Nasim Zehra (THE NEWS)

mtgondal · #1 Wednesday, May 23, 2007

President missing the point? By Nasim Zehra

The writer is an Islamabad-based security analyst

In the last few days President General Pervez Musharraf has been forcefully communicating his views to the public. What he says reflects what and how he thinks. What General Musharraf, as the president and the army chief, thinks heavily influences decision-making within a context where in matters of state power and politics institutionalised decision-making is almost missing. Instead there exists personalised decision-making led by the army leadership and a couple of key civilian confidantes. This curse of personalised decision-making has been carried through civilian and military governments. It has consistently undermined institutions and encouraged the unaccountable exercise of state power. However given that historically within Pakistan's power construct it is 'soldier power' and not constitutional power that calls the shots ultimately when circumstances lead to a military man wielding both 'soldier power' and constitutional power, then his ability to influence the destiny of the nation outstrips the authority of a civilian head of state.

Today within the realm of state power and politics it is General Pervez Musharraf and his close key advisors who call the shots. As they did in the way the Waziristan issue, the Balochistan issue, the issue of increasing threat to state authority in the NWFP districts, the Lal Masjid issue, the reference against the Chief Justice of Pakistan, the lawyers' movement, the potential politicisation of the CJP issue and the May 12 CJP's Karachi trip, were to be handled. Most of these issues are complex issues with a historical legacy and to some extent a regional and international dimension to them. Policy-making on these issues largely flows from General Musharraf headed-military domain. As have decisions linked to the Musharraf referendum, the Musharraf uniform, the Musharraf re-election and the Musharraf-opposition dialogue. However occasionally on tactics there is some input from the political partners. Significantly on Balochistan and perhaps to a lesser extent on Waziristan, despite the input from its political partners, the Musharraf government opted to take the predominantly force route to establish internal sovereignty in Balochistan.

The March 9 reference against the Chief Justice of Pakistan became the most critical issue that progressively acquired the characteristics of a serious political challenge to the authority of the Musharraf government. The Musharraf government must take full responsibility; first for the mishandling of what was a constitutional move and then subsequently for the blundering strategy adopted to tackle a deteriorating political situation.

While according to the president, Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz prepared and sent the reference to the president, most of the subsequent decisions including mistreating the CJP, coming down heavy-handedly on the initial lawyers' protests on which the politicians had bandwagoned, on how to respond to the growing public and political support for what the CJP maintained he stood for -- all this is what the president refers to as 'tactics' and involved the uniformed and civilian intelligence agencies. While the PML leadership was allowed to call the shots on how to tackle the CJP Lahore rally in Punjab, the president and his inner circle have been calling the shots.

The fact is that key members of the president's own party the PML-Q have let the president know from the inception of the CJP issue, that it could potentially snowball into a serious political crisis for the government. There has been open and not-so-open disagreement with the president. Reports suggest that the president, the secretary-general, the former Prime Minister Jamali, Dr Sher Afghan Niazi and others have suggested the path of reconciliation. There is also little doubt that irrespective of what may be the ruling wisdom, the post-March 9 developments including the media-lent transparency, the Supreme Court judges have in fact been put on public trial themselves. They will have to stay within the parameters of law, constitution and integrity not within the parameters of power politics in deciding on the petition regarding the constitutionality of the presidential reference against the CJP. The decision can go either way. 'Engineering' outcomes may now be a matter of the past.

The president is right when he says the matter has gone to the Supreme Court and that is where it must be decided. Not in the streets. But those who believe 'old habits die hard' are keen to keep some show of street power alive. After all if the lawyers would not have come out initially opposing the handling and subsequently the substance of the CJP issue the Supreme Court would not have had the moral muscle to question the ways of the government and of the state institutions in handling the CJP reference issue.

While some political firework around the CJP issue will continue, the more serious issue is now what emerged from the Karachi mayhem --- the abdication of state's responsibility towards its citizens. Perhaps no state or law enforcement institution could have done worse in abandoning their responsibility virtually becoming party to the killings and mayhem in Karachi. That point seems to get lost in the politically inspired babble that flows from many quarters. From an ordinary citizens' perspective, who must demand protection of life and property from the state, the horrific events of May 12 are truly mind-blowing. Not so for those who wield power. The crime committed by the state has become the subtext of the endless political battling.

The main text of Pakistan's current political narrative must be criminal negligence of law enforcement agencies. That main text demands action too. Essentially a neutral credible inquiry is required with recommendations on how to deter another horrific replay of the Karachi mayhem. Why are the senate committees not taking the initiative to push for a bipartisan inquiry -- the senate committees on human rights, on law and order, or on national security? The Human Rights Commission in Pakistan should also move to prepare a report on what forces led to the Karachi mayhem.

The CJP issue and the bloody mayhem in Karachi paradoxically provide an opportunity to clearly assess at what cost to the people and the country, lawless power games and individualised decision-making continue. The CJP and May 12 crisis can prove to be vital developments for the power-wielders to embark on new paths. In the eye of the storm our country also sits in the lap of opportunity. Every risky situation brings with it new openings. Crisis and chaos creates a context in which the old truisms get eroded. The old ways hence show their inadequacy of delivering on national objectives.

Much depends still on one man -- on President Musharraf. He has strongly held views on Karachi. He has said that those political forces against me are trying to blame me for the Karachi killings, they are trying to give it an ethnic colour and say that because of his own ethnic background. He said despite his ethnic background he was first a Pakistani and was concerned about all Pakistanis. That what happened in Karachi was because of Opposition parties who were determined to politicize the CJP issue. He said MQM was the majority party controlling Karachi and the CJP rally amounted to throwing a gauntlet to the MQM. The president wondered what would have happened if the CJP's rally passed through MQM strongholds in Lyari etc.

The government's ally the MQM however has been angry. The MQM leader Altaf Hussain, London-based and a British citizen, has been roundly criticizing all political parties as well as the Establishment. The MQM has released alleged 'evidence' supporting the PPP's involvement, has accused the ANP for killing MQM activists and has criticized the ruling party for creating confusion. The MQM has held sections of the Establishment and the law-enforcement agencies responsible for not intervening to stop the killings of MQM workers. The MQM leadership had taken on the rally planned for the chief justice, resulting in the Karachi carnage, reportedly on Islamabad's encouragement.

Any attempt by the government to explain Karachi away as an inevitable development because the CJP was to lead a rally from the airport to the Quaid-e-Azam's mazar and to the Sindh High Court premises is unacceptable and dangerous. It is unacceptable because no party has a right to physically control any area. Citizens of Pakistan, whether lawyers or other political parties should be free to go where they want, provided it is done peacefully. Surely the government is not saying that the MQM has a right to set up 'no-go areas.' The president's explanation of the MQM militant behaviour, i.e., if the MQM was behind the killings, is also dangerous because the State is opting to withdraw from its law and order maintenance duties because its ally party is opting to enter into a political contest with its opponents.

The president's responsibility as the head of state is to order a high level impartial inquiry into what led to the May 12 bloody mayhem in Karachi. Failure to take such steps is what promotes hate and political extremism that the president believes is the real enemy of Pakistan.

mtgondal · #2 Wednesday, May 30, 2007

Pakistan's new political narrative

By Nasim Zehra

The writer is an Islamabad-based security analyst

In Pakistan we are witnessing some unprecedented events likely to influence the state of power and politics in Pakistan. On May 26, when the Supreme Court Bar Association organised a seminar, which in fact was a lawyers' political gathering, in the auditorium of the Supreme Court, militant political energy was witnessed both inside and outside the auditorium. Inside, every lawyer was attacking President General Pervez Musharraf. They said that Pakistan needs to become a welfare state looking after the people of Pakistan instead of being a security state looking after the 500,000 Pakistanis in the armed services. One lawyer said that the president was right that the reference issue was about a struggle between lies and between the truth, and that the lawyers were on the side of the truth. For much less an utterance about the army some years ago, this regime threw a PML-N MNA, Javed Hashmi, in jail. In his case the courts could not ensure a fair trial. Throwing any of these lawyers into jail is likely to multiply the lawyers' militancy.

Outside the Supreme Court on May 26, the Constitution Avenue was yet again living up to its name. Before March 9, the jokes never ended as Pakistanis drove on this avenue; the biggest avenue with the most farcical name; what constitution in a country where martial law held sway over the people longer than civilian rule. Post-March 9 those jokes should be no more. Thousands, from different political parties led by lawyers, have come out calling for rule of law, for constitutional rule. On May 26, as the national anthem played inside the auditorium at the start of the seminar cum political meeting, the few thousands who sat outside on the avenue witnessed it on the huge television screens put up by the organisers. It was a chilling scene as the diverse group of thousands sprung to their feet all at once and respectfully, in complete silence and unity, heard the national anthem. The energy was unmistakable. It was political and positive. However, how this available raw material is utilised remains unclear.

Besides the lawyers-led movement there are those political groups that actively threaten the state. They believe that taking up arms against the state is a holy war. These groups are increasingly using coordinated violence, attacking symbols of state power, specifically the army and law-enforcement agencies. They are gradually investing themselves with the authority to enforce their own version of social morality by taking on shopkeepers, school administrations, cable operators etc. From the capital, the administrations of Lal Masjid and Jamia Hafsa send out the victory signals to the already angry and organised groups determined to continue undermining state authority. These groups believe their ways are the ways of the 'pious' and hence the only one that can salvage the Muslims of Pakistan and beyond, from the 'evils' within and the 'evils' abroad.

While these militant groups may be numerically small, it is what they are able to do in public space that makes them big in impact. In these dark times, calls to 'social morality' and ritualistic piety, invoking the Holy Quran and Sunnah, will reverberate in the hearts of hundreds of thousands angered by exclusion, deprivation and disrespect within and outraged by the killing fields of Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine and to some extent in India-held Kashmir

Then there are the mainstream political parties. Essentially their politics is 'business as usual.' Though they are completely supporting the lawyers' movement, as the opposition they have deployed no new strategies to convert the pressure points into a real threat to the government. An en bloc resignation from the National Assembly over the May 12 failure of law-enforcing agencies could have precipitated a serious political crisis. But a divided opposition cannot create a genuine crisis. Their eyes are on the October elections as they attempt to unite against General Musharraf. The likely electoral line-up will have the MMA, PML-N and Imran Khan on the one side and the PPP contesting on its own. Meanwhile, elements like the May 12 tragedy, the government's refusal to hold an inquiry, its support for the MQM, the state pressure on Imran Khan and the MQM-Imran clash, are all elements that are potentially problematic. Unless the opposition can utilise them politically against the government, they do not have dangerous repercussions.

In Pakistan we have entered an 'unhinged' political period. Matters are now on a political boil. It seems highly unlikely that either tinkering with the existing political alignments or deploying state power, overtly and covertly, will take the country back to the relatively manageable pre-March 9 political situation. When internal dynamics come alive the ability of the external factor to impact the situation is usually diminished. In Pakistan's case, given the connection between Washington and the leadership of Pakistan Army, Washington would, to some degree, impact the army leadership's political decisions. Similarly, given that Washington views the PPP as a moderate party suited to be Musharraf's partner, the PPP leader's decisions on future political alignments could also be influenced by the Washington factor, but to a much lesser extent.

In the realm of power and politics, there are two contests that are concurrently being fought. One that wants to dictate the terms for the use of state and political power. The lawyers and the militants' groups are both seeking to redefine the exercise of state power; one wants the constitution of Pakistan while the other wants Islamic Shariah, according to its own perceptions, to dictate the terms for the exercise of state and political power. The militant groups seek a far more invasive role of the state to ensure that the state, politics and society all function according to its version of Shariah. Both these groups are contesting, at this juncture, not against each other, but indeed against General Musharraf's setup which exercises state and political power. The other contest is between political contestants who seek to exercise state and political power. This includes all those political forces that participate in the electoral process and political process including the leadership of the armed forces.

Forces participating in these two contests do overlap, but there are two distinct contests underway. And undoubtedly it is those struggling to dictate the terms for the use and exercise of state power who have triggered the unhinging of the current setup. The militant groups and the lawyers cannot be contained within the existing political system.

Pakistan is facing the fallout of the incessant failure of state authority to ensure that its public space is controlled in accordance with constitutionally-determined rule of law. Instead, Pakistani public space became the arena in which contesting groups, patronised by civilian and military managers of Pakistan, fought their battles, in which religious parties were encouraged to battle Nawaz Sharif's Lahore summit plans, Nawaz Sharif set off his goons to attack the Supreme Court, the army moved the 111 brigade to strike a coup, armed Mujahideen groups were repeatedly encouraged to threaten civilian government on policy matters, the Zia regime encouraged hard-line ethnic groups to rise and fight the PPP whose leader he had illegally hanged, the PPP threw opposition leader Shaikh Rashid in jail for raising a toy gun in public and took into custody the aging father of Nawaz Sharif and state power moved in to kill a callous yet elderly, elected Baloch leader. The present regime has also been responsible for over 200 plus 'missing people' and is also indirectly involved in the death of at least two journalists in the tribal areas. There has been endless abuse of Pakistan's public space by the state and the government.

Today, new players are contesting for ways in which public space should be managed. Unless the state can reclaim public space to enforce the dictates of law for all its citizens equally, internal security cannot return to Pakistan. The answers and response to that lie with movements focusing on rule of law and a stronger, more credibly functioning state, in which institutions play their constitutional roles and the judiciary can ensure rule of law, reining in the men and women who wield state and political power.

While the militant groups and the lawyers movement will continue their protests and battles with the establishment, the two institutions that will determine if these protests and battles will lead to more mayhem or to some saner arrangements are Pakistan Army's leadership and the judiciary. They both wield genuine power. One, now aided by the lawyers' movement, derives it from the constitution, the other from the weapons that it carries. Significantly though, within the domestic political context, undoubtedly the corollary of increasing judicial power must be diminishing weapons power. Pakistan's decades old power construct is now showing signs of discontinuity. The unprecedented transparency in the functioning of state institutions and of the wielders of power, ensured by Pakistan's independent media, is also greatly contributing towards the emerging discontinuity within the Pakistani power scene.

Email: nasimzehra@hotmail.com

mtgondal · #3 Wednesday, June 06, 2007

Gagging the media

By Nasim Zehra
The writer is an Islamabad-based security analyst

Wednesday, JUNE 06, 2007

The world before March 9 was a relatively comfortable place for the many forces directly and indirectly occupying or influencing Pakistan's political fray. This includes mainly the military leadership which principally manages Pakistan, the PML-Q (the army leadership's junior partners) and the MQM (the army leadership's 'more equal than the PML-Q' partners), the judiciary and the media. The political parties in terms of the impact are currently on the second rung of Pakistan's current power scene. They are largely following trends not creating new ones.

The landmark events and dates which created the conditions for the 'unhinging' of the current power system within Pakistan are four; March 9, not the filing of the presidential reference but the ordering by the president and his men that the Chief Justice of Pakistan resign and the subsequent application of crude force by the agencies to put pressure on the CJP; March 13 the manhandling of the CJP by state functionaries and the force used to intimidate the CJP's supporters; May 5 when the outpouring of the peoples' support demonstrated that the people of Pakistan at the gut level have been instinctively resentful of a power culture from which the powerful intangibles such as rule of law, credibility, justice and fair-play have been missing; and finally May 12 when horror struck Karachi and exposed the complete political and moral bankruptcy of Pakistan's managers. Pakistanis saw how in the country's power politics the law enforcing agencies were freely allowed or maybe made to abandon their principle task of protecting the life, property and dignity of the citizens of the state. In the battle between the CJP and the establishment, the latter opted for a 'strategy' that turned out to be bloody and immoral.

This led to an unsettling of the status quo. The first challenge to the establishment came from the lawyers, the judiciary had no choice but to follow suit. The judiciary saw itself on public trial. The lawyers' movement demanding rule of law, protesting against the CJP's near dismissal, combined with the peoples' support and the political parties support gave the judiciary the muscle to stand up against the force that it had historically aided. The media remained the candid mirror that reflected this reality for the people of Pakistan.

Clearly, misreading of a shaken power scene by the establishment, that still remains steeped in the tried, tested and failed ways of political manipulation which means that the establishment has raced ahead on a blundering path. The tales of blunder are endless as have been the calculations regarding what the judges will or will not do, what the media under pressure will do, how effective banning of certain anchors will be in 'pacifying' the public, what can invoking the 'national interest' or 'national institution' achieve in restraining criticism against the establishment and the army leadership. Perhaps wisdom and reflection less and anger-cum-misplaced confidence, if not arrogance, have been more the guiding elements for the top level decision makers. Hence the blundering landmarks have now almost converted into a signpost to unprecedented political chaos.

The comfortable space for any of the forces within Pakistan's power scene no longer exists. In an 'unhinged' context old ways will not work. Old ways of ruling, dictating, terrorising and obedience will have to be abandoned by men in uniform: dictating by unaccountable rulers, terrorising by a certain party's leader and obedience to the ruling party. Pakistan's power scene is now a melting pot with the old ways crumbling and the news ones still not in place. There is a nationwide questioning of why should all the institutions not play their constitutional roles and why should all those who occupy the seats of power and decision-making not be held accountable?

In a sign of changing times and changing perceptions of power and no less a sign of how empowered the judiciary feels, two Supreme Court judges have refused to be on the bench hearing the petition against the Supreme Court Bar Association for the political meeting called seminar it held in the SC auditorium. Events post-March 9 are gradually moving towards a comprehensive questioning of what must be the basic touchstone of patriotism, rule of law and obedience to the Constitution, or no criticism of leaders of institutions such as the army, who have played extra-constitutional roles throughout Pakistan's history.

An effort by any section of society to frame criticism of the actions of the army leadership or criticism of certain aspects of the institutional working as an issue of the army versus the rest would be a great disservice to Pakistan and to the institution. This is the institution from which thousands have served the country through martyrdom and it is a national institution which we have grown up owning and being proud of. Yet none of this means it is beyond reproach. It is by no means a perfect institution. With its repeated forays into Pakistan's political power scene individuals within it would have suffered on the professional front; many would have also developed warts like all people in power play do.

Hence when a researched piece of work that is Ayesha Siddiqa's book on the military and its commercial activities is published why should she be labelled a traitor? It's the force of informed dialogue and debate that steels and readies a society and state for positive and collective evolution as a unit of progress and prosperity. So none of what we are now experiencing in Pakistan is about targeting institutions. It is about saying no to the ways of individuals and leaders of institutions who have impeded rule of law within Pakistan. Many are missing this point in times of increasing polarisation. Amazing words of 'shoot those criticising the army' are repeatedly heard from a relatively wise man of Pakistan's politics Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain.

From all the developments after March 9 the media has merely reflected through its reporting and discussion programmes the key issues that deeply influence the state of affairs in Pakistan. The fact is that the media is no one's ally. It is merely facilitating Pakistan's power players to squarely focus on issues that need to be settled if Pakistan must progress as a peaceful country. The questions are endless: is there rule of law in Pakistan? Who decides which law is applicable and which must be rejected? How are those who exercise power held accountable? What political system will ensure stability within Pakistan? What is at stake for the entire nation? What are the ways and the thinking of the current people in power? The media has been able to go beyond merely reporting and focusing on these more fundamental issues.

In fact the media has opted not to stop at the questions that affect Pakistan's current power players. The questions influencing them are endless. For example for President General Musharraf the issue is how to ensure his re-election by the current assemblies while in uniform. He is also concerned about the terms upon which to enter some agreement with the PPP leader and what it will take to get the PML-Q on board for a pre-election accommodation with the PPP? Musharraf is also finding ways to project his 'power' and authority and hence the ISPR statement that stated that the corps commanders fully back the army chief. General Musharraf is also saddled with the liability of the MQM which he had believed was his major political asset. For Benazir the question is whether or not to enter into some agreement with General Musharraf who is unquestionably in deep political trouble?

The media is mirroring the obvious and the not-so-obvious. It has popularised a discourse which is raising uncomfortable questions. No one likes this. Not only those in power but indeed even many in the public. While the public appreciates the media for being the candid camera on Pakistan's power scene the people seek calm and peace.

Only General Musharraf, who controls all the levers of state power, through quick, free and fair elections under a neutral set-up and a truly independent election commissioner can steer the country towards genuine and lasting political stability. No other route is likely to work. The step of clamping down on the media meanwhile would have been amusing for its simplicity and naivety had it not been in the times of internet, cable and satellite television. It is a worrying step for all Pakistanis who believe that those at the helm of affairs can do with more wisdom, competence and humility. The march for change in Pakistan is unstoppable as is the freedom of the media.

Email: nasimzehra@hotmail.com

http://thenews.jang.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=59290

mtgondal · #4 Wednesday, June 13, 2007

Unchanging mainstream politics

By Nasim Zehra
Wednesday, JUNE 13, 2007

The writer is an Islamabad-based security analyst

In Pakistan there is the emerging non-electoral lawyer-led political energy that is pushing for the resolution of some of the country's chronic problems. These include problems of the weakening of the democratic institutions, the failure of governments to uphold rule of law and the extra-constitutional and unaccountable authority repeatedly exercised by the army. These problems perpetuate power battles within Pakistan's political scene undermining the principle agendas that state and governments must adopt, that of improving the quality of life of its citizens. These are hence systemic issues which require a systems' overhaul. Systems are overhauled through processes and principles. On Pakistan's mainstream power scene these systemic issues are of secondary importance. Instead battles for gaining and retaining power are perpetually fought.

It is therefore no surprise that three months into the lawyers' movement, it remains unclear to what extent the energy generated through this movement will influence the texture of Pakistan's mainstream electoral politics. While the lawyers' movement is likely to continue, the likely ownership of the issues that it raises will rest with the lawyers. The politicians will be counted in the support brigade of the lawyers but increasingly, barring any sensational political development, the politicians will find themselves more engaged in with how to win the next elections. And that means essentially fighting the elections along old battle-lines.

Ostensibly the only 'new' development on the political scene is the PML-Q attempting to evolve its own brand identity. While remaining deeply connected to its parent body it is seeking an independent role as well. Can it achieve the independent identity it seeks given that it derives its political clout from its partnership with the ruling President General Pervez Musharraf? Some of its political moves are interesting. For example buoyed by the obviously damaging fall-out of the blunders committed by the government many in the party have found the guts to stand up to criticise these moves. The lawyers' movement gave the judiciary the unusual confidence to 'go by the book' as opposed to the caution and fear that normally guided it. Similarly to the politicians of the ruling party it is the peoples' unprecedented criticism of the government's high-handedness on handling the CJP reference, that gave them the political confidence to be critical of the government's policies.

In an interesting turn of events those very politicians who have looked only at the GHQ for their political succour have gained confidence to articulate an approach separate from yet parallel to what the president, prime minister and some of the ministers are stating on many current issues. There have been authentic reports on the criticism by PML-Q members of government's policies on the Karachi tragedy, the mistreatment of the CJP, the president getting re-elected in uniform, the president's re-election by the present assembly, the attempt to gag the media and now to initiate another reference against the CJP. The PML president has told the press that "I must frankly say that the PML leadership was completely unaware of the government's initiative of filing another reference against the CJP and we came to know about it through the media's statements.”

Earlier when the president complained about being left alone by the political men of the PML-Q its president and others openly stated that they were not consulted when the move for the reference was made. In fact even the attorney general was taken aback by surprise at the filing of the reference! The PML-Q's attempt at reconciliation too was sabotaged by other institutions close to the president. There are however within the party two extreme positions that exist. One led by the Punjab chief minister which vows complete and total support to the president in almost all his political moves. The other extreme is represented by PML-Q Vice-President Kabir Wasti who went on-air on an independent TV channel to openly criticise General Musharraf.

Significantly many high profile politicians from the official party have also questioned the wisdom of the uniformed president's re-election by the current assemblies. Many have argued that such a move will adversely affect their party's fortunes at the hustings. While the party is willing to go along with Musharraf's tenure as the president, many of the members have raised questions about the wisdom of a move that would contribute to raising public resentment against the army's continued interference in civilian matters.

As elections approach the PML-Q leadership is likely to raise issues linked to the elections. Chaudhry Shujaat has again called for a round table of the politicians to decide 'the rules of the game' needed to hold fair and free elections. He also again asked the opposition to propose three names for the post of the chief election commissioner. The government has also made a commitment to go by the constitutional requirement of setting up a neutral caretaker government to hold the elections. All these are moves that would contribute to relatively free and fair elections. All this overlooks the current demand of most opposition parties that elections under General Musharraf will not be acceptable.

Nevertheless there are positions that the ruling party is taking which do not approximate with the government's positions. An earlier example of this was the party leadership's criticism of the killing of the Baloch leader Sardar Akbar Bugti. None of this difference of opinion is any indicator of a 'rebellion in the making' against the party's uniformed mentor, rebellions and revolutions are long gone from Pakistan's mainstream political culture.

Yet it does mean that the political instincts of some of the leading party members do separate the party from the government. On issues of social change the party leadership has tended to be extremely cautious. For example on the Women's Protection Bill and Honour Killing the party leadership took a politically more cautious position in an attempt to make the near impossible happen, to make the bills acceptable to the MMA. The political agenda of the party leadership was also to keep the MMA on board while keeping the ruling party and the president away from Pakistan's key mainstream party the PPP.

However on some mainstream political issues created through the government's blundering moves, the party leadership has taken a relatively bold position. This has meant that on many occasions the party does manage to get out of the media and the public's 'firing line.' In some cases the party advice keeps the president from falling over the political precipice. Imran Khan, through his unadulterated and pointed criticism of the government's post-March 9 blunders, shows the utter poverty of wisdom of the government's politics, while the occasional moves by the ruling party show a section of the present set-up as being less impoverished.

In spite of the lack of authority of this section of the present set-up, it tends to offer itself as the relatively sane element to Pakistanis who can see that illogical political moves have exacerbated an existing political crisis. There is a feeble attempt within the party to initiate, even sometimes publicly, a parallel approach, to deal with political problems. Often such an approach is in contradiction with General Musharraf's combative and confrontational approach.

The PML-Q men have been keen that General Musharraf closes the fronts that he has opened with the media and the judiciary. The closure on the media front is in the offing. The president and the prime minister were clearly 'guided' by the PML-Q office holders to close this front. Earlier angry men of the establishment had conferred with some key bureaucrats to gag the media. The withdrawal of the PEMRA ordinance 2007 signals this. The harassment of at least the 'heavy-weights in media will also likely cease while harassing the less known, the use of advertisements as pressure tools etc. may continue. Overall the freedom of the media, towards which some contribution by this government cannot be denied, will generally remain intact. A difficult political environment for the government simply means the media will continue to be on its feet as the government will repeatedly return to the knee-jerk reaction of wanting to 'shoot the messenger.'

Hence the Supreme Court is also conducting suo motto proceedings on an application filed by the Press Association of the Supreme Court seeking the SC's intervention in the cases of harassment of journalists. And political parties, including the PPP and the ANP continue to protest against the government's pressure on the media.

As for the other front opened with the CJP and by extension with the lawyer community, the president is not taking any advice from the PML-Q's leading men. Instead the battle of affidavit and the battle of references seems to be on. The government hopes that a long drawn court hearing will help to ease the pressure on the government. Whether this in fact happens depends greatly on at what point the mainstream political energy led by the political parties' turns to electoral activity.

Meanwhile the PML-Q's attempt to distance itself from the government's controversial policies notwithstanding, the party cannot move away from the two even more critical political parameters set by General Musharraf. First, that he will be re-elected by this assembly and in his uniform. Second, that there are no early elections and that the current assembly completes its term. Significantly in addition to these parameters is the question of the government's 'settlement' with the PPP. While no electoral alliance with the PPP is in the offing some understanding on providing a relatively level playing field will be on the cards. For the elections, the PML-Q will meanwhile draw upon state intervention and patronage to manage the home run. It will hope the latest budget will help it to earn some public goodwill in the election year.

If all else remains the same Pakistan's mainstream political energy will remain engaged with planning for electoral politics. Unless new political realignments in the political fray occur, such as an MMA-PML-N-PTI alliance, the electoral activity will not undermine the current status quo. The forces that however will continue to challenge the prevailing status quo on the power scene will be the lawyers' movement and the judiciary. And unless the power scene readjusts itself to the demands of these forces, the movers and shakers of the power scene will be in a flux irrespective of how comforting they may find the unchanging electoral political scene.

Email: nasimzehra@hotmail.com

http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=60260

mtgondal · #5 Wednesday, June 20, 2007

Receding political crisis

By Nasim Zehra

The writer is an Islamabad-based security analyst

Wednesday, June 20,2007

The hundred-day old lawyers' movement is not waning but it may no longer remain the principal focus for Pakistan's mainstream political energy. Two interesting developments, some political rethink in Pakistan's ruling circle and the beginnings of electoral activities may veer political energy towards electoral politics. Forced to some extent by the pressure exerted by the lawyers' movement, there is a review of political strategy within the Musharraf camp.

Some of the likely results of this rethink may be General Pervez Musharraf's re-election as president by a newly elected assembly, relatively early elections and the government's extra efforts to convince the opposition that it is keen to hold 'fair and free' elections. Dialogue for an end to the confrontation with two key opposition parties, the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), despite its ups and downs will continue. Unless some political development that radically counter these trends emerges on the political scene, the grave political threat of a major destabilisation that the lawyers' movement had posed to the Musharraf regime seems to be receding. This notwithstanding however the crisis of governance, with a weak writ of the state, and the absence of justice with weak institutions etc. will persist.

The unscripted resistance to the high-handedness of state power has indeed provided muscle power to a hitherto weak judiciary. In the apparent strengthening of the judiciary, the lawyers' movement appears to have impacted one of the principal causes of lack of good governance -- the unaccountable exercise of executive and state power. For example the possibility of judicial intervention to block unfair practices by the ruling party, the establishment or the election commission through suo moto action or the admission of petitions by opposition parties, would serve as a deterrent to blatant tampering with the election process. Interestingly this fact has been acknowledged by none other than Benazir Bhutto. Bhutto emphatically stated in her mid-June interview with Geo television that the government does not have the capacity to rig elections in the way that it rigged them in 2002. Similarly a relatively independent judiciary's engagement on general Musharraf's re-election by the current National Assembly too must be factored in as the regime strategists decide on the re-election question.

Furthermore, the lawyers' demand for the reinstatement of the CJP is one that will not fizzle out. The judicial process will have to address the questions of the presidential reference, the CJP's reinstatement both against the backdrop of the president's illegal move of rendering him "ineffective" and against the backdrop of the CJP's post removal political-populist role. The Musharraf regime recognises that the relatively independent judiciary will address the question of the CJP's future within legal parameters. Reportedly there has been indirect back-channel engagement between the CJP and the Musharraf camp. There is still no indication that either side is willing to give up its current position.

However, the two key political demands of the lawyers' movement which go beyond the judiciary's independence are Musharraf's removal and an end to the military's involvement in politics. In identifying Musharraf's ouster the lawyers' movement overstretched its own capacity. As a widely supported legitimate ethical movement raising the chronic issues of power politics, the lawyers' movement also seeks immediate results in Pakistan's current mainstream politics.

Its political objective is to ensure Musharraf's removal and that is unlikely to happen. As matters now stand in electoral politics, the demands and the threats of mainstream politicians of the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI), the PML-N and Imran Khan are not likely to be backed by concrete action. For example there is no indication that either or all of the three will boycott elections with General Musharraf as the incumbent president. They are demanding his ouster and Qazi Hussain Ahmad has also threatened to boycott the elections but given the track record of the JI it will opt for pragmatism rather than for radical action involving a boycott. PML-N may attempt a return of its leaders from London but its men in the field will want to fight the ballot battle.

Meanwhile the political competition between mainstream parties including the PML-N and the PPP will accentuate. Political parties the world over compete with each other and so will Pakistan's political parties. The recent somewhat amusing claim by Benazir Bhutto of a PPP-PML-N agreement on taking turns to rule Pakistan for five years each, was contradicted by the PML-N. The fissures between the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) partners may become public. The MMA may begin to unravel under the pressure of JUI's pro-government leanings versus the JI's anti-Musharraf stance.

In Pakistan for multiple reasons the gap between mainstream politics and ethics is barely shrinking. Imran Khan, the maverick politician who combines ethics, principles and politics functions largely without party machinery. He may influence the urban vote bank as an electoral partner of a party such as the PML-N. On his own for now he is the emerging voice of conscience on Pakistan's power scene; he is to Pakistan's mainstream political scene what Asma Jehangir is to Pakistan's human rights scene.

The demands of electoral politics are complex and contradictory. The lawyers' movement is an urban movement, with support from the political parties insofar as it weakens their adversary the Musharraf regime. The political parties have a partial commitment to the lawyers' political agenda. Their principal objective is to do well in the imminent ballot battle. PML-N and Qazi sahib may be equally committed to Musharraf's removal.

Yet they know that given the current political configuration Musharraf's removal is not an immediate possibility. In addition to some of the economic and foreign policy gains Pakistan made under Musharraf and because of his institutions' support, Musharraf is there because the opposition parties will never unite to oust him, he is there because some of the competing political parties see him as a road to power, he is there because post 9/11 Pakistan's opposition is genuinely split along ideological lines and some belong to Musharraf's ideological leanings, he is there because there is no popular public uprising against him. For example a political crisis that could have shaken the system would have been an en bloc resignation of the entire opposition from the parliament after the bloody tragedy of May 12 in Karachi. Then the state was at its worst and its weakest and the public outraged. But the opposition was at its pragmatic best. It was passionately critical of the government but in no mood to take any radical action.

Interestingly another unstated but a seemingly emerging political objective of the lawyers' movement has to do with the person of the Chief Justice of Pakistan. Popular wisdom has tipped him as an alternative presidential candidate for a section of the opposition. That seems unlikely because every opposition party, maybe barring Imran Khan's Tehreek-i-Insaaf, will not want a non-political and non-loyalist as its candidate. Some in the opposition will 'play ball' with the Musharraf regime and will look for a quid pro quo in exchange for supporting Musharraf or for not opposing him.

While the answers to the fundamental questions of rule of law and of an independent judiciarythat the lawyers' movement has raised, must come from the judiciary itself, the role of Pakistan's mainstream political parties cannot be undermined. Unless mainstream politicians genuinely appreciate the importance of the rule of law, of governance within the constitutional framework, of strengthening state institutions, of recognising the potential of the parliament and Senate as legitimate political forums through which state institutions such as the army are steered towards playing their constitutional role, the lawyers' movement will not influence Pakistan's mainstream political culture as well as the exercise of unaccountable state power.

Meanwhile as the logic of electoral politics spreads on Pakistan's political horizon it will divert the bulk of Pakistan's mainstream political energy away from trying to ensure Musharraf's exit. Many in the opposition will no doubt attack Musharraf, the system and his policies in their election campaigns. But under Musharraf, if all else remains the same, the 2007 elections will be held. How the elections are conducted, fought and won will influence Pakistan's ability to face the multiple challenges of rule of law, re-establishment of the writ of the state combined with the destabilised region surrounding Pakistan.

Email: nasimzehra@hotmail.com

http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=61224

mtgondal · #6 Wednesday, June 27, 2007

Lal Masjid — end the lawlessness

Wednesday,June 27,2007

By Nasim Zehra

The writer is an Islamabad-based

security analyst

From the numerous and ostensibly crisis-like situations that keep popping up in Pakistan, three broad cause and effect themes have emerged. One, the lawyers’ movement and a strengthened judiciary, two purposeful unified opposition action and genuine democracy and three establishing the writ of the state and safeguarding internal sovereignty. Judiciary, democracy and internal sovereignty are three important pre-requisites of successfully governed nation-states. Without a strong judiciary justice cannot be dispensed and the exercise of power by different state institutions and the executive cannot be held accountable. Without democratic institutions contending interests in society cannot be regulated and contests amicably resolved. And without internal sovereignty there would be confusion leading to chaos and conflict.

Fortunately for Pakistan, the moral pressure generated by the lawyers’ movement has made the judiciary more mindful of its constitutional responsibilities. It is more proactive and confident about holding state functionaries accountable. For example in the famous missing persons’ case the two member bench of the Supreme Court has demanded explanation from federal secretaries on non-compliance with the court’s earlier directives. In another case, a single bench of the Lahore High Court ruled that the government cannot rely on reports of intelligence agencies against a civil servant for the purpose of withholding or granting promotion. On issues affecting the average citizen a Supreme Court judge has taken suo moto notice of price hike.

On the democratic front too the struggle continues. Some civilian politicians are caught between often conflicting demands of seeking power and of ensuring the return of the military to the barracks. A unified opposition alone will pressurise the current regime to take the steps needed to hold fair and free elections. Without genuine pressure the regime will ignore the oppositions’ demands. Often only threat of survival prompts those in power to change policies and positions that will reduce their hold over power. On the political front matters are in a melting pot. There is heightened activity among the politicians and they will meet in London to make their final choices on the political weapons they may use to put pressure on the Musharraf regime.

It is however on the issue of internal sovereignty that problems appear to be most acute. The state institutions that were ordered in the eighties by the military ruler president general Zia ul Haq to deliberately retreat from public space are attempting to stage a ‘come-back.’ Also then the law of the land was in many instances replaced by the compulsions of the anti-Soviet international jihad. The ‘come-back’ by the state is proving to be a complex task.

Over the years there has almost been a ‘breakout’ of militias in Pakistan. They have shared different worldviews on how a society must be run. Mostly they are guided by their own interpretation of shariah, of jihad, of morality, of kafir, of the enemy etc. The links and inspirations are nebulous ranging from the Taliban to other supranational armed militant groups including the Al Qaeda. Blundering US policies in Iraq and Palestine and highly irresponsible acts like that of the British government to confer the title of sir on the most controversial man in the Muslim world helped fuel anger and violence.

Over the years militant militias have also surfaced from parties like the MQM to repeatedly challenge the writ of the state. On May 12 in Karachi the writ of the state was exercised. In abandoning its responsibility to protect the people of Karachi the state institutions had made a choice based on the orders of the MQM government and the Musharraf regime. Similarly in Balochistan the political battle between the centre and the province too became violent. The state used force to kill the Baloch sardar Akbar Bugti in Balochistan who led his militia in a guerrilla battle against the Pakistani law enforcement agencies and the army.

The Pakistani state is facing different challenges to its writ. They range from the tribal areas to Balochistan and from the heart of the capital to the urban areas of NWFP. While those who resist the writ of the state all deploy force and violence but their motives differ. In Balochistan, while some groups may have taken extreme steps, at the core there has been a political struggle for provincial autonomy and reallocation of resources. In Karachi, the MQM, the centre’s ally, has used muscle power to clobber its opponents. With MQM ruling the province it has often used state power to battle the opposition.

It is in NWFP that the writ of the state is challenged by groups that believe enforcement of shariah is necessary to root out what they regard as criminal and evil from society. Repeatedly these groups, armed and unarmed, have played the role of law enforcing agencies by demanding closure of shops, television cables, girls’ schools etc.

In the heart of Islamabad, students of two madrassahs who are self-appointed guardians of societal mortality have aggressively begun to implement their version of shariah. By any definition of law these students have kidnapped individuals, men women and children, Pakistanis and foreigners. They claim they have done so to stop the spread of unIslamic ways. In response to the arrest of their students by the Islamabad police the madrassah students kidnapped three policemen. Earlier the female students occupied a government owned building of the children’s library. When they set up a shariah court they ruled that the sitting Minister Neelofor Bakhtiar’s marriage was annulled because she embraced her coach after a safe parachute landing from a moving plane.

Initially the state was wise not to opt for use of force. It opted to engage with these students, men and women who are kidnapping Pakistanis and non-Pakistani citizens. Long drawn out and patient negotiations have emboldened these students and they have increased their ‘moral cleansing’ operations.

These students led by the madrassah’s principal do have genuine complaints against the state but they have opted to reject the legal route to register their complaints, which would have been through the courts. Instead they have taken law enforcement in their own hands. A weak and blundering state cannot be taken to task by taking on the role of the state. That is a recipe for greater chaos and cannot be acceptable to the state.

President General Musharraf acknowledged the state-of-affairs on June 25 while speaking to the participants of the National Internship Programme at the Governors’ House in Peshawar. The president emphasised that, “ I know (a) majority of the people are against these elements and want to purge the country of the scourge of extremism…We are all Muslims and these people have no right to categorise the people as good and bad Muslims. Religion and belief is a matter between Allah and his creatures and no one has the right to cast aspersions on beliefs of others.”

But these words account for little. In the heart of the capital the students move around freely to carry out their ‘cleansing operations.’ After all when two dozen women and men piled up in cars and left the madrassahs, were there no policeman present outside the madrassahs? If they were, then why didn’t they follow them to see where were they headed? Why didn’t these policemen stop the students from forcibly entering the Chinese parlour? And if no policemen or agency men were present outside the madrassahs then obviously the students are not seen to be undermining the writ of the state by those who should be most concerned about the matter. Many other questions worth asking are: How did the madrassah students get armed? How were they able to move around freely? How were they earlier able to procure sandbags to defend themselves against an imminent police operation?

Whatever the reality of the madrassah students and their supporters or detractors maybe, it is about time that those who seriously wield state power undermine the ability of the madrassah students to repeatedly threaten the writ of the state. Preferably the state must opt for use of unconventional non-force methods to impair their ability. There is no dearth of such non-conventional methods. Firmly, yet wisely the state must now re-establish its writ.

Email: nasimzehra@hotmail.com

http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=62154

mtgondal · #7 Thursday, July 19, 2007

From the canvas of consciousness

By Nasim ZehraThursday,July 19,2007

It is hard to recall another event in Pakistan's non-war days which captured the hearts, minds, time and attention of the entire nation, as did the 10-day-long Lal Masjid siege and operation. It was one event which suddenly flared up so much around us and within us. There are countless questions. What are our values and principles as a nation, where have we journeyed, who is managing us, where are we headed, our we destined to be divided, who is the enemy, was the one that killed 45 innocent people in Karachi less deadly than the one inside Lal Masjid, why do we insist on calling these armed militias Islamic militants, why don't we see their politics as an extension of the failure of our politics, why don't we understand the processes by which these militias were eased into the power fray in our public spaces by all those who now want them extinguished, can we extinguish the 'other' let alone our own? No matter how dangerous and deadly they were we cannot deny that they were our own. Yes we punish even our own too when they go astray, but we must be cautious in the application of force when they are our own.

Will we ever know the extent their deadliness beyond the completely illegal vigilante actions they had taken turning the mosque into a small time arsenal and keeping many boys as hostages. Standing outside Lal Masjid on July 7, a group of four men from Peshawar, Taxila, Mardan and Dir said their sons had told them on the cell phone that they wanted to come out but feared the men inside Lal Masjid would shoot them. We will never know how deadly the men inside were. The ferociously bulleted insides of the Lal Masjid and Madressah Hafsa only tell us about the weaponry and the attacking force used, not what those inside used.

There was never any doubt that the Lal Masjid group seemingly led by Marhoom Rashid Ghazi had to be reined in. For far too long they had been given free rein. Ghazi sahib was a stubborn and finally a self-destructive man. In the narrow and correct definition of law he qualified as the enemy of the state. What remains unclear is if all this blood had to be spilled to get him. Did it have to end this way, could he not have been defanged, de-weaponized and de-linked from his group and his base? Perhaps mindful of all these questions the state had opted for negotiations -- as if a Waziristan kind of accord was underway. Shujaat, the man of peace whose instinct was overruled like earlier in the case of Bugti, was against the final assault. He wanted a settlement. Finally what was a hasty retreat from the negotiations seemed incongruent when the state backed by three cordons of varied but lethally armed forces had been so wisely patient for all those days. The death of a commando officer and maybe the fear that the Supreme Court would issue stay order on the operation the next morning triggered the haste.

The media brought as much transparency as it possibly could in this combat. Maybe even too much. If Marhoom Ghazi was being elevated as a brave rebel, if not a hero, through television interviews it was because the government was ok with it. Why else would the government not jam Ghazi's cell phones? Thos attacking the media must ask the government what its rationale was for letting the dialogue carry on till the last day.

Meanwhile we were never shown the deadly tribe inside. Throughout the seven days we were told about the 'wanted foreigners' inside. Figures ranged from 40 to many more. Some "terrorists" with even head money were inside. But now the foreigners seem to be missing. The two earlier identified by the state have been claimed by Pakistani families. Some tunnels earlier identified have also disappeared. How long did the operation last no one knows. We were told almost 48 hours.

Many untruths had come from Marhoom Ghazi. From July 9 onwards, he was claiming there were almost 200 dead bodies inside. It is unlikely that those were found. He said there were hundreds of women and children. While we don't know how many bodies disappeared or were burnt in the ghastly grenade shower, not too many parents came to claim their lost, certainly not the numbers that the opposition was claiming. But equally, there is no doubt that some collective burials in haste and in secret were also done. We will never know too many facts too soon. But many will speak from all sides.

The journey of the men inside Lal Masjid and the women and children inside Hafsa leading them to this end will have to be traced, truthfully. They could not have defied nature's most fundamental rule. You must reap what you sow. Apples don't grow when mangoes are planted. Peace, tolerance and compassion don't flow from lessons in intolerance, self-righteousness and exclusive piety. But what caused these original inputs into their minds and hearts, what caused the lovely young girls to lose their childhood to that tough and harsh worldview? The apartheid in Pakistan between the rich and economically disadvantaged extends across the entire spectrum of existence; from respect and dignity, to basic amenities, to job availability, to access to food, the exposure to art and culture, the list is endless. Lal Masjid will not go away easily. It will symbolize the worst-ever manifestation of the saying that 'chickens come home to roost.' But they were our people on all sides. The most frustrating of all is the realization that some of this, if not all, was inevitable.

The Supreme Court did well by intervening to ensure that Ghazi's sisters go for his funeral, that the state return the mother's body to the sisters and, even better now, it will stay its course on overseeing the human rights situation of whatever is left of the Lal Masjid case. The moral authority of the state, that is drawn from justice and fair play, has been on the wane for a while. And now in the non-compartmentalized, all encompassing consciousness of the Pakistani citizen many scenes play in her/his mind and heart: the orchestrated killings of May 12, the hanging of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the Waziristan accord with Nek Mohammad, the release of many Al-Zulfiqar fighters by Zia and Nawaz Sharif's exit after having been convicted by the Supreme Court. All these are different instances in different circumstances, so the comparison may not hold. But how do stop the mind seeing the hypocrisy of the state, its double play.

For long the margin of error has not been available to the Pakistani power players. Every error extracts its own cost. The action, however tragic, against Lal Masjid was inevitable. In the minefield of contradictions and controversies this too will extract its cost. We can only pray that it does not go beyond what we have already witnessed. Lal Masjid has let out many messages. One, the state means business. Two, in its language the state confuses religion with politics (Lal Masjid was in fact a challenge to state authority by militias, originally patronized by the state. In Pakistan militias have been allowed to challenge the state and society in the name of justice, religion, ethnicity and national security). Three, it has deepened the suspicion between the state and the people and the state can no longer take its authority over the society for granted; it is lost and has to be reclaimed, on the unfolding canvass of the Pakistani consciousness.

In Pakistan the attempt to label society as good Muslim and bad Muslims will prove to be the country's undoing. Neither the society, nor the army, nor other institutions of the state will find this acceptable, no matter who authors this divide, w Marhoom Ghazi sahib or the top general in the maze of challenges. The only valid divide is the lawful and unlawful Pakistanis, those who live by the law and those who live by breaking the law. This alone is the touchstone that a diligent Supreme Court must promote and protect.

The writer is an Islamabad-based security analyst.

Email: nasimzehra@hotmail.com

http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=65031

mtgondal · #8 Wednesday, August 01, 2007

Benazir-Musharraf talks: impact of selective engagement

By Nasim Zehra

Wednesday, August 01,2007

The writer is an Islamabad-based security analyst

On July 27 in Abu Dhabi the half-a-decade-long, mostly indirect contacts between General Pervez Musharraf and Benazir Bhutto came to a climax. It was so far the most public contact, disclaimers notwithstanding, between the two. The Musharraf-led establishment is easing off the pressures on Benazir that had been applied by it and the Nawaz Sharif government before it. On the corruption cases filed by NAB as the representative of the State of Pakistan, three 'conciliatory' moves were made: one, from the Swiss Courts NAB decided to withdraw from prosecution; two, in the Spanish Courts after first seeking to be a party in the cases against Benazir, NAB has recently withdrawn; three, at home where the law does not give the state the option to unilaterally drop charges in a criminal offence, NAB has been instructed not to pursue the cases. The state will let the courts decide.

Other such moves include the unfreezing of some of Benazir's bank accounts. There is also a strong possibility of Musharraf, maybe through an ordinance, knocking down the clause of the 17th Amendment that prevents an individual from becoming prime minister for the third time. The likely quid pro quo for Musharraf will be no active opposition by casting negative votes or putting up an alternative candidate to his re-election as uniformed president by the current assembly. Instead the PPP may abstain. The president's commitment it seems will be to remove his uniform after the general elections. A post-election national government with the PPP, PML-Q and even the MQM, and perhaps Benazir as prime minister, is also under discussion. Benazir is seeking guarantees for fair and free elections and is also suggesting names for a caretaker setup.

Multiple factors prompted the Abu Dhabi meeting--an attempt to finalize an agreement. The July 20 restoration of the chief justice has made general Musharraf vulnerable to legal scrutiny and underscored his increasing political fragility. The judgment has demonstrated the power of the lawyers backed by the public. The lawyers' movement is now calling for the removal of a uniformed president. They argue like the political parties, that in his presence fair and free elections are not possible.

The pressure from Washington on the government to seek a popular political partner, the PPP, for its own stability and to effectively fight the war against terrorism, has also been increasing. At home the fast deteriorating security situation in the post-Lal Masjid operation phase means the government needs to opt for partnership with popular politicians. The gathering opposition to the president's uniform and his re-election by the current assembly has created unprecedented political trouble for Musharraf.

Against this backdrop the opposition reached out for Benazir, the politician with popular support and Washington's confidence enjoys the greatest leverage with the establishment. Her public message is commitment to democracy, the army to the barracks and the PPP a force of the future, a bulwark against "Islamic extremists". Seeking withdrawal of the cases against her, fair and free elections and return of political leaders abroad, Benazir's politics is pragmatic. It combines realism and opportunism promoting self- and party interests. These Musharraf-Benazir negotiations for now seem to prove most beneficial for Benazir. She is standing by her commitment to opposing a uniformed president and to engagement for transition to genuine democracy.

The political fortunes of the PML-Q seem to have diminished. Its members, now doubtful of the establishment's support in future elections may either turn to the PPP for a 'safe' future or turn to the PML-N as a genuine opposition party. As for the establishment, the system that it put together and the previous positions it took vis-à-vis the politicians were either politically convenient or extremely naïve.

All these developments are significant from two perspectives; one the rule of law, and two the future of genuine constitutional democracy in Pakistan. These moves undermine the rule of law by making prosecution seem like a tool for political horse-trading. Earlier when in December 2000, when a convicted Nawaz Sharif was allowed to take off for Saudi Arabia, then too the state had used prosecution as a political tool by hijacking the legal process Then the justification was unavoidable pressure by oil-granting friends. Whatever the justification then and now, on both occasions the key tools that are crucial for upholding rule of law, investigation and prosecution, have been compromised.

These moves, including the reference against the chief justice, could be viewed as the government faced by a political crisis using prosecution institutions as its political tools. In the past too, individuals for whom NAB, we were told, had been set up for, were actually given posts as important as minister of interior. This is of course ironic giventhat NAB reports to the interior ministry.

Clearly the answer to the use of accountability as a tool to harass and hound political opposition is not to completely mutilate the process. Instead the response must be to let a genuinely independent judiciary examine the charges.

But there is another dimension to all this Musharraf-Benazir dialogue and the withdrawal of cases -- the political dimension. Given that the country is so deeply and viciously divided and the current system is largely bereft of credibility, the argument for a healing touch, for credibility-seeking moves and for smooth-transition moves is a strong one. And if for these objectives the government announced a general amnesty for all the politicians abroad, dropping the cases and letting the courts decide their fate, it would be a welcome move. For the government and for the country selective engagement and selective amnesty may backfire politically.

Interestingly, another reason for promoting selective reconciliation is to "defeat extremism and promote moderation" in the coming elections. The president and his supporters believe the way to defeat the "extremists" is by joining hands with the "moderates". This is a simplistic understanding of admittedly the principle challenge that Pakistan faces -- the violent killer brigades and armed militias and those who spread hatred, intolerance and lawlessness in the name of religion, ethnicity and national interest.

Reducing all this to an extremist-versus-moderate divide defies fact and logic. For the state to reduce Pakistan's electorally relevant political parties like the ANP, PML-N, PPP, MQM and JUI to a moderate-versus-extremist divide is analytically and politically flawed. While these parties may hold traditional, literalist or contemporary positions on different issues, it is hard to brand them into extremists or moderates.

However, all those forces that undermine the Constitution of Pakistan by undermining the rights of the citizens and violate the rule of law must become the principle concern of the state and the target of the law enforcement agencies. Business of politics is not the business of those who represent the state. Their business is principally and exclusively the rule of law. Our framework of analysis and prognosis must be home-grown. In a global and alliance context where the Washington-led "war on terror" seems the paramount political reality of our times, for the state to slip into a flawed prognosis – and subsequently flawed remedial strategies – is easy. For our national good and even for global peace such flaws must be avoided. Instead, we need genuine democracy and firm enforcement of law.

Facing a genuinely difficult security and political situation, the establishment must recognize the need to function strictly within the parameters of constitutional law. The notion that the imposition of martial law or emergency will solve any problems for either the establishment, or the country or the people must be set aside. There is only one way forward – the path of a general amnesty for all, genuinely free and fair elections and the return of the army to the barracks.

Email: nasimzehra@hotmail.com

http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=66486

mtgondal · #9 Wednesday, August 08, 2007

General Musharraf's re-election

By Nasim ZehraWednesday,August 08,2007

The writer is an Islamabad-based security analyst

The next vital stage in Pakistan's political system is the presidential election. All the speculation regarding General Pervez Musharraf's re-election should now end. What he has told his party the PML-Q and the ruling coalition member party the MQM in confidence is now out in the open. Between September 15 and October 15 General Musharraf, while remaining the chief of army staff (COAS) will present himself for re-election to the Senate and to the current provincial and national assemblies. The president is confident of being re-elected. With the MQM and the PML-Q's support he hopes to poll around 56 per cent votes. He has also had no publicly stated resistance to his re-election from his main constituency, the armed forces. In fact at the last corps commanders meeting they gave him a vote of confidence.

Once the goal pf re-election has been achieved, General Musharraf's plans, as of now, include giving up the position of army chief after the general elections planned for around November. Following that, to respond to the criticism on his re-election by the current assemblies, he will plan to obtain endorsement as a civilian president by the newly-elected assemblies by early of next year.

The Musharraf-Benazir Abu Dhabi meeting has also given reason for optimism to General Musharraf. He reportedly found Benazir willing to cooperate and has indicated that her party will not cast votes against General Musharraf in the presidential election. Also once he gives up his uniform her party will endorse his presidency. This Benazir has also publicly stated in her August 5 interview given to CNN. She said once that when the issues between the parliament and the presidency are settled she can work with Musharraf. Meanwhile she has assured Musharraf that she will not return to Pakistan before the national elections. The post elections plans are that once Musharraf becomes president if PPP leads at the hustings Benazir will be prime minister.

On the broader political context that General Musharraf foresees for his election, there will be no physical presence of Nawaz Sharif or Benazir Bhutto in Pakistan. Also the MMA will not necessarily be unified in his opposition. The JUI, the most potent electoral force within the MMA, has already been critical of Qazi Hussain Ahmad's resignation against General Musharraf's re-election by the current assemblies. Maulana Fazlur Rehman is also holding dialogue with the government party finding appropriate quid pro quos for cooperation. Hence if the Musharraf-Benazir and the PML-Q-JUI sustainable 'understanding' is crafted then Musharraf's re-election as both military and civilian president will be indirectly and directly supported by three popular mainstream political parties: the PPP, MQM and the JUI. They see his re-election as the best way through for their own political interests and for the transition from guided democracy to genuine democracy. Obviously they seem to think, given his performance and his standing within the international context that he is a more appropriate consensus president than any other.

On the Constitutional and legal fronts General Musharraf believes his re-election in uniform cannot be questioned. The 17th Amendment allows him to hold a dual position until December 31, 2007. Musharraf's supporters believe that his plan to endorse himself as a civilian president after the elections takes care of the argument that the election by the outgoing assembly takes away the right of the new assembly to elect a president. Finally on the legal front Musharraf was reported to have said he would argue for himself in case his re-election is contested in a court. Hence given all these facts he is confident that his re-election is almost a foregone conclusion. He and his supporters believe that criticism from home or abroad cannot alter this fact.

Yet their beliefs and facts notwithstanding there is another alternative re-election picture. Criticisms abound: the political opposition believes a uniformed president must not be re-elected since it violates the principles of genuine democracy, re-election of a uniformed president means the army's continued role in politics, General Musharraf's re-election will mean no free and fair election and it also means rewarding someone who launched a coup who violated the Constitution. Also that the re-election will be a mockery of rule of law, that genuine democracy can only come with his ouster and there can be no constitutional democracy if the military is not banished from politics. Pakistan's lawyer community too supports this position. They have repeatedly declared that in case General Musharraf stands for re-election they will launch an anti-Musharraf pro-democracy movement.

Clearly from these two contesting positions will flow a highly controversial presidential election. There is the idealistic and a purist democratic position which must call for General Musharraf to remove his uniform immediately and opt for election from this assembly and endorsement from the next assembly but the fact is that from the existing political and constitutional angles the contending pro and against Musharraf positions do enjoy some political and constitutional weight. The public generally now seeks fair play. The restoration of the Chief Justice of Pakistan through a legal victory has made the public appreciate that law as the moral heavy weight must always reign supreme. The public, the politicians and all the other players and courtiers in the corridors of power now read from the same page where the script says no one individual or institution can be more powerful than the law. What the public however still needs to see demonstrated is the power and the authority of the elected parliament.

Its political concerns, its increasing support for democracy and opposition to the military in politics notwithstanding, the public generally bears a conservative political temperament. The public is not necessarily conservative in its ideology and in its voting patterns but in its stomach for radical action from which violence, chaos and bloodshed flow. Unless there is widespread politics of extreme violence and hate inspired in the name of ethnicity, nationalism or religion, the overwhelming majority of the public seeks security shying away from anarchy. The broader questions whether or not to let a coup making general go scot-free and how to bring about a political revolution that will promote the best of democratic values do therefore rarely influence public politics. The public there would prefer a non-violent non-disruptive settlement of the controversy around Musharraf's re-election.

There is no doubt that Musharraf's re-election will be contested in the Supreme Court and to some extent in the streets and led by the lawyers in the bars. To what extent the political going will remain good for General Musharraf's re-election will depend largely on how far Benazir stays the course of the decisions taken at her Abu Dhabi meeting with General Musharraf. Also in case the Supreme Court allows the return of the Sharifs, it would queer the political pitch against Musharraf.

So then what is the way forward without resorting to violence on the streets by the politicians or the law enforcement agencies? How do we move forward on the basis of law and the Constitution and not on the basis of an individual's strengths and weaknesses? How do we prevent disruption and anarchy on the one hand and imposition of emergency and martial law on the other? How do we move forward to a resolution that is neither subjective, nor based on danda power or gun power? Above all how do we arrive at a national consensus on this position?

A constitutional move to end the controversy would have been Constitutional amendments by the opposition or the proponents of General Musharraf to either rule out all Constitutional avenues available for his re-election or knock out all Constitutional provisions that can potentially block his re-election. But to take the Constitutional route neither has the numbers.

The only way forward is to let the critics of Musharraf's re-election take the case to the Supreme Court. In the Supreme Court alone rests the power to pass a ruling in-keeping with the Constitution, factoring in political morality and the specificity of our circumstances, on what is legally and constitutionally kosher for General Musharraf's re-election. Fortunately the Supreme Court also enjoys the moral authority it requires to ensure that its decision is respected and accepted.

As matters now stand there is potentially explosive controversy around the presidential election for it to go forward peacefully and credibly.

Email: nasimzehra@hotmail.com

http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=67438

mtgondal · #10 Wednesday, August 15, 2007

Pakistan at 60: the changing rhythm

Nasim Zehra

Wednesday,August 15,2007

The writer is an Islamabad-based security analyst

There ought to be a different feel to this year's birthday celebration. At 60 Pakistan has thrown up new forces that are concretely engaged in pushing two new themes; the rule of law and constitutional rule. All those in power, those vying for power and those watching the power scene cannot ignore these two forces. There is a new rhythm in the air. There is more to talk about than just listing yet again the chronic problems of lack of democracy, the presence of army in politics and the spread of intolerance. The rhythm is one of many colours, of divergent views, of a culture that is rich and warm, of a populace that can boast of decent debate on issues of power and of people in public space, of a collective effort to hold those exercising power accountable. The media above all is the architect of the new rhythm. In addition to art, culture and spirituality

There is a new emerging reality in which structures, sensitivities and political scriptures, if not practice, are acquiring new and better characteristics. For example, the structures like the Supreme Court, the presidency, the ruling party and others are now being questioned and concretely being held accountable. A new widespread cultural spirit is discernable, in music, drama, art etc. Through this there is more color, more texture, more joy, and more engagement with human sensitivity. The pain and the struggle both stay, as those must in any living context, but now the effort is to push the pain in receding spaces.

Joy must be there if sensitivity is, despite our political context, our battles with those in power, despite the pain of the continued killings and the continuing tussles in Balochistan and the warring zones of the tribal areas. The suicide bombings and our zones of chaos also generate the fear that imposes itself, within the public context on all else. The joy that we experience therefore belongs to only the restricted zones and does not translate into a collective characteristic. So even if Pakistanis enjoy music, drama and film no one says Pakistanis have fun, Pakistan is a fun place. The crisis, the bad news, the bloodshed must dominate all else.

The problems of inflation, of personal insecurity, of corruption in high places all exist, yet alongside all this there is a sense of renewal of revival. Across the ideological and the class divide there is the unifying act of participating in national debates, in having 'your say' in seeking solutions to the problems. The talk shows on the dozens of independent television channels seem to have become popular entertainment programmes. So all this new energy in the field of cultural discourse and the crucial intangibles like the media and so on make for great content of democracy in Pakistan. The many contemporary tools of communication and of linkages including the media, peoples' mobility and a growing global collective of status quo critics, have helped the content to develop.

Ironically a general with democratic proclivities is responsible for both: the wobbly context of democracy and flourishing content of democracy. Hence the missing link which will enable us to reap the fruits of democracy in the shape of an accountable exercise of power is essential. Some accountability the lawyers and the media have begun but only a fair and free election, which hopefully we are headed towards, can ensure accountability at a systemic level.

Already concrete steps towards making the context of democracy, the system within which credible democracy will function, are underway. The July 20 restoration of the Chief Justice of Pakistan was a crucial first step. Benazir's hesitation in supporting a uniformed president, the back-tracking of a near imposition of democracy are all important manifestations of a journey towards accountable exercise of power. A new process is already in motion. Until very recently Pakistan had been stuck in a repetitive cycle. The principles of fight till the finish with the opponent and collaborate to extinguish the opponent have for long kept the process of democracy, of socio-political evolution, hostage to these personalized or institutional agendas.

While clashes and killings dominate the minds of Pakistanis, there is a new emerging reality that can potentially dominate this particularly turbulent period of contesting ideologies and armed men. It's the reality of divergent groups uniting around the call for justice. In a context where in the popular mind credibility seems to have evaporated from all sections of the ruling context and the problems of terrorism haunt us even if from the margins of society, this new convergence means we may have a much needed uniting ideology in the making.

For example, are there any common points in the lawyers movement and in the Taliaban who had taken over the NWFP town of Darra Admakhel? Yes, despite their divide on the ideological axis, there was. Both wanted justice and fair play. The Taliban of course belong to a different socio-educational orientation with their exposure to the fiercely armed 'anti-Soviet, nationalist and Islamic revolution' of their predecessors the mujahideen. The mujahideen were tutored in this by Pakistan and US-led international community. It is therefore no surprise that the Taliban way to resist injustice or exclusion by the state will be different from that of the professional urban-trained lawyer community.

For example the armed Taliban who had taken control of Darra Admakhel from the local administration were reportedly demanding that the government and the Qaumi Jirga assure them that there would be "no more kidnappings, car-lifting, issuance of fake degrees and other educational documents, sale and purchase of wine, narcotics and other un-Islamic activities in the area." After getting some assurances from the Qaumi Jirga (national council) addressing these issues, the Taliban conceded Darra Adamkhel's control to the government.

Bridging our many divides is the struggle for fair play. For example what prompts those who have relentlessly fought for constitutional rule and the rule of law to connect with those in Lal Masjid who repeatedly broke the law of the land? It was the realization that may be the lawbreakers inside Lal Masjid were dealt with in less than a just way. The need for justice connected the two seemingly ideologically opposed groups. In its Independence Day message the Supreme Court Bar Association (SCBA) appealed to the people "to celebrate Independence Day with simplicity because of the loss of lives in Lal Masjid."

Contesting positions in society will always be there. They are a testament to living, vibrant societies, to thinking and evolving societies. There are many questions that will always confront societies, in any given situation; questions like: who is right, which political position is morally more acceptable, which political action is more superior to another? These questions have no political shelf-life. They exist in perpetuity. However societies agree on a modus operandi for addressing these questions so that conflict, violence, intolerance and rage are minimized. The objective is to allow harmony through an objectively verifiable means while continuing to contest and debate contending views on issues that concern us as a society. The modus operandi we chose consensually as a society within which to contest and resolve our differences, learn to concede to the other, to co-exist with difference of opinion is primarily the 1973 Constitution.

It is the gradual but determined advance of the Pakistani state and society towards the rule of law which heralds a new dawn in Pakistan. Our journey in the next decades will take the Pakistani state and society towards responsible adulthood yielding progress, peace and excellence, and away from the erring and risky adolescence.

Email: nasimzehra@hotmail.com

http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=68312

Similar Threads
Thread	Thread Starter	Forum	Replies	Last Post
development of pakistan press since 1947	Janeeta	Journalism & Mass Communication	15	Tuesday, May 05, 2020 03:04 AM
Kinds of Features	Nonchalant	Journalism & Mass Communication	0	Friday, May 23, 2008 05:30 PM
PAKISTAN Press, Media, TV, Radio, Newspapers	MUKHTIAR ALI	Journalism & Mass Communication	1	Friday, May 04, 2007 02:48 AM
international news agencies	Muhammad Akmal	Journalism & Mass Communication	0	Tuesday, June 06, 2006 11:33 PM
""face The Nation"chief Executive’s Talk	free thinker	Pakistan Affairs	0	Monday, May 01, 2006 06:29 AM

The Following User Says Thank You to mtgondal For This Useful Post:
Manazer (Sunday, September 23, 2007)