21.07.2013

Right to know versus right to ‘no’
The growing debate on the extent of ‘national interest’ and ‘right to know’ reflects the impact and consequences of the Snowden case
By Adnan Rehmat

Edward Snowden has come to be as well-known on the planet as Julian Assange. And perhaps loved with as much passion and loathed with equal intensity as him. Both have many things in common — they are hated and hunted by powerful governments and eulogized as heroes for the new information age by the public and rights activists. Both are on the run from current laws and exist in a fuzzy legal state where their citizenships and passports have been revoked and suspended, and effectively they are citizens of no country, perhaps the only two humans on the planet with this peculiar status.

Both Snowden and Assange find themselves in the middle of a battle royale of global proportions that is pitching traditional state structures that are used to hiding and manipulating information against a changing world order where the ubiquity of information and its sources and tools are making the old way of doing things redundant. They represent a cause celebre that would be glorious if it weren’t for the sobering fact that they are considered traitors under existing laws. And since they are both wanted by the United States, where the state subscribes to capital punishment, they technically face the death sentence if convicted. Luckily even the mighty US is unable to get its hands on either, for now, despite long passages of time.

Snowden’s is a newer case than Assange’s who, unsurprisingly, has mobilised his WikiLeaks organisation to deploy resources both legal and financial to extend protection to his fellow champion of transparency and accountability. However, both have become heroes for two different aspects of the whistleblowing. While Assange is famous for disclosing massive amounts of classified documents mostly related to US diplomacy including damning private conversations of government officials, with the help of whistleblowers within the government, Snowden is now known for unveiling military data related to the extent of American surveillance of the world, including its own allies, that he himself had direct access to. While Assange is an Australian with a journalism background, Snowden worked for the US government as a contractor.

Privacy or Access?

The Snowden case couldn’t be more simpler and simultaneously more complex: he is caught up in the long history of tension between the constitutionally guaranteed rights of American citizens and government actions that abridge those rights in the name of national security. Fundamentally, do citizens have total privacy or can government claim margins to spy on those it suspects? What exactly did Snowden do to earn the wrath of his government?

Among other specifics, he divulged, through a British journalist working for Guardian newspaper, the existence and functions of several classified US surveillance programmes and their scope, including notably the ‘PRISM’ programme, the ‘NSA [National Security Agency] call database’ and the ‘Boundless Informant.’ Additionally, he also revealed details of ‘Tempora,’ a British black-ops surveillance programme run by the NSA’s UK partner GCHQ.

The consequences were of epic proportions. US Director of Intelligence James Clapper, the NSA and Department of Justice together launched a criminal investigation into Snowden’s actions charging him with treason under the Espionage Act, theft of government property, unauthorised communication of national defense information, and willful communication of classified intelligence to an unauthorised person. This makes Snowden only the 10th person charged under the 100-year espionage law. The law was seldom used before Barack Obama became president. His administration has now used it seven times.

The US military blocked access to parts of the Guardian website related to government surveillance programmes for thousands of defense personnel across the country, and to the entire Guardian website for personnel stationed in Afghanistan, the Middle East, and South Asia. Speaker US House of Representative John Boehner and Senators Diane Feinstein and Bill Nelson called Snowden a traitor, and several senators and representatives joined them in calling for his arrest and prosecution.

British Foreign Minister William Hague admitted that UK was also spying and collaborating with NSA. UK Department of Defense issued a confidential compulsory notice to British media asking for restraint in running further stories related to surveillance leaks. European governments reacted angrily, with German and French leaders Angela Merkel and Francois Hollande branding the spying as ‘unacceptable’ and insisting the NSA stop immediately while EU Justice Commissioner sent US an official list of questions and demanded an explanation.

Security or liberty?

The reaction from non-government sources was also intense. “This wholesale invasion of Americans’ and foreign citizens’ privacy does not contribute to our security; it puts in danger the very liberties we’re trying to protect,” Daniel Ellsberg, who was himself charged four decades ago with espionage, among other crimes, for leaking the Pentagon Papers, the government study that cast a deeply negative light on the Vietnam War.

After Chairman of the US Foreign Relations Panel Robert Menendez warned Ecuador that offering Snowden asylum “would severely jeopardize” preferential trade access the US provides to Ecuador, the Ecuadorean President Rafael Correa responded by abdicating US trade benefits, saying his country would offer the US “economic aid of $23 million annually, similar to what we received with the trade benefits, with the intention of providing you education about human rights.” He also criticised the US media for centering its focus on Snowden and countries supporting him, instead of focusing on the global and domestic privacy issues implicated in the leaked documents.

The presidents of Uruguay, Argentina, Venezuela and Suriname joined Correa and Evo Morales after the Bolivian president’s plane was forced to land in Austria, after Spain, France, Italy and Portugal refused it entry into their airspace during a return flight from Moscow suspecting that Snowden was being transported aboard for asylum. The presidents, joined by a representative from Brazil, met in Bolivia to discuss the incident and denounced the US. Presidents Nicolas Maduro of Venezuela and Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua offered Snowden asylum after the meeting.

Obama himself was pointedly critical asserting that the Snowden leaks harmed US security and made it easier for America’s enemies “like stateless al-Qaeda terrorist operators” to avoid the never-blinking eye of Washington surveillance. Defending his administration’s information gathering and tough approach in handling leaks and whistle-blowing, he said: “You can’t have 100 per cent security and also then have 100 per cent privacy and zero inconvenience. We’re going to have to make some choices as a society.”

However, others such as former CIA and NSA chief General Michael Hayden welcomed the debate about the balance between privacy and security that the leaks have provoked. “I am convinced the more the people know exactly what it is we are doing in this balance between privacy and security, the more they know the more comfortable they will feel.”

True lies or false truths?

Senators Ted Cruz and Rand Paul offered tentative support for Snowden, saying they were reserving judgment on Snowden until more information about the surveillance programmes and about Snowden’s motives were known. Paul said, “I do think when history looks at this, they are going to contrast the behaviour of James Clapper, our National Intelligence Director, with Edward Snowden. Mr Clapper lied in Congress in defiance of the law, in the name of security. Mr Snowden told the truth in the name of privacy.”

Former US president Jimmy Carter said: “He has obviously violated the laws of America, for which he’s responsible, but I think the invasion of human rights and American privacy has gone too far. I think that the secrecy that has been surrounding this invasion of privacy has been excessive, so I think that the bringing of it to the public notice has probably been, in the long term, beneficial.”

Public polls showed greater public support against current laws that promote secrecy and invasion of privacy. A European opinion poll carried out by Emnid in end June revealed that 50 per cent of Germans consider Snowden a hero, while 35 per cent would hide him in their homes. An American poll by Quinnipiac University found that 55 per cent of voters regard Snowden as a ‘whistleblower’ compared to 35 per cent who consider him to be a traitor. A plurality, 54 per cent of those surveyed also said government anti-terrorism efforts have gone too far in restricting civil liberties. Three years ago, a similar survey found 63 per cent saying anti-terrorism activities didn’t go far enough.

“The massive swing in public opinion about civil liberties and governmental anti-terrorism efforts, and the public view that Edward Snowden is more whistleblower than traitor, are the public reaction and apparent shock at the extent to which the government has gone in trying to prevent future terrorist incidents,” said Peter Brown, assistant director of the Quinnipiac University Polling Institute.

Free speech or freeze speech?

On its face, the Obama administration seems an unlikely one to step up use of the Espionage Act against leakers and whistle-blowers. He is a liberal Democrat and former constitutional law professor who pledged to make government more open, points out Steven Hurst, a journalist. “Obama’s use of the law has cast a chill on free speech and freedom of the press,” says Kathleen McClellan, a lawyer at the Government Accountability Project, which represents two of the seven people charged with espionage. “If we continue down this road, the public is only going to be able to hear what the government wants the public to hear because any source that is not approved at the highest levels will now fear giving information to reporters,” she said.

Grant Silver of the University of Denver notes the Obama administration leaks information that benefits the White House while cracking down on those who give out information that casts it in an unfavourable light. “When you’re granting access to certain people and you’re giving them anonymous stories and anonymous scoops, the official story becomes the only story,” he says.

Pakistan cannot remain immune to the consequences of the Assange and Snowden cases. Already the Supreme Court of Pakistan has ruled that there cannot be secrets in government and even spending from ‘secret funds’ should be accountable and made public.

Only days ago the sensational Abbottabad Commission Report was leaked that exposes actual security and military capacities and the fatal nature of the civil-military imbalance. While no ‘Snowden’ of this leaked report has emerged in Pakistan, the growing debate on the extent of ‘national interest’ and ‘right to know’ in the country reflects the impact and consequences of the Snowden case.

21.07.2013

No big deal
Right connections and wheeling dealing can earn one billions in a society where corruption and kickbacks are a norm
By Alauddin Masood

In a country where scams keep surfacing every other day, if the nation and the country have not reaped due benefits from the privatisation process one should not be surprised. Just take the case of the KESC. Since privatisation of this company, stories about undue and illegal favours to the KESC’s new management have been making rounds time and again.

The KESC was privatised to Al-Jumayia Group (Al-Jomiah), in November, 2005, with 71.5 per cent share holdings. Later, the Ministry of Water and Power declared the Al-Jumayia Group a defaulter but, finally, it ended up extending the company’s new management a bailout package of Rs70 billion. Don’t be surprised! Such things keep happening in the Land of the Pure. (Even the Eitisalat has yet to pay $800 million despite PTCL’s privatisation over a decade ago) Of course, you have the right to know how it happened.

On former prime minister’s orders, the accord with the KESC was changed in 2008 so as to extend more incentives to the management of the privatised company. The Cabinet Division made these startling revelations before a committee of the Senate of Pakistan on July 9, 2013. To change the accord with the KESC, a summary was presented in ECC. But, this step was against the rules and regulations, “And more importantly the then Prime Minister, Syed Yousuf Raza Gilani, himself chaired that particular ECC meeting,” Cabinet Division officials told the Senate’s Sub-Committee on Water and Power. (Traditionally, the finance minister presides over the ECC meetings. Why did the prime minister go out of his way to preside over the ECC meeting is anybody’s guess?)

Furthermore, the ECC decision was not got ratified from the Cabinet of Ministers, which was mandatory. Even the decision to supply 650 MW of electricity to the KESC from the Pepco’s system was illegal because it did not have the approval of the Council of Common Interests. Above all, according to the top officials of the Ministry of Water and Power, necessary legislation to protect the amendments in the accord with the KESC did not take place, therefore, the changed accord has no value or worth.

A company with 17,000 employees, the KESC was given to Al-Jumayia Group, in November, 2005. At that time, the KESC owed Rs56 billion to the Pepco (WAPDA) in electricity arrears. Meanwhile, UAE-based Abraaj Group got interested in the KESC and it acquired the company’s full management control without owning a single share or clearing even the outstanding Pepco dues.

How did something that sounds incredible happen? Abraaj/KESC management itself revealed that in a 28-page document, in October 2008, in response to a set of questions sent to it by Group Editor of The News, Shaheen Sehbai. According to Abraaj/KESC’s version: “At no time has any personal relationship played a part in Abraaj’s involvement in the KESC....Abraaj spent six months doing due diligence of this deal and no favours were sought by Abraaj during the course of its negotiations with the Government of Pakistan (GoP) and none were granted outside the normal course of commercial discussions aimed at reviving the KESC for the benefit of all stakeholders.”

The KESC’s management tried to give an impression that the relationship of Farrukh Abbas, who was then Chief Executive Officer of Abraaj Capital (Pak), did not influence its involvement in the KESC affairs. Farrukh Abbas is a relative of President Asif Ali Zardari though not directly, but “through marriage”.

At that time, Abraaj Group/KESC’s marketing and communication head, Qashif Effendi, was also related to the Zardari family. The KESC’s Chief Financial Officer, Jalil Tareen, was a distant cousin and a good friend of the then Prime Minister’s Adviser on Finance, Shaukat Tareen. However, according to Abraaj/KESC management, Jalil Tareen was “hired entirely on his own merits as he happened to have a superb track record as a highly seasoned UK-qualified chartered accountant and senior manager.”

The six-month period spent by Abraaj “doing due diligence of this deal” resulted in Abraaj Group’s taking over KESC’s full control (without transfer of shares taking place in the transaction) in a highly complicated manner. However, as per October 2008 written statement of the group, “Abraaj will subscribe for new shares in KES Group (Al-Jumayia Group), the holding company that owned 71.5 per cent of the KESC at that time. As a result of this subscription for new shares, Abraaj will end up owning 50 per cent of the issued share capital of KES Power, and therefore will indirectly own 35.75 per cent of the KESC. All of the capital (i.e. funds) used for the purchase of KES Power Shares will remain in KES Power and will then be injected into the KESC.”

In its October 2008 written reply, Abraaj/KESC has, however, confirmed the following special favours given to it ever since Abraaj started the due diligence process to acquire the KESC. While Abraaj has already taken over the KESC and started running the show, the document says:

“Management control of the KESC will transfer fully to Abraaj once the transaction has been completed. The Consortium agreement has been signed between Abraaj and KES Power (Al-Jumayia Group, the previous owners) and there are a number of conditions precedents that need to be satisfied before the subscription of shares can take place.

“KES Power and the Government of Pakistan, as the existing shareholders of the KESC, requested that Abraaj make its new management team available to the company prior to transaction completion.”

The new senior management team was appointed and empowered by the existing Board of Directors, including the government, through circulation without any formal board meeting.

“Abraaj’s entry into the KESC will occur once the GoP approves a waiver to the Sales-Purchase agreement signed between the Privatisation Commission and KES Power in November 2005. The GoP has to approve the transaction and sale of new shares by KES Power to Abraaj by November 28, 2008 after which the shares would be available for transfer to Abraaj.”

Although Abraaj has yet to acquire the shares, GoP has already approved a petition awarding “Disco Status” to the KESC, which means buying Wapda electricity at 25 to 30 per cent of the current rates. This concession was denied to all previous managements of the KESC, yet Abraaj was so influential that “following consultations with the GoP, and after filing a detailed petition with NEPRA, Abraaj and the KESC were able to convince the Government and NEPRA that this discriminatory treatment must be reversed and the KESC must be treated on par with all other Discos (distribution companies) in the country. NEPRA issued a determination in this regard following full consultations and hearings.” This decision saved the KESC Rs30 billion it owed to Pepco and in future it got electricity cheaper from WAPDA.

Abraaj/KESC 28-page document admitted: “Without active involvement from Abraaj and the new management team, many of these issues would have remained unresolved.” For example, GoP has already settled the dispute of pending payments between the KESC and Wapda/Pepco on the KESC’s terms. A major achievement as the issue has been lingering since 2004. In addition, Abraaj and GoP have agreed on amendments in the Implementation Agreement originally signed between the KESC and the government when the KESC was privatised to Al-Jomaih Group in November 2005. According to Abraaj, these amendments will “bring the agreement up to date and clarify the support which the government will provide (to KESC under Abraaj).”

These decisions/agreements have been possible because Abraaj’s top managers were so smart and competent that within days and weeks they moved the mountains and forced the bureaucratic machinery to move in their favour at top speed. However, Abbas and his team of 40 executives was content to get monthly salary tabs, ranging from Rs 1 million at the lowest level to Rs 5 million for the chief executive, plus the perks, for these extra-ordinary services to the stakeholders!

According to KESC insiders, the total bill of Abbas and his 40 executives was the same US$8 million, which was paid to M/s Siemens for operation and maintenance contract by Al-Jomaih Group. Siemens was an operations company with engineers and equipment, while these 40 executives were managers with a few engineers and no equipment. But, these professional managers had an edge — right connections and the knack for getting things done!

However, in a press release carried by a section of the media on July 16 — eight days after the Senate Committee’s meeting and the disclosure — the KESC spin doctors have tried to rebut the grant of any bailout package to it. According to the KESC, “the government had not paid any bailout package or any direct amount to the KESC to fund its operations since September 2008 when the current management took over charge of the company. On the contrary, at present, the federal and provincial governments owed huge arrears of Rs78 billion to the power utility.” The KESC reiterated its stance that ‘the government paid only the Tariff Differential Claim that was passed on to the electricity consumers on the government’s own demand.’

Past events prove the efficacy of transparency for peaceful rule in the 21stcentury. The authorities, therefore, need to explain to the tax-payers the rationale for owning by the government the debts/liabilities amounting to Rs70 billion owed by a company privatised as early as 2005. Furthermore, they need to apprise tax-payers of the need/rationale for amendments in the original Implementation Agreement that was signed between GoP and Al-Jomiah Group when the KESC was privatised in November 2005.

In addition, the authorities need to tell whether it is the first instance when the government has given a bailout package of Rs70 billion to a privatised company or it has been a normal practice with GoP to own liabilities of companies even after their privatisation. In case the government is obliged to subsidise the operations of privatised companies, then one needs to re-visit the privatisation policy, aimed at removing such discrepancies.

The writer is a freelance columnist based at Islamabad.alauddinmasood@gmail.com

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"Nay! man is evidence against himself. Though he puts forth his excuses." Holy Qur'an (75:14-15)

21.07.2013

Public parasites
The country cannot progress and survive unless the government dismantles elitist structures that feed on public money
By Huzaima Bukhari & Dr. Ikramul Haq

Judges of higher judiciary, military and civil hierarchy and parliamentarians feel that they are underpaid, thus, economically deprived! Frequently, the parliamentarians pass laws for their own benefits extending more emoluments and fringe benefits! President keeps on enhancing benefits of judges.

No doubt, economic deprivation prevails for the majority of low-paid employees, but the top-notches give them only peanuts — in retaliation they resort to corrupt practices in the name of “necessity”. This is in a nutshell our nizam-e-hakumat (system of governance). It is a strange form of polity where the privilege classes want more and more share in taxpayers’ money in the form of free plots and perquisites.

The total amount spent on military establishment — not for defence needs but for the luxuries of the generals and other high-ranking officers — is not less than Rs125 billion. The cost of running the offices of president, governors, prime minister, ministers, advisers (supported by huge staff) in a year is between Rs130-145 billion — 60 per cent of it is extending a host of fringe benefits. The entertainment budget alone of the Prime Minister’s House and the President’s House is Rs170 million and Rs195 million respectively. One minister costs around Rs60 million per year; whereas we spend Rs144 per Pakistani per year for health; and Rs145 per Pakistani per year for education!

Former prime minister, Yousaf Raza Gillani, while speaking to a grand gathering of senior bureaucrats in Lahore, asked the Pay and Pension Commission, notified on April 2009, to come up with concrete suggestions for “a reasonable pay and pension package for the government employees”. The so-called party of the people, established by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, in its 5-year rule did not bother to establish any commission to assess the unbearable incidence of taxes and cost of basic services to the ordinary citizens and how to give them relief. But Zardari et al were very concerned to give pay raises and benefits to the judges of Supreme Court and High Courts, military and civil bureaucrats. These institutions have failed to deliver but enjoy unfettered powers.

The high-ranking officials have dual nationalities and enormous hidden assets — kept mostly outside but also within the country in the names of others (benami). No doubt all the public servants have legitimate right to get reasonable pay and security of job — the State must fulfill its duty of good pay master. But in turn, they should be the public servants in real sense of the word and not the Gora sahibs.

We beg money from all and sundry and then provide luxuries to elites. It is shameful and deplorable. No growth has been achieved even after borrowing billion of dollars. People are dying of hunger — majority is living in miserable conditions — and our privileged public servants (sic), public office holders, generals and judges are not ready to give away their perks and benefits. In a democratic setup they should get ‘Consolidated Pay Package’ and pay tax on it like others do.

Way back in 1964, a book titled ‘Your most Disobedient Servant’ was published by a civil servant in a transport service of the UK. It revealed the losses and irregularities in the use or misuse of official transports — it eventually paved the way for ‘Consolidated Pay Package’ that monetized pay, perks, privileges of those serving in state organisations. It reduced the corruption a great deal. Civil society and social media in Pakistan must take up this issue forcefully.

According to a press report, “in the locality sprawling over an area of 1,514 kanals of Mozang, Lahore, the largest house in the area, over 52 kanals, is the designated house for the Lahore High Court Chief Justice. The Commissioner’s House is the second largest house covering 26 kanals. The Chief Secretary’s House covers 12 kanals and the Chief Minister’s House covers 5 kanals. These are painful facts.

The beneficiaries of these huge residences, constructed from taxpayers’ money or borrowed funds, claim to be public servants or the custodian of law. They give public sermons about rule of law and great democratic movement launched by the ordinary citizens that restored them, but feel no compulsion for living like them. Repeatedly they quote from Islamic “golden age” of administration. But seldom have they mentioned that in pre-monarchical Islamic period, the rulers used to take minimum possible amounts — only for their essential needs — from Baitul Maal (national exchequer).

Millions are spent every year for the renovation, alteration and landscaping of Lahore’s GORs to facilitate the civil, police and judiciary high-ups living there. The renovation of Punjab House in Islamabad, Karachi, Murree and Rawalpindi has been part of five successive budgets of Khadim-i-Aala’s. This is the story of good governance in the Punjab where the Chief Minister prefers to be called Khadim-i-Aala (Chief Servant)!

The situation in other provinces and the federal government is no different — rather it is worse. Huge sums are spent (rather wasted) for providing privileges to the high-ranking government officials and politicians. The same situation prevails in the military establishment. The style of living of our generals is unmatched in the world. In the post-colonial period they became not only political masters but also the main beneficiaries of country’s major resources.

While the government servants blame politicians for plundering and wasting the money, they allege that bureaucracy is the root cause of all the ills. They claim that a secretary of government costs at least Rs500,000 per month to national exchequer with lot of facilities and perquisites in kind. If rent-free accommodation given to him in Islamabad alone is evaluated on market basis, the benefit is not less worth Rs250,000 per month. In addition, he exercises unfettered powers and defy the orders of elected members of parliament and even sometime of ministers. These facts call for immediate right-sizing — closing down of all the unnecessary departments, divisions, sub-divisions and allied paraphernalia [see list in ‘Capital Suggestions’, The News, January 04, 2009]. The list is long and astonishing.

At Constitution Avenue, Islamabad, one can count 30 useless government establishments that are doing nothing but have imposing buildings and huge staff. The same is true everywhere — in all parts of the country one finds government offices, overstaffed, wasting money and time and making the lives of the citizens difficult.

Living in sprawling bungalows with army of servants, the rulers, mighty bureaucrats, judges and generals are least pushed to bother how the common man is living (or dying) — even totally indifferent towards their own fellow low-paid employees. The civil-military structure in Pakistan is class-oriented and against the basic precepts of democracy. They make policies while sitting in the air-conditioned rooms for poverty alleviation and what not.

Since independence, State of Pakistan is either directly run or controlled by a strong civil-military complex. It has proved to be crueler than colonial masters — in terms of oppression, denying the people their fundamental rights and being highly inefficient and corrupt. Political elite, playing in the hands of civil-military complex, has also shown strong indignation towards pro-people decentralised governance.

Our governance model — under civil or military rules alike — has proved to be even worse than many developing countries where decentralisation has brought benefits for the people at gross root level. Our rulers have failed to empower the masses by implementing the command of Constitution — Article 140A says: “Each Province shall, by law, establish a local government system and devolve political, administrative and financial responsibility and authority to the elected representatives of the local governments.”

The immediate actions should include right-sizing of huge government machinery and monetising of all the fringe benefits and perquisites in kind given to the employees [see detailed recommendations by Dr Ishrat Hussain, Shahid Kardar, Nadeem ul Haque and many others]. Democratisation and decentralisation necessarily requires complete reform of our civil service and military establishment as well as accountability of public office holders.

The State must withdraw from all its employees and public office holders all facilities like houses, cars, servants, telephones etc. All perquisites given in kind should be monetised. Let the government servants — especially the senior bureaucrats — live with the ordinary citizens of Pakistan and not in GORs or other posh (isolated) colonies. It will give them real insight how the policies should be made and what are the real problems of the ordinary folk.

The government must give ‘Consolidated Pay Package’ to its employees — there should be no free plots, free club memberships, fringe benefits and perquisites in kind. This will be the starting point of change in society — beginning of the democratisation of governance.

It is the Constitutional duty of the State to treat all the citizens equally and provide them the facilities of education, health and transportation. Since all the money is spent on the luxuries of the elites, the State has persistently failed to fulfill its main responsibility. If we want to survive and progress, we will have to dismantle elitist structures.

The writers, tax lawyers, are members of visiting faculty of Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS)

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"Nay! man is evidence against himself. Though he puts forth his excuses." Holy Qur'an (75:14-15)

21.07.2013

National education and crisis of identity
Only a well thought out and actually implemented plan of national education, not seeped in either Western or Arab traditions, is critical if we are
to survive as a nation
By Yaqoob Khan Bangash

It might come as a surprise to many in Pakistan today, but most countries try to establish a ‘national education’ system for their people (not simply ideological). Here by ‘national’ I mean, something which is grounded in the history, culture, and needs of the country — a tool by which not only a person can become an ‘educated’ and ‘literate’ human being, but also someone who is ‘grounded’ and contributes to the development of his/her country.

In the erstwhile British Empire in India, education was an important subject and several government commissions deliberated the provision and content of education. Two early pronouncements set the stage for British policy on education in India. The first was Macaulay’s minute in 1835, in which he dismissed Oriental learning and claimed that ‘a single shelf of a good European library was worth the whole native literature of India and Arabia,’ and the other was the Wood Dispatch of 1854, after Sir Charles Wood, the President of the Board of Control of the East India Company, which while supporting a Westernisation of education, allowed for the vernacular to be taught at the primary level, and gave a little credence to local resources.

This ‘Westernisation’ of education perturbed many people in India and several people attempted to ‘nationalise’ it (interestingly enough Sir Syed Ahmed Khan was one of the fiercest proponents of Westernised education). There were several such thinkers, but I will just mention a few here (primarily those never mentioned in Pakistan), to give an indication of what they were aiming at.

The first pioneer I want to mention is the Nobel Laureate Sir Rabindranath Tagore, who set up a school — Patha Bhavna, at Shantiniketan in Bengal in 1901. Tagore was not an educationist, but realised that contemporary education was lacking in important aspects. He noted once: ‘Education is a permanent part of the adventure of life...it is not like a painful hospital treatment for curing them (students) of the congenial malady of their ignorance, but is a function of the health, the natural expression of their mind’s vitality.’

Lamenting the prevailing notion of education, Tagore further noted: ‘The highest education is that which does not merely give us information but makes our life in harmony with all existence. But we find that this education of sympathy is not only systematically ignored in schools, but it is severely repressed… Thus the greatest of educations for which we came prepared is neglected, and we are made to lose our world to find a bagful of information instead.’ Therefore the Shantiniketan experience was a pioneering one where students lived, learnt and did manual labour at the same place, all the while becoming aware of themselves, their culture, and how to engage with the wider world. Tagore was perhaps prescient in realising that the world will become, what we now call, a ‘global village’ and so prepared his students to be at once aware of their own environment and be comfortable with the rest of the world.

Ms Annie Besant, who set up the Home Rule League (of which Jinnah was an avowed member), also elucidated her views on national education in India. She noted: ‘Nothing can more swiftly emasculate national life, nothing can more surely weaken national character, than allowing the education of the young to be controlled by foreign influences, to be dominated by foreign ideals.’ Therefore she called for a ‘nationalistion’ of education in India, so that a more coherent ‘Indian nation’ might be nurtured.

Criticising British control of education, she stated that this new kind of education must be controlled, shaped and carried out by Indians. She noted: ‘It must hold up Indian ideals of devotion, wisdom and morality, and must be permeated by the Indian religious spirit…’ She also argued that a national education must be seeped into traditions of patriotism, not as a spirit of competition or jingoism, but by being aware and proud of one’s own ideals. ‘British ideals are good for Britain, but it is Indian ideals which are good for India,’ is how the great Punjabi nationalist Lala Lajpat Rai (and himself an education pioneer) understood Ms Besant.

Another nationalist scheme was the famous ‘Wardha scheme’ of 1937-8 by the Congress, much riled by the Muslim League and still by our Pakistan Studies textbooks. While our textbooks seldom go into the details of what the scheme actually entailed, it would suffice to mention here the fact that its planning committee was actually chaired by Dr Zakir Hussain — a Muslim and the then Principal of Jamia Millia Islamia in Delhi.

The scheme, the brainchild of Gandhi, highlighted several initiatives including the centrality of vocational education, teaching in the mother tongue, etc, but it also gave a ‘national’ perspective to this style of education. The committee noted that those ‘who undertake this new educational venture should clearly realise the ideal of citizenship inherent in it.’ This experiment was ‘necessary to secure the minimum of education for the intelligent exercise of the rights and duties of citizens’ which would produce citizens who were able to ‘repay (the nation) in the form of some useful service what he owes to it as a member of an organised civilised community.’

The ultimate aim of this scheme was to ‘inculcate the love of the motherland, reverence for its past, and a belief in its future destiny as the home of a united cooperative society based on love, truth, and justice’ but without ‘arrogant and exclusive nationalism.’ This system was immediately blasted by the Muslim League as trying to undermine Muslim life and culture (interestingly, the League claimed that most Muslims in India speak Urdu as their mother tongue, and hence don’t want to be educated in the ‘vernaculars’), but the Muslim League’s real failure was in not developing its own coherent scheme of education.

With the creation of Pakistan, the question of the ‘type of education’ again came up. I have dealt with the ideological underpinnings of our educational policy in an article here earlier, but now I want to focus on the development of the idea of ‘national education’ in Pakistan.

Within a few months of the establishment of Pakistan, an all Pakistan Education Conference was organised in Karachi to set the direction of the future education policy in the country. The founder of the country addressed the gathering and emphasised the importance of their task. Jinnah noted: ‘... the importance of education and the type of education cannot be over-emphasised ... there is no doubt that the future of our State will and must greatly depend upon the type of education we give to our children, and the way in which we bring them up as future citizens of Pakistan…’ Therefore, education in Pakistan were to have some sort of a ‘national’ focus which would enable the ‘bringing up’ of students as ‘citizens’ of Pakistan. What was to be the scope, content and layout of such an education was the real problem, and still today we are unable to completely grasp this important issue.

In the realm of education policy, the report of the Pakistan Commission on National Education 1959, remains a hallmark. After the 1947 conference, there was a national plan for educational development but not only did it fail to achieve its desired results, literacy in the country actually fell as a result! Thereafter, except for general outlines in the five year plans, the 1959 Commission was the first comprehensive study of education policy in Pakistan. And what that report said was extremely revealing and still bears relevance and importance.

The Commission was set up by Ayub Khan in December 1958 (interesting how a lot of such initiatives are only taken in this autocratic regime), and submitted its report in August 1959. Since the Commission was primarily composed of academics, it not only focused on practical recommendations (like improvements in curriculum, infrastructure, separate development of primary, secondary and higher education, etc), it also theorised on the real ‘purpose’ of this education — the subject of this article.

Therefore, in the introductory part of the report the Commission stated that its purpose was to ‘…think beyond the walls of our schools and universities and beyond the offices of our educational administrators to the society of which education is a part and to the future of this society which it should help shape….the educational system of a nation should be consonant with the country’s self-image…’ Without quoting them, here the Commission clearly echoed the aspirations of the thinkers mentioned above, I believe.

So what did the Commission think we need to do to achieve this? I shall only note a few things here.

First, they noted, the people should ‘revise their concept of Government and their relationship to it.’ The members of the Commission lamented the fact that everywhere people depended on the government for everything: ‘If they wanted a school, they petitioned government to build one. When the streets were dirty, they expected the government to clean them up,’ and so on. So first the Commission insisted that people must understand that the government ‘is but an instrument through which they give direction and substance to their own aspirations.’ Self reliance and private initiative were the bedrock of a change in education, they argued. Hence, they also asserted that people should not expect education to be a ‘free good,’ either.

Secondly, the Commission blasted our long held ‘attitudes’. It said: ‘We have lingered upon this question of attitudes because we believe them to be at the very crux of our difficulties….Each analysis of past failures, each problem that has been discussed, and each solution that has been proposed turns ultimately upon the attitude of some segment of our society. We have become convinced that all our educational problems and, in fact, all of our national problems are inseparably entwined in a web of attitudes and values that are inappropriate to an independent people and incompatible with progress and national development. The attitudes of a people are not readily changed, but they can be changed.’ Here they really hit the nail on why there was no ‘real’ change in the education, nay any, policy. If a society is unable to modify its long held attitudes then certainly no development can take place.

Thirdly, the Commission finally argued for a ‘nationalisation’ of education. It said: ‘none of our educational reforms will achieve the desired results unless they lead to the inculcation of personal and national values based on a deep concern for the welfare of Pakistan. A citizen must have a deep and abiding love for his country. This is conceived not as a vague sentimental feeling, but as a genuine appreciation of the spirit of Pakistan. It is characterized by a pride in the nation’s past, an enthusiasm for its present, a firm confidence in its future, and a conviction that every citizen has a basic responsibility to contribute, what he can, to the growth and strength of the nation.’

It is here that the Commission pointed out that ultimately this change in education should create a ‘citizen’ who is not only well-versed in their own environment (i.e., country), but also able to contribute to its well-being, and if I might add, also become a responsible world citizen.

This creation of a good ‘citizen’ is the real difference between living as a ‘subject’ in a colonial regime, and living as a free ‘citizen’ in an independent one — and this is the journey we have yet to complete. The Commission also made several other points, which I cannot go into due to space constraints, but even the three points noted above are still relevant for us today.

We, as country, still do not want a real change, depend too much on the government to actually do it, and most of our educational initiatives are unable to create a ‘citizen’. Just notice that we consider the best educated person in Pakistan who has either done O’ and A levels, or has a foreign degree, and most of our students are simply disgusted by the teaching of ‘Pakistan Studies,’ a course which was theoretically supposed to inculcate a sense of good citizenship. We have also confused the ideals of ‘national education’ and ‘citizenship’ with ideological indoctrination. As I have mentioned in an earlier article, the near obsession with ‘Islamic ideology’ at the inception of the country (and of course later), has led to a very narrow definition of the ‘nation’ and its ideals, and has largely created bigoted individuals rather than inclusive citizens.

Pakistan has a major crisis of national cohesion and national identity, and such fissures are not simply going to go away. A well thought out and actually implemented plan of ‘national education,’ (not seeped in either Western or Arab traditions, but in our own, and not ideological indoctrination either), is critical if we are to survive as a nation.

The writer is the Chairperson of the Department of History, Forman Christian College, and tweets at @BangashYK. He can be contacted at: yaqoob.bangash@gmail.com

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"Nay! man is evidence against himself. Though he puts forth his excuses." Holy Qur'an (75:14-15)

21.07.2013

Fatal decline
With every change of government, a new set of politicians rise to prominence with old slogan of giving birth to a new Pakistan, but…..
By Dr Syed Hussain Shaheed Soherwordi

With its waning social gauge, degenerating economy, dividing society on ethnic, sectarian basis and the government’s mislaid priorities, Pakistan is emerging as a disturbed state. Institutions like independent judiciary, strong vibrant civil society and moderate-thinking Pakistanis are delaying its fatal decline.

Pakistan as a state is weakening but the Pakistani society is strengthening with every passing day. If state has failed to counter insurgency, terrorism, extremism, intolerance, ethnic and sectarian divide, the society has made itself indifferent to such monsters. Both are working in isolation. However, this indifference is making Pakistan more feeble and society more artificial.

Who hurt the state? All. General KM Arif in his latest book says: “Pakistan is a wounded nation, hurt by both friends and foes. Her national body is riddled with injuries of insult, neglect and arrogance inflicted by dictators and democrats; judges and generals, the bureaucrats and media. None of them are blame-free”. On international scene, she has been badly treated by its friends, situated thousands of miles from Islamabad. Pakistan has been more harmed by its allies than by its enemies in the name of Cold War, détente, and the war on terror, to name a few.

The power corridors believe in guided democracy with a byproduct of political stability. Had it been vice versa, Pakistan history would have been based on strong pillars of tested democracy mustered by political constancy. Transformation for economic growth, national security, and Islamisation were given precedence in the past and every effort was made to bring out a concrete shift from the past to present.

It was a superficial change which eroded civilian and democratic institutions that pushed the country further into deep troubles. Enlightened moderation with selected accountability was also tried. But by now, larger population of the country has turned extremist, kudos to the CIA’s war against Soviet Union in Afghanistan and drone strikes in the tribal areas of Pakistan. This resulted in a permanent threat to democracy and challenged faint political stability.

With every change of government, a new set of politicians rise to prominence with old slogan of giving birth to a new Pakistan. Ayub Khan tried to be the rebirth of Jinnah. Bhutto was the second most popular politician after Jinnah. General Zia was ‘the Mard-e-Momin Mard-e- Haq’. Benazir was ‘Mohtarma Fatima Jinnah’, the sister of Quaid-e-Azam. Similarly, Musharraf wanted to bring a new generation of competent politicians to power by putting electoral bars on old politicians and by introducing a new local government system.

However, none realised that the success of democracy is to give more time to democracy for its nurture and maturity. Adopting names do not change disposition of a person. A crow sitting on a hill-top can’t become an eagle.

In a democratic setup, politicians make mistakes and learn from them in the long run. Today, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his governing team are more mature than 12 years back. Had their government not been overthrown in 1999, they would have been more mature and competent than today. Failure of democracy brings technocrats in power. But politics is to politicians and not to technocrats. Non-elected can’t be equated with the elected ones. In the past 65 years of Pakistan’s history, the only thing we have failed to understand is to differentiate between the servants of the nation and representatives of the people. Representatives serve the nation with the help and assistance of servants. We deserve more wisdom to know the difference.

Pakistan would be a stable state with conducive and permanent relationship between the Centre and the provinces. A democratic reform strategy is based on equitable and balanced distribution of powers and resources between the Centre and provinces.

During military rule in Pakistan, provinces always cry for their rights and thus result in centrifugal forces. However, in a democratic setup, provinces are satisfied with their due share granted to them with mutual consent. 18th Amendment provided provinces their due right. Fiscal and administrative powers were devolved to federating units and hence, all the four are moving in harmony and with their support, a strong federation is working in Pakistan.

Keeping in view the Balochistan situation, military operations in Waziristan and the TTP insurgent movements in other parts of the country, any blow to 18th Amendment would result in a huge shake of the nation for which it is absolutely not ready. This means stability grows from below — from districts to provinces and from provinces to the federation.

Rulers of Pakistan always idealise vision of the country in shape of compassionate slogans like “Saab Se Pehlay Pakistan”, “Politics of Reconciliation”, “Real Democracy”, “Nizam-e- Mustafa”, “Basic Democracy” and “Naya Pakistan”. But they are neither good strategists nor good implementers. They always have permissive or lax attitude towards result-oriented projects. They talk more and act less. Their short-sightedness is costing the nation immensely. Had they been far-sighted, we would have had a successful negotiation round with the Tahreek-e-Taliban-e- Pakistan (TTP), we would have a friendly Afghanistan, we would have a motorway and bullet-train from Peshawar to Karachi, we would have a strong economy based on friendly ties with IMF and the World Bank, we would have had very friendly and sincere ties with the US, we would have won the War on Terror (rather the war on terror would not have started in the first place), we would not have been deceived by our allies during the War on Terror, and over and above, we would have a stable and secure Pakistan for the Pakistanis.

Violence is another mean of damaging a country’s security and stability. Pakistan is eroded by its domestic cancer of sectarian, ethnic and regional violence. With every passing day, their death squads intensify their war against their opponents. Most of them are fighting a proxy war on behalf of other hostile countries to harm Pakistan.

Economic stagnation, high rate of growing poverty, bad governance, unequal distribution of wealth between haves and have-nots and lavish style of government produce frustration amongst the common man. Thus a foreign funding to any small group to play a subversive role in Pakistan makes a huge dent in the country’s security. A group of deprived people, starved of basic necessities of life, after receiving foreign funding, consider themselves as ‘the Mujahid of Islam”, or “Anti-Americanism” and wage a jihad against the “stooges of the West” and “usurpers of the rights of underprivileged”.

Organised violence, including suicide attacks, can never bring any change in foreseeable future of Pakistan. Every militant organisation has to change its discourse and disposition from militancy to political entity. This is the way to their success. By acquiring power through electoral and democratic means, their agenda, appreciated and recommended by the majority of the populace, will be implemented through democratic means. This will give not only permanence to their entity but would also reduce a sense of threat to the people of Pakistan.

The author teaches at the Department of International Relations, University of Peshawar syedshaheed@hotmail.co.uk)

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"Nay! man is evidence against himself. Though he puts forth his excuses." Holy Qur'an (75:14-15)

21.07.2013

“Transparency in decision-making and accountability of actions are crucial”
Dr Sania Nishtar, former caretaker minister for Science & Technology, Information Technology & Telecom and Education
By Saniyya Gauhar

Now that the general elections are over and the new government has been sworn in, the ministers of the caretaker government have presumably returned to their normal routine. For Dr Sania Nishtar, that means a return to her NGO Heartfile.

As caretaker minister of three federal ministries — Science & Technology, Information Technology & Telecom and Education — in two short months, Dr Sania has certainly left her mark on these ministries in the shape of her handover papers, which she hopes will set a new benchmark for accountability and decision making transparency.

When she assumed office as federal minister many were keen to see how she would perform outside of being a policy analyst and author in her civil society comfort zone. She turned out to be an astute implementer, evidenced in the manner in which she spearheaded the creation of a health division at the federal level. Her voluntary personal appearance at the Supreme Court may have saved Pakistan from what would have been an ill-prepared e-voting embarrassment. She reached out and built bridges with the Higher Education Commission and diffused tensions through creative engagement with the media. The News on Sunday was able to get an interview with Dr Sania to learn more about the motivation behind her much talked about handover papers.

TNS: It seems you were trying to set many precedents through the handover papers. Can you tell us a little about what you were trying to achieve?

SN: Yes, I was trying to achieve several objectives through these papers. Foremost, I voluntarily wanted to submit myself for accountability. Government offices and ministries are places where safeguards against conflict of interest, the need for transparency in decision making and accountability of actions matters the most. Conversely, it is exactly in such settings where there are no mechanisms in place to institutionalise these attributes. I wanted to set a precedent by being the first one to open my decisions for scrutiny and share with people the rationale for these decisions. The other precedent related to the process of government transition. I was quite surprised to see that in an institution as critical as the government where a formal handover would matter the most, there is virtually no mechanism to enable that. No wonder we see the detrimental policy vacillations. Therefore, I wanted to summarize for my successor minister the work that was done and highlight reform plans developed so as not to lose any forward momentum.

TNS: You had a short span of time at your disposal and three portfolios to deal with. How did you organise yourself?

SN: I was aware that I needed to be very strategic in my approach and that every day counted. I spent the initial week imbibing briefings in all the three ministries. I reflected on the challenges and potential opportunities within the given context, limited timeline and defined mandate. I then categorized my scope of work into three areas: support for the elections process, which was the core mandate of the caretaker government, administrative running of the ministry and strategic planning for potential reform. With regard to the latter, I tried to identify sectoral and specific challenges and respective opportunities to overcome them within each ministry. These I summarized in my handover papers to my successors. However, to the extent possible, I also tried to sow the seeds of reform. The papers highlight what I was able to do.

TNS: What was the key thrust of your work in each of the ministries?

SN: The nature of what I did in the respective ministries varied according to the need. For example, in the Ministry of Information Technology, I noted that there was a dire need to put governance back in order, since there were serious distortions. The ministry had been without a minister for five years. With frequent changes in secretaries, ad hoc appointments, attached departments deviating from their missions, affiliated companies not complying with corporate governance polices, and sick public sector enterprise hemorrhaging resources, the first priority was to focus on governance.

An account of what I did to initialise reform and the needed next steps are in the handover papers for that ministry. In the Ministry of Education and Training (MoET), I focused more on strategic parameters regarding federal, provincial and district education roles after the 18th Constitutional Amendment. In the handover paper for MoET, I articulated a framework for reform relevant to each of the five areas, which are federal functions in education after the 18th Constitutional Amendment and demonstrated how selected policy choices in the ‘pathway to change’ had the potential of ushering sustainable change. Launching of the Tuition Fee Access Scheme was an effort to show how the federal edge can be strategic for equity objectives in a context where education is a provincial subject.

Also, in the Ministry of Science and Technology (MoST) my engagement was more at a strategic planning level. I formed a think tank, drawing on the support of eminent experts. My concern was that MoST’s research institutes are largely disconnected from academia and that both do not optimally link with the market, entrepreneurs and national sectoral research priorities. The latter have not been defined as a starting point. In this regard, I have recommended five policy levers of change for reform within this sector.

In my opinion, if these are implemented in tandem, they could have a synergistic effect in linking research and development (R&D) and academia with the process of national development on the one hand and can have a transformative role in promoting a culture of entrepreneurship on the other. I have tried to sow the seeds of change to the extent possible within the two-month term.

TNS: You also had responsibility for health during your term? Why was there a need for special arrangements in this area?

SN: In 2010, Pakistan became the only country in the world with no central health institution after the health ministry was abolished as a result of the 18th Constitutional Amendment. Although many institutions were retained at the federal level, they were scattered across nine divisions. The resulting institutional fragmentation was aberrant.

Every stakeholder, including the provinces, suffered as a result of lack of clarity and some donors refused to invest money in needed activities unless arrangements were clearer. Things had come to an impasse. I had been advocating for a central health structure at the federal level for ‘national’ responsibilities since 2010 and when I assumed office, I offered to the prime minister that I would like to put these arrangements back in order. My cabinet colleagues supported consolidation of federal health functions and the decision was widely hailed internationally.

TNS: There has been much talk about your “unusual gift” to government functionaries, can you tell us a little about that?

SN: Yes the day I left office, I mailed a wallpaper message to thousands of government employees in Pakistan with the Pakistan Flag against the backdrop of the inscription: “While serving under the flag of the Crescent and Star, always remember the government is a sacred trust.” I think that pretty much conveys what I was trying to communicate.

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"Nay! man is evidence against himself. Though he puts forth his excuses." Holy Qur'an (75:14-15)

21.07.2013

Pakistan and Army
“Pakistan: The Garrison State” deals with ever-expanding influence of the Pakistan army over political, social, and economic milieus in Pakistan since 1947
By Helal Pasha

Dr Ishtiaq Ahmed’s recent book “Pakistan: The Garrison State”, published in 2013, by Oxford University Press, immediately after his seminal work “The Punjab Bloodied, Partitioned and Cleansed” in 2011, is a remarkable achievement in terms of time spent on research, reviewing numerous sources, and analysing multiple events spread well over 70 years. His dedication in recording Pakistan’s history and unearthing, previously unknown, undocumented events is laudable. Dr Ishtiaq travelled extensively, interviewed incredibly large number of people, including former president Gen. Musharraf, and many top India army officers.

As the title suggests, the book principally deals with ever-expanding influence of the Pakistan army over political, social, and economic milieus in Pakistan since 1947. In the last decade, luminaries such as Ambassador Husain Haqqani, Ayesha Siddiqa, Ahmed Rashid, and many others wrote books discussing the Pakistan army. Ayesha Siddiqa’s Military Inc. stands out for her breakthrough research in detailing the army’s flourishing entrepreneurial endeavours and control of the economy.

Ironically, the army is more or less openly involved in business and industry highlighting most of its enterprises by using prefix ‘Fauji’ (army man in vernacular) or ‘Defense’, and there is nothing secret about it. Siddiqa did not focus entirely on army’s business interests. She veered off to itemising personal monetary benefits enjoyed by the generals. That triggered a backlash and an angry retort by the generals.

Dr Ishtiaq takes a different route. He starts off by examining ideological inclination of the army. His inquisitiveness on the use of metaphor ‘Fortress of Islam’ by a former president in his speech, in 2001, ignited the urge to get to the core of such a haughty vow. The result is a phenomenal book that will make scholars’ proud libraries richer, and readers immensely conversant with insight from the early development of the idea of Pakistan to a state incapable of untying the Gordian knot for the last several decades. “Pakistan is Islam’s fortress,” an arrogant declaration adopted by Pakistan army from an old Jamaat-e-Islami political slogan during the army rule in the 1980s. The army concomitantly embraced “Jihad, for Allah” as one of the armed forces guiding maxim around the same time.

The book largely deals with the ideological progression translated into political dominance of the army over the country, as well. Primarily, due to the ideological mishmash of the independence movement, the Pakistan army catapulted itself as indubitable protector, and arbiter of the ideology of the nation after independence.

Dr Ishtiaq seeks to decipher the origins of the concept garrison state that certainly is not a religious concept. The roots of garrison state are in the early human development along with the concepts of area boundaries and protection of communities.

The first question that needed to be resolved was: whether Pakistan is a garrison state or not? A dominating army does not make a garrison state. He has candidly pointed out, despite the ominous cries of military-industrial complex, US is not a garrison state. Many historian and defense analysts would not accept it kindly. The Pentagon’s influence extends far beyond just the defense policy. There are many institutions including the largest eavesdropping organisation in the world, National Security Agency (NSA) that report to the Pentagon and information to the White House is filtered through the Pentagon. Pentagon usually overrides the US Foreign Office.

Dr Ishtiaq rightly implies that the purpose of small forts or fortresses or cantonments now, was primarily to keep the populations under control. The British extended the concept when they organised the volunteer army in undivided India. Their patterns of recruitment solidified the Pakistan army’s influence on certain areas of the country.

Dr Ishtiaq then embarks upon a discussion assessing national security state and garrison state. He traces the roots, the reasons, the Mughal and the British influences that Pakistan inherited. He enforces his views using strong arguments by various academics.

He concludes that Pakistan fits the profile of a garrison state. He observes that Pakistan can continue as a post-colonial garrison state as long as the donors are proving the required resources. At this point, the reader is left with only one answer: Pakistan will probably disappear as soon as the donors lose interest in Pakistan. Is that an accurate conclusion?

Dr Ishtiaq pronouncement appears to be rushed and needs further examination. Having cantonments, large army, and overbearing generals, does not qualify Pakistan to be billed as a garrison state. Considering that the garrisons are supposed to help in controlling the population and frontiers, Pakistan army’s garrisons are located smack in the middle of the large cities that render them useless in their basic functions.

Cantonments in Karachi, Lahore, Rawalpindi, Peshawar, Multan, Gujranwala, and many other cities do not intimidate the population. They are commercial hubs, and it would be better for the army to sell the prime lands, and use the proceeds to take the cantonments as far away from the cities as possible. Money from selling two cantonment Karachi and Hyderabad would finance almost ten new cantonments in rural areas.

However, these cantonments are a major source of income for the army and former army personnel. Similar to the business interests that Ayesha Siddiqa pointed out in her book. The new breed of army officers and generals prefer to stay close to the cities, and personal comfort takes precedent over war readiness.

The harsh reality is that looking at the current state of affairs, Pakistan might qualify as a dysfunctional national security state that is, paradoxically, incapable of supporting its security needs. The state acquired nuclear option, as the US looked the other way to maintain balance of power in the region. The US still provides finances for the maintenance of nuclear warheads.

A garrison state or a security state; the Pakistan army still manages to control the country in many ways, and the distinction between the two does not diminish the quality of the book and effort that has gone in to documenting complex, controversial, and highly noticeable army position in Pakistan politics.

To be concluded

Dr. Ishtiaq Ahmed is a Lahore born Swedish political scientist and author. He is Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Stockholm University. Readers in India and Punjab enthusiastically welcomed his previous book “The Punjab Bloodied, Partitioned and Cleansed”. The book won him many laurels including ‘Best Non-Fiction Book’ Prize at Karachi Literary Festival in 2013.

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"Nay! man is evidence against himself. Though he puts forth his excuses." Holy Qur'an (75:14-15)

28.07.2013

Tackling the local governance crisis
As the political parties, driven by the political climate, move towards local governments, it is vital for the provincial governments to make their plans public for wider debate and commentary
By Raza Rumi

Pakistan’s governance crisis has manifested itself in various ways including the inability of the state to provide services and create a responsible relationship with its citizens. Throughout its history the greatest paradox has been that of creating an effective system of local government.

The military regimes were always keen to create local governments, as they wanted to bypass national and provincial politics and create a constituency of support for martial rule. This is why the three long serving dictators — Generals Ayub, Zia and Musharraf — were quick to create local governance structures. The elected governments, on the other hand, have been wary of local governments and since 2008, Pakistan unelected local institutions were managed by provincial bureaucrats.

Musharraf’s experiment of local government was perhaps the boldest as it aimed to increase the power of elected officials and abolished the office of district magistrates and divisional commissioners. The bureaucracy as well as the provincial elites due to various reasons resisted it.

The key issue was that while the provinces were meant to transfer power and resources they were still controlled by the strong central government and unfair federal revenue sharing arrangements. The latter was taken care of in the previous government and the 18th Amendment also transferred powers. While these transformational reforms were being carried out, the provincial governments during 2008-2013 remained averse to holding the local government elections.

The irony is that Musharraf’s cronies in the shape of Pakistan Muslim League (Q) had already denuded the 2001 local government law and had initiated a reversal of various features therein. For instance, the key service departments also with the highest potential of kickbacks and commissions e.g Public Health and Engineering Department, were gradually recentralised. The Police Order of 2002 was also abandoned by the political elites during the Musahrraf’s tenure. By 2008, it was formally laid to rest thereby ending the little movement towards reform.

There is no doubt that the Musharraf and his junta’s agenda was not to deepen democracy at the local level. The cynical use of local governments was to create an artificial constituency in support of military rule. However, the conduct of political elites to have thrown the baby with the bathwater in 2008 was also unwise. If the local government system had flaws they could have improved them instead of scraping it altogether.

The political parties in Pakistan have another rational reason not to have local governments and their noisy existence. Patronage and resources are tightly controlled by party machineries to benefit their constituents and the lackeys at the local level. With local governments, the patronage has to be shared which also dilutes the ability of party leaders to grant favours when in power. Also the larger issue of party funding remains unresolved in Pakistan. Patronage is also used as a means to sustain party’s structures. Several cash handouts and welfare schemes; and the way these were managed, reflect the party interests preceding redistributive efforts.

With the new elections and federal and provincial governments, the debate on local governments has restarted. Two factors have led to this reemergence of the debate. First, the commitment of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) to hold local government elections in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) has generated a competitive momentum which both the PML-N and the PPP cannot ignore simply for political reasons. Second, the renewed activism of the judiciary in asking for local government elections has catalyzed political clamouring. There were petitions pending in the past three years as well but this time the courts seem determined to push the local government agenda which among other things is also a constitutional obligation of provincial governments.

The Sindh government recently announced that it was going to revive the 1979 law. However, reports suggest that now a committee is deliberating the precise contours of the system that will be in place. Punjab has prepared a draft bill which, by and large, retains the 1979 bureaucratic model with some improvements.

In the new local government scheme, there is a proposal to set up Education and Health authorities along with reconciliation councils to resolve disputes at local levels. Proposals for panchayat systems and municipal police in cities are being considered as well which is a welcome step. The proposed law has a clause 14(1) which states that quotas would be filled indirectly by elected LG members (hence allowing for potential for nepotism and cronyism).

The PTI criticism on the draft legislation also mentions that the Punjab government wants DCOs and Commissioners to maintain law and order, thereby confirming their fear that provincial government would control local affairs.

In KP, the provincial minister for local government has recently stated that KP might hold elections by October or November 2013. The KP government plans to introduce a new law which would replace the earlier 2012 law.

In line with its manifesto, the PTI envisages a four-tier system of local, village/neighbourhood, union, tehsil and district councils. Its vision document has a detailed plan to create grassroots structures but media reports have also suggested that the selection processes mentioned by the party need to be revisited.

Balochistan had enacted a law earlier, which mirrors the 1979 Ordinance with heavy involvement of the bureaucracy. The new provincial government may take some time to announce and work on the kind of vision it has for the local government.

In summary, the political parties, driven by the political climate are now moving towards local governments. It is a welcome step even if it means that the bureaucratic control of local authorities and service providers would not be replaced by democratic accountability. Having said that, it is vital for the provincial governments to make their plans public for wider debate and commentary. What is clear is that Pakistan’s governance will further crumble if local governance arrangements are not sorted out.

Three factors ought to be kept in mind. Social sectors require complete decentralisaton and service providers need to be accountable to the local elected officials. Secondly, law and order capacities cannot improve if police laws are not enacted by the provinces which complement the local governments and also clarify the fuzzy ad hoc relationships between the province and local governments.

Finally, we need to think creatively to include women, the marginalised, peasantry into the local bodies which may help avoid elite capture of local institutions and also increase public trust in participatory democracy.

Raza Rumi is a writer, analyst based in Islamabad. He is the author of “Delhi by Heart: Impressions of a Pakistani Traveller” (Harper Collins, 2013). Follow him on Twitter: @razarumi

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"Nay! man is evidence against himself. Though he puts forth his excuses." Holy Qur'an (75:14-15)

28.07.2013

In deep water
Taking stock of the emerging water crisis, Pakistan needs to redouble its efforts for the conservation of water resources while protecting its water rights as a lower riparian
By Alauddin Masood

Alarm bells have started ringing, conveying a message loud and clear. Once, water abundant Pakistan has become “one of the most water-stressed countries in the world, not far from being classified water scarce.”

In 1947, Pakistan possessed 5,600 cubic meters of water per person, which decreased to 1,100 cubic meters per head by 2009 and now stands below 1,000 cubic meters per person. According to international water standards, countries having water reservoirs below 1,100 cubic meters water per person are considered among the chronic water shortage states.

The Asian Development Bank (ADB), in its mid-July report this year, has pinpointed that Pakistan’s water storage capacity (the amount of water it has on reserve in case of an emergency) is limited to 30 days, which is far below the recommended 1,000 days for countries with similar climates. The report notes that the last several years have seen Pakistan plagued by chronic energy scarcities and power outages lasting up to 18 hours a day, with damaging effects on its economy and the well-being of its citizens.

According to ADB, deficiencies of energy and water resources have the potential to intensify the already unstable situation in the country. Early signs of the potential imbroglio that could transpire are already beginning to take shape. In mid-July, the residents in Abbottabad (KP) vowed to hold mass demonstrations if the local government was unable to address rampant water shortages in the city. The country’s demographics suggest this trend will only worsen over time and demand for water grows due to exponential growth in population, which was expected to swell to 256 million by the year 2030.

Pakistan’s thirst for water, a vital resource for people’s health, livelihood and economic development, has been constantly rising over the years because of population growth, increase in industrial activity, over-exploitation, climate change, failure to augment water resources and lukewarm cooperation of India, with which Pakistan shares Indus River basin, requiring integrated basin management. In addition to electricity, the scarcity of water has emerged as one of the main impediments to the sustained growth of agriculture and industry. But, unfortunately, successive governments in the country have been unable to create national consensus to resolve this crucial problem head on; while some quarters spare no effort in making even technically feasible mega-water conservation projects controversial, on one count or the other.

Meanwhile, taking advantage of wrangling in Pakistan and the country’s inability to execute major water conservation projects, India remains continuously engaged in building scores of hydropower projects on rivers flowing into Pakistan despite her assurances, under the Indus Basin Treaty, not to interfere with the Pakistani rivers. India’s tacit role in making controversial those economically feasible hydropower projects in Pakistan, which could be promptly launched, cannot be ruled out.

Under the Indus Basin Treaty, the World Bank had agreed to finance the construction of two dams — Mangla and Kalabagh — to compensate Pakistan for the loss of waters of its eastern rivers. President General Ayub Khan advised his team to fudge the estimates so that the country could build another (third) dam with the World Bank funds. While Tarbela was built, somehow Kalabagh dam became controversial and over the years the stands of the provinces on this issue has continued to become more rigid.

The Indus Basin Treaty was signed in 1960, after World Bank’s intervention, following rising tensions between India and Pakistan after New Delhi stemmed the flow of Indus tributaries to Pakistan on April 1st, 1948. Under the Indus Water Treaty, India has rights to waters of rivers Sutlej, Ravi and Beas (Eastern rivers) while Pakistan to the waters of rivers Indus, Chenab and Jhelum (Western rivers) as a lower riparian. Pakistan had accepted the treaty at the stake of its very survival and assurances from India that it would not interfere with the waters of Western rivers, but India never honoured its promises and started tempering with Pakistani rivers, at a massive scale, beginning 1980s.

Taking advantage of Pakistan’s inability to execute major water conservation projects since building of the Tarbela Dam, about 39 years ago (in 1974), India has accelerated plans to control and harness the water potential of the Himalayas. This scribe has been highlighting India’s endeavours to build dams, through articles written frequently during the last decade, and a detailed one titled “Pakistan’s water vision Vs Indian hydel-projects in Occupied Kashmir” appeared in The News as early as September 11, 2004.

To add 7,036.5 MW hydro-power during 12th Plan (2012-17) and increase it further in later years, according to daily the Kashmir Times (Jammu: June 24, 2009), the projects that India envisaged to complete during the 12th Plan included: Baglihar-II (450 MW), Sawalakote (1200 MW). Kirthai-I (240 MW), Kirthai-II (990 MW), Lower Kalnai (50 MW), New Ganderbal (93 MW), Parnai (37.5 MW), Kiru (600 MW), Karwar (56 MW), Kishanganga (330 MW), Ratle (690 MW), Pakaldul (1000 MW), Ujh (280 MW) and Bursar (1020 MW).

Some other hydropower projects finalised, completed or under various phases of completion by India in IHK include: Sewe II (120 MW), Chutak (12 MW), Uri-II (280 MW) and Parkachak (30 MW). After completing the first phase of Baglihar Dam in the last decade, New Delhi is now engaged in raising the capacity of this hydropower project to 900 MW during phase II.

After completion of these dams, some 5.516 million acres of land in Pakistan’s nine districts (Namely, Multan, Jhang, Faisalabad, Gujrat, Okara, Vehari, Bahawalnagar, Bahawalpur and Rahimyar Khan) would suffer acute shortage of water; while 406 canals and 1,125 distributaries would become completely dry. The most affected areas, where fertile lands can become barren due to non-availability of water, include: 3.55 million acres of fertile land in Okara, 669,000 acres in Neely Bar, 626,000 acres in Khanewal, 182,000 acres in Sulemanki division, 420,625 acres in eastern Bar and 68,308 acres in western Bar.

Pakistan has been raising objections to the Indian activities aimed at construction of hydroelectric projects in IHK on the grounds that these works violated the provisions of the Indus Basin Treaty (IBT). However, notwithstanding Pakistan’s objections and provisions of IBT, India geared up work on completing the hydel projects in IHK.

Quite close to Pakistan-India border, on the river Chenab, Pakistan has three large headworks of Marala, Khanki and Quadirabad, feeding large tracts of agricultural fields in Neeli Bar, Ganji Bar and Sandal Bar areas. The Baglihar Dam provides New Delhi leverage to stop the flow of river Chenab at will and strangulate Pakistan’s agriculture by depriving it of 30 million acre feet of water.

Likewise, Kishanganga hydroelectric project, which is located alongside AJK’s Neelum valley, has been designed to change the course of river Neelum by some 100 kilometres through a channel and a 27-kilometre tunnel, by diverting it to join the Wullar Lake and the river Jhelum near Bandipur in IHK. Presently, both rivers Neelum and Jhelum join each other at Muzaffarabad in AJK.

India is contemplating to construct scores of other hydropower projects in IHK, enabling her to take control of rivers Chenab, Jhelum and Sindh like the rivers Sutlaj, Bias and Ravi. In fact, India has already identified scores of projects, ranging from one MW in Puga Leh to 200 MW Naiaguh in Kishtwar of Jammu’s Doda District, for construction.

The names of some projects in this category and their projected capacity are: Lower Kalnai, Doda (50 MWs), Lower Ans, Udhampur (37 MWs), Parnai, Rajouri (37 MWs), Mandi, Rajouri (37 MWs), Bichllery, Rajouri (36 MWs), Uri-II, Baramulla (200 MWs), Sonmarg, Srinagar (83 MWs), New Ganderbal, Srinagar (50 MWs), Sewa II, Kathua (90 MWs), Mawar Hydel, Handwara (6 MWs), Boniyar Stage II, Baramulla (6 MWs), Lidder, Anantnag (30 MWs), Vishar, Kulgam (15 MWs), Aru Hydel, Anantnag (30 MWs), Wangat Hydel, Srinagar (30 MWs), Sandarn Hydel, Anantnag (6 MWs), Lassipora, Handwara (4 MWs), Kahmil, Handwara (4 MWs), Chingus II, Rajouri (2 MWs), Neeru, Doda (25 MWs), Paniklor, Kargil – Par Kochok (30 MWs), Chatok, Kargil (7 MWs) and Igophe Merileng, Leh – Merlaezng (4 MWs).

Taking stock of the emerging water scenario, Pakistan needs to redouble its efforts for the conservation of water resources while, at the same time, it must strive for protecting its water rights as a lower riparian. It is time that the nation also develops a consensus on mega water conservation projects and engages in serious and united efforts to preserve its water rights.

The writer is a freelance columnist based at Islamabad:alauddinmasood@gmail.com

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"Nay! man is evidence against himself. Though he puts forth his excuses." Holy Qur'an (75:14-15)

28.07.2013

Lacking the local level
The disconnect between the state and society is expanding due to the absence of institutions at the basic level through which the state delivers
services
By Raza Khan

Eventually, the Supreme Court of Pakistan (SCP) has ordered the four provinces and Islamabad administration to complete legal and administrative formalities, including delimitation of constituencies by August 15 so that the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) could hold local government elections in September. The SCP has also directed all the provinces to issue schedule for their respective local government elections as the former wants the elections in September.

The provinces, which under previous governments were reluctant to hold local government elections, are now ready to have them but needs some time in this regard. In particular, the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Balochistan provinces have told the SCP that they would be ready in a couple of months to hold local government elections while the Punjab has also finally expressed its willingness to have these elections. Sindh, which is again ruled by the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), has told the court that it is not possible for it to hold elections within a few months as it needed more time to make arrangements.

The main problem of the PPP government in Sindh regarding the local government is that it has serious difference over the structure of LG system in the province with its previous coalition partner the MQM. The latter wanted a separate system for urban Sindh than rest of the province. The PPP, during its last stint in power in the province, had even agreed to the MQM demand and had issued notification for a dichotomous LG system. However, stiff resistance from within the party and Sindhi nationalist parties forced the PPP to take back the decision.

Punjab, though has problems with holding LG elections, has agreed to do so following the SCP orders. The PML-N having a sweeping majority in the provincial legislature is now in a better position to hold elections.

The KP, which is now ruled by the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf-led coalition, is showing alacrity to have LG elections as it has been a cornerstone of the party’s election manifesto and politics of ‘changing the system’. The PTI had promised to introduce a new system of local government in all the provinces.

The PTI is going to shortly unveil a new LG system in which a new tier of Village Council would be introduced. This is quite innovative as governmental and administrative powers have never been devolved to such a rudimentary level of human habitation. The proposed village council would be the lowest tier while above there would be the union, tehsil and district councils.

Balochistan has also shown its readiness to hold LG polls. This is quite important because of all the four provinces Balochistan needs the local government system most urgently. Still, most of the districts of the province are ‘B’ areas where policing is not possible and, thus, levies are given law and order duties. So, when in an area policing is not possible it means that there is a huge administrative vacuum there. In this context, local government would be instrumental in filling this administrative vacuum.

The SCP, taking a stern notice of the dillydallying attitude of some provinces regarding holding local government elections, warned that the delay of a single day would not be tolerated in this regard. This stand of the SCP needs to be applauded because the traditional ruling parties have not had a favourable attitude towards the local government. This is fundamentally because of a tendency for the concentration of political and administrative powers in a few hands.

Since the introduction of the local government system in 2001 by General Musharraf, the two successive local government elections had somewhat stabilised the system at its core and it was expected that with two or three further elections, anomalies in the local government system would have been removed. However, since the return of elected governments in 2008, the political parties have been shying away from holding local government elections on one pretext or the other.

For feudal or feudal-turned-industrial classes, surrendering power to people is akin to depriving the political elite of its traditional hold on power. Continuation of the status quo denies any space for development and progress. The delay in holding local government elections has inflicted colossal damage on the process of good governance.

Holding of local government elections is the constitutional responsibility of the provinces under Article 32 and 140 A of the Constitution which they have been overlooking on one pretext or the other.

The SCP bench, headed by Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, observed during the case regarding law and order in Balochistan that the new government also failed to maintain law and order. The court rightly observed that without having local government, the situation would not improve.

State administers its territories through institutions and local bodies are the fundamental administrative machinery which carries out all the governmental functions.

In Pakistan, the raison d’être of many problems is the disconnect between the state and society. It is in this context that the august court observed, “Prima facie, we are of the opinion that for want of a network at the grassroots level it is difficult to establish contact with citizens living in far-flung areas.”

This disconnect has expanded over the years. Because the policies, which are conceived and formulated at the state level or parliaments, cannot be implemented at the local level due to political-democratic vacuum due the absence of local governments.

The installation of local elected councils would reduce the burden of administration on the provincial governments. The provincial ministers and their departments, in such a situation, would concentrate more on policy. Therefore, if the state has to address the grave administrative lacuna and to link the disconnected state and society it has to ensure the holding of local government elections at the earliest.

The writer is a political analyst and researcher.razapkhan @yahoo.co

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"Nay! man is evidence against himself. Though he puts forth his excuses." Holy Qur'an (75:14-15)