proliferation epiphany, South Korea must better prepare to live with its disturbing neighbour while conveying the emphatic message that the Kim regime will gain no military or political advantage. The return of American nuclear weapons to South Korea would be the strongest statement the United States can make to buttress the position.

The writer is PhD, JD, served in the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs in the US Department of State during the George H W Bush administration. He is the author of “Nuclear Power Plants as Weapons for the Enemy” and can be reached at: bennettramberg@aol.com

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