The main thrust of the Army-Air Force operation in the Swat area is over. Army personnel are now busy coping with remnants of the Taliban and helping the civilian administration restore civic amenities like electricity and water, and repairing roads to facilitate the return of the displaced people.

Now, the focus of the Army is South Waziristan, where the Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan is fully entrenched. The Army’s Waziristan strategy is different from the one for Swat. It is encircling the area and building pressure on the TTP by using ground and air attacks to target key Taliban locations before moving in to directly challenge TTP fighters.

The strategy of constant pressure and softening of the target can also encourage intra-tribe splits because Baitullah Mehsud, chief of the TTP, established his leadership by ruthless elimination of dissent. He managed to eliminate his rivals or neutralised them by forcing them to leave the area or accept his superiority. Two groups surfaced to dispute Baitullah’s leadership. The leader of one group, Qari Zainuddin, was killed by a Baitullah loyalist. His successor vowed to carry on the fight against Baitullah, implying that the breach persists and the Army can find some allies for its operation against the TTP.

The visit of Army Chief General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani to the troops in South Waziristan on June 25 reaffirms the Army’s commitment to eliminate terrorist groups that challenge the writ of the Pakistani state. He expressed similar determination during his visits to the Swat area over the last three weeks.

Pakistan’s civilian government is equally committed to the effective pursuance of counter-insurgency. President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani have repeatedly talked of eliminating the groups engaged in terrorism in the tribal areas and mainland Pakistan. The provincial administrations in Punjab and Sindh have arrested a large number of Islamic militants linked exclusively with the TTP as well as activists of local militant and sectarian groups, including Jama’at-ud Dawa/Lashkar-e Tayba.
This is a major shift in the orientation of the civilian and military leadership from the Musharraf days. In the past, the civilian government and the army top brass manifested ambiguity towards the Taliban and other militant groups. The army moved into the tribal areas in the summer of 2003 and launched operations from time to time. However, the army and the government always stopped after a while to give space to the militants to survive. Militant groups also avoided a head-on collision with the government and security forces.

Some of their activities — cross-border movement between Afghanistan and Pakistan, amassing of weapons, and training camps — were ignored Agreements with militant groups in the tribal areas were initiated by the military authorities and some senior commanders in the NWFP were not convinced that tough action should be taken against the militants. They were convinced that most Taliban were friendly to Pakistan and that if American troops quit Afghanistan, no Taliban group would have an anti-Pakistan disposition.

This divided state of mind characterised the orientation of the federal government under General Musharraf. Some federal ministers and others in the official circles made no secret of their sympathy for Islamic militancy. That was the main reason the Red Mosque issue was allowed to fester. The burqa-clad armed women were allowed to continue with their take-over of a children’s library and they paraded the streets of Islamabad at will. The movement’s leader could give exclusive interviews to TV news channels from the roadside. Had the burqa-clad women not taken Chinese nationals hostage, would their activities have continued indefinitely?

By the time the government took action against the Red Mosque in July 2007, it was too late and the government incurred high human and political cost.

The Red Mosque was a real break between the Musharraf government and Islamic militancy. The latter, personified by the Taliban based in the tribal areas, thought that if the government was allowed to get away with the suppression of the Red Mosque militants it would target other militants elsewhere. The Taliban and mainland militant groups increased their collaboration to hit back at the government. Suicide attacks and bombings have increased since then.

The PPP-led coalition government was also divided on the militancy issue mainly because General Musharraf continued as President until August 2008 and the government was bogged down in confrontation with the PMLN after the latter left the coalition. Even after Asif Ali Zardari became president in September 2008, there was hardly any significant change in the dual-track counter-militancy policy. A member of the federal cabinet openly criticised Pakistan’s pro-US policy and sympathised with the Taliban.

The change in the disposition of the civilian government and the army high command came through their own review of the growing threat of militancy in the first quarter of 2009. Mutual consultation brought the civilian government and the military to the firm conclusion that militant groups, based in the tribal areas and the mainland, could not be allowed to threaten Pakistani state and society.

What helped them come to this conclusion were the stories of brutalities of the Taliban and their attempts to expand their domain of authority; their targeting of security personnel and state institutions and symbols; the Swat ‘Nizam-e Adl’ episode; the Mumbai terrorist attack; several terrorist attacks in Lahore, especially the attack on Sri Lankan cricket team; Chinese complaints of the presence of their Muslim dissidents in Pakistani tribal areas; and American-British prodding.

The government and the Army are now on one page on counter-insurgency. The same can be said about their disposition towards the militant groups based in mainland Pakistan. However, this strategy faces some political obstacles. Mainland militant groups have developed strong roots at the societal level by cashing on sentiments about the Kashmir problem and India’s efforts to build military and diplomatic pressure on Pakistan for controlling India-specific militant groups in total disregard to the challenges that Pakistan faces from terrorism.

The Mumbai experience suggests that India is more interested in isolating and condemning Pakistan at the international level rather than working with Pakistan to eliminate the menace of terrorism. For example, the documents about the Mumbai terrorist attack supplied to Pakistan in January 2009 contained material in Hindi and Marathi whose authentic translations were supplied four months later.

Further, strong anti-US sentiment in Pakistan creates sympathy for militant groups. Islamic groups and militant organisations often talk of a conspiracy by India, the US and Israel to destabilise Pakistan. Others sections of the public do not fully share this perspective.

India needs to recognise that Pakistan is now working towards the elimination of terrorism with full determination. India needs to move away from a single-track approach of insisting on elimination of India-related terrorist groups as a pre-condition for normal interaction. India-related terrorism should be viewed as part of Pakistan’s overall problem of extremism and terrorism.

India needs to work with Pakistan to cope with terrorism and focus on problem solving in the context of India-Pakistan dialogue. This will make it difficult for Islamic parties and militant groups to play up anti-India sentiments and thus weaken the government’s efforts to cope with extremism and terrorism. A soft and cooperative approach aimed at problem solving including elimination of terrorism will be mutually advantageous.

Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi is a political and defence analyst

The new financial year, beginning July 1, was marked by street protests in many cities, including Islamabad, Karachi and Lahore, against electricity outages ranging from 12 to 18 hours a day. Over and above this are unscheduled electricity suspensions that cause more disruption in business and commercial activity. These protests are expected to intensify because electricity outages have seriously depressed commercial and industrial activity all over Pakistan. Job losses at the lowest and middle levels are high.

It is annoying to watch the top management of power companies sermonising on TV channels on the gap between supply and demand due to increased consumerism, excessive use of air conditioners and carelessness in the use of electricity. What they need to address is their failure to plan for increased demand, and who is to be held responsible for this negligence: WAPDA, the federal government, or private power production companies. Iran has agreed to provide 1000 megawatts of power but it is not known if Pakistan is installing transmission lines on its side of the Pakistan-Iran border.

The electoral triumph of the Pakistan People’s Party in the February 2008 elections created the hope that the new government would work towards easing economic pressures on the common people. It was expected that the government would take steps to increase employment opportunities, curb inflation and price hike of essential items, and spend more on education and healthcare.

These expectations did not materialise and the lower and middle classes found themselves struggling harder to cope with inflation. At times the government appeared helpless to control shortages, which were often caused by manipulation of supplies by vested interests.

On July 1, the government increased the price of petroleum products by imposing a so-called carbon tax. Interest rates on national saving schemes were reduced. The price of gas for domestic consumers was reduced slightly, which was understandable because consumption of gas goes down drastically in the summer. Earlier in the winter months, when demand was high, gas prices were increased.

The government is toying with the idea of increasing electricity rates at a time when the people are protesting power shortages in the streets. Initially the government wanted to increase the price of electricity from July 1. However, good sense prevailed and the matter was put on hold.

The raise in the price of petrol and other oil products has negative implications for other sectors of the economy. The current petrol price is fixed at Rs 62.13 per litre. The retailers add 9 to 15 paisas to the price. Over one-fourth of the price goes to government in the shape of different taxes and levies. Profits of companies and retailers, and transportation costs, are in addition to the government’s share.

These developments have diluted the impact of the government’s decision to raise salaries and provide financial assistance of Rs 1000 per month to the poorest families through the Benazir Income Support Programme. Not many people talk of these relief measures because the current economic issues, especially electricity outages, have overwhelmed them.

The most perturbing development is that socio-economic disparities have increased rapidly in the recent past. The gap between the highest income groups and the lowest income groups has widened. Compared to five years ago, there are more people in government and semi-government institutions (bureaucrats and others) now whose monthly income and perks amount to one hundred thousand rupees or above. If you include non-government sectors, this number goes up many times.

The number of people below the poverty line or in the low income bracket has increased over the same period. Consequently, the affluence of a small section of the population is in sharp contrast to the poverty and under-development of large percentage of citizens.

These inequities are the most serious threat to Pakistan’s internal harmony and stability. The people who are at the periphery of the political system have little stake in the existing power arrangements. Their alienation turns them into sympathisers or supporters of militant Islamic and sectarian groups.

The government needs to review the perks and benefits (legal and acquired through influence and connections) of the senior-most officials to address the disparity issue and to assure the people that it really cares for them. The excessive use of official transport should be discouraged, especially for personal and family use. The unnecessary use of air conditioners in government or semi-government offices needs to be discouraged. Many officers in Grade 18 now have now air conditioners in their offices.

Some top officials either get a monthly petrol quota or there is no limit on the use of petrol. This should be reduced by 25 percent. These savings should be used in the education and healthcare sectors.

The future of the present coalition, especially the PPP, depends on how it addresses the economic predicament of the common people and how far it can work towards narrowing socio-economic inequities. The domestic situation has remained manageable so far for five major reasons.

First, the main opposition party, the PMLN, does not want to challenge the government on economic issues. These issues have more potential for popular mobilisation than the restoration of the judiciary, as invoked in March this year.

Second, the growing threat of religious extremism and militancy, and the on-going army operations in Swat and South Waziristan against the Taliban have also discouraged the political forces from challenging the government. The major political forces are unanimous in supporting army action on a priority basis. Other issues have been pushed back.

Third, foreign economic assistance has enabled the government to cope with the injurious consequences of terrorism and eased some economic pressure. The new budget cannot meet its targets without foreign economic assistance.

Fourth, this year’s agricultural output has been good, which helps improve the rural economy and secures against shortages of agricultural commodities, especially wheat, this year. The government needs to pay more attention to agriculture so that food items are do not need to be imported.

Fifth, foreign remittances by Pakistanis living abroad help the government and their families. This additional income contributes to the capacity of these families to cope with price hikes and maintain a life style that they cannot afford if they live on their income from within Pakistan. This dampens revolutionary zeal among the middle and lower strata of the society.

These factors give breathing space to the government while addressing economic issues, especially the growing gap classes. However, it is in the government’s interest to address these issues at the earliest. The key question is whether the government can improve governance and political management. It is in these areas that the government’s performance has been poor, if not abysmal. Some political problems have aggravated because the presidency often prefers loyalty over professionalism for key appointments and shows lukewarm interest in quickly resolving political problems in consultation with the opposition.

Immediate and persistent attention to addressing political issues and socio-economic problems will make it possible for the political forces to continue supporting the current civilian-military efforts to eliminate religious extremism and terrorism.

Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi is a political and defence analyst

__________________
CSS 2009, 2010, 2011 Qualifier

The completion of the Malakand security operation and initiation of a new security operation in South Waziristan represents a turning point in Pakistan’s efforts to deal with extremism and terrorism. There is a widespread view in official and non-official circles that the security forces will also succeed in South Waziristan, which would be a major achievement in Pakistan’s drive against terrorism.

The new counter-terrorism policy stands out on four major counts.

First, the army and the paramilitary have demonstrated that they have the commitment and capability to deal effectively with the Taliban and their allies. In the past, the army was periodically criticised for lacking the determination to fight the Taliban because, it was alleged, the army viewed them as a ‘strategic asset’ and thus took action against them half-heartedly and gave them enough space to survive. The other criticism raised doubts about the army’s counter-insurgency capacity. These criticisms have now been set aside by the security operations in Malakand and South Waziristan.

Second, the civilian leadership and the top brass of the military are now unanimous in their view that the Taliban and their allies are the major threat to Pakistan’s internal harmony and stability. In addition to the federal government, the ANP-led provincial government in the NWFP is also on board for the on-going security operations.

Third, the civilian leadership made a conscious effort to mobilise popular support for the security operation against the Taliban. This effort has been quite successful, and has boosted the morale of the army and paramilitary personnel fighting the Taliban. Major political parties support the security operation; the exceptions are Islamist parties and Imran Khan’s PTI. A large number of societal groups also extend support to counter-insurgency. The media’s tone has also showed significant change — from varying degrees of sympathy for the Taliban to support for the security operation.

Fourth, the security operation has helped to rehabilitate the army’s image at the popular level. Around 140 army personnel, including officers, have been killed in the Malakand operation, which has won popular sympathy and appreciation of the efforts of the army. The role of the Pakistan Air Force, which has been actively involved in the security operations, has been equally appreciated.

The shift in the orientation of the key institutions and leaders of the Pakistani state towards Islamic militancy and how to cope with it is a remarkable development. In the past, the Musharraf government lacked unity of mind on countering terrorism The same could be said about the military/intelligence agencies that were not fully convinced about the total elimination of militancy, especially the Taliban.

The Islamist MMA government in the NWFP, 2002-2007, was supportive of the Taliban and allowed them to expand their influence to settled districts of the province. The Musharraf government ignored such activities because it needed the MMA’s support to sustain his rule. When the army went into Swat to control Taliban activity, the MMA government refused to grant permission for a full-fledged security operation. The Army got greater freedom of action in Swat after the exit of the MMA government in 2007.

The real shift came in March-April 2009 when the Taliban got fully entrenched in Swat and the efforts of the NWFP government to defuse the situation by agreeing to implement a sharia-based judicial system failed. The Taliban viewed this as a weakness of the government and expanded their domain to Buner, thereby mounting more pressure on the civilian and military authorities in the area and elsewhere.

Further, violent incidents in Lahore, like the attack on Sri Lankan cricket team and the attack at a police training school, perturbed both military and civilian authorities. Several violent incidents including suicide attacks took place in other parts of the country, especially Punjab. In the first 100 days of 2009, twenty suicide attacks caused 332 deaths.

These developments threatened the writ of the state in unambiguous terms. The civilian leadership was left with no choice but to stop the Taliban onslaught or let them take control of more and more territory, which would have opened their way to overwhelming the Pakistani state.

The top military commanders came to the conclusion that the militant groups were threatening the primacy of the army as the key security institution. They felt that the Taliban and their allies would have to be checked in their bid to grab more Pakistani territory.

These developments also improved the Pakistani state’s credibility at the international level. The United States was already asking Pakistan to adopt a tough policy towards the Taliban and other militant groups.

By mid-April, tough action against the Taliban had become Pakistan’s own imperative. Had the Taliban and their allies not over-played their hand in Malakand and not stepped up their activities in Punjab, civilian leaders and the army top brass would have continued with their ambiguous disposition towards militancy.

Discussions between the president, prime minister and army chief produced a consensus among them to take a firm action against the Taliban and their allies. The NWFP government was also on board for this decision.

The security operation in Swat was initiated on April 26, although its formal announcement was made by Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani on May 6. Since then there has been no going back on the part of the federal government and the army top brass on counter terrorism.

The key decision makers in Pakistan — the president, the prime minister and the army chief — regularly consult each other on counter-terrorism. They held three meetings on July 1, 4, and 7 for winding up the Malakand operation and initiating a new operation in South Waziristan. The Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee also met the president on July 7. They issued public statements from time to time in support of the security operation for popular mobilisation and to boost the morale of the troops.

It is however difficult to suggest if the top civilian and military leadership has come to a similar decision regarding the militant groups based in Punjab, who are known for violent activities in Indian-administered Kashmir and mainland India. Some of these groups have Islamic-sectarian orientations and function exclusively within Pakistan. The recent incident in Mian Channun shows that militancy is deep rooted in the province.

It seems that these groups are no longer favoured by Pakistan’s security and intelligence authorities. These have been put on hold because the army is busy in the tribal areas and does not want to open a new front in mainland Pakistan. Further, it does not want to seen as taking action against these groups under Indian pressure.

The Punjab security and intelligence apparatus is now targeting activists of these organisations and monitoring the madrassas that have a reputation for militancy and maintain links with the Taliban. This effort is aimed at destroying their networks, isolating them and discouraging recruitment.

The next two months will show if Pakistan’s civilian and military authorities will exert more pressure on Punjab-based militant groups and ensure that they do not force a foreign policy situation on Pakistan in its interaction with India. If the role of these groups is neutralised, it will be possible to argue that Pakistan’s counter-terrorism policy has made a historical shift.

Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi is a political and defence analyst

__________________
CSS 2009, 2010, 2011 Qualifier

Anarchy and democracy
ANALYSIS by Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi
Sunday, July 26, 2009


The tendencies of defiance and anarchy can be discouraged if the PPP-led government pays serious attention to improving governance and bridging the gap between the policy pronouncements of its leaders and performance of the government

Violent protests against electricity outages and hikes in petrol and diesel prices last week raised a host of issues, especially about these protests’ implications for civic order and the future of democracy in Pakistan. Was the defiant and anarchic behaviour of the protesters aimed only at registering protest or did it have a wider political agenda of targeting the federal government? This may be the emergence of a new type of violent popular disposition and political culture that threatens democracy.

The protests took place in the major cities of all provinces, although their intensity varied. Invariably the offices of WAPDA or power generation companies, state property and banks were ransacked by the rioting crowd. There were clashes with the police in some places, including Karachi and Hyderabad.

The protests were more widespread and violent in Punjab. Even district and sub-district level areas experienced violence. Electricity-related offices and public property was ransacked in most places. The protesters paralysed normal functioning of business and commercial activities and ordinary people found it difficult to undertake their routine affairs. In some places, the police had to resort to baton charge and tear gas to disperse the rioting crowd. Regular traffic was disrupted by protesters in almost all cities. Some of them went to the extent of stopping railway trains, and, in Jhang, some coaches of a railway train were set on fire.

The pro-PMLN businessmen and traders in Lahore were very active in forcing the suspension of business and commercial activity. Some of them demanded that the federal government resign on account of electricity outages.

Street protest is a legitimate right of the people as the last resort. However, this does not give them right to ransack public and private property and terrorise people. It has been noticed for the last four to five years that protesters appear more interested in making life difficult for others, disrupting normal business and routine city life, causing traffic jams and ransacking property rather than in mobilising support for their demands. Their underlying consideration appears to be that one can draw attention by demonstrating the capacity to disrupt normal life in a city or town. This also demonstrates poor understanding of their responsibilities as citizens.

It is generally observed that aggrieved people have a tendency to walk out of their workplaces or institutions and block nearby roads by erecting roadblocks or setting fire to tyres or other material in the middle of the road. Sometimes, a small group of young people suddenly appears on the road, sets up barricades, lights fires in a commando-like operation and disappears quickly. At times such people also engage in violence and ransack business and commercial centres, official property and especially banks.

In February 2006, a large number of young people protesting in Lahore against the publication of “cartoons” in a European country turned violent without any provocation and engaged in unprecedented arson and looting. The religious parties that had sponsored the rally refused to take responsibility for what happened, declaring that their workers were not involved.

Disruption of traffic has become an established method of protest. The first thing students do to protest is to come out of their institutions and block traffic. In the case of the latest protest against electricity outages, protesters created an anarchic situation in some cities. They also stopped railway trains. In a separate development, when railway workers protested in favour of their demands in Lahore, they attempted to disrupt railway traffic.

It is a dangerous trend; more and more people are resorting to the disruption of civic life and causing inconvenience to ordinary people as a protest strategy. Now, there are more instances of interference with railway traffic. This has negative implications for the current efforts to revive and institutionalise democracy. The success of democracy depends on developing a moderate and tolerant disposition towards socio-political and economic issues, which need to be addressed through the democratic institutions and processes.

The prospects for democracy cannot improve if issues are to be settled in the street, and protest is not viewed as effective unless it becomes violent or disrupts normal functions of society. If democracy is to be stabilised and the prospects for non-democratic and unconstitutional changes are to be minimised, political leaders should work towards problem solving through democratic institutions and processes as set out in the constitution and law.

The opposition, especially the PMLN, may be getting grudging satisfaction from the current protest because it discredits the PPP-led coalition government. They may think that the unpopularity of the current government improves their prospects in the next general elections.

While there may be some electoral gains for the PMLN due to mismanagement of the electricity shortage by the government, this does not necessarily mean that the protests are PPP-centric, and that if the PMLN comes to power it will not face a similar challenge in the streets.

Political leaders should worry about the rise of a culture of defiance and anarchy in Pakistan. If politically active circles imbibe these political orientations, they tend to use them as a routine strategy to pursue their agenda. If the operating political norms are defiance, street agitation, disruption of civic life and economic activity, there is little hope for democracy.

Political leaders should not encourage defiance among people as was done by Nawaz Sharif after the Supreme Court disqualified him from contesting elections in February 2009. His public addresses in the immediate aftermath of this development called upon the police and civil servants to defy the government. If a politician encourages people to defy his political adversaries, what is the guarantee that these methods will not be used against him? If sections of the population imbibe violent protest and anarchic methods as normal instruments for advancing political agendas, they will use them against any government if and when needed.

The tendencies of defiance and anarchy can be discouraged if the PPP-led government pays serious attention to improving governance and bridging the gap between the policy pronouncements of its leaders and performance of the government. It needs to rectify the perception that electricity outages are partly caused by negligence and non-payment of dues to private power producers. The other perception is that the presidency is pursing state affairs in a personalised manner and assigns premium to loyalty over professionalism and judicious management.

No matter if the judiciary is supportive of democracy and the military wants to limit itself to its professional role, civilian democratic institutions can still run into serious problems if the political leaders do not pursue their divergent agendas with moderation and within constitutional limits in letter and spirit. Societal groups need to subscribe to democratic and constitutional norms for pursuing their demands. If they repeatedly resort to violent methods and create anarchy either on the encouragement of some political leaders or on their own, democracy will never stabilise.

Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi is a political and defence analyst

Oh, Dr. Hasan Askari Rizvi's articles !Really wonderfull.........


See This

Musharraf post-July 31



Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi
Sunday, August 02, 2009


Revenge appears to be a consideration for the demand from some political parties and political circles to put Pervez Musharraf on trial for high treason. Such negative sentiments tend to surface in Pakistani politics from time to time; in most cases this trend has had negative consequences for the political process

The Supreme Court announced a history-making judgement on July 31 which rejected the tradition of providing legal cover to the military’s assumption of power under the Doctrine of Necessity. The fourteen-member bench declared that General (retd) Pervez Musharraf’s decision to impose emergency and replace the Constitution with provisional constitutional order (PCO) on November 3, 2007 was illegal and unconstitutional. All actions taken by the Musharraf government during the emergency period — November 3-December 15, 2007 — have been knocked out.

The major effect of this judgement is on the judiciary itself, especially on the judges who took oath under the PCO or were appointed by the then Chief Justice Abdul Hameed Dogar, whose appointment under the PCO has been declared null and void.

The judgement is not expected to cause any upset for the on-going democratic governments at the federal and provincial levels because these have been given legal protection. The same legal cover has been given to some other actions taken during and after that period. The government has been asked to seek parliamentary approval for various ordinances issued under the emergency.

A similar judgement was given by the Supreme Court in April 1972, declaring the military take-over by General Yahya Khan “entirely illegal”, and describing him as a “usurper.” However, the Supreme Court “condoned” four categories of actions taken by the Yahya regime, which protected most actions and orders of that government. The latest judgement has also exempted some specified categories of administrative decisions, judicial actions and routine measures. However, the protection is more limited than was the case in 1972.

This judgement will give momentum to the demand of some political parties and political circles for the prosecution of Pervez Musharraf for violating the constitution under Article 6 of the Constitution.

Article 6 of the 1973 Constitution describes high treason as any attempt, or direct or indirect help to an attempt, to abrogate or conspire to do so, or subvert the constitution “by the use of force or show of force or by other unconstitutional means.” In September 1973, parliament passed a law that provided death sentence or life imprisonment for subversion of the constitution as described in Article 6.

This article could not be applied to General Zia-ul Haq because his military take-over (July 1977) was legitimised by the Supreme Court in the same year. Later, the parliament, established in 1985, provided legal cover to his military rule under the 8th Constitutional Amendment. General Musharraf’s take-over in October 1999 was also given legal cover first by the Supreme Court in 2000 and then by parliament in the 17th Constitutional Amendment in December 2003.

Musharraf’s emergency in November 2007 was approved by the Supreme Court, reconstituted under the 2007 PCO, headed by Chief Justice Abdul Hameed Dogar. This reconstituted court under the PCO has been knocked out by the latest judgement. Parliament, then dominated by pro-Musharraf elements, passed a resolution in favour of the emergency; it did not give indemnity by incorporating the PCO and all actions there-under in the constitutional framework. The new parliament that came into existence after the February 2008 elections neither endorsed the November emergency nor formally rejected it.

Some lawyers, the PMLN, the Jama’at-e Islami, Pakistan Tehrik-e Insaf and some other groups want the government to invoke Article 6 to prosecute Musharraf with reference to the Supreme Court judgement on the November 3, 2007 emergency.

Revenge appears to be a consideration for the demand from some political parties and political circles to put Pervez Musharraf on trial for high treason. Such negative sentiments tend to surface in Pakistani politics from time to time, both under civilian and military rulers. In most cases this trend has had negative consequences for the political process.

Some political circles think that they can kill two birds with one stone by demanding the trial of Pervez Musharraf: disgrace Musharraf and at the same time apply political pressure on the present PPP-led federal government because the latter does not appear to be in favour of prosecuting Musharraf. Further, some political circles think that this would also provide them an opportunity to question certain political arrangements, including the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO), which enabled the PPP leadership to return to Pakistan in October 2007.

The key question is the correlation between the prosecution of Musharraf and the non-interventionary disposition of the military in the future. Is this a foolproof method of ensuring continuity and stability of the democratic process? Another issue is how much energy the political forces should spend on settling the past scores.

One should draw lessons from the past rather than become its prisoner or use it to seek political advantages in the present-day context. Over-indulgence with the past leads to neglect of current societal issues and problems, or it leads to the flawed thinking that the present situation cannot be improved if the perceived past mistakes are not rectified. If one has undergone tough hardships in the past, there is a tendency to take a blinkered view of the past which makes it difficult to focus on the present day issues, which may be more critical to political stability and democracy.

Musharraf’s conviction does not offer a credible guarantee against direct and indirect military intervention in Pakistani politics in the future. Military intervention is a complex phenomenon which cannot be explained by a single variable. Overambitious generals are a cause but not the only cause of the expanded role of the military. The future of democracy is also linked to quality of governance and political management on the part of civilian leaders.

Direct military intervention is not the only option available to the military. It can influence the nature and direction of change from the sidelines. That is more likely in countries where anti-military sentiments are strong but civilian government falters in performing its basic obligations towards its citizenry.

The government faces several acute problems that need to be tackled if it wants to ensure continuity and stability. Religious extremism and militancy are the most serious internal challenge to Pakistani state and society. A violent separatist movement in Balochistan threatens civic order and stability in that province. The writ of the state has to be enforced in many parts of Pakistan and the state should not allow religious extremists to function as religious vigilantes.

The second major challenge is a faltering economy, plagued by power shortages, decline in industrial output, rising unemployment and increased socio-economic inequities, and declining investment. There is heavy reliance on foreign economic assistance which limits Pakistan’s domestic and foreign policy choices.

Another set of challenges pertains to social under-development and poverty, education, health, drinking water, sanitation and other civic amenities. These areas need immediate attention so that ordinary people feel that civilian democratic institutions are addressing their problems.

The judgement is likely to discourage direct challenges to the constitution. However, the future of democracy depends more on the performance of the political government rather than on spending energy and resources on who did what in the past and who should be held responsible for past failures. Instead of getting bogged down in the past, more attention should be given to addressing the current problems with an eye to the future.

Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi is a political and defence analyst

Counter-terrorism confusion

April 5th by Dr. Hasan Askari.



The menace of extremism and terrorism has now become the major internal threat to Pakistan. The recent attacks in Lahore and suicide bombings elsewhere, coupled with increased religious-sectarian killings, aim at discrediting the state and causing insecurity among the people

The terrorist attack on the Police Training Centre in Manawan on March 30 underlined the mounting challenge terrorism poses to Pakistan. A small group of well-trained and ideologically motivated attackers carried out the assault in a coordinated manner. Though the attackers were neutralised in eight hours by the Elite Force, Pakistan Rangers and the Army, the attack displayed the confidence these groups have gained to undertake a second high-profile raid in Lahore in March.

Pakistan is under siege by religious extremists and hard-line groups that are using violence in an indiscriminate manner to create fear among the people and threaten the Pakistani state in pursuit of their narrow, intolerant and bigoted socio-political agenda in the name of Islam.

The menace of extremism and terrorism has now become the major internal threat to Pakistan. The recent attacks in Lahore and suicide bombings elsewhere, coupled with increased religious-sectarian killings, aim at discrediting the state and causing insecurity among the people. They expose the inadequacies of Pakistani state institutions to protect the lives and property of its citizens.

If such groups continue to carry out attacks at the times and places of their choosing, the state cannot sustain its primacy. Such attacks also aim at undermining Pakistan’s reputation at the international level and isolating it from the rest of the world. If Pakistan is isolated internationally, terrorist groups will find it easy to paralyse the state and establish their authority in mainland Pakistan.

This growing threat has not produced a broad consensus in political circles about terrorism and how the state and society should cope with it. The overall disposition of official and non-official circles towards terrorism is generally ambiguous, and they lack the much-needed unity of mind on who is to blame and how this problem should be handled. This confusion runs deep in society as well as government, as well as the military and intelligence agencies. Divided or weak political will is the main reason for the inability of the Pakistani state and society to cope with terrorism.

The media and political leaders described the March 30 terrorist attack as ‘an act to destabilise Pakistan’, a ‘conspiracy against the people of Pakistan’, and termed the terrorists ‘enemies of Pakistan’. However, the shared perspective falters when it comes to who did it and what should be done to cope with the growing menace of religious extremism and terrorism.

Only three political parties take a clear and categorical position on the issue, and they openly identify the groups involved — the PPP, the ANP and the MQM. Most other parties maintain varying degrees of vagueness on the issue, at times avoiding blaming a group and instead holding the government responsible for not providing security to the people.

The PMLN is indecisive on three key issues: religious extremism and terrorism; who should be blamed; and how Pakistan should deal with it. Nawaz Sharif shies away from taking a categorical position on this matter. However, some of his close associates, including Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan, have declared that the war on terrorism is not Pakistan’s war and that Pakistan is serving the interests of others.

Commenting on the Manawan attack, Sharif said that “no Muslim or Pakistani can engage in bloodshed of his brothers.” It is interesting to note that when a terrorist was arrested outside the police training centre, the first thing he said to the security forces was that he was a Muslim. Most of the people engaged in such activities view themselves as genuine Muslims and are convinced that those who do not subscribe to their religio-political worldview are bad or misguided Muslims.

Another popular theme with the PMLN regarding the two terrorist attacks in Lahore is that the security arrangements were weakened in Lahore due to the removal of Shahbaz Sharif’s provincial government, the imposition of Governor’s Rule, and the resulting transfers of a number of bureaucrats and police officials.

Islamist political parties often act as the political front of the militants, defending their activities with one explanation or another. At times, political parties and various people condemn terrorism and suicide attacks in principle. However, when it comes to the involvement of the Taliban or mainland-based groups, they either avoid comment or give obscure explanations.

Some such explanations are: these attacks are sponsored by the adversaries of Pakistan like India, Afghanistan and Israel to destabilise Pakistan; the US wants to destabilise and divide Pakistan in order to justify taking control of its nuclear programme; Pakistan’s participation in the global war on terrorism alienates the Taliban and other militant groups who retaliate in different ways; if Pakistan stops playing the American game in the region, the Taliban and other militant groups would again become Pakistan’s friends as they have nothing against Pakistan; terrorist activities are a reaction to injustice faced by the Muslims in Palestine, Kashmir and elsewhere.

These explanations do not focus on the ideological and power ambitions of militant groups; they want to establish their territorial domain at the expense of the Pakistani state for advancing their ideological agenda in Pakistan and abroad. These explanations also shift the blame of violence in Pakistan to ‘foreign devils’ and their ‘anti-Islam’ policies. The argument is that others have wronged Pakistan, Afghanistan and other Muslims; that needs to be rectified if terrorism is to be stopped.

Such a mindset developed gradually because of the carefully orchestrated policies and administrative strategies of the military government of General Zia-ul Haq and the army and intelligence agencies from the mid-1980s. The army/intelligence agencies continued to pursue these policies even after the restoration of civilian government in 1988.

A generation has been socialised into religious orthodoxy and militancy, which continues to sympathise with the Taliban and Al Qaeda. A half-hearted attempt was made in 2002-2003 to pull back from open support for militancy, but the Musharraf government could not pursue this to its logical conclusion because it needed to woo the MMA to hold on to power.

This pro-militancy mindset consciously cultivated by the Pakistani establishment has resulted in divided thinking on terrorism in non-official and official circles, including the security and intelligence apparatus. The argument that terrorism is a threat to Pakistan does not necessarily mean that they think Pakistan’s counter-terrorism is justified or that militant groups are responsible for Pakistan’s predicament.

The opposition parties view the government’s counter-terrorism policy from their partisan interests. They are not willing to help the government overcome the problems caused by intellectual disarray on terrorism in society and state institutions. It seems that the government will continue to find it difficult to pursue a coherent and sustained counter-terrorism policy.

Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi is a political and defence analyst

__________________
Always do what you are afraid to do
Saqib Riaz(TIPO KHAN)

Pakistan celebrates its Independence Day on August 14. But the unfortunate incidents in the first week of August have negated the vision of Pakistan as articulated by the Quaid-e Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah. These incidents should be viewed as some of the most serious domestic threats to Pakistan as a nation-state and a respectable member of the comity of nations. It is the primary responsibility of the Pakistani state to protect the rights and lives of every citizen, irrespective of religion, ethnicity, region and gender.

Two incidents took place in and around Gojra (Punjab) on July 31 and August 1, both targeting the Christian community. The second incident was more violent, resulting in the deaths of eight Christians. The third incident on August 4 involved an attack at a factory on the Muridke-Sheikhpura Road (Punjab) by an enraged mob, killing the factory owner and two other people. In the case of the fourth incident in the Sanghar district of Sindh on August 5, local police saved a woman from the wrath of a mob by arresting and moving her to the police station. A couple of weeks ago, some houses of Christians were damaged in Kasur.

The common denominator in these incidents was the rumour that some people committed blasphemy by dishonouring the Holy Prophet (PBUH) or the Quran. No effort was made to verify the complaint and some people mobilised to take law into their own hands and physically assault the accused and others. In the second and third incident, the public address systems of local mosques were used to incite people. In these two cases, the attacks appeared to be planned as the attackers were fully armed and they brought petrol or chemicals to set property on fire. The media and official sources have accused a Punjab-based militant sectarian organisation of direct involvement in these incidents.

This is not the first time that religious zealots have resorted violence against Muslims and non-Muslims on the pretext of blasphemy. There have been numerous instances in the past when people were arrested on blasphemy complaints. In some cases, the accused was the victim of target killing or mob attack.

Such incidents are spearheaded by Islamic zealots, including elements in the local clergy and activists of militant-sectarian organisations. They are often joined by criminal gangs and adventurists who see this as an opportunity to loot and plunder others’ property. These incidents are also meant to terrorise people. Local administration and police have a tendency to ignore their activities. In the case of the Gojra incident, the issue simmered for a couple of days under the nose of the local administration but the latter was unable to anticipate the trouble and failed to control it when it erupted.

It is praiseworthy that the federal and provincial governments are endeavouring hard to heal the wounds and provide monetary compensation for the losses. However, the government should see to it that these incidents do not repeat. These should be pre-empted so that there is no loss of life and property.

There is a need to undertake a dispassionate and down-to-earth analysis of all the incidents that have taken place after the passage of the Blasphemy Law. There were only a small number of incidents of mob attacks in the pre-Blasphemy Law period. However, these incidents have increased since the passage of this law. The reason is not that more people dishonour Quranic verses now; the growing violence is the consequence of the rise in religious extremism in Pakistan that leads some to adopt the role of self-styled vigilantes. At times, some vested interests exploit this law to advance their personal or group agenda which may not have anything to do with Islam.

Another common feature is that prayer leaders and the clergy often encourage local people to take action against an alleged blasphemer. Mosque loudspeakers are used to incite people. There is hardly any desire (not to speak of effort) to verify the facts or seek the local administration or police to deal with the situation. Still another feature is that such charges are invariably framed against poor people. A large number of them happen to be Christians living in rural areas.

The Blasphemy Law is a manifestation of Pakistan’s drift towards religious orthodoxy and militancy under the military rule of General Zia-ul Haq, who cultivated orthodox and conservative religious clergy and groups, helpd them gain legitimacy and undercut the demand for restoration of civilian democratic rule. As a part of this strategy, he accepted their demand to enforce this law in 1986 in addition to other changes in Pakistani laws from 1979 onwards.

The orthodox Islamic clergy treats the Blasphemy Law as an article of faith and opposes any change in it. They often encourage the people to watch for any attempt by anybody to show disrespect to the Quran or the Holy Prophet (PBUH). It is interesting to note that an advertisement published in some newspapers on August 3 expressed the regrets of some religious leaders on the Gojra incident but they insisted that anybody indulging in blasphemy must be punished, and asked the people to identify whoever was engaging in blasphemy and hand over such people to law enforcement agencies. However, they advised them that they should not on their own punish the guilty.

The clergy’s call to the Muslims to look out for blasphemous people offers a good opportunity to vested interests to use this law to settle personal scores with their adversaries and pursue their individual and group agendas. A person having connections with a hard-line Islamic group can easily create a difficult situation for someone by accusing him of blasphemy. The ordinary people hardly bother to seek evidence and go straight for thrashing, if not killing, of the accused. It is unfortunate that Islamic parties were not active in providing relief to Christians in Gojra and some of them did not even condemn the incident or issue a brief statement in order to keep the record straight.

The Blasphemy Law can be misused either in an environment of religious intolerance or when religious hardliners assert their primacy through intimidation and violence. Under Zia-ul Haq, the Pakistani state took upon itself the task of enforcing Islam along orthodox and conservative lines. This encouraged Islamic hard-line groups and even individuals to take up the role of Islamic vigilantes. Such an intolerant and violent mindset is at the root of Pakistan’s many problems, including the misuse of Blasphemy Law.

It is important that we recognise religious extremism and bigotry as a domestic challenge rather than attributing incidents like Gojra to foreign agents. Unless we give up the habit of shifting responsibility, we cannot rectify internal weaknesses. We need to address the challenge head-on rather than look for excuses.

The Blasphemy Law should be abolished or amended in such a manner that it is not employed for vigilante action. Every city and town should maintain the data of mosque prayer leaders, especially those conducting the Friday sermons. The use of loudspeakers in mosques and other religious places should be restricted to inside use only, with the exception of the routine calls-to-prayer. Strict action should be taken against those found guilty of looting and arson in Gojra and Muridke.

Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi is a political and defence analyst

__________________
CSS 2009, 2010, 2011 Qualifier

It is reassuring that Pakistan’s army, air force and paramilitary have dislodged the Taliban from Malakand and are now concentrating on South Waziristan. The current single-minded approach of the civilian government and the military authorities for countering terrorism has checked the creeping advance of the Taliban-led militancy into mainland Pakistan.

The threat of the Taliban establishing permanent control over Pakistani territory is now reduced, but the Taliban mindset is going to haunt Pakistan for a long time. This mindset goes well beyond the Taliban. Many political circles share this perspective to varying degrees. A large number of Islamist parties and groups either support the Taliban or share their worldview, although some of them maintain a distance for political reasons.

A large number of people and societal groups sympathise with the Taliban because they have been socialised into religious orthodoxy and militancy. They may not agree with the Taliban’s violent ways but they protect and defend their cause or attempt to neutralise any action by the state and society against militant groups.

Islamist parties like the Jama’at-e Islami and the JUIF, and factions of Jamiat-e Ahle Hadees openly support the Taliban and oppose military action against them. They either describe Taliban violence as a reaction to US military presence in Afghanistan or drone strikes. At times, they argue that some agents of foreign countries have entered the Taliban movement to engage in violence to undermine the reputation of the Taliban, who are actually friends of Pakistan. Some activists of these parties express a lot of appreciation of Taliban rule in Afghanistan before September 2001.

The Jama’at-e Islami realised soon that its opposition to military action against the Taliban does not evoke a positive response at the popular level. It changed its strategy by avoiding direct criticism of military action and focused more on criticising the US and its policies in Afghanistan and Pakistan, accusing Pakistan of killing its people for the sake of the US in return for money and weapons.

Some religious circles oppose the Taliban mainly because of Islamic denominational differences. They also support military action against them. However, they are critical of the US like those religious leaders who support the Taliban. They also support the introduction of an Islam-dominated religious political system in Pakistan.

The appeal of these Islamic parties is limited to their hardcore supporters who come out for their public rallies, but these Islamist parties cannot launch a sustained agitation to stop military action in the tribal areas or force the government to sever its ties with the US. The mainstream political parties do not endorse their views and demands, neutralising the appeal of Islamist parties beyond their core support.

However, these groups have sustained overall sympathy for conservative religious discourse and Islamist militancy in society. This runs deep into official civilian and military circles. A good number of civilian and military officials express sympathy, if not support for militancy (avoiding the name of the Taliban) or argue that Pakistan has been dragged into an American war in the region. This sentiment is strong among retired officials who are more open in expressing their views.

In the past, these diverse groups sympathising with militancy could often soften the government’s counter-terrorism policy because of lack of unity of mind in the official civilian and military circles.

Now, the civilian leadership and the military have come to the conclusion that stern action has to be taken against the Taliban and other militant groups that challenge the writ of the Pakistani state. Therefore, these elements have become less effective. However, they continue to engage in a whispering campaign against the government either with reference to military action in the tribal areas, pro-US policies or alleged corruption and mis-governance of the federal government.

Support for Islamist discourse on national and international issues and militancy is reflected in the electronic media and the press, especially the Urdu press. Some columnists and TV anchors present an extremely slanted view of politics and society, influenced mainly by a strong Islamist orientation, subtle sympathy for the Taliban and strong anti-West, especially anti-US sentiments. Pakistan’s internal problems, especially suicide attacks, bombings and killings, are attributed to India, the US and Israel. The standard argument is that these countries want to destabilise Pakistan because the US has plans to directly take over Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal or use the UN to take control of nuclear weapons ostensibly to protect them from falling into the hands of the Taliban and Al Qaeda.

It is interesting to note that one Urdu columnist wrote that India must be upset by the death of Baitullah Mehsud. Another argued that the Americans decided to kill him after he lost relevance for the US.

The Red Mosque incident (2007) is periodically highlighted by some columnists as a legendary incident of sacrifice by the inmates of the mosque and brutalities by Pakistan’s security forces. Writing in August 2008, an Urdu columnist compared the Red Mosque incident with the incident of Karbala by showing how the forces of “Yazidiat” killed the innocent people in the mosque, in an operation that resembled the extremely hostile treatment of the family and companion of Imam Hussain RA. Obviously, by “Yazidiat” the author meant the government of Pakistan and its security forces.

Such a partisan mindset is the product of pro-orthodoxy and militancy policies adopted by the government of General Zia-ul Haq. It adopted militancy as an instrument of its foreign policy in Afghanistan. And later in the 1990s, governments adopted the same approach in Indian-administered Kashmir.

Several factors contributed to the gradual shift in the orientation of Pakistani society and state towards religious orthodoxy and militancy. These included the setting up of Islamic-Afghan resistance in Pakistan to fight the Soviet military in Afghanistan; the search for legitimacy and support by the military government of General Zia-ul Haq; the opportunity provided to Islamist parties and groups to penetrate state institutions; use of the state’s reward and punishment system to strengthen religious orthodoxy and constitutional and legal changes for that purpose; changes in recruitment and promotion policies for government and semi-government jobs; Islamisation of the media and imposition of cultural norms reflecting conservative Islamic norms and values; and changes in courses of studies at the junior and high school levels to socialise children into religious conservatism and make them more receptive to Islamic militancy.

The government encouraged proliferation of madrassas not only in the NWFP but also elsewhere, and state patronage was used to encourage public displays of religiosity.

Having gone through pro-Islamic orthodoxy and militancy socialisation, the generation that got high school and college education from the mid-1980s to 2004-05 was bound to lean heavily towards conservative Islamic political and social discourse and militancy.

Some half-hearted efforts were made during the days of General Pervez Musharraf’s rule to control Islamic orthodoxy and militancy. These efforts did not produce much results.

The major challenge for the government is to neutralise the Islamic conservative orientation of the populace, especially the generation socialised in the 1990s. Unless an effort is made to encourage pluralist notions of society and multiple political and social discourses, the government will continue to face domestic criticism of its counter-terrorism policy, pro-US orientation, corruption and mismanagement.

Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi is a political and defence analyst

__________________
CSS 2009, 2010, 2011 Qualifier

Pakistan’s political track record shows that “sudden” and “dramatic” changes of government have taken place in the past. This evokes interest in the “minus one, two, three or all” formulas being currently talked about in Islamabad and the provincial capitals. This is being viewed as a precursor to yet another dramatic change at the top level of the government. This campaign is coupled with stories of corruption and mismanagement in the high official circles, ostensibly to discredit the leadership and create some basis for changes.

However, the unceremonious removal of governments in Pakistan has not taken place without the blessings of the army top brass. Since the first military takeover in October 1958, the top brass of the military has demonstrated its capacity time and again to affect the nature and direction of political change with the support of the top bureaucracy.

A significant development during the days of General Zia-ul Haq’s martial law was the active involvement of military dominated intelligence agencies in political manipulation. This pattern was so firmly established by the time Zia-ul Haq died in August 1988 that the ISI played important rule in putting together the major political alliance, Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI), that opposed the PPP in the 1988 elections. It distributed funds to some political leaders before the 1990 general elections, and there were stories regarding intelligence manoeuvring in connection with the 1989 vote of no-confidence against the government of Benazir Bhutto.

The dismissals of the prime ministers in August 1990, April 1993 and November 1996 by the president were done with the backing of the army chief in a coup-like fashion. In the case of Mohammad Khan Junejo’s dismissal in May 1988, President Zia-ul Haq combined presidency with the command of the army.

The military dominated intelligence agencies were actively involved in interacting with political leaders during the military rule of General Pervez Musharraf. Some high intelligence officials worked as intermediaries for the dialogue between Benazir Bhutto and Pervez Musharraf which led to the understanding between the two, facilitating Benazir Bhutto’s return to Pakistan in October 2007.

Given such a track record of dramatic change of government and leadership, it is important to examine the possible motivations for the “minus” formulas. Do these formulas represent an attempt by some political forces to encourage the army top brass to remove some political leaders, if not the government, or is it a propaganda campaign to build pressure on the government, or is it a reflection of some initial “re-thinking” in the military/intelligence circles about the political dispensation that emerged out of the 2008 elections?

Two types of political elements would like the present system to collapse and new elections held at the earliest. First, those who do not have any stake in the present political arrangements because they did not contest the 2008 election, expecting that the election results would be rejected by the political forces.

Second, some politically active circles, including within the PPP, are alienated because of what they perceive as poor performance of the government and hold the presidency primarily responsible for this. Some of the people in these two categories want reversal of the withdrawal of court cases against PPP and MQM leaders and activists under the NRO in 2007.

The Minus “one, two, three or all” formulas are also part of the propaganda campaign against the PPP government against the backdrop of the growing drift between the PPP and the PMLN on the prosecution of General Pervez Musharraf. The PMLN campaign for Musharraf’s trial not only builds pressure on Musharraf, who dislodged their government in October 1999, but it also places the PPP government in a difficult position. The PMLN can describe the PPP as pro-dictator party. If the PPP decides to opt for the trial, it will still face criticism because this trial, the first in Pakistan’s history, will face a lot of legal and administrative problems. The key issue would be if the trial can be restricted to Musharraf only or will it extend to other civilians and military personnel who collaborated with him. Further, the trial diverts the government’s attention from acute economic and security problems.

The third probability of “rethinking” in some military/intelligence quarters is a matter of concern. The military, especially the army, returned to its professional role with the assumption of army command by the present army chief in November 2007. The top brass of the army has made a conscious effort to pull back from active politics and devote its attention and resources to professional and service matters.

Any shift from this policy to direct or indirect manipulation of politics will have negative impact on the military’s image and accentuate political and economic problems in the domestic context. The army needs to stay aloof from the current political wrangling.

The army, supported by the air force and the paramilitary, has won much appreciation home and abroad for its counter-insurgency operations in Malakand and now it is concentrating on South Waziristan. The gains of this success will be compromised if the army expanded its role. The military and the civilian government need to work closely to deal with terrorism, which threatens Pakistani state and society.

The PPP government, especially the presidency, should not dismiss the current campaign as propaganda. It needs to dispassionately examine why such anxiety has developed about its policies and leaders. There is a need to examine the sources of disquiet inside and outside the party, and especially address the complaint that the party is not keen to strengthen the parliament vis-à-vis the presidency.

There is a noticeable discrepancy between rhetoric and reality. The government has talked of changing the 17th amendment, resolving the Balochistan problem, and controlling prices of essential commodities. Nothing concrete has been done in this respect. The Benazir Income Support Fund is a relief to the poorest sections of society. However, this cannot be a substitute to not controlling high prices and inflation. The latest sugar crisis shows how the government caved in to the pressure of mill-owners to raise the sugar price to over Rs 50 a kilo. The popular perception is that the government cannot reduce the sugar price because the sugar industry is controlled by the people in power and influential people in the opposition. Can the government rectify this perception and explain the rise of over ten rupees in the price of sugar in four weeks, especially when stocks were available to the sugar mills?

The political leaders need to recognise the limits of their power vis-à-vis competing political interests and other state institutions. The government cannot get away with important economy related options without justifying them in public. At the same time, the opposition should not in any way encourage extra-constitutional trends for political change.

The government can enhance its political clout by strengthening its relations with the people. However, this is not possible without improving its performance with reference to the issues that relate to welfare of the people. Instead of spending more energy on cultivating powerful groups inside and outside the country, the government should adopt a more realistic approach towards addressing the socio-economic problems of the people. If the ordinary people feel that the government stands by them they will defend the leadership and the political institutions. This will neutralise all the minus formulas.

Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi is a political and defence analyst

__________________
CSS 2009, 2010, 2011 Qualifier