Managing Pakistan-US relations
By Talat Masood

Pakistan–US relations have been on the mend for several months with both governments showing great restraint in public comments despite differences in policy and perception on critical issues. This is a welcome change from the very turbulent relationship of 2011 and 2012 that witnessed the Salala mishap, the Raymond Davis affair, the raid on the Osama bin Laden hideout and the Memogate scandal.

Unfortunately, the current blockade of the Nato logistic supply route by the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) is becoming a serious irritant in the relationship and has the potential of once again derailing the momentum that was built through efforts by both sides for their common good. Although, it is the PTI that is blocking the route, this being primarily an internal matter, the fallout will have to be borne by the federal government and will strengthen those lobbies in Washington that project Pakistan as a weak and unreliable ally.

With hindsight, it should be clear that the previous closure of Pakistani Ground Lines of Communications to Afghanistan did create difficulties for the US, but it managed alternative routes even if these were more expensive. For Pakistan, closing supply routes should have been its last card to play.

By blocking the route, Pakistan finds itself not only on the wrong side of the US, but also of Nato countries. As a responsible member of the international community, Pakistan should be extending its full cooperation at a critical time when the US and Nato are withdrawing their military hardware and equipment. Moreover, we could suffer seriously if the US and other countries react strongly to the closure of routes by suspending economic and military assistance. More importantly, Pakistan’s role as a regional player could also be undermined during the post-withdrawal phase in Afghanistan and could lead to our isolation.

A more prudent approach would be to leverage our position with the US and Nato countries by taking advantage of Pakistan’s strategic utility at this critical juncture, when a bulk of their forces are withdrawing from Afghanistan.

As of now, Washington needs maximum support from Islamabad on several counts — nudging the Taliban to come to the negotiating table, to persuade Afghanistan to sign the Bilateral Security Agreement, clear or, at least, contain the Haqqani and other militant groups in North Waziristan and pockets of Fata to prevent them from attacking US forces. Pakistan is also expected to effectively manage the border to prevent militant groups from joining the insurgency in Afghanistan in the post-withdrawal phase. There is a lot at stake for Washington for which it cannot risk an unfriendly relationship with Pakistan. Most US demands are in Pakistan’s own interest, too. The question whether it has the will and capability of undertaking these measures will be tested in the coming months.

Pakistan’s expectations from the US are no less. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has been insisting that Pakistan needs trade not aid from the US. This may be possible provided the energy situation improves and our products remain quality and pricewise competitive in textiles and other exportable items. Meanwhile, it is important that the government achieves fiscal, structural and policy related reforms, or else it will remain an outlier among the exporting countries.

Moreover, Islamabad will only receive foreign assistance from multilateral agencies, especially the IMF and the World Bank, if it has Washington’s nod.

We cannot overlook the hard reality that there is a strong anti-Pakistan bias and frustration in the US Congress and among certain elements within the administration. Misplaced expectations have only increased mistrust. Over the years, US policymakers have tarnished Pakistan’s image by branding its establishment duplicitous. Pakistan mirrors a similar adversarial image of America by projecting it as an unreliable ally. The media in both countries has been spreading toxic propaganda against each other, not realising that neither Pakistan nor the US are going to gain by stepping up the rhetoric. Pouring venom at the public level and expecting to have a functional, cooperative relationship at the official level is not sustainable in the longer term. The ill will it generates creates problems for the military, intelligence and other government agencies, and prevents them from cooperating.

In the event that Afghanistan fails to sign the Bilateral Security Agreement, Washington may be compelled to exercise the ‘zero option’, for which there is already growing support, at least, in some official circles and Congress. Pakistan is very clear that a residual presence of US forces after 2014 would contribute to Afghanistan’s stability and would serve its national interest. If, however, Washington is compelled to exercise the zero option, the question that comes to mind is, will it retain interest in Pakistan or pull out lock, stock and barrel from the region?

The total withdrawal option by the US could place an enormous burden on Pakistan. With no military and financial support from the US and the international community, it is unlikely that the Afghanistan government will be able to stand on its own. In the event of a civil war, a fresh influx of refugees from Afghanistan could be expected to stream in across the border into Pakistan. The security situation in the border areas could further worsen, with militants drawing strength and synergy from militant groups in Afghanistan.

Amid the vacuum in Afghanistan, it is possible that not only the Taliban but also al Qaeda and other radical elements jump in and unravel the country. The grim reality unfolding in Iraq and Syria should be a stark reminder of what could happen. In contrast, a stable Afghanistan and a peaceful tribal belt could transform Pakistan into a hub of energy and trade corridors running between South and Central Asia. This could be Pakistan’s great opportunity of truly moving away from the ‘strategic depth’ concept that was based on security considerations to trade, commerce, energy and tourism — altering the geostrategic dynamics of the region. As of now, this remains a distant dream.

Published in The Express Tribune, January 8th, 2014.