well source is

PAKISTAN’S FOREIGN POLICY PREDICAMENTS POST 9/11: AN ANALYSIS

http://ipripak.org/factfiles/ff87.pdf

__________________
consistency is key to success.

INDO-PAK RELATIONS: UPS & DOWNS

by B.Raman
written in 22. 11. 2004

Since the visit undertaken by Mr.A.B.Vajpayee, our former Prime Minister, to Islamabad in January last to attend the SAARC summit, there were indications of a seeming thaw in Indo-Pakistan relations, particularly with reference to the bilateral talks over the future of Jammu & Kashmir (J&K).

2. The first of these indicators related to Pakistani support to Kashmiri and Pakistani terrorist groups operating not only in J&K, but also in other parts of India. During Mr.Vajpayee’s talks with Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf, the latter undertook what Indian officials projected as a commitment not to allow any acts of terrorism from any territory controlled by Pakistan against India.

3.Indian leaders and officials, trying to sell this to Indian public opinion as a diplomatic gain for India, interpreted this as a Pakistani pledge to stop the use of terrorism to achieve its long-standing objective of gaining control of J&K.

4. A careful reading of the joint communiqué issued at the end of the visit and the subsequent statements emanating from Pakistani leaders and officials would have shown that the written commitment, as phrased in the joint communiqué, did not specifically relate to India. It was a general commitment relating to terrorism, without specific reference to India. By avoiding a specific reference to India, Musharraf had managed to keep an exit out of this commitment available to him if he decided to wriggle out of it.

5.This was vintage Musharraf--- keeping open a “wriggle out option”. One has seen this repeatedly in his handling of domestic affairs too, the latest example being his commitment to the political parties in the beginning of the year to shed his uniform by the end of the year if they supported his proposals for constitutional changes to strengthen his powers. Having achieved his objective, he is now wriggling out of it.

6. It is possible that in the talks between the two leaders, Musharraf was more explicit and assured Mr.Vajpayee that he would not allow any territory controlled by Pakistan to be used for acts of terrorism against India, but such an explicit commitment was not to be found in writing.

7. However, despite this, one notices that there has been no major incident of jihadi terrorism by any of the Pakistani organizations in Indian territory outside J&K since August 25, 2003. That day, terrorists associated with the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) of Pakistan had carried out two well-synchronised explosions in Mumbai resulting in the deaths of many innocent civilians. Since then, Indian territory outside J&K has been free of any major act of jihadi terrorism.

8. However, during this period, the Police in different States had unearthed and neutralized sleeper cells of jihadi organizations. For example, the Hyderabad Police in Andhra Pradesh had neutralized a cell of the LET, which, according to them, was planning to carry out a terrorist strike on a Hindu religious occasion.

9. While one should take note of this decline in jihadi terrorism in other parts of India for over a year now, available evidence would not permit a definitive conclusion as to whether this decline is due to the successes of the counter-terrorism drive of the Police or due to undoubted action by Musharraf to rein in the jihadi terrorists in conformity with his commitment or both.

10. In J&K, one has been witnessing a mix of both positive and negative indicators. Amongst the positive indicators, one could mention the continuance of the bilateral cease-fire on both sides of the Line of Control (LOC) and the international border, the apparent Pakistani acquiescence in the Indian construction of a fencing along the LOC/international border to prevent the infiltration of Pakistan-trained and sponsored terrorists into the State and the noticeable decline in the number of successful infiltrations, particularly since January last.

11. In the past, the Pakistani firings across the LOC and the international border were meant not only to facilitate the infiltrations by diverting the attention of the Indian security forces, but also to prevent the construction of the fencing by Indian engineers. Fears that the Indian attempts to take advantage of the cease-fire for resuming and completing the construction could provoke Pakistan into breaking the cease-fire have been belied. Similarly, expectations that Pakistan might make it a major diplomatic issue just as the Palestinians and some Arab States had done over the construction of the Israeli security wall have also been belied. Apart from voicing proforma protests from time to time, Pakistan has refrained from any other action on this issue.

12. Both India and Pakistan have claimed credit for the decline in the infiltrations. According to India, it is due to the fencing and other counter-infiltration measures taken by it. According to Pakistan, this is evidence of its sincere implementation of the assurances given by it to Mr.Vajpayye and the George Bush administration in the US. The truth probably lies in a mix of both.

13. Has the Indian-admitted decline in infiltrations led to any significant decrease in acts of terrorism in J&K?. Jihadi terrorists of various hues---Pakistani as well indigenous terrorist organizations operating from sanctuaries in Pakistan—continue to be active in J&K. There have always been ebbs and flows in Pakistan-sponsored acts of terrorism in J&K and any periodic decline of a marginal nature could not be interpreted positively in Pakistan’s favour. Media reports quoting statistics from the Ministry of Home Affairs of the Government of India, have cited a 21 per cent decline in acts of terrorism in J&K. Even after this decline, the number of incidents is large, with over 500 fatal casualties.

14. Available evidence clearly suggests that there has been no change in the Pakistani policy of using terrorism as a weapon against India to achieve its objective of forcing a change in the status quo, which, it hopes, would lead to its acquisition of the Muslim majority areas of J&K, if not the entire State. A careful analysis of the terrorist incidents reported from J&K indicates that the jihadi organisations are now concentrating on attacks on the security forces and targeted attacks on political leaders, who are perceived as their adversaries. There has been a significant decline in terrorist strikes resulting in the indiscriminate killing of innocent civilians---such as attacks involving the use of hand-grenades and landmines, explosive devices planted in public places etc.

15. Thus, the over-all ground situation is characterised by a decline in infiltrations from Pakistan, an absence of major incidents in Indian territory outside J&K, a decline in incidents in J&K and an avoidance of incidents resulting in the indiscriminate killing of innocent civilians. These were also the features of the ground situation as it prevailed between 1989 and 1993, when the terrorism in the State was largely due to indigenous terrorist organisations.

16. It was only from 1993 onwards that Pakistani jihadi organisations started entering the State in large numbers and indulging in indiscriminate attacks. They also spread their attacks to Indian territory outside J&K, starting with the explosions in Mumbai in March,1993, which killed over 250 innocent civilians. After the Army under Musharraf seized power on October 12,1999, the situation became even worse, with large-scale resort to suicide and suicidal terrorism by the Pakistani members of Osama bin Laden’s International Islamic Front (IIF).

17. While large credit should go to the Indian counter-terrorism agencies for the decline in serious acts of jihadi terrorism since the beginning of this year, the variations in their pattern could not have been possible without some positive action by Musharraf in keeping with his commitment of January last. US pressure on Islamabad to honour the commitment to Mr.Vajpayee has also definitely played a role in this matter. These variations induced from the Army’s General Headquarters (GHQ) in Islamabad also prove once again that the levers of control over the jihadi terrorists operating in Indian territory are in the hands of Musharraf and his GHQ.

18. The positive factors noticed since the beginning of the year should not be interpreted as indicating the beginning of the end of Pakistani-sponsored terrorism. Musharraf has retained his capability to step on the terrorism accelerator once again, if needed. The terrorist infrastructure in Pakistani territory in the form of training camps and sanctuaries remains intact and he has not taken any action to arrest the over 20 Indian and Pakistani terrorists, including Dawood Ibrahim, wanted for trial in India and hand them over to the Indian authorities.

19. While the US has definitely pressurised him to reduce, if not stop, the infiltrations, its pressure, if there has been any, on him to put an end to the terrorist infrastructure and arrest the Indian terrorists in Pakistani territory and hand them over to India has not produced results.

20. Musharraf’s calculation is that so long as he keeps the jihadi terrorism confined to J&K and concentrated on the security forces without indiscriminate killing of innocent civilians, the international community in general and the US in particular would remain inclined to agree with his projection of the happenings in J&K as a freedom struggle and not terrorism and would not exercise undue pressure on Pakistan to stop even this. One should not be surprised if his calculation proves right.

21.Pakistan has been steadily infiltrating trained jihadi terrorists into J&K and other parts of India since 1989. The infiltrations used to take place in large number across the LOC and the international border and in small numbers by the overland routes from Nepal and Bangladesh, by sea from Karachi and Dubai and by air from Kathmandu, Bangkok and Dubai.

22. Though the infiltrations across the LOC and the international border might have declined noticeably, there is no evidence of a similar decline in infiltrations by other means. Moreover, as I had pointed out in an article titled “The Terrorists in Our Midst” written by me in 2002, even if Pakistan totally stops fresh infiltrations, it has enough trained and armed terrorists already in position inside Indian territory, who would be able to maintain a fairly high level of terrorism. Moreover, the terrorist infrastructure still retained by Musharraf in Pakistani territory would enable him to step up terrorism through fresh infiltrations whenever he feels the need to do so.

23. Just as the Pakistani-sponsorship of terrorism has been a recurring theme of the Indian case on Kashmir since 1989, there have been three recurring themes of successive Pakistani Governments, whether headed by civilian leaders or the Army---- namely, the need to reduce the Indian troop deployments in J&K, an improvement in the human rights situation and the implementation of the UN resolution for ascertaining the wishes of the Kashmiri people through a plebiscite.

24. Over the years, successive Pakistani Governments, in their propaganda against India, have been giving exaggerated accounts of the Indian troop presence in J&K. The pre-1999 Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif Governments used to allege initially that India had deployed 200,000 of its troops in J&K to allegedly suppress the so-called freedom struggle. They subsequently started projecting this number as 500,000.

25. Since seizing power in October,1999, Musharraf and his Army have been projecting this number as around 700,000. Till now, India, while refuting the Pakistani allegations in general terms, had refrained from giving its own estimate of the actual deployments in J&K. In breaking with this policy, Mr.Pranab Mukherjee, our Defence Minister, has for the first time indicated the actual deployments in J&K as approximately 100,000 (“The Hindu” of November 13,2004).

26. In a significant move by the Cabinet Committee on Security on the eve of Dr. Manmohan Singh’s first visit to J&K as the Prime Minister on November 18 and 19,2004, the Government of India decided to reduce the troop deployments in J&K and this has already started from November 18. While the exact number of troops to be moved out of the State has not been mentioned, some media reports have estimated it as about 9,000, that is, about nine per cent of the present strength.

27. The Government of India projected the withdrawal as a gesture to the Kashmiri people before the Prime Minister’s visit. It was also possibly an under-played gesture to Islamabad, keeping in view its past insistence on a troop reduction as a possible confidence-building measure. While public opinion in J&K, as reflected in the media, has welcomed the reduction as an important gesture, Musharraf himself, in an interview to the AFP news agency on November 19,2004, has dismissively described the Indian gesture as a tactical, but not a strategic step forward and as “good optics” and nothing more.

28. When he talks of the need for a strategic step forward and for what he describes as “good vibrations” from India, what he apparently means is an admission by India that the status quo, de facto or de jure, cannot be a satisfactory solution and that any discussions on Kashmir should involve a search for a mutually acceptable solution other than the status quo.

29. In what was projected by Pakistani officials as loud-thinking by the General with some media personalities on October 25,2004, in order to encourage a domestic debate on the possible options, he suggested a possible solution based on the administrative tehsil and not the division as the basic unit for deciding the future of J&K.

30. At present the State of J&K consists of three Divisions---the Srinagar Division, the Jammu Division and the Ladakh Division. While the Muslims are in a majority in the Srinagar Division, the Hindus are in a majority in the Jammu Division and the Buddhists in the Ladakh Division. However, even in these non-Muslim majority Divisions, the Muslims are reportedly in a majority in three tehsils of the Jammu Division and in one of the Ladakh Division.

31. There are no Hindus or Buddhists in the two administrative units under the occupation of Pakistan, namely, the so-called Azad (Free) Kashmir, which India calls Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK) and the Northern Areas (Gilgit and Baltistan).

32. Musharraf proposed a formula in three steps--- first agreeing on the basic unit of decision-making, then agreeing on its demilitarisation and then on its future status, which could be under India or Pakistan or the UN or even joint administration.. In Musharraf’s obvious calculation, a final solution based on the tehsil as the basic unit for deciding the future of the State, would ultimately result in the entire Srinagar Division plus the Muslim majority tehsils of the Jammu and Ladakh Divisions going to Pakistan, with only the Hindu majority tehsils of the Jammu Division and the Buddhist majority tehsils of the Ladakh Division remaining with India. India will have status quo minus and Pakistan status quo plus.

33. Even though he projected this as a possible solution based on a geographical and not a religious division, keeping in view India’s opposition to any solution based on a religious division, it was nothing but an application of the two-nation formula, which led to the creation of Pakistan in 1947. This formula was based on the premise, propagated by the Pakistan Muslim League, that the Hindus and the Muslims of the sub-continent, though largely ethnically the same, cannot live together because of their different religious beliefs.

34. The idea of a solution to the Kashmir issue based on a sub-regional formula is nothing new. It has been cropping up from time to time right from the days when the issue was engaging the attention of the UN in the 1950s. The International Commission of Jurists, a non-governmental organisation of Geneva, which used to be funded by the USA’s Central Intelligence Agency during the Cold War, and a so-called Kashmir Study Group in the US had revived it in the 1990s. The only difference is that they wanted the administrative division as the basic unit for decision-making, whereas Musharraf wants the tehsils to be the basic units.

35. This idea has some support in the think-tanks of the West, particularly in the USA, and Musharraf is calculating that the US would respond positively to his proposal and exercise pressure on India to consider it. He has been projecting this as an indication of Pakistan’s flexible approach to the problem, illustrated by its non-insistence on the holding of a plebiscite and its willingness to be satisfied with only a part of J&K instead of insisting on its getting the whole of it.

36. Musharraf should have known that India would not touch this proposal due to the following reasons. First, it would amount to reviving the two-nation theory and secondly, it could encourage Muslim separatism in some districts of Assam adjoining Bangladesh where the Muslims are in a majority. Yet he publicly voiced it in the hope of bringing pressure upon India from the USA to give it serious consideration.

37. Indian rejection was not slow in coming. Addressing a press conference at Srinagar on November 18,2004, Dr.Manmohan Singh said: “ I have made it repeatedly and extensively clear that any re-drawing of borders is not acceptable and any suggestion, which smacks of further division of the State, is also not acceptable.”

38. India’s rejection of the ideas coming out of his loud-thinking has elicited strong reactions from him. He told the AFP: “ Pakistan would not drop its life-long demand for a plebiscite unless India showed flexibility on its own long-held positions such as not changing the de facto border or the Line of Control. Both sides should make up their minds first on what is the way forward and they need to discuss that first. The more important issue is to decide on the blocks or segments or regions first of all, which ought to be demilitarised and then status changed.”

39. Even though through a careful public relations exercise, Musharraf has been trying to project himself as flexible and forward-looking and India as rigid and stonewalling, a careful examination of his statements and interviews indicates that his final objective remains inflexible, namely, acquisition of the Muslim-majority areas of Jammu & Kashmir. The flexibility, if at all there is any, is not in respect of his objective, but of the means to be used for achieving that objective.

40. While he would not renounce the use of terrorism to achieve that objective, he would be prepared to consider peaceful means provided India agrees to discuss a peaceful change of the status quo. What he wants to discuss is how to change the status quo through mutual agreement.

41. What he tries to play down is the fact that the continuation of the status quo is the only solution, which would not be to the detriment of the two countries. Any change in the status quo on the lines proposed by him would be to the detriment of India’s national interest. Musharraf and his army think that through the use of terrorism against India, they are for the first time in a position to make the international community come out in favour of a change of the status quo and are not prepared to let go what they perceive as the opportunity which the jihadi terrorists have won for Pakistan.

42. The hard-line adopted by him under the pretext of flexibility need not necessarily bring the thaw in the bilateral relations to an end. However, it underlines the dangers of a fresh stepping-up of terrorism ahead. Musharraf is confident that so long as he continues to co-operate with the US in its operations against Al Qaeda, keeps the Taliban under control and helps President Hamid Karzai in consolidating his position, he does not have to fear any adverse consequences of his re-accelerating jihadi terrorism in J&K, provided he keeps it confined to the State and projects it as the continuation of the Kashmiris’ freedom struggle because of India’s obduracy.

43. India has two options: Making the status quo de jure by converting the LOC into an international border or continuation of the de facto status quo without making it de jure and at the same time working for an improvement in the bilateral relations through confidence-building measures and normalisation and strengthening of economic ties.

44. The second option was also supported by Mr.Jiang Zemin, China’s former President, in a speech during his visit to Pakistan in 1996, but the Government of Mrs.Benazir Bhutto, then in power, rejected it. This has again been advocated by Mr. Altaf Hussain, the leader of Pakistan’s Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), in his statements and interviews during his current visit to India. Though Musharraf is dependent on the MQM for continuing to maintain the political legitimacy of his rule in Pakistan, he is unlikely to accept his suggestion.

45. Despite this, India should keep up the pressure for the normalisation and strengthening of economic relations and for promoting people-to-people contacts among the Kashmiris on both sides of the LOC and the international border. Amongst the proactive suggestions already put forward by India is the one for a bus service between Srinagar, the capital of J&K, and Muzzafarabad, the Capital of POK. The proposals presently under discussion mainly relate to promoting people-to-people contacts between J&K and POK.

46. There is an even greater need for promoting people-to-people contacts between the Buddhists and Shias of the Ladakh Division and the Shias of the Northern Areas. This has to be taken up earnestly. Another idea, which could be examined, is the advisability of setting up a small Eminent Kashmiris’ Council consisting of elected representatives of the legislatures of J&K, the POK and the Northern Areas to discuss periodically among themselves the problems and difficulties of the Kashmiris on both sides of the LOC and the international border and come out with agreed recommendations for implementation by the Governments on both sides.

(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Distinguished Fellow and Convenor, Observer Research Foundation (ORF), Chennai Chapter. E-Mail: corde@vsnl.com )

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consistency is key to success.

read these

SECURITY AND DEFENCE PROBLEMS OF PAKISTAN - 1

REBUTTAL:Balkanising Pakistan:A Collective National Security Strategy:BY:Naveed Tajammal « Yasmeenali’s Weblog

__________________
consistency is key to success.

SECURITY AND DEFENCE PROBLEMS OF PAKISTAN - 1

REBUTTAL:Balkanising Pakistan:A Collective National Security Strategy:BY:Naveed Tajammal « Yasmeenali’s Weblog

National Security Management & Pakistan


Pakistan - Chapter 5 National Security
National Security Strategy Terror | Pakistan

__________________
consistency is key to success.

hey samra.. u have posted very good links but under which topic u posted them here?
as first we were focusing on Pakistan's relations with her neighbors... m intermingling both...

i have posted that for sania saif..she asked for notes on National security of pakistan

__________________
consistency is key to success.

PAKISTAN SEEKS RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL: An Analysis of its Impact on the Islamic World

by Dr Subhash Kapila

Introductory Observations

The meeting of Pakistan ’s Foreign Minister Kasuri and Israel ’s Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom in Istanbul in ( Turkey as third country host) on September 1, 2005 came as no surprise.

The fact that Pakistan was seeking close relations with Israel was evident for over a year from various statements at various places by Pakistan ’s military ruler, General Musharraf. The most recent indicator was the news from Pakistan , that Musharraf would be addressing a meeting of the Jewish community in USA during his United Nations visit in September 2005.

Pakistan had been involved in secret contacts with Israel for quite some time. No wonder, Israel ’s Deputy Prime Minister, Shimon Peres had to retort in a Pakistani newspaper interviews (January 2005) that both countries should have: “direct personal contacts publicly, without being ashamed about it.”

To put the record straight, so that Pakistan Government’s “spins” on this meeting, in relation to projections to the Islamic World are concerned, it needs to be stated that the Israel-Pakistan meeting was not at Israel ’s initiative. The Israel Foreign Ministry’s official web-site states unambiguously, that: “This meeting was arranged at the initiative of President Musharraf.

The current development of Pakistan breaking ranks with the Islamic world under General Musharraf’s leadership on the issue of normalization of relations with Israel is therefore intriguing and needs to be analyzed whether it is a genuine long term strategic visualization or an “illusionary” tactical expediency by General Musharaaf to score “brownie points” with the United States .

The above will be determined by the reactions in the Islamic World and the Pakistanis masses Already, in the wake of the first flush of excitement over Pakistan-Israel talks, General Musharraf has ducked for cover by maintaining, that:

· Pakistan moves toward Israel were taken after clearance from Saudi Arabia and PLO.

· Pakistan would not recognize Israel until a Palestine State was established, with Jerusalem as the capital.

· Musharraf terming the talks, defensively, as “engagement”, only.

On balance, this analysis must also reflect Israel’s statements on the Pakistan-Israel meeting: these are as follows:

· “There is no conflict, whatsoever, between Israel and Pakistan, and no logical reasons why the two countries could not have a constructive and positive bi-lateral relationship”

· “It is pre-mature to talk about establishing diplomatic relations, but it is definitely a step towards normalization of relations”

The Israel Foreign Minister indicated that the significance of the talks with Pakistan lay in the possibilities that this may open way for talks with Arab and other Muslim countries. But there lies the rub for Israel for the following reasons:

· Pakistan is not the leader of the Muslim “Ummah” (Islamic World) as it claims to be, despite its nuclear weapons.

· Pakistan’s premise publicly stated for the talks is in contradiction to Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) declared stand.

· Reactions within Palestine, (at whose instance, Pakistan claims to have begun these talks) have been sharply critical of Pakistan, both at the official level and the public level.

Islamic countries therefore are not going to take their cues from what Pakistan states or Israel hopes. Islamic countries will follow what the Islamic World generally feels on the overall issue of recognizing Israel

Pakistan’s Contradictory Premise for Justifying its Seeking Close Relations with Israel

Pakistan, in seeking to justify its decision and to add a historical premise to the timing of the meeting, stated through its Foreign Minister Kasuri that:

· “Pakistan attaches great importance to Israel ending its occupation of Gaza.”

· “Pakistan has therefore decided to engage Israel”

This premise is totally in contradiction to what the OIC stated in a special OIC meeting at Kuala Lumpur in April 2004 and what Israel’s PM Ariel Sharon stated recently in terms of Israel’s “Disengagement Policy”.

The OIC in a separate statement on the Middle East in its April 2004, Special Meeting stated that:

“(The OIC) strongly rejects the recent unilateral plan of withdrawal from Gaza and parts of the West bank, as it breaches the resolutions of international legitimacy and contradicts….. the foundation of the peace process”.

Premier Ariel Sharon’s statement in August 2005 seems to make it clear that the Gaza withdrawals would not imply that Israel will give in to all PLO and Islamic Worlds demands that no new settlements take place and that Israel should vacate Jerusalem . His statement was:

“ We are leaving the Gaza Strip when it is clear to everyone that it will not be a part of the State of Israel in future…..The significance of the Disengagement Plan is not only the evacuation of the Gaza Strip – it is also an increased effort to develop the Negev, the Galilee and Greater Jerusalem.”

Pakistan’s Foreign Minister’s sound – bytes on the issue and other statements, when analyzed, appear contradictory to OIC ’s stated position and nor does the Israel PM Minister’s vision reflect Pakistan’s premise that Gaza withdrawals was a prelude to withdrawal form Jerusalem – the site earmarked for locating OIC HQs as per OIC Charter.

Palestinian Reactions Contradict Pakistan’s Statements & Hammas’s Condemnation

Pakistan ’s military ruler maintains that his moves towards closer relations with Israel was with the concurrence of the PLO President.

However, the statement of PLO Information Minister’s, Nabil Shaalh is in contradictory terms as follows.

“Pakistan is free to do whatever it wants, and we can’t impose a veto on their decision, but I hope that this step will not encourage any Arab country to normalize relations with Israel in this period.”

The Hammas organization was even more direct, and stated:

“We condemn any relation between an Islamic State and Israelis and we ask Pakistan to go back on this agreement, especially as the Palestinian people have not been given their rights.”

In Gaza Strip, hundreds of supporters of Islamic Jehad, a Palestinian militant group, protested against Pakistan ’s talks with Israel .

Reactions within Pakistan

Heated discussions took place in the Pakistan National Assembly on September 2, 2005 with the:

· Pakistan Government leaders maintaining that Pakistan was the leader of the Muslim Ummah and has been given a mediatory role by all Muslims countries (not substantiated by any such declaration by any Muslim Country.)

· Pakistan ’s major opposition Alliance the MMA vociferously protesting that Pak Government had not taken Parliament into confidence on such a vital issue, and especially when the Parliament was in session.

The Opposition Alliance walked out of the Parliament in protest. Protest rallies were held in Peshawar , in Baluchistan and elsewhere in Pakistan . MMA President termed Musharraf’s move as it goes against Pakistan ’s national interest as well as state policy.

Analytically, it emerges that within Pakistan there is very strong opposition to any Pak-Israel talks, and that is the reason why General Musharraf did not take the Pak Parliament into confidence.

It also needs s to be realized that in January 2005, the offices of the Pakistani newspaper, The Nation were burnt by Pakistani protestors. They burnt the offices not because of the Israeli Deputy PM s statements quoted above but as to how dare a Pakistani newspaper publish anything on Israel . That is the intensity of anti-Israeli hatred within Pakistan.

Further, the Pakistan Islamic Jehadi organizations so assiduously nurtured by the Pak Government have declared the United States , Israel and India as “Sworn enemies of Islam”.

In terms of anti-Semitism, even the Pakistani establishment is not free of the virus. Pakistan ’s Education Minister in an interview with an American News paper on 18th August, described the Jews as “the worst terrorists in the world”.

Pakistan-Israel Talks Impact on Iran

Iran has so far not come out with any official reaction to Pakistan ’s moves. Observers of Iran ’s politics maintain that Iran takes its time to come out with well calibrated statements on such significant issues.

Analytically, it can be assessed that the strategic and political significance of Pakistan ’s moves towards Israel would not be lost on the Iranian establishment. It forms the subject of an entirely exclusive analysis and will be covered as such.

Those who maintain that the Pakistan initiative would open avenues for Iran also to normalize relations with Israel are rushing to premature judgments. The Iranian governing establishment does not easily get moved by tactical expediency to change its principled stands, unlike General Musharraf.

Islamic World Unlikely to follow Pakistan’s Example

The Islamic world’s likelihood to follow the Pakistanis example of seeking closer contacts with Israel has to be viewed in three separate groupings as follows.

· Middle East and the Arab World:

Arab world politics are deeply inter-twined with the Palestinian struggle against Israel . Seeing the PLO statements and the stand taken by Hammas and the Islamic Jehadi organization in Palestinian territories no Arab Government including ( Saudi Arabia ) is likely to stick its neck out for the sake of Pakistan.

· South and South East Asia:

Bangladesh , Malaysia and Indonesia assessed as most likely candidates to follow the Pakistani lead have to take into account the violent reactions that could emerge over this issue from the Islamic Jehadi organizations, ensconced in those countries and who have Pan-Islamic links.

· African Muslim Countries:

A couple may attempt normalization of relation with Israel , but not at the instance of Pakistan . It would be more because of Israel .

Concluding Observations

The trouble with the Pakistani Military dictator, General Musharraf , is that he suffers from a mixed-up complex of his delusionary self-perception of a leader of the Islamic world and his compulsive obsessive disorder to be taken notice of by the United States at every step. It is this which has come into play in trying to propel Pakistan towards a close relationship with Israel , despite the virulent anti – Semitism that exists in Pakistan .

In this process, the United States has had a role to play. Knowing General Musharraf’s weaknesses, the United States seems to have nudged the Pakistani military dictator to do a bit of grand-standing in the Middle East to divert attention from Iraq and put pressure on Iran .

It needs to be noted that no Arab country, including Saudi Arabia , has been involved in the Pak-Israel negotiations. No statement of affirmation has come from the Saudi monarch on General Musharraf’s contentions, that he had the Saudi monarch’s concurrence.

General Musharraf always miscalculates, but it is strange that the United States also has gone in for the same miscalculation that Pakistan is the leader of the Muslim Ummah and that Pakistan is equipped and recognized by the Islamic world to be a key player in the Middle East ’s Islamic politics. The facts and the analysis above proves otherwise.

Israel too would be hard pressed; to justify logically, that other than United States nudging, it achieves any long term strategic gains. Pakistan is not geographically contiguous to Israel , nor in a position to threaten Israel ’s security, nor is it an Arab nation. Israel can achieve peace only when its Arab neighbours and the Arab World recognise the strategic reality that Israel , as a nation has come to stay. Regrettably Pakistan is ill equipped to bring about that transformation in the Arab World on behalf of Israel

(The author is an International Relations and Strategic Affairs analyst. He is the Consultant, Strategic Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group. Email drsubhashkapila@yahoo.com)

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consistency is key to success.

Pakistan has an enduring, multi-dimensional and deep-rooted relationship with China. The long-standing ties of friendship between the two countries are underpinned by mutual trust and confidence. A close identity of views and mutuality of interest remain the hallmark of bilateral ties. Pakistan has always supported China on all issues of importance to the latter, especially those related to the question of China's sovereignty e.g. Taiwan, Xinjiang, and Tibet and other sensitive issues such as human rights.[1]

People's Republic of China–Pakistan relations began in 1950 when Pakistan was among the first countries to break relations with the Republic of China on Taiwan and recognise the PRC. Following the 1962 Sino-Indian War, Pakistan's relations with the PRC became stronger; since then, the two countries have regularly exchanged high-level visits resulting in a variety of agreements. The PRC has provided economic, military and technical assistance to Pakistan.

Bilateral relations have evolved from an initial Chinese policy of sympathy and support for the creation of a independent homeland for the Muslims of South Asia in 1947 to an unusual partnership that links a small but militarily powerful Pakistan, dependent on China for its economic and military strength, with China trying to balance competing interests in the region. Diplomatic relations were established in 1950, military assistance began in 1966, a strategic alliance was formed in 1972 and economic co-operation began in 1979.

The relationship has been described by Hu Jintao as "higher than the mountains and deeper than oceans". Favourable relations with China have been a pillar of Pakistan's foreign policy. China strongly supported Pakistan's opposition to Soviet Union involvement in Afghanistan and was perceived by Pakistan as a regional counterweight to India. China and Pakistan also share a close military relation, with China supplying a range of modern armaments to the Pakistani defence forces. China supports Pakistan's stance on Kashmir while Pakistan supports China on the issues of Xinjiang, Tibet, and Taiwan. Lately, military cooperation has deepened with joint projects producing armaments ranging from fighter jets to guided missile frigates. Chinese cooperation with Pakistan has reached high economic points with substantial investment from China in Pakistani infrastructural expansion, including the noted project in the Pakistani deep water port in Gwadar. Both countries have an ongoing free trade agreement. Pakistan has served as China's main bridge between Muslim countries. Pakistan had earlier played a leading role in bridging the communication gap between China and the West, through Henry Kissinger's secret visit before the 1972 Nixon visit to China.


The Chinese leadership has always appreciated Pakistan's steadfast support on issues of their concern. They are also generous in acknowledging the significant role of Pakistan in the early 1970s, which enabled China to break its isolation from the West and the US, when Henry Kissinger secretly visited Beijing. Pakistan also helped China become a member for the United Nations and has also been instrumental in providing excellent relations of China with the Muslim world.[2]

China has also supported Pakistan through thick and thin. The Kashmir issue has always been supported, while in 2008 during Pakistan-Indian tensions, it promised unlimited financial and military aid. Pakistan and China have also been involved in technology exchanged. Although earlier, it would be mostly sharing, it now remains in the favour of Chinese.

Apart from being a neighbour, Iran is the only country with which Pakistan has “had age-old relations, based on cultural, ethnic, and spiritual links”. Pakistan shares over 900 kilometres common border with Iran. Traditionally Pakistani frontiers with Iran have always been peaceful, safe, and secure.
Both countries are bounded in a strapping relationship and Iran was the first country, which recognized Pakistan upon its emergence as an independent country in August 1947. Indeed, there have been historical linkages between the people of Pakistan (the than India) with Iranian people. Iranian migrants and Islamic preachers had left long lasting impression on the people and civilization of Indian Subcontinent to an extent that Persian became a widely spoken and later as an official language, until late 19th century. Since Iran had its security concerns from the expansionist designs of former Soviet Union and an uneasy relationship with Arab world, therefore, emergence of a none-Arab Muslim country on its neighbourhood provided her reprieve and reinforced its security. Whereas, Pakistan, otherwise agonized of Indian aggression and hostile Afghanistan, took Iran as its strategic partner that was amply demonstrated by Iran during 1965 and 1971, Indo-Pak wars. It also militarily assisted Pakistan in the initial days of its independence. Both became partners of Western backed defence pacts during the initial days of the cold war.
First Pakistani Premier Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan visited Iran in 1949 and Iranian Shah reciprocated that in 1950, as the first foreign head of a state. It is worth mentioning that, Pakistani National Anthem was played first time in the honour of Shah Iran in 1950. In a way there established a relationship of interdependence between both brotherly Islamic countries right from the inception of Pakistan. Thereafter both countries maintained their bilateral relationship in an atmosphere of Islamic brotherhood and as good neighbours, with mutual acceptability. Along with Turkey, Pakistan and Iran established Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD), an inter-governmental organization for socio-economic development in the member countries in 1964. The organization was renamed as Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) in 1985 and its membership increased to ten in early 1990s by including Central Asian States and Afghanistan. In either of its form, the organization further reinforced the bi-lateral and multi-lateral relationship between Iran, Pakistan, and other regional Muslim countries. Following the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979, Pakistan was the first country, which recognized Revolutionary Iranian Government. Pakistan sent a high-level delegation under Foreign Minister to assure Iran that, it intends further cementing its traditional relations with the later. It welcomed the Islamic Revolutionary Government in Iran. President General Ziaul Haq was among the first few heads of states, who visited Iran as a good will gesture in 1980 and again in 1981. During Iran-Iraq war, Pakistan made hectic efforts to negotiate a deal between two Islamic countries to end the war. Indeed, Pakistani suggestions later became the basis for ending the war in 1988. Moreover, Pakistan provided morale and diplomatic support to Iran even during the critical stages of the war that annoyed Iraq and Arab world with it. Pakistan also persuaded Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries to normalize their relations with Iran that at times was viewed with suspicion by these countries. Moreover, it convinced United States not to become hostile to Iran on the issue of its hostages. US indeed wanted to launch a physical attack on Iran to end the crises of its hostages in Iran. Unfortunately, both countries developed minor divergences over the interim setup in Afghanistan upon withdrawal of Soviet Union and later on the issue of the support to Taliban by Pakistan and Northern Alliance by Iran and India. Considering these differences, Iran did not support Pakistan on the issue of Kashmir, once the later was presenting a resolution in United Nations on Human Rights violations in Kashmir in 1996. It was a serious setback to Pakistani efforts and India which had already developed its relations with Iran, got an opportunity “to fish in trouble waters,” for its own strategic interests. Thereafter, Indian spying agency RAW, made inroads into Balochistan and other parts of Pakistan for causing internal destabilization, which is continuing unabated even today.
On its part, Pakistan however, continued maintaining its brotherly relations with Iran. Pakistan always has persuaded Iran on a number of occasions for the reconciliation to shun the differences. Pakistan also tried to convince Iran that the enemies of both have spread these misperceptions, may be for the time being portraying as their friend. It whole-heartedly supported Iranian viewpoint on the issue of its controversial nuclear programme. Through a progressive reconciliation and diplomatic efforts, both countries come closer to each other in last few years. Regretfully, on October 18, 2009, a suicide attack allegedly of Jundallah militant group killed over forty people including senior commanders of Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) in Sistan-o-Balochistan.
The people and the Government of Pakistan strongly slammed the attack and shared the grief and sorrow of the Iranian people over the massive loss of innocent lives. Regretfully, immediately after the terrorist attack, a number of Iranian leaders and high-level officials including supreme leader pointed fingers at Pakistan. Pakistan Government however strongly negated its involvement in the attack and assured Iran for an all out support to trace and punish all those responsible for the attack if found on Pakistani soil. The incident however deteriorated the steadily improving relationship between two brotherly Muslim countries. Nevertheless, an unanalyzed allegation from senior Iranian leadership has provided a serious setback to the sincerity of Government and the people of Pakistan. Indeed, after the Mujahedeen’s interim Government and later Taliban’s taken over of Afghanistan, India was practically evicted from that soil. Thereafter, it needed some space for the promotion of militancy in Pakistan. This was only possible by creating a rift in the bilateral relationship of Iran and Pakistan, who over the years, have been considering Afghanistan as their ‘strategic rear’, of course not on physical terms. Yet, the concept perhaps misled both in 1990s, once they were endeavouring to secure their respective interests. Now once that phase is over, there is a need to learn from the past for a positive move forward through consensus building. Under the changed global environment, there is a need that both countries to forget past annoyances and “forge a new long-term common vision reflecting their common security and economic interests.” The fleeting rip in the Pak-Iran relations has no sound basis, thus can be revamped through enhanced interactions at all level including by the masses from both sides. Indeed, the renaissance of cultural and religious affinities between Iran and Pakistan would go a long way. For this purpose, both need to ban the fissiparous forces persuading both or any of them. Mutual trust deficit, prevailing over the years has to be restored on priority. Both need to realize the looming threats around them and in the regional and global context. Presence of the extra regional forces in their neighbourhood, otherwise friendly to none, provides them yet another cause for the convergence.
Dr R Muhammad Khan