THE low-intensity Baloch insurgency has remained a festering issue for a few decades now. A country that faces a host of external threats can ill afford to let this volatile issue further complicate its internal and external security environment and it must be resolved once and for all.

Sadly, the past governments showed no political foresight or the will to confront and resolve tricky issues of provincial autonomy and control over province’s natural resources through ingenious solutions.

Instead, they used force against the dissenting sardars or undertook development work that was dismissed as window dressing. Absence of long term, comprehensive and sustainable measures allowed the issue to snowball and grow larger than it really was.

Equally responsible has been the brutal attitude of Pakistan army and security agencies in suppressing the dissident voices resulting in killings of innocent citizens. As a result, the Baloch leaders tended to treat Pakistan army as a colonial army.

The demands of the insurgents notwithstanding, there are issues that genuinely affect people’s lives at grassroots level. Ethnicity, intertwined with a sense of political isolation, endemic neglect and relative economic deprivation has agitated the Baloch mind and became a potent force in evoking anti-state sentiment.

Economic and social disparity is highlighted by the Balochistan Economic Report 2009 (from 1972-73 to 2005-06). It states that Balochistan’s economy expanded by only 2.7 times, while those of the NWFP and Sindh expanded by 3.6 times and that of Punjab by four times.

For 2006-07 Balochistan figured lowest on social indicators such as education, literacy, health, water and sanitation. A World Bank study notes that illiteracy in Balochistan was as high as 60 per cent.

While the federation is to blame for letting this happen to a resource rich province, the tribal chiefs also directly and indirectly disallowed fruits of development from reaching their people.

Comprising 43 per cent of the total area, Balochistan has just 5 per cent of Pakistan’s population, of which almost half is Pashtun population in the north. Ethnic divide exists between the Baloch and Pashtun tribes.

Of about 250 of them, only three Baloch sardars of Bugti, Marri and Mengal tribes have taken up arms against the federation at various times. Other Baloch tribes are either with the federation or take a middle ground.

The dissident Baloch sardars were driven by their interest to keep the status quo and tried to block democratisation of their tribal society which could threaten their unchallenged authoritarian rule, if they were to remain part of the federation. An independent Balochistan was therefore their best option and Baloch nationalism their vehicle of choice.

Successive federal governments having shied away from promoting genuine federalism for fear of compromising national unity gave these sardars the pretext to mobilise their people against the state. Nationalist sentiments got a boost in Balochistan and Sindh. The slogan of Baloch nationalism initially did not have many buyers but after being ignored consistently by the federal government, the average Baloch accepted the slogan.

After Bangladesh, India focused on Balochistan. Initially, some reports say, RAW made inroads into dissidents and later, when Afghanistan came under US occupation, Mossad, MI 6 and even CIA jumped into the fray with an expanded agenda of Greater Balochistan.

Small pockets of local resistance mushroomed into a full grown anti-state movement, discretely supported by the three tribal chiefs. As hub for joint operations, India established a ring of 26 consulates along the Balochistan border in Afghanistan and Iran, mainly in Kandahar and Jalalabad, which reportedly began funding, training and arming dissidents.

The leaders of the insurgency have publicly identified their sponsors. Brahamdagh Bugti, a BLA leader, was quoted as saying that he would accept assistance from India, Afghanistan or Iran to defend the Baloch nationalist cause.

In a statement Dr. Wahid Baloch, President of Baloch Society of North America, said, “We love our Indian friends and want them to help and rescue us from tyranny and oppression. In fact, India is the only country which has shown concern over the Baloch plight, but showing concern is not enough. We want India to take Balochistan’s issue to every international forum, the same way Pakistan has done to raise the so-called Kashmiri issue. We want India to openly support our just cause and provide us with all moral, financial, military and diplomatic support.”

Not to be left behind was the former RAW agent B. Raman who wrote to Sonia Gandhi: ‘struggle for an independent Balochistan is part of the unfinished agenda of the partition’.

At least six active insurgent groups currently operate in Balochistan that are led by the scions of rebel tribal chiefs in line to succeed their aging patriarchs. After several decades the movement now appears to have found sympathisers among the urban class, the youth in diaspora as well as the local educated urban youth with a progressive bent of mind.

But the movement offers no substitute to sardari system, which is unacceptable in modern day and age and takes the Baloch back into the past rather than into the future.

With arms flowing in and training imparted to a large number of tribesmen, the dissidents with the support of their foreign friends are working to create enough strength to take the insurgency to a level where a Bangladesh type situation could be created.

Insurgencies are always difficult to fight due to the very nature of warfare involved. But the experience of counter-insurgency operations that Pakistan army gained in Swat and Waziristan changes the complexion of things. There is little chance of Balochistan becoming another Bangladesh, despite the insurgency enjoying the support of certain foreign elements.

Some factors that will inhibit insurgents from implementing their agenda include: a much smaller size of their resistance; a smaller and dispersed Baloch population over a much larger area; tribal rivalries and lack of broad tribal support on this issue; substantial Pashtun population that does not support the insurgency; and the relative ease of operation for the army and the air force in case the federation opts to undertake military action.

In the case of Bangladesh these factors were more favourable to the insurgents there due to a thousand miles of territory between the two wings.

For the insurgents the solution, therefore, lies not in armed confrontation with the state but a meaningful dialogue. Their struggle has strongly registered the point that the Baloch have genuine concerns that must be urgently addressed and their confidence in the federation restored.

Punjab and Sindh are amenable to supporting Balochistan for a faster pace of development. The centre is also anxious to rectify past mistakes and provide greater attention to its political and economic needs to bring it at par with rest of the country, which President Zardari openly offered recently.

A ‘consensual’ Balochistan package named ‘Aghaze Huqooq-e-Balochistan’, is being developed by the federal government covering constitutional, administrative and economic aspects which will address political, social and economic problems.

Now is the time for the Baloch leaders of all shades to begin talking to the government. The consensual acceptance of NFC award by all four provincial governments speaks volumes about the spirit of cooperation that marks the environment of empathy towards Balochistan. The federal government has moved to raise Baloch comfort level by actions such as replacing the army with FC in areas of conflict.

But for these efforts to succeed the dissident leadership will have to dissociate itself from their patron agencies and shun violence. BLA will have to wind up its headquarter in Jerusalem and fundraising office in Washington DC. Other groups will have to follow suit. Baloch nationalism will have to be redefined within the ambit of Pakistani statehood. The dissidents will have to now talk of democratisation of Baloch society instead of restoration of sardari system, of human rights and of changing the lives of disadvantaged people.

On its part the federal government will have to approach the Balochistan issue with an open and liberal mindset, engage the dissidents in a meaningful dialogue about their inclusion in the political process within the framework of the federation and give to the Baloch people a deal that has long been denied and which they cannot refuse.

One often hears the cliché “the worst democracy is better than authoritarian rule” frequently these days. But like all other clichés, it is misleading though one can sympathise with the concerns of the proponents.

Why do we consider it misleading? Let us examine some facts.

As all students of history know, the concept of democracy has its origins in the hoary past. The Greek city state or polis functioned under this system. Demos in Greek language means the poorer section of society who exercised their right to rule themselves as opposed to the rich and propertied classes.

In modern times, the idea became current in the West during the Civil War period in England and the American War of liberation had democracy as its declared aim. But the greatest example of democratic thought was, however, epitomised by the French Revolution which under the slogan of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity overthrew the decadent feudal monarchy.

By the 19th century it developed into a comprehensive system encompassing various elements such as a representative parliament, separation of powers between the organs of the state, rule of law, fundamental human rights such as freedom of expression and the extension of franchise to all adult population.

In the subcontinent, imperial writ was gradually modified from the third decade of the 20th century [limited home rule] till the formal “independence” in 1947. This was due to the great tide of national liberation struggle sweeping across Asia at that time as well as the weakening of the empire due to two world wars.

After the departure of the British, the system of government, chosen by the ruling elite of both India and Pakistan was the Westminster model.

In India, the experiment was a partial success because it had a developed bourgeois class capable of exercising its control on the country’s politics, economics and culture, through this political structure.

In Pakistan, the experiment was beset with grave problems right from the start. The dominant feudal, bureaucratic and military alliance finally discarded all pretensions of democracy and ushered in Ayub Khan’s military rule.

This was the beginning of an era of crass authoritarian rule by military and civil bureaucracy in Pakistan which was to continue till the present day, with brief interregnums of elected civilian governments. Some observers term the elected governments as democratic governments.

However, this is not so. The authoritarian ethos of these governments can hardly be ignored. The were democratic to the extent that they were elected by the people of Pakistan.

A democratic system of government, must, of necessity, not only be a representative [elected] government, but also guarantee the rule of law, separation of the organs of state power, and most importantly, fundamental human rights. These are the recognised features of a democratic government.

The question arises, what is meant by a” worse” or “worst form of democracy?” Obviously, its quantification and qualification depends on the absence of one or more of the requirements mentioned above. So, does a ‘worst’ democracy lack representative character or rule of law or fundamental human rights? Examined from any angle, the answer is the same. Absence of any of these conditions does not merely result in a decrease in quality, but in fact the negation of the concept altogether.

Therefore, it is clear that what makes democracy distinct from authoritarianism are the attributes mentioned above.

Today, political institutions and political parties are weak and unable to resist the machinations of an organized civil/military bureaucracy because of three reasons.

First , the programme and manifesto of political parties are of no significance, the emphasis is on personalities and various political parties are in fact extensions of different personalities.

This gives rise to the pernicious trend of dynastic politics on one hand and deprives the organisation of the cementing force of a common ideology on the other.

Second, political parties are not organised on a broad mass base with active units at the grass root level. The most one can see is the ritualised meetings of the central committee from time to time. Therefore, these bodies are not capable of mobilising the masses and during a crisis tend to become ineffectual and irrelevant.

Third, the concept of democracy and discipline within the organisation is personalised, lacking any organisational and ideological basis. So, it degenerates into the very opposite of what it was meant to be.

Therefore, the civil and military bureaucracy continues to remain the most organised political party in Pakistan. Since they embody the coercive power of the state, they cannot be made to function in a democratic system.

No amount of legislation or constitutional prohibitions can alter ground realities and guarantee the continuity of the democratic process unless those who believe in democracy are an effective and organised force.

CONTNUING tension between India and Pakistan revolves around the question of Kashmir. The other issues such as cross-border terrorism and Mumbai attack relate to this question. The position of India has been that the terrorist activities must be brought to an end first so that the question of status of Kashmir may be examined. It would not negotiate under pressure.

An argument can be made, however, that if a workable settlement of Kashmir dispute should materialise, the raison d’etre for terrorist attacks on India would to a large degree become irrelevant. The home-grown terrorist activity within Pakistan and India would still obviously call for solutions in the context of domestic parameters.

India nevertheless has not been a passive spectator in this drama. It has been focusing on its own defences to keep the military strategy up to date. The Indian secret service is blamed by Pakistan for encouraging dissident elements in places like Balochistan. New Delhi has also taken steps to establish its presence on the western border of Pakistan by means of substantial investment of infrastructure in Afghanistan, an attempt at a kind of encirclement of the enemy.
In Pakistan, Kashmir is the guiding principle of its foreign policy which has become completely militarised and civilian authorities seem to defer to its agenda. Economic and social relations between the countries have remained frozen. And army has gradually moved on to an unrealistic concept of ‘strategic depth’ in response to a possible threat of war from India.

In a recent article (Is India-Pakistan entente possible? Dawn, February 21, 2010) I had focused mainly on the financial cost of this conflict for both countries, and how their resources could be better used on wellbeing of the people, and on poverty alleviation. For lack of space, the question about what possible avenues exist for a settlement of the dispute did not receive proper attention.

My objective now is to discuss how the differences between the two countries can be resolved through dialogue and what factors are likely to delimit the scope of negotiations between them.

Kashmir is a territorial dispute between the two countries, and such disputes are a worldwide phenomenon, and have been around especially ever since the rise of the nation-state. The circumstances, however, under which this particular dispute arose has a special significance, and these circumstances relate to the Partition. With the transfer of power it became necessary for princely rulers to adjust to the new reality. Kashmir was one such state ruled by Maharaja Hari Singh Dogra, in the northwest of the subcontinent, with glaciers feeding water to the rivers flowing to the Indus region.

The Maharaja came under pressure from both sides but the historical accounts show that he was inclined to opt for independence, with some arrangement of mutual cooperation with both Dominions. What tilted his position in favour of India were the tribal volunteers who had been organised to wage a proxy war against the Maharaja. These volunteers soon forgot about their missions and engaged themselves in looting and, according to some reports, raping as well. Under this pressure the princely ruler sought aid from India which was supplied in exchange for the Instrument of Accession.

It is a controversial issue in Pakistan. According to many historians, the Quaid-i-Azam had personally encouraged this proxy war and the records indicate that the cabinet was divided about their support to this venture. Pakistan nevertheless did not accept Maharaja`s accession of his territory to India as a de jure phenomenon. With the intervention of the UN, a ceasefire was arranged and a plebiscite was to be held under the auspices of the UN in order to determine the wishes of the Kashmiri people to settle the dispute. That was long time ago. The plebiscite has never taken place and Kashmir is still under effective control of India.

History tells us that the future of a disputed territory is usually decided in favour of the party that has the effective control over it. India has been virtually in possession of Kashmir for the last six decades but the issue remains unsettled. Pakistan has refused to recognise India’s sovereignty over this old princely state. Several other conflicts that arose after August 1947 were gradually phased out, and the Indus waters Treaty was negotiated through the World Bank in 1960. The Treaty has been an uneasy agreement and it would be necessary for Pakistan to seek redress through the World Bank or the UN for mediation.

The shadow of the Kashmir has kept the atmosphere between the two countries poisoned. Within Kashmir, the separatist tendencies have remained active, even during the period of agreement between Jawaharlal Nehru and Sheikh Abdullah, a popular Kashmiri leader. Abdullah was imprisoned because of his disagreements with India’s official position on various policy issues related to the state.

In Pakistan, this territorial dispute led to search for suitable foreign alliance for security reasons. Affiliation with the US was fostered through regional pacts. This relationship did not provide a convergence of interests between the two countries, because the main objective of US foreign policy was containment of communism. But the relationship did boost the importance of the military in the body-politic of Pakistan, in the framework of a weak civilian government, with generous allocation of resources, expanding power and perks for its top command. Its position was further enhanced with General Ayub Khan joining the civilian government as minister of defence in 1954.

The first encounter between India and Pakistan occurred in the war of 1965. Pakistani soldiers fought valiantly but they ran out of ammunition, and the country discovered its geographical vulnerability against the push of the Indian army. A ceasefire was arranged at Tashkent, but Ayub Khan returned empty-handed from the meeting. It was not Ayub Khan’s war; it was Z.A. Bhutto’s, with zeal for liberation of Kashmir.

The next phase of encounter between the two countries (Mrs Indira Gandhi and Z.A. Bhutto) was against the background of East Pakistan debacle of 1971, resulting in Shimla Accord of 1972. On the question of Kashmir, both prime ministers agreed that the conflict should be settled through bilateral negotiations. Also, the ceasefire line was to be renamed as the Line of Control. India’s position was to establish the LoC as an international border. Whether Z.A. Bhutto agreed with this interpretation remains a controversy in Pakistan.

Shimla Accord had called for another summit as part of the ongoing process. Instead three formal meetings took place as follows: in 1994, Benazir Bhutto met Narasimha Rao in Islamabad; in 1998 Nawaz Sharif met Atal Behari Vajpayee and announced Lahore declaration, promising to promote cultural and economic relations between the two countries; in 2002 talks were held in Agra (India) between General Pervez Musharraf and Atal Behari Vajpayee. It is said that a draft Agra declaration had been prepared which would have made a significant advance over Lahore declaration but the meeting failed; In February 2010, the foreign secretaries of the two countries met, but they made no progress. India did not accept Pakistan’s agenda to have a `composite dialogue’ between the two countries, with Kashmir as a priority item. For India for any meaningful discussion of the question of terrorism must be settled first. This has been a consistent position of India.

India has always claimed that Kashmir is an integral part of the country, that it has its own constitutional identity and is part of the Indian constitution. There lurks behind this claim, however, a search for another Sheikh Abdullah who would unite the people and bring social stability to the state. In their view, to have a summit with Pakistan for a ‘composite’ dialogue with this goal accomplished would strengthen Indian position. This objective has eluded them so far.

In a recent commentary A.G. Noorani (Ghost of an accord, Dawn, Feb 13, 2010) suggests that now it is not only the separatists, but also the unionists in Kashmir who demand a settlement with Pakistan. Will there be a turn around? Only time will tell. An opportunity for a possible resolution, based on European experience about conflict resolution, continues to beg for attention of the three parties.

THE Pakistan-US relationship has had a history of roller-coaster rides. There have been more ebbs than flows in it. The relationship has been more conspicuous by the absence of trust between the two sides, which otherwise claim to have known each other for nearly six decades. Political pundits were long resigned to the adage of long familiarity breeding contempt. Attempts from Washington to obviate this impression had been few and far between.

That was the case until the much-ballyhooed latest dialogue in Washington that appears to have given the faltering relationship a hefty makeover. The old patron-saint of the Pakistani ruling establishment has apparently chosen to graduate the relationship to a level not seen before. Catering to the ebullient Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi’s irrepressible enthusiasm, Hillary Clinton has stepped in to pull all stops in the way of elevating it, in her words, to a resilient ‘strategic partnership’ between Islamabad and Washington.

Qureshi’s body language at the press conference, where he shared the rostrum with Hillary at the end of the first day of the proceedings, proclaimed that he and his colleagues had hit the ‘jackpot.’ He has been long enough in the top diplomatic slot of Pakistan to know how to spin a phrase for optimum public consumption at home.

But with Hillary Clinton giving not only her overly-enthusiastic interlocutor but the whole of the Pakistani nation a hefty ‘ego massage’ one shouldn’t mind being charitable to Mr Qureshi. Hillary, after all, has hailed Pakistan, in the dialogue’s aftermath as a ‘strategic priority’ for US.

There’s little doubt that for the first time Washington has made an attempt to address issues that touch upon the hard core of Pakistan’s socio-economic malaise. Power shortage is a matter of concern and suffering to every Pakistani outside the circle of Pakistani elite. Washington agreeing to upgrade — not provide new plants — three ailing thermal power generation plants is a step in the right direction. This should provide relief to millions of Pakistanis.

But it’s not a case of unlimited largesse. Washington’s commitment doesn’t stretch beyond125 million dollars for this urgent and vital undertaking. Energy experts are already saying this is too measly an amount to take care of even one ailing thermal power plant, not to mention three of them. The moral of the story is that Washington would want to keep Pakistan on a tight leash and pull the plug whenever there’s any effort to break loose.

General Ashfaq Kayani, more than anybody else in the establishment, seemed alive to the challenge the energy monster poses to Pakistan. He told Senators Kerry and Lugar that he would be prepared to forgo the hi-tech weapons on his shopping. This list puts a luminous sheen on the importance the general attaches to this crying need of the nation.

One would hope that our politicos that routinely paint themselves as the under-dogs, vis-à-vis the Pakistani establishment, should take heed of what separates them in the public eye and perception from the military. Why shouldn’t the people of Pakistan feel more obliged to the military brass than the incompetent politicians who seem to have no clue how to come to grips with this problem?

The Obama administration is saddled with a double jeopardy: how to take the erstwhile ‘war against terror’ (re- christened as ‘the long war’) to a logical conclusion; and how to make a safe and ‘honourable’ exit from Afghanistan where the US has been badly entangled, notwithstanding the administration spokespersons’ claim that the battle-front is showing positive results and the Taliban are on the run from Helmand and Kandahar. Obama would ideally want to get out of Afghanistan — if not completely then at least the bulk of the current American military presence there — by the end of next year, before he gets into the maelstrom of the 2012 election. Obama, Hillary and the rest of the pack know, as clearly as they could see the day-light that this ‘home run’ cannot be hit without a major input from Pakistan.

Pakistan’s military offensive in Swat and subsequently in South Waziristan has raised Pakistan’s stock in Washington several points higher than it was before it crossed the Rubicon. There would have been no strategic dialogue had Pakistan not proved its mettle in combating the menace of Taliban on its side with a grit and determination that’s so conspicuous by its absence in the American and Nato forces in Afghanistan.

But that’s still not enough for Washington because it still doesn’t serve the purpose of giving the US military planners an absolutely safe and free hand to inflict a crushing blow on the Taliban in their allegedly last remaining stronghold in Kandahar. Pentagon’s strategists believe that the dreaded influx of insurgents from Pakistan must be totally dried up before the US military administers the proverbial coup de grace. That, in simple parlance, translates as compulsion on Pakistan to commence another military operation on its die of the border, this time in the other half of Waziristan in the north.

So the onus of pleasing its mentors in Washington is on the Pakistan side as much now as it has ever been in the years since the US entered Afghanistan with the intent to clean up the mess there; never mind the Augean Stables they have kicked up in the process.

The star billing given to General Kayani and his other military colleagues from ISI and MI in this hyped-up dialogue was unmistakable evidence that the real business was to be transacted with them, and that the parleys with the civilian constellation under Qureshi was only a side-show. Kayani was the man-on-the-spot and the hero who, in his own modesty, kept himself away from the kind of media lights that Qureshi seemed to enjoy with great relish and élan.

Did Kayani’s interlocutors in Washington and at the Central Command’s headquarters in Florida — where he spent some time before joining the party in Washington — succeed in convincing him that the remaining trust deficit between the two sides would best be eliminated by Pakistan throwing its Taliban off-balance in North Waziristan remains to be seen. But the proof of the pudding served to him there may not be long in coming.

President Obama’s unannounced dash to Kabul, on the heels of the strategic dialogue in Washington suggests that the chickens should be coming home to roost on this theme sooner than later.

That the military strategists in Pakistan may come to appreciate the logic and sense of earning Washington’s goodwill on this sensitive point isn’t something entirely apocryphal. The Cassandras in Pakistan seem to have concluded that its military elite is already convinced of this strategy; some believe the military incursion into North Waziristan has already begun and would be markedly expanded on the heels of the Washington session of the dialogue.

There is enough reason to believe that Gen Kayani and his team have sufficiently convinced the Obama administration to accommodate Pakistan’s urgent requirements of tools to break the back of the Taliban’s nettlesome presence on the Pakistani side. Pakistan has burnt its fingers badly in the process of pulling the American chestnut out of the Afghan fire and has all the reason to insist on a handsome recompense.

For once, Qureshi may have been right in calling for Washington to ‘do more’ on its part for Pakistan. The army, sticking its neck out in the remaining half of Waziristan deserves to be given the hi-tech weapons to perform up to the level expected of it.

However, after all the good words said with near-perfect body-language symmetry during the two days of the conclave, Pakistan didn’t get its way on what was, clearly, the top shopping item on the list tucked under Mr. Qureshi’s belt, i.e. to be treated at par with India on the supply of nuclear technology for civilian purposes. Washington wasn’t moved at all by Qureshi’s theatrical antics to show the world that he and Hillary were on the same page on everything on their mutual agenda.

That Islamabad was shoved off on the nuclear parity with India was no surprise at all to those who have always believed — and rightly so on the basis of ground realities — that despite all the hoopla in Washington and Islamabad, the relationship between the two is still that of a client and master and not of two equals.

The harsh reality is that Washington’s sole long-term strategic partner in the region is India, and that’s something the power barons in Islamabad just can’t wish away.

Yes, for entirely tactical reasons, Washington is constrained to give primacy and precedence to Islamabad to make its life easier in Afghanistan. It’s common sense and conventional wisdom in Washington that without Pakistan on board the plan to gain an upper hand against the Taliban — no matter how ephemeral or short-lived — can’t be brought to fruition.

But Washington’s long-term strategy on Afghanistan is also focused on keeping India in the loop as well, despite Pakistan’s strong reservations. The best Pakistan should hope for is that the Indian role is kept to the minimum and not allowed to become a major power broker as the puffed-up Indian elite in Delhi has long been angling for.

Little wonder that Manmohan Singh scampered to Riyadh last February to beseech King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia to lean on Pakistan to not insist on dealing India out of the Afghan loop entirely.

But the million-dollar question, not answered at the end of the Washington dialogue with as much clarity as garnished other issues, is what happened to the guarantees Islamabad was supposed to seek on its status as a nuclear-weapons state? Is the jury in Washington still out on this demand of primordial importance to Pakistan? If so, how long must we wait before all the fog was lifted?

THE third round of Pak-US strategic dialogue was held in Washington on March 24-25. Arguably the most remarkable thing about the dialogue, whose first two rounds were held in 2006 and 2008, was its elevation to the ministerial level. Two important questions are: What has the strategic dialogue accomplished in terms of strengthening Pak-US relations? Two, does the elevated strategic dialogue signify that Pak-US relations have graduated from a mere tactical alliance to a strategic partnership?

The strategic dialogue was held in the wake of shored-up military campaign by Pakistan against the militants in which some top Taliban leaders have been killed or apprehended. This exhibits the seriousness of the Pakistan government in stamping out militancy, which has been acknowledged by American leadership.

In a statement before a congressional committee US secretary of state observed that US efforts in Pakistan were important for her country’s success in Afghanistan. To quote Mrs Clinton, “In Pakistan, our efforts are vital to success in Afghanistan, but also to our own American security….We have made it a strategic priority to strengthen our partnership with the Pakistani people.”

The joint statement issued at the conclusion of the strategic dialogue acknowledges the role that Pakistan is playing in rooting out religious militancy, which, it notes, poses a threat to global, regional and local security. It reaffirms US commitment to provide technical and economic assistance to Pakistan; underscores the need for Pakistan’s enhanced market access to the US as well as early finalisation of the Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs) legislation; reaffirms the resolve by the two sides for advancing peace and stability in Afghanistan and their commitment to “wide-ranging, long-term and substantive strategic partnership.”

Both sides discussed issues relating to a bilateral investment treaty and creating an investment fund to attract FDI in Pakistan. A Policy Steering Group has been established to ‘intensify and expand the sectoral dialogue process’ in various fields including economy and trade, defence and security, and strategic stability and non-proliferation (to name a few).

However, the joint statement falls short of containing any concrete US commitment towards Pakistan. For instance, although the US is “committed to work towards enhanced market access for Pakistani products,” what will be the mechanism of the increased market access and when it will be granted to Pakistan has not been specified. Pakistan has long been requesting the US to enter into a free trade agreement (FTA) dialogue, but the joint statement does not even mention the word “FTA.”

Regarding the ROZs, whose legislation is pending with US Senate, the joint statement does not mention when it will see the light of the day and what has been America’s response to Pakistan’s request to broaden the product coverage and make rules of origin less stringent in the programme. Similarly Pakistan has been pursuing the US for a civilian nuclear deal like the one it struck with India. But the joint statement does not make a reference to that, although Pakistan’s foreign minister, who co-chaired the strategic dialogue, expressed satisfaction over meetings with US officials on nuclear cooperation, non-proliferation and export controls.

Though the joint statement reaffirms strategic partnership between Pakistan and the US, whether the bilateral relations have elevated to strategic partnership remains a question. In order to answer this question, one needs to look at Washington’s worldview and Pakistan’s place in it. The US wants to preserve the existing unipolar global order based on the philosophy of liberalism. America realises that although it is the lone superpower, it cannot control world affairs independently. It needs regional partners or allies, particularly those believing in economic and political liberalism, to control the world.

The political expression of liberalism is democracy, while its economic expression is free market economy. Democracy is advocated mainly because it is useful for promoting American interests as autocratic regimes are more likely to breed extremism and terrorism — at present the most potent threat to the US-dominated global order — than representative ones. Free market economy is advocated for the world because it best suits American companies engaged in international business. Promoting political interests of the US government and the economic interests of US transnational corporations (TNCs) is the pivot on which the American foreign policy revolves.

Since 9/11 counter-terrorism has remained the criterion for defining US allies and enemies and South Asia has been the frontline region and Pakistan the frontline state in the US counter-terrorism campaign As acknowledgement of Pakistan’s vital role, in 2002, US president Bush announced a $3 billion aid package for Pakistan over five years in addition to debt relief of $1.5 billion and lifted sanctions clamped on Pakistan in the wake of nuclear explosions in 1998 and coup staged by General Musharraf in 1999. In total, the US provided around $12 billion aid to Pakistan for next seven years the bulk of which was military related. The grant of a major non-NATO ally status was also an acknowledgement of Pakistan’s contribution to anti-terrorism campaign.

In 2007, US Congress passed counter-terrorism legislation, which promised increased assistance to Pakistan provided the country demonstrated the commitment to fight religious extremism. It was that conditionality that irked some quarters in Pakistan. However, that conditionality was only logical, because the enhanced aid aimed at increasing the capability of the Pakistan government to fight terrorism. From American standpoint, aid is the means and counter-terrorism is the end. If the end is not achieved, the means are of little avail.

The Kerry-Lugar law passed last year provides for annual economic assistance of $1.5 billion to Pakistan for the period 2010-2014 and possibly for another five years, in addition to unspecified amount of security or military assistance. In return, Pakistan has to demonstrate its commitment to fight extremism, terrorism and proliferation of nuclear weapons — the major items on Washington’s foreign policy agenda. The provisions of the Act relating to strengthening of democracy in Pakistan, non-interference of the armed forces and agencies in political matters and civilian control over military affairs are rooted in the US perception of involvement of security forces of Pakistan in terrorism and nuclear proliferation.

The war against terrorism is a drawn-out one. A relationship which is based on this war should also be long-term. Hence, the legislation exhorts the US administration to establish a long-term, multi-faceted relationship with Pakistan. The relationship will be instrumental in achieving American objectives all of which relate to rooting out extremism and terrorism in Pakistan, and making the country a moderate democratic state.

The policy framework established by the Kerry-Lugar legislation will result in increased US engagement with Pakistan. This means that Islamabad will be under increased pressure to crackdown on militants and smash networks involved in proliferation of nuclear weapons. This also means greater US interest, as well as interference, in political developments in Pakistan.

However, the claims of a long-term, multi-faceted partnership notwithstanding, trust deficit continues to characterise the relations between the two countries. On the part of Washington, the trust deficit is on two counts: One, the suspicion that the security establishment of Pakistan is not going all-out in tracking down Al Qaeda leadership; two, the apprehension that Pakistan’s nuclear material may be proliferated to terrorists, who may use it against the US.

On the other hand, a significant portion of Pakistani intelligentsia continues to suspect that the war against terrorism in which Islamabad is a frontline player is essentially Washington’s war and that all the repercussions of the war on the country’s society and the economy are a ‘gift’ of American ‘friendship’.

Strategic dialogue may help remove the trust deficit. However, it may also raise the expectation level on both sides, which if not realised may widen the trust deficit.

In sum, the future of Pak-US relations including capital inflows from Washington is contingent upon how well Islamabad plays its counter-terrorism role. Both politically and economically this relationship is important for Pakistan. The US is already Pakistan’s single largest export market and one of its largest sources of FDI. On the other hand, Pakistan is also very important for the US, because without the former’s active role, the latter cannot achieve its principal foreign policy objective. The realisation of mutual dependence does make them strategic partner; however, the concrete results of their partnership are what matter at the end of the day.

SINCE Pakistan came into existence there has been a tussle between the politicians and the generals. When they assume power, the generals seek legitimacy and the politicians more power. Together, they shred the constitution to pieces. The generals must remember that no matter what the causes of their takeover, they will never have legitimacy. The politicians should remember that no amendments to the constitution can protect them from their inadequacies and short-comings.

We seem to be going through still one more effort of amending our constitution. We have a problem with the powers of the president. Agreed that in a parliamentary form of democracy like we have, the chief executive should be the prime minister. What we should ensure is that as in a true parliamentary system the whole chain, the prime minister, the cabinet and parliament be empowered and not just the prime minister.

The most notorious section of our constitution currently seems to be Article 58(2)(b). Agreed that it should not be there. A number of coups though have been avoided in this country and democratic process has survived as a result of article 58(2)(b). For the time being we need a safety valve in the shape of 58(2)(b).

A judicial review as we currently have in the 17th amendment is not appropriate. We politicians should try and resolve our problems politically. The president’s power under this section should be there but with adequate political checks. One check may be that after having exercised this power, the president should be obligated to seek a vote of confidence from the newly elected National Assembly, failing which he or she should be stripped out of power.

With respect to the appointment of governors and service chiefs, agreed that the power should be with the prime minister. We should realise though that in this game there cannot and should not be any favourites one is seeking to appoint. Such appointments should be made purely on merit and for the betterment of the country and the institution.

We have a very important issue of provincial autonomy. Nobody can disagree with the concept but a few fundamental questions arise. Is it not true that our provinces right now are far more autonomous than the Indian states? Is the abolition of the concurrent list the only way to give more autonomy to the provinces? Is it not the current structure of the federation, where Punjab constitutes over 60 per cent of the population, the main problem?

As the federation stands today, when Pakistan grows, Punjab grows at a faster rate than the rest of the country and thus becomes richer. The creation of a new province should not be based on ethnic or linguistic reasons. Its capital should be reachable by the population easily. The current balance in the senate should not be distorted, meaning that the balance Punjab, Balochistan, Sindh and the NWFP have in the Senate at present should be retained after the creation of the new provinces. This criterion can only be met if we split the existing provinces in equal numbers. The process to create a new province should be simplified in the constitution.

Creation of more provinces in Pakistan will strengthen the federation as it exists today. These provinces should be given direct control of more sources of revenue. Currently a major chunk of the combined revenues of federal and provincial governments are collected by the centre. Almost three fourth of all provincial expenditures are met through resource transfers from the federal government as per the NFC awards. More autonomy may also be given to the provinces by making their share in their natural resources more equitable, and by giving them adequate employment quotas in all government services.

The constitution as it existed on October 12, 1999 should be restored, but the amendments relating to joint electorates, minorities and women reserved seats, lowering of voting age and increase in number of seats of parliament should be retained. The term of the National Assembly should be reduced to 4 years.

The concurrent list is a list of areas where both the provinces and the federal government can legislate. In case of a conflict, the federal legislation currently prevails. We seem to believe that abolishing the concurrent list and reducing the federal legislative list is the way for achieving more provincial autonomy. No body seems to have done any home work on the implications for the federation, as it currently exists, of such a move. It may entail a major dismantling of the federal structure and major enhancement of the capacity of the provincial governments. The Federation may cease to function and may become redundant.

We should reduce the federal legislative list somewhat and add these items to the concurrent list. The existing concurrent list should be retained. However, in the concurrent list we should have two sections. One section should be laws and areas where the federal legislation will prevail. The other should be laws and areas where provincial legislation will prevail in case of a conflict. This will give adequate autonomy to the provinces without jeopardising the federal structure.

The concept of a judicial commission making initial recommendations is fine. Parliamentary scrutiny in the end is done in many countries. In between, the prime minister of the country should have some say too. The Charter of Democracy’s clause of three recommendations of the judicial commission to be sent to the prime minister, who then forwards one to the parliamentary committee seems appropriate.

The appointment of the chief justices of the provincial and supreme courts should be made by the prime minister. These should not only be based on length of service, but also on competence and reputation. The appointments must also come before the parliamentary committee, which having a representation of opposition and treasury equally, should be able to block with a two third majority. Similarly the appointments of the head of accountability organization or the chief election commissioner again should be made in a similar fashion as the appointment of the chief justices.

The current system of our elections, being first by the post, is biased towards the larger political parties of the country. In the national and provincial assemblies, like the reserved seats of women and minorities, a new category of technocrat members should be added. All these reserved seats should depend on the actual percentage of votes a particular political party is able to get in an election and not on the number of members they are able to elect. A serious problem in Pakistan is the non existence of adequate capacities within the ranks of political parties to govern, once they get into power. Like the senate, the addition of technocrats in the national and provincial assemblies would give political parties a better capacity to govern. Also, the minorities still remain unrepresented in the senate provisions for which should be made in the constitution.

Most of the legislation in Pakistan is done through ordinances which essentially is a legacy of our colonial past. No country in the world, in the presence of duly elected bodies, permits the issuance of ordinances. If we look at the history of our legislation, apart from the NRO, no ordinance has subsequently been removed or significantly changed by an assembly. If we want to empower our assemblies, we must get rid of the power of the executive to issue ordinances.

The last local government system had a lot of positive points. The system had its teething problems though. Revenue and law and order functions should be taken away from these local bodies. Other powers should remain intact. The process for the election of nazims, naib nazims and reserved seats for district / tehsil councils should be simplified so that it is less prone to malpractices.

With respect to the status of Fata, the options are that it can continue the way it is now, administratively and politically, or it can become part of our existing provinces, or become a new province or be given special status like Gilgit-Baltistan. Obviously the people of Fata must be consulted in what they want for themselves. But my recommendation is to give them the status similar to that of Gilgtit-Baltistan.

Years of mismanagement, political manipulation and corruption have made Pakistan’s civil services incapable of providing effective governance. The previous regime’s devolution plan led to further confusion. Reforms of the civil service should be prioritised in order to make it into a more effective and an accountable institution. The recommendations of the National Commission on Government Reforms, which was set up by the previous government in 2006 and which has presented a report to the prime minister in May 2008, could be the starting point for the debate to reform the civil services.

My advice to my political colleagues is that the eighteenth amendment is a good effort. It is necessary but certainly not sufficient. If we really want to strengthen democracy, let us start delivering to the people and let us learn to protect the interests of the state rather than our own. What has happened in Washington should be an eye opener where the red carpet was rolled out for our army chief, with politicians nowhere to be seen, only two year after the election. Such is the level of vacuums we create which of course take no time in filling.

The writer is secretary general of a faction of PML-Q and a former federal minister.

THE leftists of yesteryear and present-day apologists of the American imperialism have forgotten one simple fact: imperialism has the elephant’s memory and does not forgive its critics and opponents whatever garb they put on.

There are some known former leftists in our country who are now dear to the US not because they really abhor terrorism — which fortunately all the saner forces do — but because it is widely believed that they were already CIA’s moles within the progressive movement committing strategic deception with their own comrades. The same criterion applies to Taliban in Afghanistan. They can be temporarily lured to reintegration and reconciliation, but they won’t be forgiven and be punished in due course of time when the conditions stabilise.

Sulaiman Laiq is a known literary, social and political personality of Afghanistan who had been one of the founders of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan, its Politburo member, an important minister in Presidents Tarakki’s, Karmal’s and Najib’s cabinets, as well as Vice- Chairman of the renamed Watan Party with President Najibullah is living in Kabul. He was recently invited by the Tufts University for a workshop held on February 17-18. From February 19-20 he was supposed to participate in 25th Annual Norris and Margery Bendets EPIIC International Symposium on Afghanistan and to deliver lecture on Buzkashi game.

The workshop was held under Chatham House rule, had convened a select group of approximately 20 policy-makers and experts on Afghanistan and the region to discuss the prospects and likely conditions for a potential political settlement in the country, and the impact of such a settlement on the current political framework in Afghanistan, on counterinsurgency efforts, including the development of the Afghan National Security Forces, and on the political economy of the conflict, as well as regional dynamics that may influence the prospects of sustainable reconciliation and peace in the country.

The event was co-sponsored by the Institute for Global Leadership at Tufts, the Compton Foundation, and the Belfer Centre for Science and International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, with assistance from the Centre on International Cooperation and United States Institute of Peace. On the very first day (February 17) Laiq was supposed to deliver a speech as he was the second confirmed speaker of the day along with Michael Semple, from Carr Center for Human Rights Policy. Despite all the arrangements made by the event organisers, the US embassy at Kabul declined to issue him visa.

I remember that when President Najibullah during the last stage of his rule desperately tried to win the backing of the US for his national reconciliation policy, the US spurned him to the detriment of the people of Afghanistan and the world at large. One of my Afghan friends, Mian Gul, who was at that time charge d’ affaires in the embassy at Washington asked Richard Murphy, Assistant Secretary of State, as to why they opposed the overtures of President Najib, just because he had been the KhAd (State Security Service) chief; to which Richard Murphy replied that not for his KhAd credentials but for he had insulted our vice-president. The 39th Vice President of the US under President Nixon, Spiro Agnew, during a visit to Kabul had been jeered and hit by eggs by the Kabul University students, including Najibullah, who as a result had got prison sentence during monarchy.

The US has not forgiven its erstwhile enemies. Last year in June I was selected by the Kuwait based Middle East Business Solution Company as a linguist in Qatar and had completed all the requirement and procedures, had signed contract with the company and had even received visa that at the last moment the US government refused to issue security clearance for me. Initially I did not know that I had to work in the US military Camp As Saiyiliyah in Doha. This was done because of my past progressive credentials in Kabul and my relationship with Laiq.

The present anti-corruption campaign pursued by the West against the Karzai administration is just eyewash. The forces unleashed by the US on Afghanistan after 9/11 are those from whose rampant corruption, destruction and bloodletting the people of Afghanistan had welcomed the Taliban reign. To expect these forces led by President Karzai to cleanse the country of corruption is like asking Osama bin Ladin, Ayman al-Zawahiri and others to rid Afghanistan of terrorism.

As far as the reconciliation is concerned, this is also a belated realisation of their past mistakes. The feared Taliban commander Dadullah had once approached the US supported administration immediately after the toppling of their rule in early 2002, but his overtures were turned down. One of my friends, Mirajuddin Pathan, who was governor of Khost, was approached by Jalaluddin Haqqani in 2003 as he also wanted reconciliation with the government, yet he was also ignored despite the efforts of the governor.

Americans know only the logic of might. They do not abide by the logic of civil society in practice. Taliban know it well. Therefore they suspect the US peace intentions. US have to prove their seriousness.

The writer is working in Area Study Centre, Peshawar, and has spent two eventful decades in Afghanistan.

CHARISMATIC leader Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s execution in a dubious murder case is a tragic chapter of our political history. Though a lot has been written on this subject, there is still lack of some concerted research resulting in much confusion about the real identities of Bhutto’s killers.

But how can one conduct an inquiry into such matters in a country where a number of national tragedies are buried in classified files? Perhaps Voltaire had a country like Pakistan in his mind when he said “History can be well written only in a free country.”

By describing Gen. Zia as the only person responsible for the tragedy, some elements have tried to protect other hidden hands involved in this conspiracy. Did a person like Zia had moral courage to kill his own benefactor?

Actually Gen Zia was not acting as a person; he was acting as a representative of the establishment. Yes, the same establishment whose godfather Ayub Khan had to quit power due to Bhutto’s movement. It was Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto who had challenged Ayub Khan at the peak of his ten years’ rule. It was his mass movement which made the military strongman to give up power.

Bhutto succeeded in giving the nation a constitution which had a consensus of all political parties — something unprecedented. This achievement was a rebuff to Ayub Khan’s claim that our politicians were incapable of agreeing on a unanimous constitution. The document made it clear that any supra constitutional act was to be treated as an act of high treason. Having a bitter experience of the negative role of bureaucracy in the separation of East Pakistan, he made the civil servants answerable to the people and their elected representatives.

Through administrative reforms Bhutto ended the privileges of a particular cadre and introduced the concept of equality of all service groups. Obviously, all these acts were not acceptable to the civil-military establishment, which in the past enjoyed unlimited powers. So, the bureaucracy became hostile towards him and its hatred towards him kept aggravating with the passage of time during his rule.

Though some political resistance did exist against Ayub Khan before Bhutto’s rise as an opposition leader, but with the use of brutal force, the dictator had succeeded in silencing almost all dissenting voices.

The regime put restrictions on political activities of the opposition politicians under black laws like EBDO and PRODA, defeated Madr-i-Millat Mohtarma Fatima Jinnah in a manipulated presidential election, jailed prominent leaders of Awami League under Agartala Conspiracy case, and restricted the activities of religious leaders.

Under these circumstances, when an atmosphere of despondency had gripped the country and chances of any political change in near future looked improbable, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s movement kindled the hopes.

On his call, the people came out on the roads and within months the decade-old dictatorship fell like a house of cards. Sensing that the end of dictatorship was imminent, other parties also joined the movement.

However, the people expressed full confidence in Bhutto’s leadership in 1970 general elections and, as a result, his party defeated the older parties and seasoned politicians. The election was also, in a sense, a duel between leftist and rightist parties for the first time in Pakistan.

The left emerged victorious also for the first time. The popularity of Bhutto among the masses and the radical reforms he undertook made other parties envious of him which ultimately led to formation of an anti-Bhutto alliance by the name of PNA in which religious parties were dominant.

During Bhutto’s tenure as prime minister this alliance continued to create obstructions in smooth running of the government. Though PNA was an alliance of eleven rightist parties, an Islamic party, owing to its better organisation and discipline, was its most active component. The end of Bhutto’s government and imposition of military rule was welcomed by the “democrats” of PNA.

Not only these politicians, several other anti-Bhutto elements joined Zia’s cabinet or strengthened his hands. But soon they discovered that the Bhutto was still very popular and any fair elections would bring him back to power.

This was not acceptable to the panicked establishment and already certain anti-Bhutto forces were chanting the slogan that “Bhutto should be hanged at Kohala Bridge.” So, a conspiracy was hatched to physically eliminate Bhutto. Obviously, the role of the establishment was central in carrying out the conspiracy.

In consultation with anti-Bhutto legal experts and some members of judiciary, an old murder case against Bhutto was revived. A judge offered his services to award capital punishment to him provided certain legal requirements were met.

During last days of his rule, Bhutto had, in an attempt to win support of religious leaders, declared a religious sect out of Islamic fold and reduced it to the status of a minority in Pakistan. This was a big blow to the powerful community. But Bhutto committed a grave mistake when he appointed a member of that community as the chief of his special force, FSF. Zia regime used the same person as an approver in the Bhutto case.

According to some reports, that person was approached through the high command of his religious community which was determined to take revenge from Bhutto for being made a religious minority in Pakistan.

In nutshell, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s ‘killers’ belonged to the civil-military establishment and the obscurantist forces. Despite their ideological differences, the rightists of various hues joined hands to eliminate their common enemy. They succeeded in taking his life but failed to eliminate him from history and the memories of poor masses of this country.

The writer is Director-General, Ministry of Finance, Islamabad.

ONE thing is quite certain in the context of the 18th Amendment making drastic constitutional changes; Mr Asif Ali Zardari will continue with the usual exercise of power as a co-chairperson of the PPP. The matter was not within the terms of reference of the Parliamentary Committee on Constitutional Reform. And Senator Raza Rabbani deserves all the credit for bringing the difficult task to a successful end according to its mandate.

Of crucial importance are the amendments which should have been settled two years ago: “According to the substitution in Article 270AAA, the proclamation of emergency of the fourteenth day of October 1999…the Provisional Constitutional Order, the Oath of Office ((judges) Order 2000, the amendments made to the Constitution through LFO 2002…are hereby declared as having been without lawful authority and of no legal effect.” Another relic of the past, Article 58-2(b) should also have been consigned to the dustbin of history.

In all, the committee made 95 recommendations. The impact these changes would have on the overall value of the revised constitution would, no doubt, be enormous but it would all depend on how these amendments are implemented. The much-awaited amendments in the constitution would certainly serve as the first important step towards restoring parliamentary democracy in the country. In order to make the democratic process self-sustaining, however, and to promote democratic culture in the country, some additional steps would have to be pursued.

It is important to underline, for example, the central point in the old controversy about supremacy or sovereignty of parliament which arose in the context of the British tradition. In order for the parliament to be sovereign, at least two conditions must be met: that parliament can make laws on anything; that a valid act of parliament cannot be questioned by the court. Neither of these two conditions is applicable to Pakistan, the jurisdiction of parliament is defined by the legislative list which is subject to legal interpretation, and that provinces are autonomous and give rise to inter-government problems.

The issue, therefore, is not relevant in light of the constitutional framework inherited by Pakistan from the Indian Independence Act. In fact the constitutional developments have even been moving rapidly in Britain; and parliamentary sovereignty has been diluted by the introduction of devolution of power (e.g. Scotland), and by virtue of Britain’s membership of the European Union.

Apart from the question of legal or constitutional sovereignty of parliament, how the decisions are made by the parliamentarians is of great importance. The most popular convention is the simple majority rule. The advantage of this system is that business gets done. Among the disadvantages is that there are no minority rights. To a degree this matter can be corrected by requiring simple majority of all eligible to vote, compelling all members to be present at the crucial time. In both cases, the majority prevails, and 51 per cent take it all, and it creates a situation concerning matters of long-term consequences for the country. This is what the 19th century political economist, J.S. Mill, called the majoritarian tyranny.

In the Jacksonian tradition of the US Congressional system, many countries now use two-thirds of votes of eligible voters in special cases. The question of majoritarian tyranny persists, however, especially with reference to democratic transition. Political parties are an integral part of the legislative system and unless they are organised on the basis of democratic principles, they are susceptible to become convenient covers for petty oligarchies. Muslim League, for example, in its various incarnations since the first time when Mohammad Ali Jinnah became its president with Liquat Ali Khan as its Secretary General has at times been a refuge of ambitious politicians in search of “leadership”. Z.A. Bhutto was founder-leader of the Pakistan Peoples Party inaugurated in Lahore on the wave of anti-Ayub Khan campaign and remained its uncontested leader. Benazir Bhutto became life-time chairperson of PPP. And Mr Asif Ali Zardari is now co-chairperson by virtue of his wife’s will.

Political Parties Act has been around as a decorating piece of legislation and is a sham. Parties should be organised on the basis of conventions, holding periodic elections, with voting by secret ballot, and the candidates for leadership explaining why they want to become the leader of the party. It is only when they have received the mandate from party members that they have a right to impose party discipline in the legislature. Otherwise, it becomes just an exercise in power and perks, and not representation of the “will” of parliament.

The parliamentary reforms committee has established new rules for the appointment of members of judiciary. In the 1973 Constitution, section 177, for example, called for appointment of chief justice by the president. That this action of the president was subject to the overriding limitation on his powers as given in section 48 was always ignored. In this section, the president in performance of his duties was required to act (i.e. shall act) in accordance with the advice of the prime minister. This and other procedures for appointment of judges were distorted by military rules.

The constitutional reforms committee has proposed a judicial commission for the appointment of judges in the country. To include a member of the executive (Minister of Law and Justice) is a step in the wrong direction. Also what position the Committee has taken concerning section 48, clause (1) and section 177, clause (1) of the 1973 Constitution is not clear.

The defining moment which will put to test the fragile edifice of transitional democracy in Pakistan will be how the government manages to cope with the post-NRO issues. Most of the well known players in the political and economic life of the country are tainted with charges of corruption.

There are regular reports of corruption coming from all major areas of the society. The NRO created a difference by granting a discriminatory amnesty to some selected political leaders and their associates, with the blessings of the Bush administration.

By declaring NRO null and void ab initio, the Supreme Court is pitted against Mr Zardari as a direct beneficiary of the NRO, and many of his colleagues in the government.At this delicate moment, it would be necessary to have a competent minister holding the relevant portfolio to cope with the challenge.

But Zardari government seems to have decided to weather the storm by ignoring the Supreme Court orders, or take refuge by invoking the Benazir Bhutto’s grave, rather than confronting the challenge. There is a serious problem of credibility here. The minister of law and justice happens to be a person who is himself under the shadows of serious charges of corruption. He also claims to have a Ph.D. but the search in the usual channels for all dissertations approved by recognised institutions in North America for granting of the degrees produced no results. Recently, he received a medal for meritorious award for scholarship from Mr Zardari as president.

Again the usual search for academic publications led to a dead end. After all, holding the portfolio of law and Justice calls for some confidence-enhancing perspective. There is so much talk about accountability in Pakistan but there has not been any voice raised from informed sections of society that while the country is trying to cope with widespread corruption, there is an urgent need for an independent office of accountability, directly appointed by and responsible to parliament, requiring a two-thirds majority of all eligible votes. The countries which have low corruption index do not necessarily have more pious people living there.

They use established and effective checks and balances. Also, those who get caught by the accountability process, which is widely accepted as credible and responsible, must expect to pay a heavy price for their crime.

It is sad that the Parliamentary Committee on Constitutional Reform was not able to or not had in their terms of reference this very important matter. NRO is just one aspect of this phenomenon, coping with past sins, and is almost corroding the Zardari government. There are other areas, government and non-government, where an independent and an effective accountability office would be well-equipped to meet the challenge.

PAKISTAN and the former Soviet Union followed a roller coaster model in their relations, oscillating between ‘cordial’ to ‘hostile,’ until the latter collapsed. Conscious of the need for close bilateral relations, they worked in that direction, exchanging visits at the highest level, vowing to make their relations meaningful and agreeing to cooperate in regional matters. Yet they were unable to achieve much because their respective geopolitical interests were too divergent and their existing alliances too overpowering to allow them to come any closer.

Pakistan’s relationship with the Soviet Union was all along defined by the latter’s relations with India, the Soviet darling at that time. Their close military and economic ties and Indian aggressive posture increased insecurity for a weaker Pakistan. This compelled Pakistan to rely on the US protection and military assistance and led it into joining the American led defence pacts — Seato and Cento, which essentially served western interests of containment of communist Russia and China.

That Pakistan got in the bargain only a false sense of security is another matter. When Pakistan invoked the Mutual Defence Treaty between Pakistan and the US seeking intervention on Pakistan’s behalf after India’s 1965 attack across the international border, the US State Department said it was unable to find the file of such a treaty.

Pakistan also became wary of the indirect Soviet role in strengthening the hands of India when the latter helped break up Pakistan. Unprovoked Indian invasion of East Pakistan occurred immediately after the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship was signed in August 1971, followed by massive arms sales to India on concessional terms.

The lowest point in Pak-Soviet relationship was reached when Pakistan played a key role in the mujahideen’s armed campaign against Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, as this was perceived to be part of Soviet strategy of pushing its way to the Indian Ocean, cutting through Balochistan. Pakistan welcomed the strategic role of the US which saw in this an opportunity to avenge its own humiliation of Vietnam. The Soviets withdrew, but for them Pakistan’s ‘sin’ remained ‘unforgivable’, given its ultimate consequences.

Washington also played a role in drawing a wedge between Pakistan and the Soviet Union. In one instance, the US launch of U-2 spy plane in 1960 from the PAF facilities at Peshawar without Pakistan’s knowledge and its subsequent downing by the Soviets so angered their Prime Minister Nikita Khrushchev that he threatened to bomb Badaber out of existence — a base leased to the Americans in Peshawar.

But now, some thirty years after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and some twenty years after the Soviet collapse, the world stands changed and continues to change dramatically. Today’s international political and geopolitical landscape is fundamentally different from that of the second half of the 20th century. Both Russia — that rose on the ashes of the Soviet Union, and Pakistan — that struggles to overcome threats to its security, face new realities, global, regional and domestic. It is, therefore, time for both of them to overlook the past, mend fences and work together for a better future.

As the successor to Soviet Union, Russia inherited its superpower mantle and has challenged the US-led unipolar world order. Recognising this, the US and Europe are now forced to defer to the Russian position on missile defence in Eastern Europe, Georgian misadventure, American ingress into Central Asia, sanctions against Iran and other global issues. It controls energy supply to western Europe, is anxious to regain its influence in Central Asia through Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in tandem with China, both of whom want to stem the tide of American expansionism. There are indications that Russia will assume a proactive role in Afghanistan as the Americans get ready to leave. And importantly, Russia is actively seeking export markets and new allies in Central, South West and South Asia.

While Russia was picking up its pieces in the ’90s, India and the US began to flirt. India had an eye on the US investment and technology, collaboration in fields such as the civilian nuclear technology and attainment of its regional power status by replacing its ageing Soviet-origin war machine with more advanced American military equipment. The US interest lay in gaining a foothold in the vast Indian market and create an ally in South Asia to pursue its encirclement of Russia and China.

The situation has changed in Pakistan too. Unlike its complete dependence on the US for security until the 1980s, it now enjoys a nuclear-based security environment that keeps the Indian belligerency in check. It is reaching self sufficiency in defence production, the most recent being the multi-role aircraft produced with Chinese collaboration. This gives Pakistan enough room to manoeuvre in the area of foreign policy, but for its poor economic performance and dependence on the US assistance that remains a limiting factor.

When players on the world stage, including India, find it necessary to redefine their priorities in keeping with their changing national interests and are realigning themselves for new security and trade arrangements, there is no reason why Pakistan should not take a fresh look at its allegiance to the US, which has neither served it well in the past nor does it hold any promise for the future. It is time for Pakistan to move towards a balanced and broad based foreign policy.

Despite major and minor differences and irritants, leaders of both countries — from Ayub to Musharraf and Kosygin to Putin, have always felt the need to improve bilateral relations. There are some achievements to show too. The Soviet mediation between India and Pakistan after 1965 war led to the signing of Tashkent Declaration. The Soviets rendered assistance in the oil & gas and power sector, supply of agricultural machinery and helicopters and establishment of the landmark project of Pakistan Steel Mills.

Pakistan was the first state to recognise Russia as the successor of the USSR. Islamabad assisted Russia in getting an observer status at the OIC and Moscow reciprocated by helping Pakistan in gaining similar status at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.

But despite this cooperation within the framework of multilateral organisations the full potential of bilateral relationship is yet to be realised. Islamabad has so far shied away from moving closer to Moscow for the fear of upsetting Washington. This mindset should change.

Islamabad must cut itself loose of Washington’s stranglehold to gain independence in policy making, both domestic and foreign. It is in Pakistan’s strategic interest to initiate politico-military outreach towards other global power centres, including Russia. A window of opportunity for Pakistan’s foreign policy to move towards independence is now opening as the US has begun to lean on Pakistan for help in reaching a deal with the Taliban and implementing its exit strategy.

Russia has indicated its readiness to open doors, even for military cooperation. On the heels of a meeting between Russian and Pakistani presidents during the SCO conference last June, came General Kayani’s visit to Moscow that apparently explored military cooperation. This signals a policy shift, indicating that Pakistan is not ruling out such an arrangement.

The Russian Duma has established a Group of Friendship with Pakistan — a measure that should now be reciprocated by Pakistan’s parliament. The Inter-governmental Commission on Trade and Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation needs to be made functional and trade and investment potential explored. Russian help in the energy and power sector would be critically important.

Contacts between the two governments notwithstanding, people of both countries have generally remained alien to each other. A prolonged American propaganda against communism and the Soviet Union created the image of that country as an aggressive and an evil empire. This was later reinforced by the negative perception created by the Soviet misadventure in Afghanistan. This prevented Pakistanis from coming closer to the people of Soviet Union.

But now with Soviet Union no more, communism having faded out, glasnost encouraging the Russian society to open up and Russia reshaping its economic and foreign policies to meet the challenges of new millennium, Pakistanis need to see Russia in a positive light. Negative perceptions can change with increased people-to-people contacts, cultural and academic exchanges and scholarships and student exchange programmes that need to be facilitated. Pursued with diligence, a new era of friendship and cooperation is not difficult to begin.