Points of indistinction

Zafar Hilaly

In retrospect, kicking the Abbottabad fiasco into the long grass by appointing a commission to conduct an enquiry seems to have been the prudent thing to do. The frayed tempers, escalating civil-military tensions, and finger pointing following the US raid suggested trouble.
It was fortunate that better sense prevailed on both sides. And when the military decided to take the rap for the fiasco, the politicians seemed appeased. It was an especially adroit move by the military to have the DG ISI offer to resign since that took the wind out of the sails of its opponents. Even our guileful former ambassador in Washington, who was expecting a coup, was caught on the wrong foot.
Of course, it did not deter either side from hurling accusations at the other, in the form of spiteful expressions, albeit conveyed with venomous politeness via the media. But that was only to be expected. It would need a revolution in civil-military relations here before fear of coups can cease altogether.
Those who were disappointed by the non-publication of the Abbottabad Commission Report must have hoped for something from that report, although to hope for anything from supine, time-tested pen pushers is asking for the moon. Besides, commission reports seldom contain anything worthwhile. It is not for their contents that they are prized but the absorbent paper on which they are printed – they make for excellent paan wrappings and are much sought after by paan sellers in Aabpara.
Anyway, by now each of us has his personal unshakeable theory about OBL's sojourn in Pakistan; how he managed to enter the country; remain undetected; obtain the permissions to construct his custom-built residence near Kakul and generally gad about with his many wives in tow.
And why not? Our governments are not bothered about who moves in and out of Pakistan. Regarding permissions to construct strangely designed buildings like OBL's house in Abbottabad, all kinds of home designs can be arranged for a fee.
As for those who remain concerned about American helicopters entering the country undetected and undisturbed, there have been far greater intrusions in the past, like the seizure of thousands of square miles in Siachen by India without anyone then, or subsequently, demanding a commission to affix responsibility.
So, even if those responsible for the mishaps at Abbottabad were named and punished it is unlikely to guard against the future possibility of such incidents. Any doubts on that score were removed by the successful Taliban raid on the DI Khan jail the other day, despite specific warnings of an impending attack.
The malaise that afflicts our organisational efficiency is terminal in nature. Punishing those notionally responsible in the hope that others will learn a lesson is like treating cancer with aspirin. In truth, there is no gap between what we are, what we do or what we are becoming. Hence, whether we ever get to see the commission report is neither here nor there.
But yes, we must change (or else we will be changed) as the extremist threat we face today is not merely a threat to our society or a crisis of society but the extinction of our civilisation. And those who fail to face this fact are accomplices in its perpetuation.
So what should we do? To begin with we must recognise that the enemy we confront has no conscience, no pity and no honour. It has no face, no nationality and yes, no religion.
Second, from what one has been able to glean by reading on the subject, other countries that faced a similar situation targeted three separate tiers of the enemy's organisation. The first two, which constitute the target proper, was their leadership and the main body of fighting supporters. They constitute the head and the body of the fish. The third is the population, which represents the water in which the fish swim.
In the words of one expert, 'fish vary from place to place in accordance with the sort of water in which they are designed to live. A fish can be caught by rod or by net depending where it is located. But if rod or net cannot succeed by themselves it may be necessary to do something to the water to force the fish to move where it can be caught. Conceivably, we could kill the fish by polluting the water although that will be considered undesirable'.
Whether the 'undesirable' should remain 'undesirable' given the enormity of the challenge we face is, of course, a question we need to ask ourselves. We also need to ask ourselves whether we can hope to fight the war without taking extraordinary steps in the spheres of tactics, legislation, etc. In other words, without bringing about fundamental changes in the state apparatus, state structure and the constitution.
With regard to tactics, for example, the enemy is no longer a foreign nation or an isolable force but one that is lying somewhere within the population with no visible attributes. Why not then change our tactics to better address the challenge?
Why, for instance, should the army not become the police force living within the population? Obviously this will create problems for a military that is not accustomed to police work or dealing with urban terrorists but the prospect is worth a thought. The fact is that the police are ineffective – 'criminals in uniform who pose a greater threat to public safety than those they are supposed to fight'.
Should we not, in other words, look 'to multiply the points of indistinction' between the civilian forces and the military rather than continue the rigid separation that exists in just about every sphere of operational activity? When it comes to fighting extremists all war doctrines are categorical on one point – the forces of the state must operate like the enemy wherever there is an enemy.
In other words, the enemy must be made to realise he cannot be treated as an ordinary criminal, nor as a prisoner taken on the battlefield. No lawyer will be present for an interrogation. If he gives the information requested, well and good. If he fails to do so, it will be forced out of him. The extremist/terrorist accepts this as a condition inherent in his trade and in his methods of warfare. The trouble is we don't and that too warrants a rethink.
Continuous surveillance of the populace, legalised torture, psychological warfare, police control of publicity, the infiltration and exfiltration of extremist groups and so many other aspects of a civil war will need to be carried out without fuss. As well as intelligence gathering, by whatever means, to generate an abundance of low-grade intelligence on which the authorities can work.
In a civil war like the one we are engaged in, the law sadly must take a back seat. In fact as the fighting intensifies, the courts should be prepared to implement legislation that will justify imprisonment without trial even on the nebulous basis of, say, 'moral complicity' in crimes. And yes, there is the risk the courts' workings could also be perceived as an explicit mode of warfare but that's a risk we need to take.
As one expert said, 'while urban terrorism offers a lot of advantages to the terrorist it has one serious drawback. The population that harbours the terrorist knows him. At any time, given the opportunity, it can denounce him to the authorities. Strict control of the population, therefore, can rob the terrorist of this vital source of support.' Hence, 'strict control of the population' is also what we should be contemplating even if that means that the constitution needs to be amended.
What is clear is that if we do not win the current battle against extremism there will be none around to order a commission, like the Abbottabad one, to determine what went wrong. It's them or us.
Get it?
Email: charles123it@hotmail.com

http://e.thenews.com.pk/8-3-2013/page7.asp#;