The arrogance of power
By
Stephen M. Walt

Will the U.S. and the rest of the P5+1 manage to turn a potential diplomatic breakthrough with Iran into another counterproductive failure? It's too soon to tell, but betting on failure has been the smart wager in the past.

The Baghdad talks between Iran and the P5+1 apparently got a lot of serious issues on the table, but didn't achieve a breakthrough, let alone an agreement. The main reason is the hardline position adopted by the United States and its partners, and especially our refusal to grant any sort of sanctions relief. The parties will resume discussions in Moscow in June.

From a purely strategic point of view, this situation is pretty simple. Iran is not going to give up its right to enrich uranium. Period. If the West insists on a full suspension, there won't be a deal. It's that simple. At the same time, the U.S. and the rest of the P5+1 would like to maximize the amount of time it would take Iran to "break out" and assemble a weapon. The best way to do that is to limit Iran's stockpile of enriched uranium to concentrations of less than 5 percent. If Iran insists on keeping a large supply of 20 percent enriched uranium on hand, we'll walk too.

So there you have the outline of the deal--we accept low-level enrichment and lift sanctions, and Iran gives up the 20% stuff--although there are other details what will have to be worked out too. Frankly, given where we are today, it's surprising the U.S. isn't grabbing that deal with both hands. Why? Because unless the U.S. is willing to invade and occupy Iran (and we aren't) or unless we are willing to bomb its facilities over and over (i.e., every time Iran rebuilds them), there is no way to prevent Iran from having the potential to obtain nuclear weapons if it decides it wants to. They know how to build centrifuges, folks, and the rest of the technology isn't that hard to master. So the potential is there, and there's no realistic way to eliminate it.

The smart strategy, therefore, is to keep them as far away from the bomb as possible, and to reduce Iran's incentive to go all the way to an actual weapon. And the best way to do that -- duh! -- is to take the threat of military force off the table and to stop babbling about the need for regime change. Also bear in mind that Iran's leaders have repeatedly said they don't want to build a bomb, and Supreme Leader Ali Khameini has repeatedly declared nuclear weapons to be "haram" -- forbidden by Islam. Maybe that's just empty or deceitful talk, but violating a statement like that is a tricky move for a theocratic regime. And maybe he's saying exactly what he really thinks.

While we're being realistic, let's keep a few other bedrock realities in mind.

Right now, the United States has thousands of sophisticated nuclear weapons in its arsenal. Israel has a couple of hundred. Four other members of the P5+1 have nuclear weapons as well, and the fifth member -- Germany -- has had access to nuclear weapons through "dual key" arrangements with the United States.

Right now, the United States is far and away the world's greatest military power, with no enemies nearby. Israel is the strongest military power in the Middle East. We spend close to a trillion dollars on various national security programs each year; Iran spends maybe $15 billion, tops. Iran is a minor military threat at best.

Right now, the United States and Israel are actively engaged in a variety of covert actions directed against Iran, and the United States still have military forces and bases all around that country. Top U.S. officials, Senators and Congressmen have openly called for "regime change" in Iran. And then we wonder why, oh why, Iran might be wary of us, and why some Iranians might think that having an effective deterrent to counter our vast military superiority might be a good idea.

Right now, the United States and its allies have imposed increasingly punishing economic sanctions against Iran. Iran has no way to retaliate in kind, no matter how its leaders may bluster about oil and gas embargoes.

Since World War II, the United States has fought at least eight wars (Korea, Vietnam, Panama, Grenada, Iraq War I, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Gulf War II), and we've intervened in other countries countless times. Israel has fought at least six wars since independence (the 1956 Suez War, 1967 Six Day War, 1969-70 War of Attrition, 1973 October War, 1982 invasion of Lebanon, and 2006 war in Lebanon), and it started the wars in 1956, 1967, 1982, and 2006. It has also conducted innumerable cross-border raids and covert actions. Iran has fought one war during that same period -- against Iraq -- and only because Saddam Hussein attacked. It has also provided material support to groups like Hamas and Hezbollah, but its overseas activities are paltry compared with ours.

Yet it is these two comparatively powerful and nuclear-armed nations are insisting that Iran cannot under any circumstances have its own nuclear weapons -- which Iran has repeatedly said it does not seek -- and Israel's leaders are declaring that Iran must give up even the potential to acquire them. I have no trouble understanding why the P5+1 and Israel might prefer such a world, but what I don't understand is why they think Iran will ever agree to it. I mean, I'd like to live in a world where anyone making more than a $1 million per year had to send me ten percent of their income, but it would be foolish for me to plan my life on that basis.

For the past decade, the US and its allies have been insisting that Iran suspend enrichment. Back when we started making that demand (in 2001 or so), Iran had no centrifuges in operation. We've continued to issue these ultimatums for more than a decade, and Iran now has thousands of centrifuges in operation and a stockpile of enriched uranium that we're now trying to get them to give up. In short, our take-it-or-leave-it approach to this problem has been a complete failure, and you'd think those in charge of U.S. policy would have recognized this by now.

As I noted awhile back, the current impasse reflects a significant shift in our approach to arms control. In the past, we understood that arms control was a diplomatic process of mutual compromise, designed to produce a situation that was ultimately better for both sides. Arms control agreements didn't get the participants everything they might want, but they worked if each side understood that they'd be better off striking a reasonable deal. Today, "arms control" consists of our making unilateral demands, and insisting that other side give us what we want before we'll seriously consider what they want. It reflects what late Senator J. William Fulbright called the "arrogance of power," the tendency for powerful states to think they can dictate to others with near-impunity. This approach hasn't worked yet with Iran, and it's not likely to work in the future.

MAKHACHKALA, Russia – The officers nervously cocked their rifles as the crowd began to swell. The Kirovsky police station in the capital city of Russia's Dagestan region was now under siege. But the angry cohort outside the station walls on May 27 wasn't composed of the bearded, gun-toting militants one might expect in this insurgency-racked region, but a crowd of enraged women in hijabs and ankle-length dresses. It wasn't the first angry mob the officers had faced down, but a crowd of only women was unprecedented. Their dry faces wrinkled by sleepless nights, the women stormed the courtyard looking for their husbands and sons, locked in the basement cells, where they were thought to be beaten or, worse, tortured with electricity.

Yelling at the top of their lungs, the women, mostly Salafi Muslims, demanded that police let in their lawyers. Desperate to make sure that one of the women's sons, a 19-year-old named Abdurakhman Magomedov, detained a few hours earlier, was not hidden in a trunk of a police car, the women blocked the driveway. They yelled that they would blow themselves up if the authorities didn't answer their demands. After a few phone calls and text messages went out, hundreds of the women's infuriated male relatives and friends drove up to the police checkpoint. With iPads and cell phones held aloft, they began taking photos of the men in uniform.

The Dagestan insurgency began with the spillover of militant activity following Russia's harsh crackdown on neighboring Chechnya in the late 1990s. Although the region is traditionally Sufi, militant Salafi imams have been making inroads in the North Caucasus since the collapse of the Soviet Union. In recent years, the region has been the scene of a vicious cycle of violence and repression: police and special forces have arrested thousands of young Salafists throughout the North Caucasus republics, which in turn has driven more young men -- and increasingly women -- to various jihadi groups that aim to establish an Islamic state encompassing the entire North Caucasus. With thousands of active fighters, the insurgency in Dagestan is now reportedly the largest in the Caucasus.

In Makhachkala, frustration and rage have been growing over the 17 people abducted, presumably by authorities, since the beginning of this year. Dagestan, always one spark away from fire, is heating up -- a bad sign in this region, where 254 Russian police officers died in insurgency-related incidents last year, far more than the number of U.S. casualties in Afghanistan.

"Women should be sitting at home cooking soup for men, under sharia law," the police officers sarcastically shouted at the angry crowd. The comment was the last straw for Zhanna Ismailova. Two of her five sons had been abducted from their workplaces that month, she said. Men in black uniforms, who introduced themselves as members of the Federal Security Service (FSB) took them in on suspicion of militant activity. One of her sons, Arslan, 34, had been released after two days and has gone into hiding. Taking out her cell phone, Ismailova showed me pictures of her son's wounds, including pictures of his feet, burned by what she said were electric shocks. The FSB men questioned Arslan about twin suicide attacks on May 3 that killed 13 and injured more than 100 people in Makhachkala. Ismailova's youngest son, Rashid, is still missing. "This brutality and Moscow's idiotic politics is the reason for the war," Ismailova said.

At one point, she slipped past guards and ran into the building, yelling: "Show me immediately the cells where you beat our children!" Outside, hundreds of her supporters, now face to face with a unit of special-forces troops in black balaclavas, were raising their hands in the air and chanting: "God is Great! God is Great!"

To most Russians, the scene would probably look more like Syria or Libya than their own country. State television rarely broadcasts images or even official comments about the increasing human rights abuses by the FSB or police in Dagestan. It's a part of Russia that newly returned President Vladimir Putin does not want to talk about now. Meanwhile, Dagestan is quietly turning from police action to the kind of shooting war against Islamic insurgents that Putin waged with brutal efficiency in Chechnya at the beginning of his first presidential term.

"Instead of reforming the court system, so independent courts could prosecute those who abduct and execute people in this part of Russia, Moscow assigns thugs, men known for their criminal background, to leading positions at security agencies, who pay million-dollar kickbacks to the insurgency in order to save their lives," said Gagzhimurad Omarov, a former member of parliament from Dagestan who stepped down last fall and has now joined the opposition. It's a paradox that Moscow refuses to address. At the same time Putin has declared a zero-tolerance policy for militant activity in Dagestan, the officials he has appointed are paying protection money to the insurgency, which has often targeted Russian officials.

"Silence and secrecy is Putin's style. We never heard any proper commentary clarifying why he canceled the trip to G-8 summit. It does not surprise us that we hear nothing of his strategy to put an end to violence in Dagestan," senior human rights activist Svetlana Gannushkina said.

Gannushkina has been focusing on the North Caucuses for years, calling and Skyping associates in the region day and night. A member of ex-President Dmitry Medvedev's human rights council, she reported to the Kremlin for the past three years about conditions in the Caucuses. She got little reaction to her increasingly dire warnings while Medvedev was in charge, but with Putin back in his presidential seat, Gannushkina quit the council along with other highly respected human rights defenders.

The night before the angry gathering outside the Kirovsky police station, Gannushkina, members of the human rights NGO Memorial, and a parliamentary committee on constitutional law and civil society stayed up all night in Moscow, trying to save the lives of two young men, three women, and two babies in a house in Makhachkala surrounded by federal forces. The inhabitants of the house were suspected of participating in the Islamist underground. Gannushkina and her team tried for hours to convince the commander of the operation to let the women and children out and allow the men to surrender. But in the end, federal forces raided the house, killing one of the men, who was indeed armed; keeping the three women in custody for a day; and arresting and beating the other man at Kirovsky station. It was this arrest that precipitated the demonstration at the station the next day.

The situation at the station quickly spiraled out of control. Soon enough, blood was on the pavement. Several Salafi men grabbed this reporter's notebook and camera, but returned them. A reporter for a web news portal went down in a scrum of fists, was pulled out and rescued by police, and later flew to Moscow to receive treatment for shock and bruises. The police started making arrests. The crowd threw chunks of pavement, hitting one policeman in the forehead, leaving a bloody gash. Before the crowd dispersed, 11 more people were in cells in Kirovsky station.

It was just another day in the violent conflict that most Russians aren't even aware is taking place within their own country.

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When Problems are so Big & Your Strength is no Longer enough to CaRRy them, Don't Give uP; Because where your Strength Ends the Grace of Almighty ALLAH Begins

Behead All Those Who Insult The Prophet (PBUH)

The violent protests that took place over the last week in response to a Youtube video defaming the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) were carried out by a small fraction of Muslims. While the law has well established methods across the globe to punish individuals for rioting, especially when it causes deaths or substantial property damage, the more difficult question is whether the video that inspired the riots was a valid exercise of free speech.

The US judiciary has an expansive view of free speech, which includes the right to offend others, but it has granted the government excessive authority to limit certain civil liberties for the sake of national security in the aftermath of 9/11. When one considers the global reach of speech by American citizens to the rest of the world and the negative impact it has had on US interests overseas, an argument can be made that the realm of free speech should be reexamined to prohibit extreme forms of hate-speech.

In a classic constitutional analysis, the video that caused riots across the Muslim world was a permissible exercise of free speech. The US Supreme Court protects the right to insult or offend others. As they explained in Terminilo v City of Chicago, "freedom of speech undoubtedly means freedom to express views that challenge deep-seated, sacred beliefs and to utter sentiments that may provoke resentment."

However, as Justice Murphy explained, there are some forms of speech that "are no essential part of any exposition of ideas" and that their social value is "clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality." In Chaplinksy v State of Connecticut, the court stated that freedom of speech does not sanction "incitement to riot or that religious liberty connotes the privilege to exhort others to physical attack upon those belonging to another sect. When clear and present danger of riot, disorder, or other immediate threat to public safety, peace, or order, appears, the power of the state to prevent or punish is obvious."

Historically, judges focus on the physical "proximity" of the speaker to his riotous audience. Therefore, the court's approach to free speech is limited to addressing situations in which hateful speeches are delivered in public places or offensive pamphlets are distributed.

Offensive speech is now much more mobile than ever before, but jurisprudence has not caught up to the speed of the internet. To keep pace with globalization, the US government has increased overseas involvement by investing billions in the creation and maintenance of embassies. This is especially true for Afghanistan, where the US is also actively engaged in military operations. These phenomena have led some to question whether the US should reexamine freedom of speech in relation to hate-speech and incitement of violence.

In a worthy law review article entitled "Shouting Fire in a Global Theater," Timothy Zick states that speech that "originates inside the United States but crosses territorial borders may cause violence in distant locations, upset delicate foreign policy objectives and relationships, and aid foreign enemies."

Mr Zick points to several examples of Islamophobia in the US that have directly impacted American interests abroad. In the case of Pastor Terry Jones, American military generals pleaded with him to stop his plan of burning a copy of the Holy Quran, as it would cause a blowback of violence against troops in Afghanistan. Unfortunately, the apprehensions were correct. Jones' actions incited violent protests across the world, damaging US credibility and safety.

This was repeated to a greater extent in the protests that followed the release of a trailer for the movie "Innocence of Muslims." Hundreds poured out to protest, many organized by extremist groups like Al Qaeda, to launch violent attacks on US embassies in Sudan to Egypt. The cost was all the more apparent in Libya, where career-diplomat Chris Stevens was killed along with several colleagues due to an attack on a US consulate in Benghazi.

The video gave extremist groups the political ammunition needed to drum up support for violent protests in front of American embassies. As a result, the film's creator, Nakoula Basseley Nakoula, went into hiding and is currently being questioned by the FBI. Nakoula stated that his intent in creating the film was to trick Muslims into watching it due to the innocuous title and incite a response. One of the film's producers is Steve Klein, a Vietnam War veteran who distributes anti-Islamic propaganda and trained a militia in California to prepare for a holy war with Muslim "sleeper cells in America."

When asked whether he would have withdrawn his support for the film knowing the violent reaction, Klein asserted, "I didn't incite them. They're pre-incited, they're pre-programmed to do this." Most importantly, Klein admitted that "we went into this knowing that something like this would happen." This is significant because it shows that Klein and Nakoula's intent in creating the film was to create a controversy and perhaps violent reaction so they could discredit Muslims in their community, and around the world.

For its part, the US government has resoundingly rejected the video and its creators. A joint statement from the FBI and Homeland Security warned that "the risk of violence could increase both at home and abroad as the film continues to gain attention," and "we judge that violent extremist groups in the United States could exploit anger over the film to advance their recruitment efforts."

In a decision during World War I, the US Supreme Court stated in Schneck v US, that "when a nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight." In the aftermath of 9/11, the Supreme Court has deferred to the decisions of Congress and the president concerning national security, even when they limit freedoms. As such, the president could potentially have the power to punish hate-speech if it could be proven that the speech would directly affect American international interests.

In Holder v Humanitarian Law Project, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction under the Patriot Act of a group providing legal advice to separatist factions in Sri Lanka and Turkey. The US government designated these factions as terrorist groups and argued that offering legal advice to them amounted to "material support" which was prohibited under the Patriot Act.

The group challenged the conviction on grounds that the law violated their right to freedom of speech, which the court rejected. The court explained that while Congress could not ban independent forms of expression that might assist terrorist groups, they could limit expression that would "materially benefit" banned extremist organizations due to the effect on American interests abroad.

Justice Roberts wrote that 'material support' "helps lend legitimacy to foreign terrorist groups - legitimacy that makes it easier for those groups to persist, to recruit members, and to raise funds - all of which facilitate more terrorist attacks." The controversies created by Jones and Nakoula have certainly lent legitimacy for extremists recruiting fighters in the Middle East, who use their radical hate-speech to mischaracterize Americans as a whole.

If the Supreme Court is willing to allow the punishment of a legal aid group that was assisting Sri Lankan and Turkish separatists, it seems logical that the government could prosecute individuals like Terry Jones, Steve Klein and Nakoula for publishing material that "materially supported" the cause of extremists like Al Qaeda.

President Obama and several other high level government officials have already stated that the publication of anti-Islamic hate speech has materially affected missions abroad by inspiring more extremists to join forces against the US. But the US government will be on a slippery slope if they broaden the definition of "material support" too greatly. They should reserve prosecutions against hate-speech to very limited circumstances where a connection can be shown to national security.

By
Waris Husain

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When Problems are so Big & Your Strength is no Longer enough to CaRRy them, Don't Give uP; Because where your Strength Ends the Grace of Almighty ALLAH Begins

As US ally in war on terror being fought in Afghanistan for the last 10 years, Pakistan-US relations have been ridden with mutual suspicions and lack of trust in each other. The US has been accusing Pakistan of not doing enough despite the fact that Pakistan has committed large strength of its troops to fight terrorists in FATA and Swat areas (almost equal to coalition forces in Afghanistan) and suffered colossal human and economic losses in the process.

US secret attack on Osama’s hideout in Abbottabad city without prior information of Pakistan further enlarged the trust deficit. Attack on Pakistan’s Salala security check post by the US troops killing 24 military personnel was the worst incident as a result of which, in protest, Pakistan closed ground supply routes to US and NATO forces deployed in Afghanistan. After about 5 months closure of supply routes US Secretary of State, rendered apology on behalf of the US and the routes were opened by Pakistan and mutual relations started improving. Now as a result of meeting of Pakistan’s Foreign Minister and US secretary of State both countries have agreed to re-start negotiations of the working groups which had been constituted for negotiating establishment of strategic partnership between two countries. But, despite these efforts the speed of improvement of relations is very slow and trust deficit still prevails which is required to be addressed on priority basis as both countries have to work together to bring peace in Afghanistan preferably before completion of withdrawal of US and NATO forces, by end of 2014.

Pakistani politico-military leadership, intellectual community and common people very well understand that keeping good relations with the US is very important for Pakistan. But what they want is that future relations with the US should be based on respecting Pakistan’s sovereignty by the US and honouring each other’s national interests. While the US wants to pursue its wider national interests as a super power it should also realize that Pakistan as US ally has also to protect its interests particularly the core national interests in the light of its constitution and aspirations of elected representatives and people. Strategic cooperation cannot be a one sided and zero sum game as probably US thinks in case of Pakistan as an ally in war on terror. Strategic community in Pakistan considers that Pakistan-US relations can be improved speedily but being a super power some meaningful and major initiatives have to be taken by the US with a view to addressing Pakistan’s concerns and turning Pakistani public opinion in its favour by addressing their expectations. In this context following suggestions and policy options are offered for the US policy makers.

US may announce a concrete plan to help meet Pakistan’s energy needs with in shortest possible time since this shortage has very badly affected Pakistan’s industrial sector and also the common people. US should announce a nuclear deal for Pakistan like India. As a consequence, majority of Pakistani people is likely to consider the US a friendly country because it will end their perception that the US is after Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. This is because people consider that nuclear deterrence is the only safety measure against India’s aggressive designs. US should declare provision of substantial economic aid to Pakistan (without strings or restrictions) for ending Pakistan’s debts, bailing out its economy due to losses suffered on account of war on terror, then Pakistani people will fully support initiatives of the Pakistan’s government in brokering a successful peace deal in Afghanistan.

The US should give assurances to Pakistan that it will not give any military foothold to India in Afghanistan and will also not accept Indian strategy of exploiting its strategic partnership with it against Pakistan’s interests with respect to Kashmir dispute and Afghanistan. It is already being done by India by terming Kashmiri’s freedom struggle as terrorism and by having increased foothold in Afghanistan; she is destabilising Balochistan using its consulates in Afghanistan. While Pakistani people are not against US- India friendship, they want that the US should consider Pakistan equally important in this region and should give equal treatment to it. The US should not insist on Pakistan to do more and may cooperate with it to carry out anti terrorist operations according to its own internal dynamics and environment. It is also not justified to say that Pakistan is providing sanctuaries to terrorists in FATA. For the last few years Taliban are controlling about 60% of Afghanistan’s territory and the US and NATO forces have not been able to expel them. Should it be said that they are providing sanctuaries to terrorists there as the US says to Pakistan regarding Taliban’s presence in FATA? In this context US is also not justified in saying that Taliban are coming from FATA to attack coalition forces in Afghanistan.

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When Problems are so Big & Your Strength is no Longer enough to CaRRy them, Don't Give uP; Because where your Strength Ends the Grace of Almighty ALLAH Begins

Malala, 14, is the new face of Pakistan- a country that has persistently been pushed as the hotbed of militant Islam. She is not only the latest victim of an extremely criticised brand of Muslim faith that supports the totalitarian interpretation of Islamic law, but also a new hope for a whole generation of moderate and tolerant Pakistanis. A segment of local Pakistani and international media has reported that this teenage blogger was attacked for being vocal on women education in a primitive society that does not support women’s equal role in society as compared to men.

Yet, the Taliban, who attacked Malala has clearly stated that she was targeted because of her pioneer role in preaching secularism and moderation in Muslim society. They have also mentioned that whosoever will commit so in the future he will be targeted . The latest media reports say they have threated the injured girl’s parents to kill them. The Taliban were described as eliminated from this area after the massive clean-up operation by Pakistani security agencies. But, this incident has proved that they were still operating in heavily guarded zone and Pakistan’s security apparatus was not fully aware of the situation on the ground. Over the years, it has been the favourite issue for global media that the Taliban has a popular support among local masses, particularly in Northern Pakistan. Now, some of the media pandits claim that this attack seems to be launched to check the popularity of the Taliban movement in these areas. In fact, if they were hoping for more populist division in Pakistan with the attack on an innocent girl, they appear to have underestimated.

During last two days, world has witnessed a large-scale protest and anger by all Pakistanis including political parties, civil society and media that shows a different story. Even those who have been vocal and deeply involved in creating confusion about extremely debated blasphemy laws have denounced this appalling incident. Such a popular and collective sympathy for Malala has slapped on the faces of those who were sceptical about this country’s existence as a tolerant society. Now, Pakistan people are confident to ask questions about totalitarian approach in defining political and ambitious aspects of Muslim faith. They are wondering whether it is enough to change deep-seated and orthodox sentiments about the role religion must play in running the affairs of a modern state.

Some of the political faces on the helm of affairs in Pakistan are still endorsing the views that banning women from education, publicly executing those who do not practice Islam in their daily life and killing innocents have something inherent to Islam.It’s so encouraging that mainstream media in Pakistan has applauded Malala’s side of the story. It has also been reported that some of the media houses have been put on hit-lists of the Taliban for exceedingly advocating the Malala cause. It is now clear that why the Taliban attempted to silence the voice of 14-year-girl. It was fear, not faith, which drove them to attack this gallant girl. After all, she was writing a blog for BBC about her life under the Taliban and was the recipient of the national peace prize in 2011.

Some of the critics of media have raised objection on not highlighting the critical and sad plight of other girls who were injured with Malala. Yes, they need to be given the best possible care and treatment from the state and they also rightly deserve the prayers and well wishes of millions of Pakistanis as they keep for Malala. They could be as important as Malala. It is not Malala who climbed heights of national pride and international applaud after a cowardly attack on her life; it is her message that is gaining popularity and showing the accurate face of Pakistan. They all are on streets, on TV screens, newspaper pages and everywhere; all saying Malala, you are not alone. Millions of voices of fellow Pakistanis are with you. They have a shared stance that in the war against terrorism they are not with the Taliban.

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When Problems are so Big & Your Strength is no Longer enough to CaRRy them, Don't Give uP; Because where your Strength Ends the Grace of Almighty ALLAH Begins

Missing things in India-Pakistan dialogue
By
Amit Ranjan

On May 25-26, 2012, once again, India and Pakistan were engaged in a bilateral dialogue. Prior to it, umpteen times they have carried on this process but have failed to resolve even a single contentious issue out of many lying between them.

The mother of all conflicts between the two is the present status of the Kashmir Valley, which both of them want to change in their own favour. All other issues have erupted and could not be resolved because of hyper-nationalism generated by chauvinistic forces on both sides of the border on this one issue. On the Kashmir issue, the two countries have tried and tested all means, from multilateral negotiations to bilateral engagement. They even went for various forms of war like ‘total war’, ‘limited war’, ‘proxy war’, etc. However, despite all those steps, the status of the Kashmir Valley is as it was in January 1949, when a ceasefire was declared by the United Nations to stop the first Indo-Pak war of 1948. In 1954, 1963, 1972 and 2008, this issue, as claimed by negotiators and the media, was almost resolved.

Besides Kashmir, other contentious issues between them are not as complicated as the two sides are projecting them. Ayesha Siddiqa wrote in Indian Express that issues like the Sir Creek estuary and demilitarisation of Siachen glacier are the easier ones to resolve. Still various rounds of talks over the years have taken place on these issues, with no results.

Now the question arises why India and Pakistan, in spite of engaging in various rounds of talks and negotiations, have failed to resolve even a single and or even the easiest issue between them. The fault lies in both their intentions and their approach to negotiations. For both countries, negotiations are a zero-sum game and instead of resolving the issue at hand, they look for drawing relative gains from any sort of outcome or result. Against this form of negotiation, there is another one that has led to the breaking of the ice between the archrivals. In this form, the centre of attention is the ‘issue or problem’. The negotiating team focuses upon resolving it, rather than having relative gains out of the solution. In this, both parties make certain compromises and try to adjust to the grievances of the other. During their talks, particularly on Kashmir and on other issues too, the negotiators from the two countries adopt the former method instead of the latter. The Indus Water Treaty, to share the water from the Indus River System could be successfully negotiated and signed because during the eight-year long negotiations, the focus was on catchment areas and not on the two countries.

Then they are still practising a structured form of diplomacy where the talks are hierarchical in nature. It starts with a joint-secretary or a secretary level, then a ministerial level and finally, heads of the states meet to give their final authority. Many times, both countries have started the talks at a joint secretary or a secretary level; a few times, ministers have met too, but less than a few times, political heads have formally shared the dais together. This means, somewhere or the other, there is an institutional conflict and lackadaisical attitude towards the talks. In the past, either the political heads or the bureaucrats were not very supportive of this bilateral negotiation process. The Agra summit was derailed due to that; the infamous verbal fight between Foreign Ministers S M Krishna and Shah Mahmood Qureshi at Islamabad occurred in front of the global media. Both times, it was ‘insiders’ who set up a plot to foil the dialogue.

Finally, a negotiation is a process that takes time. The amount of time depends upon the nature of the political relationship the two countries share. To get some result out of the negotiations and to boost a dialogue, the negotiating countries adopt certain Confidence Building Measures (CBMs). These CBMs reduce the trust deficit and lay the foundations for further engagement. The problem between India and Pakistan is that the CBMs between the two take longer than the required time period to take off. For example, even a simple thing like the granting of the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status to India by Pakistan is taking a long time. More often than not, these CBMs are suspended whenever they are being tested due to some untoward incidents.

To conclude, it is better for the two countries if they are serious to resolve a few of their disputes to move issue by issue, instead of going for a comprehensive dialogue on many issues in one go. Only after resolving one, they should move to another. Secondly, all issues should be treated as an independent entity, with not even an iota of linkage with another. Finally, continuity should be there in negotiations. Channels of communication must not be closed even during the worst times. The leadership must learn the art of not succumbing to chauvinistic forces.

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When Problems are so Big & Your Strength is no Longer enough to CaRRy them, Don't Give uP; Because where your Strength Ends the Grace of Almighty ALLAH Begins

Afghanistan: hope, fantasy and failure!
By
Air Commodore (R) Khalid Iqbal

While the people of Pakistan prayed for earlyrecovery of Malala, they were awe-struck by the frenzy created about the incident. Where people die in dozens each day as a result of terrorist attacks, singling out Malala for over glorification was rather intriguing. Our media, especially its electronic component gave a helping hand to their pay masters; or may be it sleep walked into the trap. Sense of proportion was lost, caution was thrown to wind. It appeared asif a high profile headof state had been critically attacked. The only other example of such hype was Raymond Davis case. National leadership fumbled in case of Raymond Davis and had to face the humiliation of Abbottabad attack.

This time the Malala incident was being exploited for pressuring Pakistan to undertake military operation in North Waziristan. Once again, national leadership was posturing to cede space and fall into the trap of initiating a military operation. Hopefully, the strategic fiasco has been averted, at least for the time being. Our political government which carries an unfortunate stigma of coming into power as an outcome of a deal underwritten by America appeared more than keen to improve its credentials with its mentor before the next elections.

Alas! Marc Grossman must have expected unanimous parliamentary resolution in support of military operation prior to his arrival. Apparently, there is no Military action in the offing in North Waziristan Agency. National consensus does not exist. Opinion is divided on political lines; hence a harmonious public view is unlikely to emerge.

Problem is not with the public opinion in Pakistan alone.As the American public's disillusionment with fighting the war deepens, the precarious consensus in Congress and mainstream policy circles is also melting down. As a consequence, a peaceful Afghanistan may be a lost cause— at least in short to medium timeframe. In a recent editorial note, the ‘New York Times’ has suggested: “it is time for United States forces to leave Afghanistan… the United States will not achieve even President Obama’s narrowing goals, and prolonging the war will only do more harm...it is time for United States forces to leave Afghanistan"—now, not in 2014.

Vice President Biden is quite clear on his viewof Afghanistan policy: America's combat commitment to President Karzai's governmentends in 2014. "We are leaving in 2014.” For him, "It is the responsibility of the Afghans to take care of their own security..."It's their responsibility, not America's." Biden is of the opinion thatwithdrawal is not conditional. He argues that America's core objective to oust the Taliban is "almost completed. . . . We've decimated al- Qaeda central. We have eliminated Osama bin Laden. That was our purpose." Republican challengers facean even more daunting task, since they are determined not "to lose the gains we've gotten" in the fighting: "We want to make sure that the Taliban does not come back in and give al Qaeda a safe haven,...that we give our commanders what theysay they need to make it successful."

vice presidential candidate Paul Ryan affirmed. Top brass no longer talks of winning but of leaving an Afghan force capable of withstanding the insurgency. Mitt Romney does not have the option of directly confronting Obama's popular approach of disengagement. If Romney wins, he would inherit the conflict at the force level maintained by President Bush. Obama has already undone his sin of surge. Romney envisages continuation of existing political dispensation in Kabul, free of Taliban influence, as a vital national interest, one that could justify continued military engagement. However, it is not clear as tohow prolonging the military presence in Afghanistan could succeed when Afghan public hostility to the foreign occupation is growing.

Obama-Biden position indicates that their administration has no plans to leave a stay-behind force in Afghanistan after 2014 and is only paying lip service to this effect to keep things calm while they hasten to withdraw. At the same time Obama has dubiously kept open the door for a negotiated peace settlement with the Taliban. Romney’s view about continued prosecution of the Afghan war is reinforced by his obstinate opposition to negotiations with the Taliban insurgency leadership. This means a Romney administration has only a single option: a continued Afghan war between the Kabul coalition and its Taliban opponents.

Some analysts believe a US withdrawal without stabilising Afghanistan will plunge the country into a civil war. However, other viewpoint holds that: the USpresence itself is contributing to instability; and the US isin no position to stabilise Afghanistan; whenever occupation forces leave, Afghanistan will invariably go through another round of civil war; and, the longer the foreign forces stay the greater would be the intensity such civil war. Hardly a month passes by when someone important in Western capitals does not lower the bar on attainment of war aims in Afghanistan. A few days ago, NATO secretary general hinted that a retreat from Afghanistan could come sooner than expected in2014. This is a ‘generous’climb down from NATO’s
earlier stance of “conditions on the ground dictating the pace of withdrawal from Afghanistan.”

Being a son of the soil, President Karzai is convinced that the Taliban cannot be defeated. He wants a quick reconciliation with them. In his desperation, Karzai continues jockeying between the two extremes of calling Pakistan a special friend and declaring it an adversary.

Afghan Army is so plagued with desertions that it has to replace a third of its entire force every year. That implies that a third of the Afghan Army perpetually consists of first year recruits fresh from a three months’ nominal military training formality. And tens of thousands of men with military training are put atloose ends each year. They are inducted into an environment endemic with militants who have ample of military equipment to rearm these deserters as their comrades at arms. Afghan deserters complain of corruption amongtheir officers, poor food and equipment, indifferent medical care, Taliban intimidation of their families and, probably most troublingly, a lack of faith in the army’s ability to fightthe insurgents after the American military
withdraws.

Afghan army commanders complain of lack ofadequate capability and capacity; they fear that Taliban will eventually gain ground. Attacks on Afghan military have dwindled because the army has refused to patrol far out of their bases, even though the Taliban presence in such areas has increased. Devastating spate of recent “green on blue” incidents (or “insider killings”), has been the last straw, to sap the ISAF’s morale as well.

Pakistan has faced a set of overlapping crises in the past several decades due to its location at a geopolitical crossroads. In addition to unrelenting hegemonic aspirations of India, Pakistan has had to deal with the spill-over of major conflicts in Afghanistan. Moreover, Pakistan has been the chief victim of terrorism. Pakistan has suffered more than 10,000 military casualtieswhile fighting terror. Even the ISI has suffered 350 deaths, a higher toll than the CIA has suffered in its entire history.

Under these murky circumstances when there is lack of clarity about the ‘Way Forward’ for resolving the Afghan conflict, Pakistan needs to follow a cautious approach rather becoming over enthusiast tojump into the North Waziristan fire.

Source---The Nation

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When Problems are so Big & Your Strength is no Longer enough to CaRRy them, Don't Give uP; Because where your Strength Ends the Grace of Almighty ALLAH Begins

The invitation by the Group of 7 countries (G7) to 12 more countries from various regions of the world and the EU and transform themselves into a Group of 20 countries (G20) is indeed a welcome step. The economic power relations have changed considerably in the past decade or so and it was therefore natural that the global governance architecture should begin to reflect this new reality. The efforts of the G20 in tackling the 2008/9 global crisis did indeed reinforce the efficacy of this initiative.
The question, going forward, is to examine whether G20 could become an effective coordinating mechanism for maintaining stable conditions in the global economy to promote sustainable and equitable growth for improving the living standards of the majority of the 7 million inhabitants while holding inflation under control and generating gainful employment opportunities. The other objectives the G20 would have to set for its’ self would be how to reduce global imbalances, keep the markets open for trade, and reform the international financial system. There seems to be a broad consensus on this agenda setting but the anxiety is whether it possesses the tools, leadership, culture and the authority for conflict resolution and enforcement of its decisions.
The first challenge is to demonstrate that it is not in fact the mechanism to perpetuate the ascendency of the G7 countries by co-opting other countries that have developed economic muscles and have become critical for the well being of the advanced countries. Is it G7 plus 13 or is it indeed a homogenized G20?
Second, there is at present a disconnect between the key international institutions which are the tools for implementation of G20 decisions and the structure and the mandate of these institutions. For example, the IMFC is the policy setting body for the IMF and has a system of representation from all its 180 members. What happens if a decision taken by the G20 is perceived to be against the interests of all or few of the 160 members represented at IMFC but having no voice at G20.
Third, there are serious doubts about the quality of present leadership of the G20.The internal divisiveness among the two political parties in the US and the tension between the Northern European countries led by Germany and the peripheral countries within the EU have made it difficult for either President Obama or Chancellor Merkel to assert any moral authority in exercising the leadership role. Japan has had too many Prime Ministers in last few years and the developing countries are new kids on the block observing what is going on.
Fourth, the culture of the G7 was derived primarily by the western values of direct, decisive and result orientation while the Asian countries believe in slow, painstaking, patient dialogue and consensus building. How can the Indonesians and the Saudis feel comfortable in the inherited legacy of the G7?. Will the G20 be able to substantially engage and reach group wide decisions on time and with broad based support?
Finally, how is the authority for conflict resolution and decision enforcement derived? The UN, WTO, Bretton Woods institutions have negotiated and established agreements, protocols, practices and rules for governing these institutions. G20 is an informal talk shop where the participants are able to articulate their respective viewpoints. Suppose China does not think it should appreciate its currency the way the US wants it to do or the US does not think that it should discontinue QE because developing countries are facing undesirable capital inflows. How will these differences be reconciled when the IMF has been unable to do so despite the authority it enjoys?
These challenges will hopefully be taken up in all earnestness in the future deliberations of the Group and solutions found. The thesis of this paper is that in doing so Asia as an emerging powerhouse of the global economy has to play a more proactive role within the G20 Forum. China has already overtaken Japan as the second largest economy in the world and is likely to take over the top spot by 2020. India is moving rapidly up the ladder and would soon become the third largest economy in the world. IMF estimates that the propellant of the otherwise lackluster world economic growth would be emerging Asia. Europe, US and Japan face serious risk of double dip recession. Public finances of Asian countries are in good shape, debt ratios are low, banking systems are healthier, corporate balance sheets are less stressed, huge foreign exchange reserves act as an insurance against unexpected shocks. Wages and incomes are rising and unemployment rates are no where alarming. Regional trade is all time high and the dependence on the US and EU for exports has declined. China ships only 35% of its exports to the US and EU.
The above strengths of the Asian economies clearly shows as to why they should be in the driver or at least copilot’s seat. The existing arrangements of Asian plus 6 and SAARC countries should be used to consult other member countries in the region and their voice can thus be ventilated through the six Asian countries represented on G20.

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When Problems are so Big & Your Strength is no Longer enough to CaRRy them, Don't Give uP; Because where your Strength Ends the Grace of Almighty ALLAH Begins

In the summer of 2011, Cameron Munter, the U.S. ambassador to Pakistan, met with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in Washington and asked her to intercede with the White House to give him greater control over the CIA's use of drones along Pakistan's border with Afghanistan, and to let him speak openly to the Pakistani people -- who viewed drone warfare as a gross violation of national sovereignty -- about the rationale for the strikes.

The stakes, in Munter's mind, were very high. A few months earlier, the White House had dispatched Senator John Kerry to Pakistan in the hopes of cooling the public fury over the killing of two Pakistanis by Raymond Davis, a CIA contract officer. Kerry had succeeded, in part by promising greater coordination on counterterror measures -- and then, soon after his plane left Islamabad, the CIA launched another drone strike. By the time Kerry landed in Doha, Pakistan's political and military leaders were apoplectic, and Munter had a new crisis on his hands. Clinton brought the issue to the White House -- and got beat by the CIA. "The State Department threw him under the bus," says Christine Fair, a South Asia scholar and an expert on counterterror warfare in the region.

Today, Pakistanis know next to nothing about the drone program, and believe the worst about it. The same may be said for many Americans. The debate over the use of drones has grown more acrimonious as the administration of President Barack Obama has increased the number of strikes in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and expanded the program to Yemen and Somalia. Critics have denied the alleged pinpoint accuracy of drone strikes, arguing that hundreds of civilians have been killed as collateral damage. Scholars of constitutional law have asserted that targeted assassinations have no basis in American law. But there are many people -- myself included -- who defend the use of drones but decry the pervasive secrecy around them. There is a real danger that around the world drone warfare will come to be seen as the dark arts of the Obama administration, as torture and "rendition" were for President George W. Bush.

It seems blindingly obvious that the United States is not going to refrain from using unmanned vehicles -- naval as well as aerial-- for attack and surveillance. Any technology that can locate and kill an individual combatant without endangering American forces or bystanders (though there is an important debate over how many civilians have been killed) is not going away. Critics like Micah Zenko of the Council on Foreign Relations, and the former Obama official Vali Nasr accuse the White House of falling in love with the short-term fix of drone warfare and ignoring the long-term imperative of nation-building in weak states. But experience in Afghanistan and Somalia, among other places, has taught us that nation-building, if it can work at all, is a generational endeavor. The United States can't wait for the jihadist swamp to be drained.

At the same time, drones are not just another arrow in a battlefield commander's quiver. It is precisely the power of drones, the immense temptation they pose, the certainty that they will become yet more central to American counterterror efforts in the future, which compels a much more open debate than we have had to date. To take only a single example, although the Authorization for Use of Military Force voted by Congress after 9/11 permits the president to use "all necessary and appropriate force," against the nations, organizations, and individuals responsible for the terrorist attacks, the Obama administration has authorized so-called "signature strikes" against targets whose individual identity is unknown but whose pattern of behavior matches that of al Qaeda. Is that authorized? Is it morally acceptable? Maybe; I'm skeptical.

The Obama administration deserves some credit for deciding -- after intense debate -- to speak about the legal and ethical rationale of this highly classified program. In the aftermath of the killing of Anwar al-Awlaki, the American-born leader of al Qaeda forces in Yemen, Attorney General Eric Holder delivered a speech in which he defended the president's right to target an American citizen for killing; soon thereafter, John Brennan, the president's intelligence advisor, laid out in some detail the extensive review process which begins with the determination that an al Qaeda member poses a threat that warrants "lethal action." And that review process appears to be extraordinarily rigorous.

Of course, the level of disclosure was nothing compared to the exquisite detail which administration officials provided on the killing of Osama bin Laden. And many fundamental questions remain unanswered. Brennan's comments shed no light on the rationale for signature strikes. How are those decided? We don't know. And in Pakistan the CIA is targeting members of the Taliban, not al Qaeda, including jihadists who menace Pakistan rather than Afghanistan. Does that fit with the 2001 authorization of force? Is it a judicious use of this Faustian technology? Hard to say.

Brennan announced that the president had de-classified the drone program in Yemen, thus permitting him to speak. But the far larger program in Pakistan remains covert, and classified. (Many of the strikes in Afghanistan are carried out by the military, and thus are not covert.) Why the continuing secrecy in Pakistan? The White House declined to make anyone available to address this question. The widespread assumption, though, is that since Pakistan's military and civilian leaders -- unlike President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi of Yemen -- publicly oppose the program, CIA officials have deferred to their wishes and maintained the cone of silence. The administration may have concluded that if the program were declassified and openly discussed, Gen. Ashraf Kayani, Pakistan's military chief of staff and de facto leader, would finally make good on his endless threats to shut it down.

The CIA doesn't have to care about public opinion; but diplomats do. That was why Munter made his bid for greater transparency last year. Munter, who has since retired from public service, believes that the drone strikes have been and continue to be effective, but argues that the secrecy has allowed Pakistanis to believe the worst about America. "If we are able to lift the veil on the program and talk more openly about what our goals are and how those goals coincide with those of people of good will in Pakistan," Munter says, "I think it could have a very positive effect."

But what about the danger to the program itself? "The impact of the program," Munter says, "has come to a point where it is time for the American authorities and the Pakistani authorities to have a much more open discussion." That might be healthy. But in any case, the United States can not hold itself hostage to Pakistani politics, which runs on perpetually stoked anti-Americanism. The benefits from the drone strikes, great though they may be, do not trump the imperative of democratic debate.

This post-election, pre-Inaugural period offers a moment for taking stock. In the weeks to come, I will be looking at other aspects of President Obama's foreign policy. But perhaps we could ask the president, as a New Year's resolution, to level with the American people about what it is that drones should and should not do, who they do and do not target, where they should and should not be used. It's not too much to ask.

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When Problems are so Big & Your Strength is no Longer enough to CaRRy them, Don't Give uP; Because where your Strength Ends the Grace of Almighty ALLAH Begins

The 2007-2009 economic crisis, followed by the sovereign debt traumas in Europe, has triggered a variety of operational and institutional challenges in both global finance and economics.

With the French Riviera town of Cannes busy preparing to host leaders from around the world at Thursday’s Group of Twenty summit (G20), CFR’s International Institutions and Global Governance program is releasing the annual update to the Global Governance Monitor: Finance. This multimedia interactive tracks and analyzes multilateral efforts to manage global finance, spur economic growth, and prevent future meltdowns of the international financial system.

The package includes options for strengthening the regime in its issue brief, which outlines five actions the United States and other major economies should take in the near term. Following are a few highlights from these policy recommendations.

1. Revitalize G20 action on global economic imbalances

Back in April, G20 finance ministers and bank governors agreed (PDF) on a two step process to reduce persistently large imbalances between countries with current-account surpluses (notably China) and those with deficits (notably the United States). The plan also charged the International Monetary Fund with identifying factors that drive countries to accumulate massive surpluses or deficits.Leaders will evaluate these assessments at this week’s G20 Summit in Cannes, and determine action to take. Building unanimous consensus will be difficult—the risk is that national politicians will despair of a multilateral solution and will resort to unilateral sanctions, (as suggested by the U.S. Congressional proposal to punish China for currency manipulation). But unilateral measures are likely to spur retaliation and escalation. Instead, the United States and its partners must display leadership by affirmatively supporting—and giving teeth to—the G20’s “Mutual Assessment Process,” designed to identify those sovereign policy decisions that might put global economic recovery or financial stability at risk. Both China and the United States recognize that it is in their own interest to address persistent imbalances, so an international understanding about benchmarks of progress should not be impossible.

2. Stemming liquidity crises

The United States should support France’s proposal to bolster the IMF’s role in helping countries respond to liquidity crises. Stronger IMF responses would decrease the motivation for vulnerable countries to stockpile excessive reserves as a precaution in case of a sudden capital outflow. An increasing number of emerging economies are practicing precautionary reserve accumulation—which contributes to macroeconomic imbalances and mispricing of financial risks. As the U.S. dollar is the currency of stockpiled reserves, widespread reserve accumulation drives up the value of the dollar, widening the U.S. current account deficit. A larger IMF, and one that stood ready to lend rapidly and without excessive conditions, would reduce the incentive to unilateral reserve accumulation: collective insurance would displace individual insurance.

3. Implement IMF governance reform

Leaders at the 2010 G20 Seoul summit agreed to increase the voting shares of emerging economies at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) by six percent, and give more seats to developing countries on the IMF Executive Board. The IMF board of governors agreed to these reforms in December 2010, but the timeframe for actual implementation is slated for October 2012. Countries should ratify the changes in their domestic processes, to ensure a smooth and quick adoption of the proposed reforms by the 2012 deadline.An additional challenge will be negotiations within Europe to decide which European nations will give up seats on the executive board to allow for emerging economies. The United States needs to continue to pressure its partners in the G20—especially those European countries hesitant to acquiesce—toward implementing these reforms. The reallocation of quota shares and board seats should reinforce the sense of ownership that emerging countries feel toward the IMF. That, in turn, should encourage them to have faith in the IMF’s ability to provide liquidity in a crisis, and should dampen the temptation to unilateral reserve accumulation.

4. Resolving the European debt crisis

Resolving the European debt crisis will be important for curbing fears of contagion across the eurozone and reinvigorating a sustainable global economic recovery. Greater leadership from Germany and France is required to ensure the survival of the union, notably through increased steps toward fiscal and political unity. Since early 2010, when Greece received its first bailout package, the lack of coordination within the eurozone has resulted in a series of policy shifts that have damaged market confidence. Europe’s leaders first said private debt would not be restructured, then said Greece’s creditors should accept a twenty-one percent reduction in the value of their loans, and then settled on a fifty percent reduction for private investors last week. One possible upshot will be that Europe acquires new regional institutions, including centralized financial regulation for the eurozone and some version of an enhanced bailout fund with adequate funding. Last Wednesday’s deal on the European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF) was a first step, but the source of increased resources the EFSF remains undecided and its proposed size is inadequate to bail out any of Europe’s larger economies.

5. Improve regulatory standards to mitigate financial risks

Experts and policymakers have placed much of the blame for the financial crisis on weak regulatory standards and inadequate supervision of sophisticated financial activities. Although progress has been made, particularly through the creation of the Financial Stability Oversight Council in the United States and the European Systemic Risk Board in Europe, the complexity and integrated nature of modern finance continues to pose unprecedented challenges. Responding to the crisis, the Financial Stability Board (FSB), formerly the Financial Stability Forum, has provided (PDF) a set of proposals to “restore confidence in the soundness of markets and institutions.” However, FSB recommendations remain advisory, and have no legally binding enforcement mechanism, and the institution itself remains woefully under-resourced. In the absence of a strong global regime governing systemically important financial institutions, the international financial system remains vulnerable to excessive risk-taking and regulatory arbitrage.

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When Problems are so Big & Your Strength is no Longer enough to CaRRy them, Don't Give uP; Because where your Strength Ends the Grace of Almighty ALLAH Begins