In a recent statement, the former Taliban Minister, Maulvi Arsala Rahmani, now a member of the High Peace Council of Afghanistan has said that, Taliban have decided to soften up their stance for a peace in Afghanistan. Today, they are ready to make comprises on some of the aspects which one could never thought of earlier. He however said that, “The Taliban are not back to govern the same way as the old Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. When they are back, they will be back as (other) Afghans.” With the opening of a Taliban office in Qatar, one could see this change in the attitude of the Taliban leadership. They are no more adamant to their previous stance that they would talk only once the occupants leave their country. Indeed, the shift in the Taliban strategy has transformed them from “being a non-state to a state actor.” On its part, United States is also negotiating with Taliban considering them as a legal entity.

It is not only that Taliban has changed their stance and attitude, but apparently there is change in the US perception and attitude too. A few months earlier, US official stance was that, they would never talk with Al-Qaeda and Taliban. Then there came a change of stance and its officials said that, US is willing to talk to good Taliban and so on. However, now Mr Grossman and other US officials have met with the people of Mullah Omar, the former Taliban head of Afghanistan, whom they were accounting for as the bad Taliban. There is also a visible flexibility on the US side, which is no longer insisting that the Taliban accept the existing constitution as a pre-condition or disarm them, before the talks.

While these negotiations are on their way, the American military operations are continuing in various parts of Afghanistan as a routine. Still there are night raids and indiscriminate firing by US and NATO troops, killing innocent Afghans. Degrading of Afghan people has reached to a level that US soldiers have been found in humiliating and desecrating the dead bodies of their opponents, the Taliban fighters. This humiliation is unique in nature whereby US marines are urinating on the dead bodies of the Taliban, a worst form of humiliation in this highly civilized world of 21st century.

Unfortunately, except few words of condemnation, the champions of human rights in US, Europe and else where in the world including Pakistan are quite on this extreme act of US soldiers. Apart from this particular event, United States soldiers have the worst record of the violations of human rights in Afghanistan and Iraq. Punishing one odd soldier may not redress the grievances, but a change has to come through the change of attitude of US military commanders and those running and directing the human tortures in centers like Guantanamo Bay. On their part, Taliban are continuing the negotiations despite such like inhuman acts by the occupants. Perhaps, being sons of soil, they think that, Afghan had enough and any how, these negotiations may pave a way for the ultimate pull out of foreign forces from their soil.

Taliban, otherwise consider this negotiation as their success, and they have rightly announced this as such on January 16, 2012. Only after this declaration of success, Taliban officially expressed interest in negotiations with Washington. Indeed, opening of Taliban office in Qatar and starting of negotiations was a US desire and through Qatar Government, as intermediary, US covertly made all these arrangements. The reality is that, after a decade’s of military engagement; White House and Pentagon have reached to the conclusions that they are loosing in Afghanistan and situation is just like Vietnam. Although, such a realization was there once the late Richard Holbrooke tried to start the negotiations, but resisted by Pentagon.

Nevertheless, according to a new book of Zbigniew Brzezinski, then security advisor to President Jimmy Carter, United States is facing serious challenges to its very survival if it fails to take some immediate measures. The book entitled, “Strategic Vision” has revealed many grey areas, facing this global giant, owing to the wrong policies of Pentagon and White House hawks. He himself being a hawkish of the time is critical to the status-quo policies in US. In his book, Mr Brzezinski finds, “alarming similarities between America today and the Soviet Union just before its fall, including a gridlocked governmental system incapable of enacting serious policy revisions, a back-breaking military budget and a failing decade-long attempt to conquer Afghanistan.” Rather acting as a colonial power, US needs to be a balancing factor in the global politics. Mr Brzezinski also feels that, US must become a “responsible partner to the rising and increasingly assertive East.” US role should be as a “balancer and conciliator” among Asian nations. Envisioning all the symptoms of a dying empire, US policy makers perhaps finally decided to talk to Taliban as a way out from this never-ending and convoluted conflict in Afghanistan.

For a peace and stability in Afghanistan, US-Taliban negotiation is a welcoming step. However, the peace process would remain fragile unless it has the backing of all groups and warring factions of Afghanistan, besides other stake holders; the immediate neighbours, which remained associated with the conflict for over thirty years now. Pakistan is one such country, which has been directly and indirectly associated with the conflict in Afghanistan, ever since the Soviet invasion in it in 1979. It helped US and West in the first phase and following 9/11, it is playing the role of frontline state to fight the terrorists and extremists. For this role, Pakistan paid a heavy price in all fields viz; economic, social, politic and military. It is felt that US is negating Pakistani role in its recent talks with Taliban. Though US tried to rebuff this impression, as in a recent briefing of Ms. Victoria Nuland, the spokesperson of State Department, said that Pakistan is very important country and has a role in the process. She further said that, “We very much want Pakistan to be part of this, as do the Afghans. We have at every opportunity been clear that we think that Pakistan has a very important role to play in supporting this reconciliation process.”

Right from the beginning of US invasion in Afghanistan in October 2001, Pakistan is the only country which has been emphasizing for a political solution of Afghan issue, through integration of all groups and factions including Northern Alliance. Today, Pakistan welcomes the peace talks between US and Taliban. However, being the worst sufferer of this prolonged instability in Afghanistan, would like that its interests must be catered for. Pakistan never wants to assume the role of an imperial neighbour, but would surely like that; the true representatives of the country must get their due share in any future setup of Afghanistan.

Furthermore, Pakistan desires that US should not promote the interests of its adversary in Afghanistan either to; enhance its security concerns along its western borders or else to block its entry into hydrocarbon rich Central Asian Republics. US must remember that, only sincerity in the negotiations and incorporating its true stake holders and rightful neighbours would bring stability in Afghanistan for its honourable exit, otherwise, the process would remain fragile like ever.

The writer is an analyst of international relations.
Email; drmk_edu@yahoo.com

A charter for citizens
By
A.G. Noorani

IT would be cynical to ask of what worth to the ordinary citizen are the fundamental rights to freedom of speech and expression, to assemble peaceably and the like. He is concerned, the argument proceeds, with matters that impinge directly on his daily life; earning a living, to begin with, and providing a decent life to his wife and children. Tersely put, he is concerned with roti, kapra aur makaan .

It is trite to say that man does not live by bread alone. But the grim reality is that for most, life itself is a struggle and the state does not exactly go out of its way to make life any easier for the citizen. True enough that without fundamental rights he would be powerless. Nonetheless, something more is required institutionally to ensure accountability at all layers of public institutions.

Old though it is, democracy has not passed the age of child-bearing. It can yet give birth to new institutions and new remedies. The ombudsman ( mohtasib ) is one example; another is the evolution of public-interest litigation and the courts’ sensitivity to flaws in governance.

One such recent innovation is the Citizen’s Charter which the British government promulgated in 1991. Sir Christopher Foster, who taught at Oxford and served as adviser to many governments, hailed it as prime minister John Major’s “greatest achievement”. It reflects a new citizen-focused philosophy of administration and a participatory democracy which aims to provide new and lasting objectives for the public services. By codifying precisely in plain language the standards to which the public services must conform, the charter empowers the citizen. Those running the services are required to wear name-badges and give their names when answering the telephone, to aid identification and foster good relations between public services and their consumers.

Public transport, providers of electricity, hospitals, educational institutions – all the way from kindergarten to university – postal services, etc. are all required to draw up the standards and display them. The citizen-consumer learns what he has a right to expect, and can demand accountability if there is a lapse in meeting the standards.

Speaking in the House of Commons on July 22, 1991, prime minister John Major said, “I want the people of this country to have services in which they as citizens can be confident and in which public servants can take pride”. The charter establishes six principles of public services, namely established standards, information and openness, choice and consultation, courtesy and helpfulness, putting things right and, not least, value for money. The standards must be publicised and their implementation monitored. Hitherto an object of public administration, the citizen becomes its master; the one for whom the administration exists and functions.

The charter would be a futile exercise altogether if it was not backed by an effective complaints procedure in each of the services. The ombudsman is there to check maladministration generally. But the citizen must not be driven to seek his help or that of the courts. A swift inexpensive remedy to redress grievances must be available as part of the public service itself. Reasons must be given for a decision which affects the citizen’s rights. The result is a completely new culture of administration.

There was a suggestion that the small claims court should be empowered to enforce the charter. The minister for public service and open government, William Waldegrave responded “I do not want to be rude about lawyers, but if one can avoid getting too many lawyers involved in these redressal systems, so much the better”.

In recent months, India was rocked by a powerful agitation for an effective ombudsman. Coupled with it was the demand for a citizen’s charter. Introduction of a Lokpal Bill in parliament was followed immediately by introduction in December last of the Right of Citizen for Time-Bound Delivery of Goods and Services and Redressal of Their Grievances Bill.

It declares that “every individual citizen shall have the right to time-bound delivery of goods and provision for services and redressal of grievances”. Every public authority is required to publish a citizen’s charter specifying the category of goods supplied and services rendered by it, and the time within which the goods would be provided and the services rendered.

The contents of the charter are specified. It must mention (a) the details of all the goods supplied and services rendered by the public authority and the name of the person or agency through which such goods are supplied or services rendered and timings during which such services are supplied or services rendered; (b) the conditions under which a person becomes entitled for goods or services, and the class of persons who are entitled to receive such goods and avail services; (c) the quantitative and tangible parameters (including weight, size, frequency) of the goods and services available to the public; (d) complaint redressal mechanism including the time within which the complaint be disposed of and the officer of the public authority to whom such complaint may be made; (e) the name and addresses of individuals responsible for the delivery of goods or rendering of services; (f) any other functions, obligations, or service which the public authority is required or reasonably expected to provide.

An enforcement machinery will be established. An information and facilitation centre for efficient delivery of services and redressal of grievances will be set up. Every public authority will have as many grievance redress officers as are necessary. There is provision for appeal to a person or organisation outside the public authority. Each state will have a public grievance redressal commission as an appellate authority.

At the apex will be a central public grievance redressal commission. Full records will be maintained at all levels of decision-making. A grievance redressal officer will be liable to a fine for failure to perform and to dismissal from service if his action is mala fide.

The bill, when enacted, will go a long way towards ensuring good governance. But its educative value will be greater still. It will arouse public awareness.

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When Problems are so Big & Your Strength is no Longer enough to CaRRy them, Don't Give uP; Because where your Strength Ends the Grace of Almighty ALLAH Begins

Honor killings that take place in Pakistan don't make the headlines too often; not because of a lack of severity, but because of the frequent nature of those killings or abuse. But honor killings committed in a foreign land attract a lot of attention, partly because 'honor' based crimes are often taken to reflect the values of a certain ethnicity or culture that is brought to the fore in the host country.

In Toronto, honor killing has reared its ugly head yet again, defaming Islam and the Muslim community at large. The link that ties honor to women, and honor killings to Islam, is hard to break. In a collectivist culture like ours, a woman is entrusted with keeping the family's honor as a mother, daughter, sister and wife. For a woman, maintaining the chastity of this word may take an entire lifetime, but one accusation or suspicion can muddle her dignity, 'sully' her name and, in some cases, bring upon her the sentence of death.

The Shafia family murders took place on June 30, 2009 in Kingston, Ontario. Shafia sisters Zainab, 19, Sahar, 17, and Geeti, 13, along with Rona Amir Mohammed, 50, were found dead inside a car that was discovered underwater. Zainab, Sahar, and Geeti were the daughters of Mohammad Shafia, 58, and his wife Tooba Mohammad Yahya, 41. The couple also had a son, Hamed, 20. Rona was Mohammad Shafia's first wife whom he married in his native Afghanistan before the family moved to Canada in 2007 and settled in Montreal.

On July 23, 2009, Mohammad, Tooba Yahya, and Hamed were arrested on charges of four counts of first degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder. The misogynistic crime brought this family to a courthouse in Kingston, where the proceedings continued for three years and the verdict was finally announced in January 2012. They were found guilty of all four counts by the jury.
Mohammad Shafia, a native of Afghanistan, came to Canada with his family in 2007. According to reports, Zainab and Sahar, the two eldest daughters, had trouble assimilating into life in Montreal within the strict boundaries of the household rules, which included a prohibition on relationships with boys. Both had secret boyfriends, wore fashionable clothes and, according to evidence heard in court, resisted pressure from their parents and eldest brother to wear the hijab. This case brings us to the debatable topic of whether honor based crimes are entrenched in religion, culture or simply in the power to control.

Dr. Shehrzad Mojab, a University of Toronto professor who served as the Crown's expert witness during the final days of the trial, feels this topic is highly debatable and must be understood with sensitivity.
According to Dr. Mojab: "Research has shown that diaspora communities are often more entrenched in the traditional culture than the homeland communities from which they came. This is seen more often in communities that have been displaced by war, where community members may spend a considerable time in a refugee camp before ultimately settling in a new environment."

Many immigrants travel to the Western world not just with their belongings, but with a certain mindset too. Men feel the need to control their household and its inhabitants and continue to do so with the methods practiced in their homeland. Women, and not men, tend to become in such cases the repositories of a family's shame and honour; the strict standards relating in particular to the human body and sexuality are set in stone for them to abide by.

Aqsa Parvez, a 16-year old, was strangled to death in her family home in Mississauga, Ontario, in December 2007. Her father, Muhammad Parvez, 57, and brother Waqas Parvez, 26, pleaded guilty to second-degree murder. Parvez left her family home twice and came back for the final time, not knowing a death sentence awaited her at home. The murder has been described in some accounts as an honour killing.

Aqsa was punished because she didn't like wearing traditional clothing; she chose not to wear the hijab despite her family's insistence and demanded privacy for herself. Aqsa, according to court documents, wanted to get a part-time job and enjoy the same freedoms as other girls she knew in Ontario.

In an interview with police, Aqsa's mother, Anwar Jan Parvez, said that her husband had told her he killed his youngest child because "this is my insult. My community will say, 'You have not been able to control your daughter.' This is my insult. She is making me naked."

The entire family had moved from Pakistan to Canada in 2001.

Mojab believes that in the case of Aqsa Parvez, teachers, school councilors, classmates and family friends all knew about the violence that Aqsa was facing at home, but no one acted to stop her being murdered by her father.

Similarly, in Sweden, the murder of Fadima Shahindal by her father (in 2001) could probably have been averted if the government had known about the seriousness of the threat. The murder of Heshu Yones Abdalla in Britain (in 2002) in a similar manner also could have been prevented. According to Mojab, legal equality is a goal yet to be achieved in many states because it does not automatically translate into mechanisms (courts, law enforcement, shelters, early warning systems, etc.) to uproot or constrain such violence against women.

Thousands of immigrants arrive in Canada every year. Some assimilate well into a culture far different from their own, while others struggle to maintain the traditions and norms that define their existence. Many immigrant families lead a dichotomous life, adorning a different personality when they step out of the house and another one at home.

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When Problems are so Big & Your Strength is no Longer enough to CaRRy them, Don't Give uP; Because where your Strength Ends the Grace of Almighty ALLAH Begins

Democracy is not just about elections, even if they are free and fair. Elections are simply a relatively cheap way of changing governments regularly, and so avoiding the twin horrors of either violent change with its attendant confusion and mayhem, or a sclerotic government that gets stuck in office for decades and loses its way.

Democracy is more about the spirit of inclusion, in which all members of society agree that others have a legitimate place in their nation’s proceedings. This means that opposition parties should be respected as having a right to be part of the political debate, even if they are not in power at the time. It means that the rights of the individual are supported by strong rule of law, in which all individuals have defined rights that they can enforce in court if they are restrained in some way by either individuals or even their government.

Democracy also means that the government of the day cannot be confused with the structure of the state. The government has to work within the system, and the head of government should not be able to run roughshod through the structure of the state, nor be able to treat the state as his or her personal possession. Achieving power does not give a new government a “winner-takes-all” right to loot the state. A government does not own a country, but holds it in trust for its successors and future generations to take over when their time comes.

The twin challenge facing many Arab states today are that they are defining new long-term constitutional structures for their states, and at the same time they are electing new governments. And these governments are coming to power with active social agendas and very high hopes after decades of repression, which is leading to a blurring of the distinction between the government of the day and the future long-term structure of the state.

In Tunisia, an Islamist government has won power but seems to have the support of the majority of its people as it has insisted that the future constitution should be more inclusive, with government thinkers quoting the example of Turkey’s more secular constitution supporting a popular Islamist government.

In Iraq, the process is a few years further down the road since Saddam was toppled in 2003. But a bitter civil war deepened the hatred and suspicions between the Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds, so the country has failed to arrive at a final constitution. This has opened a vacuum within which the present government has started to reinforce its Shiite position, to the alarm of others.

In Egypt, the new parliament is dominated by a majority of Islamist parties, including the Muslim Brotherhood and their more radical Salafist allies, and their candidates are very strong contenders to win the presidency. They also tried to fill the constitutional assembly with their members, leading to a walk out of other parties which was backed by the courts. In this case, the long-term structures of the state reminded the government of the day that it is required to work within the system.

The challenge is that the new government has strong social policies with which other Egyptians disagree, but it is seeking to insert these into Egypt’s as yet unwritten new constitution. The Islamist government wants more public adherence to Islamic values, and that these should be enforced by law. Many more secular (but not atheistic) Muslims do not want their religion to be part of public life and resent the government’s assumption of moral duty, not to mention Egypt’s large Coptic Christian community which also disagrees with enforcing Muslim values as part of public life.

Throughout the Middle East, the great fear is that when the Islamists gain power, they will seek to insert their view of life with the structure of government and also refuse to relinquish power. This concern was very explicitly expressed recently by Lieutenant General Dahi Khalfan Tamim, Commander of Dubai Police, who told Al Qabas newspaper that Kuwait would be taken over by the Muslim Brotherhood by 2013, who would then seek to take over the rest of the Gulf by 2016. “They are concerned only with ruling chairs, and have nothing to do with implementing Islamic jurisprudence,” said Lt Gen Dahi.

There is no doubt that governments do reflect public opinion and in time changing public morals are reflected in law, but these changes have to reflect the broad will of the people, and should focus on supporting and encouraging individual opportunity, rather than imposing restrictions.

For example, during the twentieth century all across Europe and the United States laws were changed so that women could vote. In fact, this profound social shift of achieving full equality between men and women has yet to work its way through all sectors of society and employment, but ensuring women’s right to vote and own property independently of their husbands were essential starting points, and were mandated by government action.

The Arab world has to make sure that the liberalising changes that the vast majority of its people want, do not get confused with their largely conservative social and family structures. Just because the religious parties are far better prepared for this new public debate, they should not overplay their hand.

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When Problems are so Big & Your Strength is no Longer enough to CaRRy them, Don't Give uP; Because where your Strength Ends the Grace of Almighty ALLAH Begins

Americans are fooling themselves if they think the era of adventures abroad is over. In fact, another big international intervention is just around the corner. And we're not nearly ready for it.

U.S. President Barack Obama's recent speech during his surprise visit to Afghanistan on May 1 said it all: "Our goal is not to build a country in America's image or to eradicate every vestige of the Taliban. These objectives would require many more years, many more dollars, and most importantly, many more American lives." This extraordinary statement is one that those involved in U.S. foreign policy have heard many times before: The era of big interventions is over. It's a tried-and-true narrative, and today, the argument goes something like this: The combination of significant war fatigue and coming defense cuts makes it unlikely that the United States will muster the political will or economic resources to sustain another large-scale military effort. The invasion, occupation, and reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan will almost certainly be seen as aberrations permitted by the post-9/11 environment, or so the thinking goes.

The conventional wisdom has it wrong. It is, in fact, likely that in the next decade, the United States will once again launch a military intervention, though with a smaller footprint than in years past. The threat from terrorist camps in weak, failed, or rogue states such as Yemen; the danger of civil wars or internecine conflicts that threaten stability in countries such as Sudan and South Sudan, and humanitarian crises that could cost tens of thousands of lives in places such as Syria and Somalia will not allow the option of intervention to be taken off the table. But the full-scale military engagements of the 2000s -- akin to Iraq and Afghanistan -- will not be policymakers' preferred mechanism for conducting such operations
In light of these changes, future interventions require a revamping of current counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine. COIN doctrine as presented in the famous FM 3-24 field manual -- let's call it COIN 1.0 -- reflected the historical experience of the 20th century and the fledgling 2003-2006 counterinsurgency efforts, based largely on the U.S. experience in Vietnam. It's unsurprising that this doctrine is now showing its age.

COIN 1.0 may not have been written exclusively for Iraq, but it was significantly tailored to meet the demands of that war. Not to minimize the complexity -- and lethality -- of combat operations in Iraq, but in retrospect it was a relatively easy country to stabilize. Iraq is a coherent nation-state with infrastructure, an educated workforce, and a well-established market economy with a high-value export: oil. It has only two ethnic groups and two major religions, and these groups overlap. Perhaps most importantly, it has a fully functional seaport connected to a road network, making supplying large bodies of troops relatively inexpensive (as such things go). Between the lack of infrastructure, complex tribal structure, and poorly developed economic market, the challenges in Afghanistan, as well as in many other countries in which the United States might be tempted to intervene, are much greater.

With revisions of COIN 1.0 under way, it is time to consider the lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan. The differences between the two wars underscore a host of significant lessons from the last five years that should be incorporated into a revised counterinsurgency doctrine -- let's call it COIN 2.0.

Our starting point is the belief that a society that has been disrupted, whether due to war or natural disaster, does not experience a linear return to stability. This is immensely frustrating to the outside observer (let alone a participant like the U.S. forces who were charged with shepherding the transition). The history of civil conflict suggests that the relationship may be more analogous to the physical process of phase change, such as conversion of water to ice or steam. Long changes in temperatures, whether cooling or heating, do not affect the liquid state of water -- until at a fixed point it changes state to become ice or steam. In a similar manner, it often appears as though many counterinsurgency measures are without observable effect until a threshold for change is reached. The perception that various inputs appear to have no impact leads to both unjustified support for ineffective projects and unfair dismissal of potentially very effective programs.

For example, in Iraq after months of intense conflict and high death tolls, violence precipitously declined between April and December 2007. A range of targeted operations, training programs, and other 2006-2007 counterinsurgency activities have been both credited and discredited for this decline, but in fact a confluence of events and conditions were likely the reason for the declining death tolls. New counterinsurgency strategies must be built on the assumption that we do not know the exact process to obtain stability but that we should be able to identify and evaluate trajectories.

COIN 1.0 holds that establishing a set of observable measures is vital to assessing the effectiveness of various efforts. This is often easier said than done, however, as measures are fraught with inaccuracy and largely based on guesswork. For instance, the United States often measures stability by gauging levels of violence. In most cases, this is uninformative: U.S. commanders don't know whether violence is occurring because of their programs, because there are fewer victims, or because of a change in insurgent tactics. For example, in Afghanistan, civilian casualties by insurgents increase violence against coalition forces, leading many to conclude that protecting the population is critical to counterinsurgency success. However, civilian casualties by insurgents in Iraq actually resulted in less violence against coalition forces. Simply measuring levels of civilian casualties may be informative for policies in Afghanistan but under other conditions (such as those in Iraq) other more nuanced measures may be required.

The other common approach is to measure progress using operational output, conflating measuring the process of counterinsurgency activity with the impact of those activities. Process measures are most easily understood as the direct results of COIN programs. For example, a process measure for security-training programs may be the number of trained police. An assessment like this is clearly appealing -- it's easy to count -- but this approach is incomplete and often misleading. In this example, "more police" is not the desired end; "more police" increases public safety, which in turn generates government legitimacy -- but we do not know the number or quality of police required for public safety or what level of public safety is required for this increase in legitimacy to occur.

Additionally, the models and measures of progress in COIN 1.0 do not account for third-party problems. Simply stated, the United States usually fights insurgencies by supporting a host-nation government, which means it is constrained by that government's preferences. In many cases, this is a significant constraint, as U.S. officials have learned through their often-problematic partnerships with Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and Afghan President Hamid Karzai.

This presents us with what social scientists call the "principal-agent problem." In this case, the United States serves the role of "principal" -- stripped of academic jargon, that means an actor that wants things done -- with a set of objectives related to international security. The host-nation government, as the "agent" (commissioned to act for the "principal") does not receive the full benefit of the objectives, but does face costs and risks for its efforts to conform to U.S. desires.

Broadly speaking, the United States has two options to induce the host-nation government to act in accordance with its objectives. First, it can try to convince the host nation that it should change its preferences. Secondly, it can change the incentives -- through positive (carrots) or negative (sticks) means.

In the international arena, the first approach very seldom works. Politicians in weak or failed states have typically risen to the top by knowing and exploiting local power dynamics, and they don't need an international power to inform them of their interests. The second approach, while perhaps more useful, has the risk of incentivizing the host nation to sustain conflict in order to be rewarded for resolving it. That is what social scientists call a moral hazard -- a government may be inclined to play the role of an arsonist in order to get hired for the job of firefighter. This moral hazard tends to exacerbate the problems with process measures. For example, do police still increase legitimacy if they are corrupt and foster instability, thus ensuring future aid and support?

COIN 1.0 focused on military force as a solution to political or social problems, such as an insurgency or ethnic tensions. Although the military has been critical in ending and deterringinterstate conflict, it has a more limited capability in the nuanced intrastate-conflict setting. While we still don't know exactly which COIN activities induce stability, we do know that military force alone is insufficient.

First, violence has limited applicability in solving what are inherently political problems. The record regarding the use of large-scale force, in accordance with Western norms of warfare, to bring about political settlements is not encouraging. Mass indiscriminate violence (like that wielded by the Roman Empire or the Russians in Chechnya) has proved effective in quelling insurgencies. The same is true of highly targeted, discriminate violence by small and exceptionally trained forces against an opponent with a hierarchical structure (think U.S. Special Forces against al Qaeda in Iraq). However, the first of these options is not a viable course for U.S. policy (even leaving the moral concerns aside), and the second requires a special set of circumstances -- the right capability against the right enemy.

The second reason that the military is no panacea for resolving insurgencies is the simple fact that it is ineffective in employing nonviolent means. The military is a blunt instrument, best used for forcefully imposing security -- its attempts to impose nuanced political, social, and institutional reforms will likely be counterproductive. For instance, continued efforts to build governing capacity in light of widespread corruption in Afghanistan has been both intensely frustrating for NATO forces and counterproductive at building public support for the national and local government among Afghans.

Finally, existing institutions meant to better provide nonviolent solutions, such as the U.S. State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development, are often ill-resourced and ill-prepared to effectively implement programs in conflict settings and deal with substate actors (such as governors or district heads). As former Defense Secretary Robert Gates noted on more than one occasion, there are more personnel in U.S. military bands than there are Foreign Service officers. Struggles by these civilian agencies in conflict zones have been well documented, andsignificant reform in both resourcing and culture is needed in these civilian departments.

The new model of counterinsurgency, COIN 2.0, must be based on a flexible, realistic model incorporating a set of feasible methods by which progress can achieved and measured. Although some of these concepts have been considered and even to some extent developed in COIN 1.0, greater effort should be directed to the following changes:

Lesson 1: Measure both the counterinsurgency activities and their direct outputs. It's not wrong to measure the hours or dollars spent training police or the number of police. But these should be thought of as steps that move us in the right direction, not to be confused with progress toward the ultimate outcome.

Lesson 2: The record on establishing "metrics" is less than encouraging. Some are so general as to be useless, while others are so specific that their relevance is questionable. As a result, we should continue to use multiple crude measures such as violence or public polls on support to gauge any given environment. But rather than treating these measures as competitors, policymakers should treat them as related, helpful in finding the "sweet spot" where these measures may be combined to become markers for outcomes.

Lesson 3: Explicitly address the moral hazard involved in working through host nations by developing means to work "by, with, and through" their governments. Strategic planning must anticipate incentive and implementation difficulties raised by host nations' shifting incentives -- and plan on this being immensely frustrating.

Lesson 4: Cultivate civilian-agency culture to recruit, train, and deploy individuals with the expectation that work outside the traditional embassy setting is now the norm.

Lesson 5: Foster and develop a culture of impact assessment and evaluation in military activities similar to efforts to study and evaluate development programs. Despite the recognition that "assessment" is required, few programs have incorporated the controlled-comparison approach. This gold standard for evaluation typically involves collecting systematic information about the outcomes experienced by individuals or areas before and after exposure to a policy and then comparing these outcomes to individuals or areas that did not receive the program. This allows us to make inferences about effectiveness by using measurements with controls as in scientific experiments -- and thus presents the best hope for determining which programs have impact.

Lesson 6: The military, while invaluable in providing a general blanket of security, is currently unsuited for the delicate work of knitting societies back together. Hybrid operational entities that value the role of the military within a civilian framework, as well as agencies implementing civilian programs that can bring back stability and legitimacy, should be constituted.

Don't expect the United States to completely abandon its interventionist past. It will continue to be involved in diplomatic and military interventions abroad due to its strategic needs and humanitarian ambitions. To ignore this reality is to create a dangerously underprepared military and civilian workforce.
To prepare for the interventions to come in the next decade, the United States must adapt the lessons from its experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan and use them to generate a new, more realistic, and feasible doctrine. Much like innovation in technology, COIN 2.0 keeps the best features of COIN 1.0, with important modifications. Only a comprehensive relook at all these aspects of intervention strategy can effectively meet the demands of the new age of conflict. Military leaders should consider these concepts carefully -- the next intervention is always just over the horizon.

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When Problems are so Big & Your Strength is no Longer enough to CaRRy them, Don't Give uP; Because where your Strength Ends the Grace of Almighty ALLAH Begins

Europe did not collapse this last week. That was something of a pleasant surprise, since portents of the economic grouping's demise have been accumulating for years now. In lieu of collapse, there were just more troubling signs: the fall of the government in the Netherlands; unemployment approaching 25 percent in Spain and a credit rating downgrade; French elections that featured growing nationalist strength and a likely split with Germany over austerity.

This raises a question. Given all the analyses proclaiming "the end is nigh," when, exactly, might we expect it? Some European friends would argue that this is the point -- we shouldn't expect it. This sort of brinksmanship is the way of Europe. Crises loom, there is wailing and lamentation, a summit is held, someone makes a concession (the Germans a likely candidate) and the crisis is averted. Thus it has been and thus it shall always be, they say. This is largely a matter of faith, but one must admit that it is a reasonable description of the recent European experience.

Here, though, is an alternative interpretation, presented in the form of a parable:

Imagine a friend who earns $3,000 a month, but has an unhealthy tendency to spend $5,000 a month. You observe this and remark to yourself: "This is unsustainable; it's got to stop." You wait for your friend to realize this.

But it turns out your friend has some savings he can use. These savings tide him over for a while, but when he burns through those, you once again figure his time has come. Surely he must now change his behavior.

But your friend finds he can take out a home equity loan. This funds his lifestyle for months more until, at last, those funds are exhausted, too. Time's up, you think.

But your friend announces that he still has plenty of borrowing room on his credit cards. The good life continues (albeit at a rather high interest rate). Sooner or later, of course, he maxes out his cards. This has got to be the end of it, you think. But then your friend mentions that he has heard about this loan shark downtown...

So what's the moral of the story? Is it not to worry -- your friend always finds a way? Or is it that a difficult adjustment can be postponed at ever-increasing cost? And what of the original question -- at what point does "the end" come? Is it when you first recognize that the situation is non-viable? Or is it when the loan shark finally shows up with his truncheon to collect?

This is an imperfect parable for Europe's situation in a number of ways. First, not all troubled European countries got there because of profligate spending. Spain and Ireland, for example, saw good fiscal positions go bad when they had to backstop troubled banks. Nor can one argue that Spain and Greece are continuing to live 'the good life' -- they're suffering real pain. It's just that the major adjustments they have made appear insufficient. And Europe's crisis is multifaceted; in addition to sovereign debt there are faltering banks and uncompetitive economies.

The real problem with the parable is that it tends to suggest that the growing costs are all financial. The more troubling costs may be political. Part of the way Europe has pushed past previous decision points has been to shunt aside democratic input -- as when new governments were installed in Greece and Italy, or when the major Greek political parties had to pre-commit to support an austerity plan, or in the push for a zone-wide austerity pact to be enforced from Brussels. Here the "loan shark with a truncheon" takes the form of more extreme movements in these countries taking up a nationalist cause and winning growing support, as with Marine Le Pen's Front National in France, or the slipping support for New Democracy and Pasok in Greece. Indebted and shamed nations in Europe, pushed around by their neighbors, rallying to a nationalist cry, what could go wrong? Europe does have a history along these lines.

The euro zone has bought itself time and may continue to do so for a while, but the costs seem to be mounting.

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When Problems are so Big & Your Strength is no Longer enough to CaRRy them, Don't Give uP; Because where your Strength Ends the Grace of Almighty ALLAH Begins

Pakistan warrants concern, and not just because it is sitting on the fifth largest nuclear arsenal in the world. The country is in the throes of a destabilizing and dangerous energy crisis. It faces gas shortages, and electricity outages of up to 20 hours a day. As a result, factories have been forced into closing. There is double-digit inflation. Infrastructure is crumbling for want of resources. And harrowing stories of the newly impoverished setting themselves on fire or resorting to crime have become the new normal.

Good deeds never go unpunished in Pakistan. The United States, Pakistan's most generous ally, remains public enemy No. 1 for reasons that do not withstand any rational scrutiny. But then Pakistan has never been accused of being terribly rational. As someone invested in Pakistan's progress, I have always maintained the U.S. must provide an energy lifeline to our ally country to establish in real and rapid terms the consideration it accords the 190 million people of Pakistan. If the U.S. were to help solve Pakistan's energy crisis-and it can-there could be no better measure to manage and mitigate anti-America sentiment in the country and no better billboard to showcase that the U.S. means business.

Unfortunately, far too often the urgency of U.S. economic support announcements and photo ops in Islamabad are dulled by inaction or bungled by red tape in Washington. This fuels disenchantment at many levels. Speaking at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington last April, Pakistan's finance minister Abdul Hafeez Shaikh said his country had "not even received $300 million" of the $1.5 billion in annual economic support promised to Pakistan under the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009.

It is also true that the government led by President Asif Ali Zardari is crippled by compulsions of keeping intact a coalition of disparate parties often at odds with each other. Thus, Mr. Shaikh is the country's fifth finance minister in four years. The turnover at the other key ministries-water and power, and petroleum and natural resources-is just as alarming. The government's capacity for economic and information management also seems woefully inadequate.

Then there are the corruption allegations Mr. Zardari faced in the 1990s and which didn't lead to a single conviction. These are still in circulation and, coupled with Pakistan's governance crisis, provide Zardari critics in Pakistan's freewheeling media and opposition virtually uncontested space to hurl with indignant certitude all manner of accusations against foreign, and local, investments made on his watch. In other words, any projects during the last four years for the economic advancement and eminent good of Pakistan-including the Enhanced Partnership Act with the U.S.-are, in the popular imagination, either Trojan horses or sweetheart deals.

As if things weren't bad enough for Pakistan's image abroad, the country's irreversibly sensational and bizarrely anti-business media gleefully peddles self-fulfilling prophesies of an economic and political meltdown. If you strip down the self-righteous rhetoric, the media in particular is determined that Pakistan's economy fail-at least while Mr. Zardari is around.

We have seen this picture before. In the mid-90s, when Mr. Zardari's assassinated wife, Benazir Bhutto, charmed investors into setting up privately-owned power plants, her government was accused of corruption. When Nawaz Sharif's government took over, it launched "investigations," arresting not only the executives of these foreign and local power companies but also their family members. The effects were disastrous. The investment climate became toxic and would remain so until 9/11. And potential investors like Gordon Wu, who had wanted to invest $6 billion in Pakistan, ran for the nearest exit.

Faced with international censure and arbitration proceedings, Islamabad eventually agreed to a settlement: the power companies reduced their tariffs to afford the government some face saving, and the government rewarded the companies by extending their contracts with public sector power buyers. Today, the "independent power plants" Bhutto set up provide almost 30 percent of Pakistan's total electricity supply. One hopes that Bhutto and Zardari opponents realize how much worse the energy crisis would have been had these power plants not been installed.

Since the summer of 2006, Pakistan has seen recurrent and riotous protests over power shortages. These picked up after the Zardari-led government was elected in 2008 and as outages grew, exacerbated by the government's liquidity problems. The protests have resulted in the destruction of public property-and deaths. The opposition has led several of these protests while simultaneously ensuring through litigation and an unrelenting media trial that no new power generation capacity comes online during Zardari's term. Yet, no one has called out the opposition over its rank contradictions and persecutory power past.

For the last two years, Pakistan's Supreme Court had been hearing three "human rights" petitions, including one filed by a Sharif lieutenant, challenging the installation of fast-track power plants as a short-term solution for the country. On March 30, the eve of another power protest by the opposition, the court delivered its verdict: all "rental power" contracts were declared illegal and rescinded and an independent agency was ordered to launch inquiries in support of the judgment. At 7:40 p.m. that day, we were directed to shut down power supplies to Naudero, Bhutto's constituency. American personnel at the plant have been flown back. Almost all Pakistani staff has been laid off.

In Pakistan's increasingly cynical society, all success is suspect. Unless you're Chinese, all foreign investors are viewed not as risk takers and growth drivers for the Pakistani economy but as usurpers, looters, and worse. After the recent court judgment, even the Ankara-supported "Turkey-Pakistan friendship" power ship has been impounded. And the proposed Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline is popular not just because it is critically required but because it also provides the added bonus of showing down the United States., which is opposed to the project.

There's also the Tethyan Copper Company, a partnership between Chile's Antofagasta and Canada's Barrick Gold, which spent $220 million working toward a $3.3-billion copper and gold mine in Reko Diq in Pakistan's restive Balochistan province only to be stamped as colonizers by the courts and media. When the company was forced into placing advertisements to push its facts forward in the public domain, it was slapped with a gag order and disallowed to challenge the fevered narrative of misrepresentations against it. Tethyan is headed for international arbitration, an all too familiar venue for foreign investors who put store in Pakistan.

Pakistan is complicated. It hates the U.S., yet America is the second most popular destination for Pakistani immigrants. It resents American economic support, yet complains that there is too little of it. It craves investment, but will rescind legal contracts in paroxysms of nationalist hysteria casting a cloud over every existing and future contract.

America can help. It needs to emphasize to all Pakistani stakeholders-politicians, the judiciary, the Army-that their country must abide by its legal contracts and that it must unreservedly depoliticize the energy sector and the economy. Pakistan must enact a real defamation law that provides economic disincentives to the incendiary media and sets it on a path to self-correction. The U.S. must facilitate capacity building, especially in key Pakistani energy ministries and agencies, to effect durable, long-term economic planning. It can and should provide speedy debt support, for example through the U.S. State Department's Overseas Private Investment Corporation, to expedite energy projects that can visibly and meaningfully improve the lives of Pakistanis. The U.S. must make its aid to Pakistan conditional on the country delivering on these basic and essential reforms.

The opposition and torch-wielding media lynch mob claim to have the best interests at heart of the tens of millions of Pakistanis-whose everyday lives are roiled by energy shortages and rendered meaningless from darkening economic prospects-but if they think they're doing well by the people of Pakistan, they should think again.

David Walters was the governor of Oklahoma from 1990 to 1994. He is the founder and president of Walters Power International, a power solutions firm doing business in over 14 countries, including the U.K. He is a partner in Pakistan Power Resources, LLC, and Walters Power International Limited owns a 51-megawatt power plant in Pakistan.

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When Problems are so Big & Your Strength is no Longer enough to CaRRy them, Don't Give uP; Because where your Strength Ends the Grace of Almighty ALLAH Begins

It is ironic that when the nation is taking small steps towards democracy, the newly formed Difa-e-Pakistan Council, an assembly of ultra right wing politicians and ex-ISI chief Gen Hamid Gul, are out to derail the process.

The councilclaims self righteousness in projecting itself as the defender of the state’s identity through religious and militaristic nationalism.Reason has been replaced by jingoism, justified in the name of faith.

Thecurrent political situation in Pakistan is the outcome of an earlier synthesis of Zia’s militarism and religious ideologies of Jamaat-e-Islami to combat the Soviet Empire. The American support of theanti-Soviet fighters in Afghanistan and financial and military aid to the Zia regimecreated a strain of Islamthat justifies the killing of Hindus in their temples, Christiansin their churches and Sunnis, Shias and Ahmadis in their mosques. This ideologyhas destroyed the civil fabric of our society. Pakistan has become intolerant of its own citizens and religious violence has reached new heights.

In the past, Faiz Ahmed Faizhadchallenged the religious orthodoxy in Pakistanin his famous poem ‘ Dua’or ‘Prayer’:

Jin kadeenpairvi-e-kizb-o-riyahaiunko
Himmat-e-kufrmillay, jurat-e-tahqeeqmillay

(To those who follow the religion of lies and hypocrisy
Give the courage of heresy and desire for truth)

Have we forgotten that our founder Muhammad Ali Jinnah had rejected religious intolerance? His speech of February, 1948, was a clear reflection of his dream:“Pakistan is not going to be a theocratic State to be ruled by priests with a divine mission. We have many non-Muslims ��" Hindus, Christians, and Parsis ��" but they are all Pakistanis. They will enjoy the same rights and privileges as any other citizens and will play their rightful part in the affairs of Pakistan.”

It is unfortunate that the tide of religious extremism has spread in every sector of our society and no attempts are being made by the intellectuals, state institutions, and politicians to get us out of this abyss.

Politicians must show courage and denounce religious fanatics.Nawaz Sharif, once a supporter of Gen Zia, should denounce extremism. Imran Khan should also be critical of the role the Taliban have played in creating the mess we are in. And President Zardari should make sincere attempts to make up for his party’s reported support for the Taliban in the past by going back to the PPP’s original liberal manifesto. In a recent episode of TV show AwamkiAdalaton Geo TV, 97 percent of the audience consisting of university students voted in favor of rejecting religious extremism.The leaders of Difa-e-Pakistan Council should listen to the call of the young. Some of these leaders had been part of the American war against the Soviets in Afghanistan. It is time to correct the mistakes of the past. Benazir Bhutto, Salmaan Taseer, Shahbaz Bhatti and many other politicians have died at the hands of extremism. The bloodshed must stop.

It is time we carefully study Muslim history and the significance of religiouspluralism,which wasprevalent in Muslim Spain, Muslim India and the Ottoman Empire. It is this religious pluralismthat became the cornerstone of scientific, literary and philosophical success of the Muslim civilization. According to the Holy Quran: “Let there be no compulsion in religion: Truth stands out clear from error;” (2:256).

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When Problems are so Big & Your Strength is no Longer enough to CaRRy them, Don't Give uP; Because where your Strength Ends the Grace of Almighty ALLAH Begins

Two years ago the US and Pakistan were touting a strategic, long term, relationship. Today they are barely able to admit a transactional, short term, one. The trouble started with the Raymond Davis affair in February last year, plumbed new depths with the US Navy Seal raid to kill Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad in May and hit rock bottom with the Salala incident last November. In each case, US action or policy notched up anti-Americanism in Pakistan, severely embarrassed the government and military and stiffened their resistance to American unilateralism in the region. Where do we go from here?

Pakistan's parliament has taken nearly six months to formulate its position on renegotiating terms of engagement with the US. The sticking point remains America's drone policy. The military is opposed to drone strikes against the Haqqani network in Waziristan because it is viewed as a long-term Pakistani "asset" in the shaping of Pakistani interests in Afghanistan. The public resents it as a blatant violation of Pakistan's honour and sovereignty. The elected government is unwilling to incur the wrath of both in an election year simply to appease the US, notwithstanding its obvious transactional losses in the shape of bilateral budgetary grants and aid, multilateral balance of payments support (especially from the IMF), and Coalition Support Funds, weapons and spares for the Pakistan military.

Meanwhile, the delay in reopening the NATO pipeline from Karachi to Kabul as a consequence of all this is cause for rising frustration and anger in Washington. It is also an election year in America - nearly 70% of the public wants most of "the boys" back home by 2014 as pledged by the Obama administration. But the Afghan endgame is not shaping up as strategized by the administration. The bilateral Qatar dialogue with the Taliban has stalled over last minute changes in pre-conditions by the Americans. The trilateral commission comprising Pakistan, Afghanistan and the US isn't making much headway in nudging the Taliban to come in from the cold. And the recent Taliban raids in Kabul have demonstrated their ability to launch a spring offensive to shake the Kabul regime and embarrass America. Last but not least, the Americans have had to "apologize" to Kabul for their insensitivity over the Quran burning incident and their unaccountability over the killing spree of one of their soldiers. Under the circumstances, the Obama administration has balked at offering another "apology" to appease Pakistan over the Salala incident because it might provoke the Republican opposition to contemn the Democrats and belittle them in the eyes of the "American people".

Fortunately, though, both Pakistan and America recognize the need to cooperate with each other in order to protect and enhance their respective interests. In Pakistan's case, this means an American acknowledgement of Pakistan's legitimate sovereignty claims (drone policy) coupled with maximum political space for the Pakhtun Afghan Taliban in any endgame-settlement. In America's case, it means a restoration of the NATO pipeline coupled with Pakistani prodding of the Afghan Taliban to cease fire and come to the negotiating table with America and Kabul.

Pakistan's civil-military leaders are grappling with a policy formulation that restores the NATO pipeline, restricts the drones and reduces the US Intel footprint in Pakistan to the minimal satisfaction of the Pakistani opposition and public in exchange for maximum economic and military assistance coupled with greater American flexibility vis a vis the Haqqani network. To facilitate this in the eyes of their own public, they are, however belatedly, claiming a cooperative role in helping America track down OBL last year - recent interviews by ISI officials and by the Pakistani defense minister testify to this belated initiative.

But the Pakistani military will have to make a forceful endorsement of this policy before the public than it has done so far if it is to nudge the government to own it unequivocally. It will also have to shield the Zardari government from crumbling in the face of an overly aggressive judiciary and opposition. Any regime change at this stage would jeopardize attempts to bring the US-Pak relationship back on track. A recent statement by the army chief, General Ashfaq Kayani, stressing the need for all institutions of the state not to transgress the limits of their constitutional authority, however ironic in view of the repeated culpability of the military on this score, is aimed at stabilizing the government.

The US must reciprocate in order to break the deadlock with Pakistan. It should agree to a more acceptable "management" of the drone programme in order to alleviate Pakistani sensitivities. It should fully back the trilateral dialogue with Pakistan and Afghanistan aimed at securing a "proper" seat for the Afghan Taliban in the power endgame instead of stressing a bilateral dialogue with the Taliban that creates distrust and unease in Kabul and Islamabad. It should not balk at an appropriate acknowledgment of its responsibility for Salala. And it should not be financially niggardly with Islamabad while being overly generous with Kabul.

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When Problems are so Big & Your Strength is no Longer enough to CaRRy them, Don't Give uP; Because where your Strength Ends the Grace of Almighty ALLAH Begins

Europe's debt crisis gets a new potential hero, with Germany once again cast in the role of villain.

The word on the lips of many of the 17 leaders of the eurozone following this week's meeting of heads of state -- the 18th summit, for those who are counting -- is Eurobonds. The ideas behind them, though, are out of sync. "Europe can have Eurobonds soon," Italian Prime Minister Mario Monti insisted. "[The] taboo surrounding Eurobonds has been lifted," European Council President Herman Von Rompuy declared. Not so fast, German Central Bank chief Jens Weidmann chimed in, "It is an illusion to think Eurobonds will solve the current crisis."

So, what exactly is a Eurobond? Briefly put, it is a tool intended to collectivize debt across all eurozone countries. Right now, to raise funds, eurozone members have only one option: selling national bonds. The market determines the value of these bonds based on each country's fiscal and economic health. The problem is that as some European countries were roiled by a national asset bubble (Ireland) or experienced a decade of lackluster economic growth while racking up unsustainable levels of debt (Greece and Portugal), they became unable to tap private markets, and their existing debt became prohibitively expensive to pay back. To service their debt, these countries had to receive funds from the International Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank, and the European Commission. But with the crisis deepening and spreading to Italy and Spain, it looks like another solution is required: the Eurobond.

In theory, Eurobonds would allow debt-ridden countries like Greece to borrow at more affordable interest rates. For instance, according to the Guardian newspaper, if Eurobonds were adopted, Portugal would see its annual debt repayments fall by as much as $18 billion or 9 percent of GDP. Other struggling European countries, such as Italy, Spain, or even France, would likely see similar savings.

But even as Eurobonds relieved the crisis in the periphery, they would increase the borrowing costs of countries in better financial health. For example, according to same article, if Eurobonds were introduced, Germany's borrowing costs would rise above the current eurozone average, costing Berlin an extra $62 billion, or 2 percent of GDP, per year to service its debt.

What prevents the wealthier countries, or more specifically Germany, from getting to yes on Eurobonds? In a nutshell, moral hazard: If Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain were allowed to borrow at lower rates, the market pressure to implement deep and difficult structural reforms would disappear.

The path to European redemption, according to German leaders and the European Central Bank, must only come through difficult reforms and fiscal discipline, not the same sort of low-cost borrowing that got the periphery countries into their current difficulties. This moral hazard argument was precisely why Germany demanded a fiscal compact treaty (which maintains strict fiscal debt and deficit limits) in December in return for additional bailout funds.

There are also legal arguments against Eurobonds. At present, EU treaties expressly forbid joint debt liabilities within the monetary union. The introduction of Eurobonds would require several treaty amendments and very likely ratification by eurozone members. Eurobonds are likely also unconstitutional in Germany, and would require at least 10 legal changes, according to the Guardian. Sorting out the legal and political challenges could take years.

The Eurobonds debate also extends to the form and scope of these bonds. Since 2000, there have been at least six different proposals on how to structure a Eurobond. To simplify, we place the Eurobond discussion into three separate categories:

Door No. 1 is the maximalist definition of Eurobonds, requiring that all 17 eurozone countries completely mutualize their current stock of debt and issue common bonds. In other words, they would ensure joint guarantees, meaning that each member state not only pays for itself but also the obligations of any other country -- say, Greece -- unable to meet its liabilities. Germany hates this door, but it would do the most to mitigate market pressures on the periphery.

Door No. 2 seeks to tackle the moral hazard question by creating a mix of national bonds and Eurobonds. The fundamental disagreement is on the degree of the mix. The greater the proportion of Eurobonds, the less market pressure a country faces, thereby discouraging demanding but necessary reforms. Too great a percentage of risky national bonds, and you have defeated the purpose. The most commonly discussed proposal is a 60/40 Eurobond/national bond split so that member states that stay within a ratio of 60 percent debt to GDP (a rule enshrined in the fiscal compact treaty) will receive Eurobonds; anything over that amount and market forces will punish. No one has a clue how to manage this scenario, let alone how long it will take to create the mechanisms to do it.

Door No. 3 is called the European Debt Redemption Fund. This variation would involve joint guarantees by the 17 eurozone countries for any national debt exceeding the 60 percent debt-to-GDP ratio. Each individual country would still be held accountable for the majority of its debt, and the European Commission would take responsibility only for a set period of time, after which member states would be required to reassume their liabilities.

The perfect Eurobonds would be an instrument with a mandate broad enough to halt the crisis but punitive enough to mitigate the risks of moral hazard -- a tall order. To say that you support Eurobonds could a mean variation of the aforementioned options, all fraught with complexity. If European decisionmaking to date tells us anything, it is that the least-common-denominator, minimalist option eventually will be selected, but too little and too late to effect change.

One variation on the Eurobonds idea that has gained traction in recent weeks is something called "project bonds" -- financial instruments backed by the EU budget that can be used to finance infrastructure projects relating to energy, transportation, communication, and information networks. The idea, which the European Parliament has reached agreement on, offers a way to stimulate growth in the peripheral eurozone countries as they continue to implement structural reforms. Promisingly, $293 million of EU capital has been reserved for this effort, with more on the way should it prove successful.

But while project bonds can help attract private-sector investment, they cannot be a substitute for it. It is likely that these project bonds would only support about 10 projects throughout the EU until 2014 -- hardly a panacea.

Moreover, collectivized debt in the form of a Eurobond won't reduce the overall levels of European sovereign debt, solve Europe's structural problems, right trade deficits, improve competitiveness, stimulate long-term growth, or reverse public indebtedness. And that is exactly what countries like Greece and Spain need to do, as painful as it will be.

What Eurobonds can do, given the right formulation, is stall an escalating crisis -- an outcome that would be greeted with a sigh of relief in Washington, Beijing, and other world capitals in the near term. But the crisis will only come back with a greater vengeance, likely consuming Europe's stronger economies with it.

Of course, at the end of the day, the decision on whether or not to introduce Eurobonds rests with the area's strongest economy: Germany. To put it another way, is Germany willing to transfer its wealth, increase its borrowing costs, and increase inflation to save indebted European nations, or isn't it?

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When Problems are so Big & Your Strength is no Longer enough to CaRRy them, Don't Give uP; Because where your Strength Ends the Grace of Almighty ALLAH Begins