The Gilgit-Baltisatn Empowerment and Self-Governance Ordinance 2009 promises to give full internal and political autonomy to the Northern Areas by restructuring the existing current legislative set-up which critics consider is an ‘old wine in a new bottle’. However, a welcome aspect of the new reforms is the change of name of the region from Northern Areas to Gilgit-Baltistan, which gives a sense of identity to the people. The government has thus avoided the blunder of giving the region a geographical name as has been the case with the NWFP for sixty years.

The reforms package has been bitterly opposed by Kashmiri politicians and in particular by the pro-independence Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) of the both sides of the divide. In a TV interview Yaseen Malik said that ‘the reforms package for Gilgit-Baltistan is like a bullet for Kashmiris’. Mr Ammaullah Khan, Chairman of JKLF, said ‘We strongly condemn this package. It will harm the interests of Pakistan as well as Kashmiris,’ Their views, it is interesting to note, received more space and importance in the country’s print and electronic media than of political leaders of Gilgit-Baltistan.

The reasons for JKLF leaders’ anger is easy to understand and can be traced back to pre-partition days. Kashmiris, Pakistan and India for long have had considered Gilgit-Baltistan part of the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir, ignoring the events that preceded the independence of the subcontinent relating to Gilgit-Baltistan.

But, contrary to their views, the people of Gilgit-Baltistan and also the international institutions such as the UN, EU, etc., have always upheld that the rule of Maharaja Harisingh over Gilgit-Baltistan as a colonial occupation had ended with the success of ‘Jang-i-Azadi Gilgit-Baltistan’ on November 1, 1947, when the last governor of the state of Kashmir Mr Gansara Singh and his associates were killed in the war between Gilgit Scouts and Kashmiri forces.

This had ended the century long Kashmiri rule over the Gilgit-Baltistan region. Then, a new independent state called ‘Islamic Republic of Gilgit’ was established and after 14 days of its existence it had affiliated itself with Pakistan as a separate entity, independent of Kashmir.

However, since then Pakistan had kept the status of the Gilgit-Baltistan undefined and in fact muddled its identity by naming it ‘Northern Areas.’ Gilgit-Baltistan has never been part of Kashmir. Each year since 1947, people of Gilgit-Baltistan celebrate their independence day — independence from Kashmir — on November 1 just as Pakistan and India do on August 14 and 15.

The new reforms package, keeping in view the past history, is a progressive step for it recognises the fundamental human rights of the people of Gilgit-Baltistan. But it seems that the media in Pakistan is not fully aware of the history of Gilgit-Baltistan because it often describes the region as part of Jammu and Kashmir. A reputed national daily in its headline even named Gilgit-Baltistan as Northern Areas of Kashmir rather than its previous name of Northern Areas of Pakistan. Renaming the region, one hopes, would end the confusion and help promote its political position as a separate entity from Kashmir.

Other than renaming the region, rest of the package is a pack of gimmickry and is more a symbolic gesture of empathy towards the people rather than a real change in the governance structure of the area. One of the fundamental demands of the people of the region has been self-governance and transfer of powers from the ministry for Kashmir and Northern Areas affairs to the elected representatives, (now of new Gilgit-Baltistan Legislative Assembly) in the subjects of finance, administration and Judiciary.

The current set-up is a hybrid form of a provincial set-up and that of AJK assembly but with minimal powers to the elected representatives. The current chief executive will now be replaced by a chief minister who will be elected by a 33-member assembly that includes six women and three technocrats. A governor will be appointed by the president of Pakistan and he will head a 12-member council, half of them from the Assembly and another half to be appointed by him.

The governor will have greater say in the affairs of the council. This measure is a calculated move to deprive the elected assembly of its democratic and decision making powers. This would reduce its status to an advisory body of the council which would be dominated by un-elected but powerful nominees of Islamabad. This reform is the most undemocratic and detestable measure, disempowering the people of Gilgit-Baltistan. Islamabad will thus continue to maintain its tight grip over the governance structure of the region.

The governor will also have greater say in the appointment of the chief judge of appellate court and 5 other judges, as he would recommend the names to the chairman of the council, the prime minister of Pakistan. The elected chief minister would not have any say in it. Expected announcement of a high court is missing in the package, which means the people will have to go all the way to Islamabad for appeals.

The package is completely silent regarding administrative set-up. Hitherto, the Northern Areas Legislative Assembly (NALA) was virtually subordinate to the chief secretary of the Gilgit-Baltistan and DCOs of districts were in control of all financial and administrative matters. They were and will be appointed by Islamabad and will report to Kashmir and Northern Areas Affairs ministry without being accountable to the new chief minister.

This leaves the elected members of Gilgit-Baltistan with little or no say in development matters. Administrative affairs will be subject to the whims of inefficient and corrupt bureaucrats appointed by Islamabad. Formalisation of Gilgit-Baltistan Service Commission is a good step but is too little.

According to the package, the financial autonomy of the legislature remains highly ambiguous, but it is clearly shown that powers would remain with the council not with the assembly. Assembly could only pass the budget whereas control over revenue and expenditure will be the task of unelected body of the council.

The ordinance is intended to appease the people of Gilgit-Baltistan to create conditions for achieving the objectives of construction of much controversial dams and exploration of minerals in the area. The falsehood of the package came to limelight more vividly when in a briefing to Kashmiri leaders from the both sides of divide the foreign minister Mr Shah Mahmmud Qureshi stated that in the package there was ‘nothing substantial and only the separation of two divisions of Gilgit and Baltisatn and rest of the rules of engagement remain the same as they were’.

Further, it serves to calm down the international pressure regarding the violation of fundamental human and democratic rights of the people of Gilgit-Baltistan ‘without a genuine change in the political status of the region’.

Although the package is very much short of empowerment and self-governance, it has once more brought to the fore the question of Gilgit-Baltistan being part of Jammu and Kashmir. In fact Kashmir attracts tremendous media coverage because of atrocities committed there since partition of the subcontinent. Gilgit-Baltistan remained completely neglected. Why?

It is because India and Pakistan fought three mega wars over Kashmir and then within Kashmir, more often Jehadist have adopted a regressive approach under Kalashankof culture against either India or Pakistan which has attracted significant media coverage and sympathies.

Incidentally, the peace-loving people of Gilgit-Baltistan have not indulged in any violent engagement either against Pakistan or India to seek their fundamental rights and right of self-rule. In a peaceful and decent manner they have always raised their concern regarding their deprivation but governments in Islamabad have often been indifferent towards their demands.

If Islamabad does not solve the genuine problems of Gilgit-Baltistan and only tries to put the real issues under carpet as they have done now in the form of ‘Empowerment and self-governance ordinance 2009 ’they would be providing fuel to the already flamed nationalism in the region.

Mere promises cannot empower the people; it needs practical measures like transferring real powers to elected representatives which has not been done.

CYNICISM seems to dominate any discussion or evaluation of the future of Palestinians and the prospects of Palestinian state. No other nation in the contemporary history has endured so much suffering and made so many sacrifices as the Palestinian in pursuance of their struggle for regaining their homeland and yet the success remains elusive, if it has not receded further.

Since the death of Yasser Arafat in Nov 2005, the Palestinians have remained without a leader and hope. Each passing day has added to their misery and hardships. The barbaric treatment of Israel in Gaza during January 2009 operations in which 943 civilians were killed including 108 children, and its policies of collective punishment, demolition of houses, bulldozing of olive groves and expropriation of Palestinian lands have shattered the community life of Palestinians.

The apathy and callousness of international community in the face of these gruesome acts was in full display when BBC — the bastion of impartial and independent media -- refused to air an emergency appeal to raise funds for the ravaged families of Gaza strip. Most shameful was the impotence of the Muslim world, which remained a silent by- stander.

Israel since then has continued its stranglehold over Gaza which now resembles a concentration camp, its residents denied even basic daily needs. Netanyahu has spurned with disdain Obama’s appeal for not raising more Jewish settlements in the occupied territories. Israel now demands Arab recognition not just as a state but as a Jewish state implying denial of any civil rights now available to the Arab population within Israel and thus close for ever the chapter of right of return of the Palestinians to their homes, forced to leave during the violent birth of the state of Israel. It is against this background that the Fatah held its 6th Annual Congress, last month after 20 years in Bethelem, in occupied West Bank.

Taking into accounts the events of last two decades when the last congress was held some confusion and ambiguity was not unexpected. The fact, however, that more than 2,000 delegates including those from Jordan and Lebanon participated and prevailed over the old leadership has been in itself an achievement of sorts. The newly elected 100-member Revolutionary Council is dominated by younger and locally popular leaders. Twenty seats have been reserved for Palestinians in Israeli prisons and Intifada leader Marwan Barghouti — the most popular Palestinian leader serving life term was elected to the central decision-making body — the Central Committee. The election to this committee also confirmed that the old guard has lost its relevance. Out of the 19 elected members, 14 are first time members drawn mostly from Intifadeh-1 uprising.

While the emergence of new leadership could be termed as a positive development, on the whole the congress failed to address the issues that have crippled the movement. There were no serious efforts to remove the internal dissension in Fatah ranks nor any reconciliation with Hamas. It may be added in parenthesis that Palestinian movement has lost more Palestinians in fratricidal war between Palestinians and their Arab hosts and among resistance groups than in the war against Israel itself. Since Black September 1969, this tradition has unfortunately continued. Last year alone according to Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, 143 Palestinians including 25 children and 13 women were killed in inter-Palestinian violence in 2006 and 161 killed in clashes between Hamas and Fatah in 2007. The issue of corruption that has gripped the rank and file of Fatah also remained largely untouched.

The dilemma and inherent weakness of Fatah in reconciling the aspirations of the Palestinian youth and the US sensitivity was in full evidence in the resolutions adopted. In one resolution the congress recalled its “commitment to the pursuit of a comprehensive peace, reiterating the Palestinian people’s right to the resistance to occupation in all its forms in accordance with international law”.

There was significantly no mention of “armed resistance”, still the resolution invited Israeli censure. Mahmud Abbas in a bid to strike balance and mollify the West repeated that the negotiations are the only way to seek statehood. “We do not have another path and we do not wish to use another path”. The criticism that Fatah has become hostage to international political position, has thus some validity.

Surprisingly the congress, unlike in the past, did not excite much interest in the Arab world. The coverage and comments were in low key. Generally speaking, the Arab reaction to the congress and its results has not been entirely positive. It is held as a failure primarily for (i) its inability to offer a way forward from the present stalemate and (ii) its inability to overcome internal strife and restore its credibility. This may be a harsh judgment viewed in the context of the times, when Palestinian issue has become dormant and has no resonance even in the Arab capitals. Mahmud Abbas’s survival as the party chief, has failed to give the party a new face, let alone a new vision or vigour. Unless there is a radical change in the regional politics, the Palestinian cause will remain unattended. If the current status quo continues to prevail for another two decades Palestinians, in my opinion, are more likely to become another diaspora group like Armenians or Kurds dispersed in different territories without a state.

SO, the US moves to impose further sanctions on Iran while Israeli threats against it become more grating. Ex-President Bush had said every option was on the table against Iran, including that of a military assault upon it. And at Geneva, Iran had been given two weeks to decide to freeze uranium enrichment.

Before this, Saddam Hussain inflicted eight years of war on revolutionary Iran at the behest of the US. His campaign was financed by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and armed by Europe, mainly France, with Egypt, Jordan and minor Arab statelets cheering him on. Then, as one would say in Arabic, “Happened to Saddam what happened.”

Now US offers Iran “a choice between co-operation and conflict” while menacing it with a military attack in conjunction with Israel. Their ostensible objective is to prevent Iran from making nuclear weapons.

Actually the US, which calls its own war of independence a revolution, has set itself against every revolution since then, its opposition being in measure of the degree of social change proposed by the revolution concerned. It has backed democracy world-wide, having reduced it in practice to elections, except where this may threaten to lead to social change. It is fiercely opposed to any modification of the property system away from private ownership and profit.

True, the US has also fought old-style inter-imperialist wars to protect and expand its share in the world capitalist market and its control of the world’s natural resources.

For example, twice in the 20th century, Germany appeared poised to attain military supremacy in Europe, which would have enabled it to challenge America’s global position. America crushed it in two world wars. The second war also ended Japan’s quest for colonies, necessitated by its weak, old-style capitalism.

Today, the US does not express disquiet at China’s economic growth out of ideological considerations because Beijing no more desires to establish workers’ soviets around the globe. The US always strongly opposed any revolution if it rejected the principles of capitalism and the rule of the capital.

The most radical step proposed by Mexican revolution was the distribution of land among the peasants, an eminently bourgeois measure but still it posed problems for the US for it could touch the lands owned by the US citizens in Mexico. It was equally opposed to nationalisation of subterranean natural resources, which hit the US oil interests.

The US intervened militarily twice in Mexico but as the Second World War drew nearer to its end, it agreed to the Mexican laws after negotiating compensation for its citizens.

Russia’s October Revolution was different. It seemed to be bent upon bringing the known world crashing down. The US joined thirteen other countries in sending troops into Russia to defeat the Bolsheviks which they failed to do so.

The US did not recognise the Soviet regime on grounds that there could be no trade with a country which had no private enterprise. Roosevelt recognised the Soviet Union in 1933 in view of the rising German menace.

He also hoped that the sale of advanced machinery and technology for the Soviet Union’s industrialisation, while helping to mitigate the depression at home, would also reduce Moscow’s encouragement of revolutionary movements abroad. Stalin did not disappoint him.

The Cold War was against the inclusion of Eastern Europe in the Soviet bloc, because, while the US itself treated Latin America as its chasse gardee, it rejected others’ attempts to build spheres of influence anywhere. It wanted the whole planet to be open to the US capital.

Whereas it had taken the US 16 years to acknowledge the existence of the Bolshevik regime, revolutionary China had to wait 23 years. The US sacrificed 58,000 of its young men and threatened twice to use nuclear weapons to prevent a Vietnamese revolution. And it succeeded in its objective. By the time it withdrew its troops, Vietnam and its people had been so completely devastated that they could not attempt to build a socialist society in the foreseeable future.

Cuba’s revolution was isolated, subjected to aerial and maritime attacks and threatened with outright invasion on the plea that the US could not tolerate a socialist regime only ninety miles from its coast. Many other attempts at revolution were extirpated by various powers in Greece, Malaya, Grenada, Nicaragua, Guatemala and Afghanistan.

The US itself never had pre-capitalist relations. It started its national life with small-commodity economy and soon graduated to pure capitalism in which there were only two classes. The only imperfection was the slave system in the southern states. That was removed through a civil war in the 1860s. The almost continuous economic success of strengthened the hegemony of the bourgeois ideology in the US society so that an overwhelming majority adhered to it. Workers and capitalists may have disagreed about wages or the conditions of work. But they agreed that capitalism suited them both.

Capitalism had brought more freedom to the individual than any system before it. The origin of this freedom is in the market, which confers juridical equality on all commodity-owners and gives them the freedom to exchange their commodities or not. Political freedoms flow from these.

But, in ordinary perception, these latter freedoms arise of themselves purely from the will of the citizens.

The American people have come to regard themselves as a sort of special lot whom history, if not God, has charged with the mission of carrying the blessings of freedom to all mankind. However, their leaders understand that this freedom is predicated upon a liberal economy, that bourgeois freedom is the freedom of the capital.

The US has, therefore, opposed, throughout the world, any system which rejected capitalism or closed an economic space to the operation of the capital, since capital, because of its inner laws of motion, can exist only in the act of expansion. It knows only one form of reproduction — the expanded reproduction. If it does not expand, it contracts.

That was why Truman said, in effect, in 1946, that the American system could survive in America itself only if it became a world system.

Iran does not reject capitalism. But, deriving strength from its revolution, it is at present probably the only truly independent state in West Asia, all others in the region being under the US influence in various degrees. Therefore, as Ambassador Javid Hussain says, “Since the advent of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, the United States has exhibited unmitigated hostility towards Iran, basically rooted in political factors, as Washington sees the Islamic government in Tehran as a serious obstacle in the achievement of its strategic objectives in the Middle East.”(The Nation, July 22, 2008).

The US was not, in fact, opposed to the Iranian Revolution in the beginning, recognising it as adhering to the same economic philosophy as itself, since the revolution had been purely a political one, in which power had been transferred within the capitalist class from the comprador to the national bourgeoisie. Thus President Carter had, immediately afterwards, supplied special artillery shells to the Iranian army fighting the Kurds.

The rupture came with the seizure of the US embassy in Tehran by the students. Before this, every change in Iran, though made in the name of independence, had produced a regime which had felt obliged to collaborate with the hegemonic power at the time — Britain before the Second World War and the US afterwards.

Khomeini wanted to break that pattern by involving the masses directly in the struggle against great-power hegemony. Hence the encouragement to the students to occupy the US embassy, generating intense and long-lasting emotions on both sides.

Iran rejects the tutelage of the US capital. The latter’s capacity of processing the raw materials and its need for fuel are now outpacing their availability in the world. Hence the US’s grab for the fossil fuel in the Persian Gulf-Caspian Sea Basin. But, in order to secure that grab, it must break the defiance of Iran.

Therefore the tussle between the two is about something far more important than the enrichment of uranium. It is about the Iranian Revolution itself.

THE PPP-led coalition government under Mr Asif Ali Zardari as president of Pakistan assumed office in September 2008. His ascendancy and the record of his government have attracted diversity of reactions among the people, a vast majority of them critical of the performance. It would be useful to refresh our memory and briefly review how it all started before examining what the government has delivered during the year.

After the 2008 elections, General Musharraf had planned to carry on as a ‘civilian’ president but gradually the political developments taking place at the centre indicated that a change was in the offing. The first signs appeared with senior US officials, Mr Negroponte and Mr Boucher, gathering in Islamabad in March for a `friendly exchange` with Pakistani leaders. The media protested that here were these Americans trying to dictate their terms. There were rumours in the national political circles that in Washington a realisation had emerged that they had `talked to one man for too long’, and that reliance on General Musharraf to lead the new government in order to meet the challenges facing the country was no longer in the cards.

What followed has been covered extensively in unofficial reports in the media. Briefly, Benazir Bhutto had developed a long and trusted relationship with key members in US government, starting almost from 1984. In 2007 she was returning to contest the forthcoming

general elections when she was brutally assassinated after having addressed a political rally. After 2008 elections, Mr Zardari became a likely candidate to succeed General Musharraf because he fitted into the understandings that Benazir Bhutto had reached with the Americans concerning what came to be known as ‘transition’ to democracy, a gradual change of power from military rule to a civilian government.

For a smooth changeover, then, General Musharraf was given a safe passage to retirement, with guarantees from the American, British and the Saudi governments. For the US and the British interlocutors Mr Zardari would be a trusted ally in their battle against terrorism in the region. He seemed comfortable in this role. In his first visit to the US he declared that ‘Pakistan’ had the opportunity and had the right credentials to do the job, and that the world was a safer place because of George W. Bush.

It is well known that he possesses limited experience in political life; he held a portfolio in the cabinet of his spouse, Benazir Bhutto, which did not earn him a good reputation.

During the 2008 general elections the PPP won seats in every province, giving it a national character. And the people gathered around the party in memory of Benazir Bhutto and hoped that the new leadership would give attention to their needs, and meet the challenges facing the country by promoting democracy. The party liberally used its reserve of goodwill among many in the professional classes for its reputation of secular credentials, and also as the only parking place for liberal opinion in the country. What has been the performance of the government in practice, therefore, during the last twelve months is an important question.

As far as the position of the US is concerned, they are willing to continue to work with Zardari government, as Mr Richard Holbrooke, the US special envoy to the region recently underlined in his remarks. They are willing to back up their support with necessary assistance, though they would use different method of disbursement for funds than the one employed during the Musharraf regime. Pakistan’s relations with the US is a controversial issue in the country, however. Some political parties and the religious groups oppose what they call Pakistan fighting the Taliban on behalf of the US. In his remarks to a British newspaper, Mr Zardari raised questions about Afpak policy of the Obama administration. His wishes may be granted. There is a shift in thinking of many opinion-makers in the US which would put greater focus on Pakistan. If this should come to pass, it would result in considerable US presence in the country. The consequences will not be welcome to the Zardari government.

In the domestic arena, the hallmark of Zardari government has been to follow the status quo, and shy away from change. The policy is rooted in the alliance, the basis of the coalition government, in which consolidation of political power rather than promotion of principles seem to be the objective; the coalition partners do not share any common values, except perks and privileges. As an example of status quo, the reconstituted membership of the Council of Islamic Ideology leans heavily towards the traditional position of a coalition partner. The unfavourable reaction of the Council to a recent bill passed in parliament protecting victims of domestic violence is a clear indication of this thinking. It certainly is not in tune with claims of secular credentials by the PPP.

The much-publicised new educational policy is another example where political expediency seems to trump the principle as claimed by Zardari’s party. The manner in which the ‘Islamic Education has been incorporated in the draft policy does not give any assurance that it will promote enlightenment and moderation as the modern realities facing the country, just memorisation of sacred texts and relevant juristic opinions.

Further, the public-private partnership in educational institutions cannot be assumed to strengthen the overall quality of education. There is considerable evidence which indicates that it is the well-to-do whose needs are catered while leaving the others at the mercy of inadequate public institutions. This is further supported by the fact that the claim made in the draft policy for a substantial increase in allocation of public funds is totally unrealistic in light of usual fate of such budgetary provisions by the government.

With regard to the financial issues facing the economy, the government has opted for politics instead of principle to solve the problems. To ease its financial constraints, it avoids broadening its tax base, to adopt effective measures to control tax evasions. The lower income groups are available to finance their extravaganzas. Also, the Zardari government is relying heavily on the IFIs e.g. World Bank, IMF, etc., for salvation of its budget. The loans are negotiated and further ‘consolidated’. As the external debt increases, no corresponding opportunities are developed to increase export capacity of the economy. The prospects are not good.

Concerning goods and commodities of daily use, people get the warning that the situation with regard to energy, water, and sugar is going to become more serious, with no solution in sight.

Last but not the least is the question about the constitutional distortions introduced by General Musharraf. On need not be a legal wizard to understand that in the convention of parliamentary democracies, if the president is to exercise some important powers, he must get mandate through a general election, not through the electoral college of members of senate, parliament and assemblies. Mr Zardari, for example, was elected by a two-thirds majority of this electoral college but in the current round of constitutional amendments is reported to favour a ‘balance’ — have it both ways: electoral college and the effective powers. He claims, for example, to be the people’s president, but he carries no mandate from the people.

Of course there is no guarantee that the alternative of general election would be free and fair, but it would be no match to the situation where votes in the electoral college would be decided virtually by fewer than half a dozen leaders of the parties represented in the federal houses and the provincial assemblies, including Zardari himself as head of the PPP. By forcing his ‘constitutional balance’, Mr Zardari may be pushing the country to a constitutional abyss.

The legislative record has been very slim during the tenure of the government. The parliament acts more like a social club, and is also often ignored when it comes to whatever president wants to implement in the country. There is no cohesive agenda, no party ‘wish list’ to try to implement plans in order to improve the life of the people at large. Yes, there has been focus on Benazir income support fund. It certainly helps those who qualify for it, but amounts to a miniscule in the life of people at large struggling to make both ends meet.

The performance of the Zardari coalition has been disappointing.

HENRY Kissinger’s initiative of visiting Beijing, thanks to Pakistan’s role in opening doors, ended China’s alienation and marked the beginning of a Washington-Beijing relationship that blossomed into an extremely close bilateral, mutually beneficial economic partnership.

The interdependence of the two countries in this age of hyper globalisation is in complete contrast to their adversarial policies of the cold war era.

China now enjoys the MFN status with America, is the biggest exporter of consumer goods to that country, has amassed a trade surplus of over a trillion dollars, has a huge export driven economy and an industrial base that provides employment to its people and raises their per capita income, has achieved world’s highest growth rate and is rapidly achieving a qualitative edge in the manufacturing sector.

The US has come to heavily lean on China to overcome its liquidity crunch. Because its appetite for Chinese consumer goods fuelled China’s growth, China bought US treasury bonds to increase liquidity and encourage more buying. Recently this enabled the US to foot its bills and take steps to help revive its economy, including the recent 800 billion-plus stimulus package. China’s treasury holdings today amount to nearly $1 trillion, which makes it the largest American creditor.

Out of this experience, China emerged an economic giant — third biggest economy after the US and Japan, but one that showed greater resilience to global economic crisis than the other two. Yet the economic crisis has adversely impacted China. With its exports to the US declining considerably, China’s manufacturing sector was left in a lurch that forced the government to intervene and prevent labour unrest. Its economic managers felt greatly perturbed over the uncertain future of their investments, given catastrophic fluctuations. But they continue to buy treasuries, though on a reduced scale, to keep the dollar strong and help revive the US economy, in order to keep their exports going.

The nightmare of dealing with the American inflation and deflation and the changing political realities have led China to take a deep look into the future pattern of its economic partnership with America.

Exports being the lifeblood of China’s financial engines, it is actively seeking to reduce its dependence on the US market by exploring neighbouring markets. It has also shifted focus by making substantial investments in domestic infrastructure development. These steps will also allow China greater independence from American decision-making.

China has recently proposed the gradual creation of an alternate international reserve currency. The idea may not sit well with the US but is gaining currency and cannot be ignored. It was also floated some time back by Iran and Venezuela for oil trading. China has already begun to deal with Brazil, Russia, India, South Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Belorussia in their currencies and signed currency swap agreements to internationalise its currency Renminbi. But in doing so, China took care not to hurt the dollar.

Such a quest for an alternate reserve currency will lead to the emergence of a different economic order.

Successful implementation of the key concepts of “reform and opening up” and “economics as the central task” over the past 30 years through an internal policy of change and capacity building enabled China to develop into an economic powerhouse. It continues to follow an external strategy that is actively shaping an international environment conducive to its political rise.

China is now in a position to play an active role in global economic decision making. It has expressed keenness to enhance its representation and role in international monetary institutions — a role that will correspond with its real position in the world economy. It has shown interest to join the boards of IMF and World Bank, but expects them to be reformed. Given China’s ever increasing needs of energy, minerals and other critical resources, it is courting the nations of Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East and extending monetary support to needy countries, edging out traditional creditors.

Conscious of the need to strengthen its military muscle, China has focused on inducting modern technology and upgrading existing weapon systems. Collaborating with and using Pakistan knowledge of western military aviation technology, China developed an effective multi-role combat aircraft. And it is exposing its forces to multi-national military exercises outside its own borders, while undertaking internationally sanctioned operations. These developments suggest that political framework is changing. Steadily but surely, China is taking its place among superpowers. For the Obama administration this forms a new strategic basis for closer Sino-US relations. Europe is following suit.

In view of its continued dependence on China to tide over the crunch and even beyond that, America will have to coordinate its economic policies with China, respect its position as an independent player and allow space for it to play its role at the world stage. There are even speculations that the failure of American capitalism could possibly trigger the transition from the American to the Chinese model of capitalism.

But despite their close economic ties, ambivalence in both China and the US is inevitable. For them a US-West European relationship model is not possible. Consequently it is difficult to see China and the US developing a close political alliance, marking a complete break from the strained relationship of the past.

Both have historically remained hegemonic powers and have fiercely protected their identities and pursued their unilateral agendas. Driven by its global interests, the US will not withdraw its tentacles from Asia which it spread during the cold war to contain China. Then, China could not do much about it, but would not like America breathing down its neck any more.

Such conflicts of geopolitical interests are bound to sour the existing close relationship, if both countries do not exercise caution. Tricks like pulling Dalai Lama out from the closet and hoisting him and eruption of disturbances in Tibet and Beijing to coincide with Beijing Olympics were in bad taste.

PRESIDENT Barack Obama is locked, on the home front, in a battle of nerves with his Republican detractors backed by powerful interest groups, lobbies and cartels. These power brokers see in his proposed national health care programme a serious challenge to their long-entrenched monopolies, the euphemism for mass exploitation.

However, a more testing time for Obama is building up on the Afghanistan front where he has staked so much of his reputation and popularity and where the Republicans have no direct hand in stoking the fires. It’s Obama’s own chosen commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, who is crying uncle within weeks of taking over the reins in the embattled country. McChrystal has thrown up his hands and warned that the battle against the Taliban in Afghanistan will be lost within a year if the war front wasn’t beefed up with another 20,000 soldiers.

Obama, as expected, hasn’t conceded right away on his commander’s alarm but promised to review it very carefully. And cogitate and ponder deeply he must on what’s undoubtedly a very tough and challenging issue for him, one that could so easily snarl his infant presidency and throw one more spanner in his works, besides the partisan controversy of national health care.

Obama had entered the White House on his publicly avowed determination that in marked contrast to the Bush-botched Iraq adventure the war in Afghanistan against the Taliban

and their side-kick, Al Qaeda, was winnable. Buoyed by that brimming confidence, he quickly injected 22,000 additional troops in Afghanistan to bring the American troops strength there to nearly 55,000. A little mentioned, but so very relevant, fact is that there are at least as many, if not more, ‘contracted’ security men — the U.S. euphemism for mercenaries — deployed on the ground in Afghanistan, along side the regular troops. So if Obama accedes to the latest request for troop reinforcements, the number of regular US troops in Afghanistan will be raised to nearly 75,000 men in uniform, not counting the mercenaries in mufti.

But Obama, with his keen sense of history ought not to overlook the fact that Pentagon and its generals are conjuring up a virtual re-run of the Vietnam scenario of the ’60s. It was , then, President Lyndon Johnson who was inveigled by the defence ‘experts’ and wizards into believing that the Vietnamese resistance to the US onslaught could be broken and pulverised with the influx of more troops. So Johnson went on throwing as many troops into the Vietnam cauldron as demanded by his commanders.

But the result was just the opposite: it steeled the valiant Vietnamese into fighting the well-armed aggressors with all the resolve, grit and determination and ultimately forcing them to sue for peace on terms that were humiliating for a superpower. Those images of desperate helicopter rides out of the American embassy compound in Saigon are still seared on memories around the world.Obama distinctly runs the risk of getting sucked into the bottomless pit that Afghanistan is proving to be, a la Johnson in Vietnam, and being meted out a similar denouement.

He shouldn’t also lose sight of the historical evidence that no foreign invader ever succeeded in subduing the Afghans and the US with all its might in hi-tech weaponry and state-of-the-art fighting machines is not going to be an exception. He also can’t afford to shut his eyes to the rising sentiment of disgust and weariness with a war that’s losing its appeal to the American people. They are getting tired of a war, now in its 9th year, which has gone on longer than WWII and is draining American resources and public patience at a time of severe economic squeeze.

Reflective of this somber public mood, the latest Washington Post-ABC News public opinion poll indicates that 51 per cent of the American people are clearly opposed to the war in Afghanistan and think it hasn’t been worth the cost that has gone into it. And only 26 per cent of those surveyed have come out in favour of responding positively to General McChrystal’s wolf cry and send more troops to Afghanistan.

The recent drama of a tainted presidential election, still incomplete and inconsequential, is reinforcing serious concerns and doubts that eight years of such an ostentatious American presence in Afghanistan has incubated a culture of democracy or due regard for human rights of the Afghan people. President Hamid Karzai has only succeeded, with his electoral shenanigans, in refuelling public perception in the US that a morally corrupt and undemocratic system has been nurtured under American wings in Afghanistan, just as was the case with an even more expensive and monumentally bankrupt experiment in Iraq.

Both Obama and his military commanders are also guilty of adding to confusion in the minds of the American people about their war objectives in Afghanistan and the end-game with regard to it.

Even though Obama and his military planners and strategists still harp on ‘winning’ in Afghanistan the victory rhetoric has been muted, at least in the policy syntax of Obama; he has lately been laying greater emphasis on the relevance of the Afghan war to the over-arching objective of US homeland security. In marked contrast to his campaign rhetoric categorically aiming at ‘victory’ against the Taliban, and defeating them on their home turf, Obama is now talking more and more of ensuring that the Taliban and their cohorts are crippled and defanged enough so as not to pose a threat to US homeland security. The possibility of enlarging the radius of the dreadful drone incursions into Pakistani territory — an obvious tactical ploy — is part of this new strategy.

In other words, Obama, in a muffled sense, is suggesting that he may be ready, at some point down the road, to sue for peace with a resurgent Taliban, thus borrowing a leaf from Henry Kissinger and Nixon who, notwithstanding their gung-ho war-mongering, conducted lengthy peace negotiations with the Vietcong behind the scene.

This prompts many an observer of the Afghan situation to conclude that General McChrystal is trying to emulate the tactics of General Petraeus in Iraq. Petraeus had likewise asked for a heavy military ‘surge’ in Iraq, two years ago, with reinforcement of troops in order to gain the upper hand against the ‘insurgents,’ who in actual fact were those resisting the American military onslaught. But Petraeus’ surge was focused largely on Baghdad where it ultimately gave him the upper hand.

The limited military success in cooling down the insurgency in and around Baghdad enabled Petraeus and Bush to declare ‘success,’ if not outright victory, on the battle field. It provided them the much-needed cover to declare that US military objective had been realised, which then paved the way for Obama to announce a timetable to draw down and withdraw all the American troops out of Iraq in stages.

General McChrystal’s battle field blue print looks like a duplication of the plan that made Petraeus a hero and provided Bush the fig-leaf to cover his harrowing failures on both military and diplomatic fronts in Iraq. The new focus in Afghanistan could well be precisely similar: concentrate on the troubled south in Afghanistan, particularly in and around Kandahar and the region bordering Pakistan’s tribal belt, inflict some punishing, if not exactly, crippling, body blows on the Taliban resurgence there and declare victory to pave the way for a face-saving withdrawal from Afghanistan. McChrystal, apparently, wants to walk off Afghanistan in the haze of dubious glory.

Reinforcement to this likely strategy comes from some recent Obama pronouncements that he’s not seeking to stay on in Afghanistan indefinitely. But there’s one caveat in this putative end-game scenario. When Petraeus launched his ‘surge’ offensive in Iraq the local resistance in and around Baghdad had largely run out of steam and was petering out. The Afghan spectacle is just the opposite of that. The Taliban, according to all western analyses, are resurgent and buoyant; their potential to inflict heavy damages on a hundred-thousand-plus-strong US and Nato combined force, has exponentially increased.

General McChrystal, himself, is wary of turning back the tide of the Taliban. The Washington Post of September 21 published a leaked, August 30, report by the general alluding to his dilemma in so many words: “Failure to gain the initiative and reverse insurgent momentum in the near-term (next 12 months)…risks an outcome where defeating the insurgency is no longer possible.”

Obama and his military planners could be deluding themselves by relying too much on the Iraqi template. The history of Afghanistan is replete with examples of the most careful and grandiose plans of foreign invaders licking the dust of ignominy in the face of a ferocious Afghan backlash. Obama may, unwittingly, have bitten more in Afghanistan than he could chew.

TO a physician, the mention of black water is bound to ring alarm bells because this is a particularly virulent form of malaria which is mostly fatal. For those familiar with the American invasion of Iraq the name also rings alarm bells because this is the name of a particularly virulent gang of mercenaries operating under the directions of the CIA. The notorious "contractors" were responsible for numerous atrocities in that country.

Now the Blackwater is here in Pakistan as media reports suggest. And its presence is associated with the proposed expansion of the US embassy in Islamabad which is billed to become the largest communication complex in the world. To provide security to the installation, the reports say, the services of 1,000 US marines and Blackwater operatives have been acquired. They have started arriving in Pakistan but the US embassy spokespersons deny presence of Blackwater in Pakistan and equally in denial is Shah Mahmood Qureshi.

Syed Zafar Ali Shah, the PML-N MNA, has revealed that a large number of houses being acquired on rent in Islamabad were being turned into fortified bunkers. A footage of the buildings concerned was also shown. Whatever the extent of the foreign presence, it cannot remain a secret for long, as was the case with Badaber airbase during the Ayub regime.

The question is: why is such a huge facility being built here in Pakistan? Americans say it is to facilitate the war against terror and also to manage increased load of work after socio-economic assistance begins to reach here. If this is true one wonders why the Chinese ambassador had to state that he was concerned at the increasing US influence in Pakistan. Such statements are rare in China's diplomatic practice.

Out of the proposed US aid to Pakistan for the year 2008-9, one billion dollars out of $1.8 billion, have been earmarked for the proposed extension of the US embassy. And there are reasons for the construction of a 'mini-Pentagon' in Pakistan. Firstly, the cornerstone of American global policy remains the containment of China. To accomplish it, it is necessary to bring together the countries of South Asia, West Asia and South-East Asia and the Central Asian countries in this alliance.

Secondly, both India and Pakistan are nuclear powers and the US policy makers feel that there should not only be a new equation between the two but they want to monitor their ‘nuclear assets’ from a close range. Thirdly, the need to coordinate the international effort on the "war against terror" provides an explanation acceptable to the world. The US government knows that an installation of this kind would require a large force of personnel. Hence, the Blackwater.

Few people in Pakistan are aware about this organisation. Thanks for its dirty role in Iraq, it has already received worldwide notoriety. The Blackwater are hardened mercenaries and are expected to protect American headquarters and also carry out search and destroy operations anywhere in Pakistan. Blackwater Worldwide is now known as Xe [pronounced as zi'] Services LLC. It was founded in 1997 as BlackWater USA by Eric Prince and Al Clark. Based in the US state of North Carolina, Xe operates a training camp which the company claims is the largest in the world. Here the company trains more than 40,000 people a year, mostly from the US or foreign military and police services.

Currently, there are about sixty large security contractors [read mercenary organisations] operating in the US. Xe is one of three largest security contractors of the State department [read CIA].

Since Pakistan joined the US camp, Pakistani soil has been a base for covert operations. Ayub regime provided an airbase at Badaber near Peshawar, to CIA for the use of U-2 planes. These planes used to make regular overflights across the Soviet Union beyond the range of Soviet anti-aircraft guns, using onboard cameras and recorders to monitor Soviet communication and military deployment. Gary Power's U-2 was shot down with a missile over the Soviet Union. This exposed the whole operation to the world.

Gen Ziaul Haq provided the US with training camps and aided the effort to hijack the Afghan liberation struggle and turn it into an Islamic jihad, led by Osama bin Laden whose names are now anathema to US and its allies. During Benazir’s second term, the Pakistani establishment at the behest of the US organised the Taliban. After 9/11 the government led by Gen. Pervez Musharraf bowed down and accepted the unjust demands of US government.

This capitulation was the commencement of the creeping, silent invasion of Pakistan by Americans. Five air bases were provided to the US forces. The Pakistan army was deployed along the western border and the tribal areas. Military action was employed as a first option in the tribal areas leaving no room for an alternative course of action when the military operation failed.

Pakistan army's casualties were in thousands. Obeying the order to “do more” opened the flood gates of death and destruction throughout the length and breadth of Pakistan. Finally, the US policy has succeeded. Their war had become ours.

ISLAMIC banking is commonly defined as a form of banking which operates without the norm of interest. As a concept, it is comparatively of recent origin. It is only during the last fifty years or so that efforts have been made to develop Islamic banking. It is interesting to note that it is not only the Islamic Development Bank at Jeddah but the IMF and the World Bank as well which are promoting the cause of Islamic banking.

The IMF at one stage had opened a Shariah department with the sole responsibility of devising Shariah compliant securities for domestic and external debt and transforming the existing financial system in the Islamic world on lines specified by the Shariah department. What has been the success of these ventures is now of historical interest only. However, IMF staff did contribute their share to the stream of literature on the subject.

A critical review of the literature on Islamic banking and an evaluation of the so-called Islamic banks operating globally lead to a startling but significant revelation: Islamic banking both in theory and practice is nothing more than a mythology. This mythology has socio-economic implications which cannot be ignored at any cost.

By its definition, structure and functions, a bank cannot exist without interest. These two concepts are too intertwined to be separated. Because of the inseparability between a bank and the norm of interest, it can be concluded that Islamic banking is a mythical and a contradictory concept. If the objective is to abolish interest, the entire banking system will have to be scrapped altogether. In other words, if the foundation of the banking superstructure, namely the norm of interest has to be eliminated, the entire superstructure would have to be dismantled. However, to justify Islamic banking, the Shariah experts, economists, bankers and intellectuals have continued over the last five decades or so to build a web of myths which are increasing in number day by day.

The first or the primary myth which has gained common currency throughout the Islamic world is based on gross misinterpretation of the Quranic verses on Riba, which have led to the conclusion that Riba prohibited in the Quran and the bank interest are identical and as such interest must be abolished from all tiers of the economy including banking. The Muslim scholars have never seriously and dispassionately discussed the three basic and inter-related questions. What is Riba? What is interest? Are Riba and interest co-equal or synonymous? As a result of the failure of Islamic scholars to critically address these fundamental questions, the myths on Islamic banking continue to flourish.

The second myth around which the concepts of Islamic banking and Islamic economy are developed, points out that interest is the basic cause of the ills from which modern economies suffer such as unemployment, inflation, depression, income inequalities, poverty, etc. Remove the norm of interest and the economic system would be fully purified (Islamised) with no unemployment, no inflation and no income and wealth inequalities.

The third myth is in the form of the popular claim that there are as many as 200 banking units or banking companies which operate around the globe without interest and that these banks represent alternative models to interest-based banking. Even the western secular banking companies are now opening branches of Islamic banks or Islamic windows as these companies are convinced of the superiority of Islamic banking over the interest-based banking. The fourth myth is that the mode of profit-loss-sharing (PLS) is truly an Islamic mechanism and as such it can best serve as the basis of Islamic banking. In other words, PLS can replace the norm of interest in the banking industry and can give optimal results.

The fifth myth is that J.M. Keynes as one of the greatest economists of the twentieth century, in his numerous writings, has propounded and approved the structure of an economy which is free from interest. The Quàanic injunctions and interpretations forbidding interest are thus supported by the worldly economists such as J.M Keynes. The sixth myth stipulates that Islamic banking will become a reality once the Islamic economic system is established in its totality. In other words, the successful launching of true Islamic banking is contingent upon realising the objective of transforming the existing economic systems which are secular in their outlook and spirit on Islamic lines. If a truly Islamic economic system is established in a particular country or globally, operating Islamic banking and financial system will be feasible and practicable.

The mythology of Islamic banking is being propagated as a new gospel throughout the Islamic world. Scholars in Pakistan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Bangladesh, Sudan, Iran, Egypt and Saudi Arabia etc. have invested immense mental energies on themes of Islamic banking, Islamic economics etc. Their innovative research, bizarre interpretations and newly defined models have only led them to camouflage the norm of interest under esoteric nomenclature such as mark-up, rates of return, profit ratio etc.

Interest remains the foundation of all Islamic banking institutions. At the same time the Muslim world continues to suffer from a collective self-conceit that the banking system has been baptised the Islamic way. However, in a real world scenario, if interest is abolished through an ordinance or an administrative fiat, the Muslim world would face an unparalleled predicament of economic disorder and disaster.

The writer is former Joint Chief Economist, Planning Commission and is working as Chief (WTO), Ministry of Industries and Production. The views expressed here are personal to the author.

PAKISTAN has an unstable party system and there is a tendency among political parties to divide into factions. Because in a multi-ethnic state like Pakistan political parties are the ultimate expression of democracy, internal rifts in them have largely contributed to political instability in the country.

However, the trend continues and its latest example is the schism in the Pakistan Muslim League Quaid-i-Azam (PML-Q), the party which governed the country between 2002 and 2007 under the ‘enlightened’ despotism of General Pervez Musharraf.

Of all political parties in Pakistan, the Muslim League has been most susceptible to fragmentation. It is a party whose fate has largely been controlled by outside forces rather than the party leadership or the people. In fact making and breaking of the League has been an important part of the establishment’s power strategy. Hence, not surprisingly, the League or a faction thereof remains united only when it is in power. A brief look at the League’s history will make it clear why it is so.

The Pakistan Muslim League, divided into various factions and sub-factions, is successor to the All-India Muslim League. The party, which was set up in 1906, to look after the political interests of the Muslims of India, finally spearheaded the struggle for a separate homeland for them. Despite its success, the League suffered from two major weaknesses: lack of a well-defined social and economic programme, and lack of a strong party organisation.

These two weaknesses have persisted to date and are mainly responsible for the League’s pro-establishment stance since 1947.

To begin with, the League has never had a well-defined social and economic programme. Before the 1940 Pakistan resolution, the League sought to protect the interests of Indian Muslims through the mechanism of separate electorates, under which seats were to be reserved for Muslims for elections to legislative assemblies.

But apart from the assertion that joint electorates were ill-suited to protecting the interests of Muslim minority in Hindu-majority India, the demand for separate electorates was not based on any socio-economic philosophy.

By the same token, the demand for a separate homeland for Muslims did not spell out a socio-economic programme that would be introduced in what was to become Pakistan. Pakistan would be a Muslim majority state. But would it be an Islamic state? Would it be based on Islamic law? What kind of economic system would that state have? Would it be capitalism or socialism? The leadership of the Muslim League never seriously addressed these questions.

Due to lack of any socio-economic philosophy, the League has always found it convenient to dance to the tune of the establishment. Under a religious minded General Ziaul Haq, the League was the most conservative party clamouring for the introduction of Islamic laws in Pakistan as the panacea for all ills with which the country was beset.

Under a liberal General Musharraf, the League was a moderate, forward-looking party clamouring for “enlightened moderation” as the panacea for all problems facing Pakistan.

The 1946 elections held on the basis of separate electorates were a watershed in the history of the League. The party won all the Muslim seats and accounted for three-fourths of the total Muslim votes. The victory of the League however owed more to the charismatic

leadership of M.A. Jinnah and increasing demand for a separate homeland for Muslims which the party advocated than to a vibrant party organisation.

After the creation of Pakistan the League failed to maintain its popularity. For a multiethnic state like Pakistan, there was the need for a strong and stable political party with an across-the-nation base capable of holding all ethnic groups together. In India, the Congress did that. However, in Pakistan the League failed to do so.

The absence of a strong organisation and a credible leadership after Jinnah weakened the party. Apprehensive of its defeat, the party shied away from seeking a popular mandate. The result was that over the years the party lost its popularity and strength. The party, if it was to hold on to power, had to seek the support of the establishment.

When the governor-general dismissed the central League government in 1953, the party bowed to the decision by accepting Muhammad Ali Bogra as the new prime minister. When the same governor-general dismissed the constituent assembly in 1954, the party again meekly surrendered.

The League’s failure to take a firm stand against the dismissals created the impression that it was an anti-people, pro-establishment party. Hence, in the 1954 provincial elections in East Pakistan, the party was routed. In the western wing as well, the party cut a sorry

figure. A process of disintegration set in the party from which it never fully recovered.

During the Ayub era, when the need for a political party to support the regime was felt, the obvious choice was the League, which was revived by the name of the Convention Muslim League. However, notwithstanding full official backing, the party failed to regain its popularity. The 1970 elections were contested by at least three Leagues with an utterly dismal performance by each.

Throughout the Bhutto period (1971-77), the League remained a virtual non-entity. The party was resurrected after the 1985 elections held by the Zia regime to create a semblance of democracy. Though the elections were held on non-party basis, it was soon felt that a representative set-up could not work without the participation of political parties. But which party should represent the regime. Once again, the League was chosen. Senators, MNAs, MPAs and heads of local bodies were enticed into joining the born again League.

The regime projected the League as the strongest and the most popular party. However, the League’s strength and popularity were built on sand.

The party remained united only as long as it remained in the saddle. After Prime Minister Junejo was sacked by the president in 1988, dissensions broke out in the party. The League however was cobbled by the establishment to face the PPP in the national elections. Despite the administration’s backing, the party was unable to form the government at the centre.

With the support of the caretakers, the League won the 1990 elections and remained in power until its government was sacked by the president in 1993. Then history repeated itself.

No sooner was its government dismissed, the party fell apart and two main factions emerged: one was led by the ousted Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif named the PML-N and the other by Hamid Nasir Chattha called the PML-J. Of course, there were other factions like the PML-Qasim and PML-Functional each claiming to be the real League.

After Prime Minister Sharif was removed in 1999 by General Musharraf through a coup, many of his erstwhile party colleagues ditched him and formed another League faction called PML-Q to become the king’s party as desired by the military strongman. There was little surprise when after the 2002 elections the PML-Q emerged as the single largest party and formed the government with the collaboration of some PPP dissidents.

In 2008 elections, the PML-Q suffered defeat at the hands of the PPP and PML-N and subsequently dissensions broke out in the party, which is hardly surprising given the history of the League. Efforts were also made to merge the PML-Q with the PML-N.

Already a large number of PML-Q MPAs in Punjab have sided with the ruling PML-N. Interestingly, neither of the PML-Q factions has popular credentials and in all probability one of the factions will merge with the PML-N or side with the PPP, while the other will wait for another opportunity to be crowned as the king’s party.

The story of the League is thus a sad commentary on our politics. It is not that divisions in the ranks necessarily sink political parties. In India, for example, the Congress has split on more than one occasion. At any rate, a political party must be capable of managing the emergence of factions in its ranks, just as the Congress has done. However, to cope with such problems a party must have its roots among the masses.

The other major faction of the League, namely the PML-N, has come a long way from being a king’s party and established its credentials of a popular political party. Despite facing a split at the hands of the Musharraf regime, the party survived and gave a good account of itself in 2008 elections. However, the PML-N lacks a nation-wide appeal as its popularity continues to be confined to the Punjab province.

VIETNAM would be difficult to erase from American memory for at least several generations to come and wars in Afghanistan and Iraq will keep reviving those memories.

Perhaps this led former Republican senator Chuck Hagel of Nebraska, who accompanied Obama to Iraq during latter’s political campaign, to advise him last week to listen to the recording of that conversation between President Lyndon B. Johnson and then-Senator Richard Russell (D-Ga.) about Vietnam wherein "LBJ told Russell that we would not win in Vietnam but that he did not want to pull out and be the first American president to lose a war."

This appears to be the mindset that has driven the American presidency to persist in continuing both wars that have long been lost. First Bush, and now President Obama is unwilling to concede defeat despite the colossal losses and agony these wars have inflicted upon the American, Afghan, Iraqi and Pakistani people, besides destabilising the region and feeding the monster of terrorism.

In his August speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars, Obama warned: "There will be more difficult days ahead. The insurgency in Afghanistan didn't just happen overnight, and we won't defeat it overnight. This will not be quick, nor easy. But we must never forget: This is not a war of choice. This is a war of necessity”.

"Those who attacked America on 9/11 are plotting to do so again," he went on to say. "If left unchecked, the Taliban insurgency will mean an even larger safe haven from which Al Qaeda would plot to kill more Americans. So this is not only a war worth fighting. This is fundamental to the defence of our people."

This then is the strategy that Obama is laying out for Afghanistan. And this perhaps is the prelude to the public case he is going to make after he has reviewed the assessment of Afghanistan situation he received from General McChrystal, top US and NATO commander in Afghanistan. But Obama has a difficult task ahead of him. By raising the ante in Afghanistan he is caught between devil and the deep sea. He loses his own popularity and support at home for pushing the war, while his troops continue losing ground to the Taliban. His domestic audience will not concede to his rhetoric. Economic collapse and rising death toll of American troops are major factors that have turned Americans against the war.

They are broadly sceptical of his contention that winning the war in Afghanistan is necessary for war against terrorism to succeed and few see an increase in troops as the right thing to do. According to recent Washington Post-ABC News poll President Obama’s approval rating on handling of Afghanistan has slipped for the fist time below 60 per cent, from 63 per cent in April to 55 per cent in September, a sizable drop of 8 percentage points.

The argument that America has been made safer as a result of these wars does not cut much ice now. Most people believe that absence of any attack after 9/11 on American interests either on its soil or elsewhere is attributable not to Bush administration’s ability to create a safety cocoon around America, but because there existed no real threat to begin with. Attacks in London and Madrid are alleged to have been orchestrated. As more and more evidence emerges about 9/11 being an inside job, an ever-increasing number of Americans now question the motive behind it and suspect the real identity of the perpetrators.

Sensing the mood of the electorate, the Congress is getting edgy too. Members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, except for hawks like John McCain, were shaking their heads in disbelief on September 15 when they heard from Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, a bleak assessment of the war and that "a properly resourced counterinsurgency probably needs more forces". Admiral Mullen told senators that 2,000 to 4,000 additional military trainers from the United States and Nato

partners will be needed to "jump-start" the expansion of Afghan security forces and strongly suggested that more US combat troops will be required for short term security.

His efforts at reassuring the senators did not go much far. Despite being told that commanders were devising new tactics that would lead to victory over a resurgent Taliban, many remained unconvinced.

Obama has ordered 17,000 US combat troops and 4,000 trainers to Afghanistan this year, which will raise the total number of American service personnel to 68,000 by the year’s end. It is speculated that General McChrystal will request for 30,000 to 40,000 more combat troops.

An increasing number of Congressmen is sceptical about the direction and the outcome of the war and would oppose an escalation. They would be reluctant to blindly approve troops and resources for fear of a backlash at the midterm elections next year when 51 per cent people believe the war is not worth fighting for. Obama does not have the same advantage as Bush when war hysteria created by Bush and his cronies made every one opposed to ‘war against terrorism’ look stupid and unpatriotic.

The Democrats then swam with the tide. But after that Neocon hysteria died down and sanity returned to American thinking that began ripping apart Bush’s motives for going to war in Iraq, many Democrats were found scrambling to distance themselves from Bush’s war.

Except the then Senator Obama, who was among the few that opposed the war and later claimed a moral high ground for having been proven right, others sheepishly took shelter under the flimsy argument that they were led into voting for the war due to faulty intelligence presented to them — hardly an excuse for not using their own better judgment. These included the presidential hopeful Senator Kerry and the secretary of state Hillary Clinton, when their ‘vote in support of the war’ came to haunt them during their presidential campaigns. Both lost their bids for the White House.

The Democratic Party is not as solidly behind Obama on every issue as the Republicans are against him. This recently became amply clear on health care reform issue. And the Afghan war is certainly much more contentious.

The party is concerned about maintaining its slim Congressional majority, with some Democrats struggling to win back their seats. Overall, the Democrats in Congress are losing their edge on the Republicans according to a recent Washington Post-ABC News poll, slipping from 56 per cent in February to 48 per cent in September. The American voters are also divided on the war issue along party lines. Democrats look upon this war as essentially a Republican enterprise, which is why only 33 per cent believe that the war must be won to be a success and 59 per cent say it can be a success without being won. This is against 66 per cent Republicans who believe it must be won to be a success and 27 per cent believing it to be otherwise. Then, only 17 per cent Democrats support an increase of troops versus 39 per cent Republicans. Obama and Congressional Democrats cannot afford to ignore these numbers.

Obama’s ability to argue in favour of escalating the war is severely curtailed by its bleak outlook. Taliban attacks and US casualties have risen to their highest numbers in the eight-year-old war and calls for bringing the troops home are now getting louder. So for now, he is backtracking a bit and downplaying the issue by saying he will resist any attempt to rush him until he has "absolute clarity about what the strategy is going to be."

But he must decide in the next few weeks whether it is worth taking the political risk of allocating more troops and resources to fight the Taliban and Al Qaeda, when the outcome remains uncertain at best. President Obama is in an unenviable position.