The US occupation of Afghanistan was never a consequence of strategic logic. As described in these columns, it was a war that stemmed out of revenge and hate post 9/11. The impulse to pulverise the already primordial and fiercely self-independent tribesmen to the Stone Age far outweighed any strategic hypothesis. The urge was to demonstrate and employ leading edge technologies to obliterate the defined enemy that was pronounced as al-Qaeda, but as events proved, beyond that. Drone war was a lie.

In the final analysis, Pakistan will continue to pay a heavy price for joining a conflict with unstinted support, no homework and an engagement situation that warranted a paradigm shift outdone by compulsions of the homegrown social dimensions. Pakistan wasted this time holding one gun to its head and another to a floating threat, while an NRO sponsored regime set to its task of dismantling the state edifice. In case the worst comes to pass, no one in Pakistan’s establishment, including military and politicians, will be able to absolve themselves of the role they played in such attrition.
In his book, “The Nature of War”, Julian Lider describes war as an activity of choice and opportunity on a perspective of relative equilibrium from cooperation to coercion. Violence is exercised in rare and extreme cases. The transition to war is logical with an ends-means relationship to the ultimate objective of restoring equilibrium; usually peace on terms. The rationale for war is never built on emotive factors, but rather on cool and calculated political logic. However, the point at which the conflict must end is always difficult to ascertain. This is due to the uncertainty, fog of conflict and intrusion of strong emotive factors that result in prolonging a conflict, making it more illogical. In long drawn conflicts, emotive factors cast a shadow and defeat strategic and military logic.

In the invasion of Afghanistan and now its exit plans, the US supported by its most erstwhile ally, the UK, is guilty of violating both. The most dangerous aspect of this development is that primacy of politics in conflict so endearing to Carl von Clausewitz, Michael Howard and Peter Paret has repeatedly been overtaken by ‘military absolutism’ with an illogical end-means relationship.

As a minion, Pakistan too pursued a relationship and cooperation least cognisant that in great power play, it had limited independent options. The situation was complicated by mutual suspicions and lack of trust between USA and Pakistan, which resulted in ambivalent strategies on the part of both. Either way, the proposition to define a friend from a foe remained self-defeating. In a post-withdrawal scenario when violence reaches new levels, the armed forces of Pakistan could be sucked into another cycle of intense operations lacking civilian management capacity.

Every war imposes psychological limits on fatigue and how courage is spent. The USA having spent 10 years is finally calling retrograde. But for Pakistan Army, the real test of its combat hardiness is about to begin, despite intense combat in hardy environments and very high casualties. In an ironic and contrasting dimension, it could facilitate civilian control over a tired military, the main theme of Memogate that lies in the dustbins of judiciary.

Historically, the USA is once again guilty of repeating the Gulf of Tonkin tragedy that sucked and destabilised many countries in the Vietnam conflict. On the larger canvas, the springs in the Arab world have brought socio-economic disasters in Iraq, Libya, Egypt and now Syria. Countries that once prided themselves on being bastion of religious and communal harmony have been plunged into violent anarchy and proliferation of religious extremism. In Iraq, both US and British intelligence agencies through sexed up dossiers led the State Department and Pentagon into the mother of all battles. As 2014 closes in, the effects of this bad policy based on similar intelligence will have to be endured by the people of Afghanistan and Pakistan. In a very scary hypothesis, the Durand Line could just melt away in spates of floating violence.

After 9/11, the USA convinced itself to pulverise Afghanistan into the Stone Age. The conscientious decision was based on intelligence reports that were tailored to suit the declaration of war. The US policy planners failed to factorise the primordial tribal culture, proliferation of private armies and propensity of Afghan economy to thrive in conflicts. Mostly, they ignored the lessons of history in which all occupation armies in Afghanistan failed to achieve their objectives in the region. The British with their experience of Afghan wars and deployments against imperial Russia disregarded their own experiences to plan and execute an ill conceived military operation culminating in a dismal retrograde, meaning disengagement, scorched-earth policy and withdrawal.

In contrast, the Afghan Taliban and resistance see this from a different perspective. For them, it means the defeat of USA. Therefore, they in typical tribal fashion will wait patiently for the time of their own choosing and move in for the kill. To assume that relative peace in southern Afghanistan is a victory of the US-led Isaf operations leaves lot to doubt.

The USA wasted over a decade, lost more than 1,679 combaters, 1,173 US civilians working for US contractors and over $641.7 billion in a mission to eliminate only a few hundred of al-Qaeda militants. However, the leaks on the efficacy of drone strikes against al-Qaeda and other targets indicate the lack of focus on the declared mission. With huge collateral damage and creation of anti-US sentiment, the disadvantages and hate thereof, far outweigh minor gains.

Once the operation control is completely handed over to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and the US-led forces thin out with stay behind parties and imbedded contractors, the futility of following the wrong policy will finally dawn.

The entire exercise of using private contractors to train and arm tribal lashkars will backfire against both Afghanistan and Pakistan. That is when the fury of militants, hidden in the densely forested and difficult regions of Kunar and Nuristan, will debouch and unleash their wrath on the ANSF - high on desertions and low on professionalism and morale. This will most likely be a new spate of militancy that may also flow into the TTP-led activities in Pakistan.

For many decades to come, Pakistan may have to pay for the US folly of debouching on Herat and Kabul from the north and pushing the entire muck through the porous and pervious Durand Line into Pakistan; despite its support in a war, few in Pakistan had the courage to own.

As the dates of US withdrawal edges closer, Pakistan’s policymakers need to make a realistic appraisal of the situation and how best to deal with the most dangerous hypothesis described above. The issues below need an incisive analysis and discussion.
First, what were the factors that prevented Pakistan from capitalising on the US presence in Afghanistan for 10 years and why it failed to control militancy in its tribal regions and urban centres?

Secondly, is there a linkage between the sudden collapse of a growing and dynamic economy in 2007, its continued downslide and the WOT?

Thirdly, is the failure and collapse of state institutions linked to the economy with the ultimate objective of making Pakistan a failed and discredited state, or is this development being used to make it pliant?

Fourthly, will the Pakistani establishment, future governments and the judiciary, have the resolve and determination to affix blame on those responsible and punish them?

Fifthly, will the armed forces and law enforcement agencies of Pakistan get the necessary backing and support from future governments to become part of a national counterterrorism policy to play the role assigned to them in bringing stability to the country, while the US-led coalition is still in Afghanistan?

The next 12 months are critical for Pakistan to decide the fate of non-state actor conflicts in the region. The Pakistan army on its part has made a good beginning in Tirah Valley and must seal, contain and eliminate terrorists in the area with military precision.

The writer is a retired army officer, current affairs host on television and political economist.

Email and Twitter: samson.sharaf@gmail.com

Decisive phase of Afghan conflict

Dr Raja Muhammad Khan

While the NATO and the United States are all set to pack up from Afghanistan by 2014, the security situation is far from being conducive. Indeed, it is as uncertain as it was in 2005-06. Most of the areas in southern and eastern Afghanistan are still under the influence of Taliban.

According to New York Times, “Taliban insurgents dealt a serious blow to one of the Afghan Army’s most highly regarded units on Friday (April 5, 2013), killing 13 soldiers and overrunning their remote outpost in eastern Afghanistan.” This attack was on the Third Battalion of the Second Brigade, which was rated by US commanders as the only a handful of Afghan Army battalions which can operate independently; indeed the best trained and equipped with most sophisticated weapons and equipment. This and many other such like attacks by Taliban have created alarms, whether Afghan Security Forces, would be able to control the Afghanistan in the post 2014 scenario. Besides, during the two recently launched military operations in Wardak and Kunar provinces, the fighting and ground holding capabilities of elite Afghan forces were found to be much below the desired standard. Afghan forces even could not hold the ground, temporarily vacated by Taliban. Afghan elites units had to call the support of US forces for air operation in the Kunar province, where they were unable to soften up the Taliban resistance. It is worth mentioning that, over 80% security responsibilities have already been transferred to Afghan Security Forces and remaining 20% responsibilities are going to be transferred to them in next few months.

As per the ISAF spokesperson, Colonel Thomas, “We know the enemy’s going to come out hard this summer, so the numbers are going to go up.” Indeed, as per Afghan Government in 2012, only, Afghan army lost 1000 soldiers and Afghan police lost 1800 men. Afghan Army spokesperson Gen. Mohammad Zahir Azimi, told NATO Headquarters that, “110 soldiers and 200 policemen were dying each month.” In the last over, 11 years of military engagement in Afghanistan, United States and its allies have lost over 3100 soldiers besides over 18000 wounded. The number of Afghan civilian who lost their lives in the post US invasion is still unsure. Financially, US alone has expended over $527 billion, besides, the allies have spent $73 billion as aid to Afghanistan, without bringing any positive change in the lives of Afghan masses.

With all these realities, has United States and its allies attained the strategic objectives of the war. More than this had this super power brought any positive change in the lives of Afghan people, as portrayed initially and now claimed. With the available facts and figures, there is a broad consensus that, “After 12 years of bloody conflict in Afghanistan, US could not attained its objectives.” Whereas, Al-Qaeda might have scattered world over, the Taliban has become stronger and active as compared to 2002-2005. It is a considered view that, Afghan Security Forces are unlikely to sustain the Taliban offensive in the post 2014 scenario, after US drawdown.

The envisaged situation would not be very different from the post Soviet withdrawal; a factional fighting and civil war for the racing to take control of Kabul. This would mean that all that has occurred and invested in the last over twelve years have gone waste. As per the Telegraph article of April 11, 2013, the writer Con Coughlin writes, “Britain’s Afghan war is over - but there is still no sign of peace.” The paper foresees that unless a deal is brokered between Taliban and Hamid Karazai, “there may well be another civil war.” Should this be allowed to happen once again; as a destiny of the Afghan people, who suffered ever since 1979, Soviet invasion, indeed, in the clash of major powers over their strategic interests. As revealed by the former British ambassadors to Afghanistan, negotiations with Taliban are most important for the security and stability in that country in the post 2014 Afghanistan. He also pointed out to British Government that despite over a decade of military operation, there is a little understanding among NATO troops about Taliban. He also indicated that, “corruption and abuse of power was intrinsic in Afghan society and that the country’s economy depended heavily on the drugs trade.”

The fragmented and isolated dialogue process-taking place between United States and Taliban has not yielded any promising outcome as yet. A similar exercise between Afghan incumbent Government and some Taliban groups could not made headway, despite Karazai’s visit to Qatar, where there is Taliban office established under the host Government. Had there been any such breakthrough, Taliban could have restrained their offensive, at least against own fellow citizens and so could have been done by Afghan security forces. The emerging trends are contrary to reach a consensus situation.

The problems perhaps lie in the perception and mindset of all those involved in this complex process. Rather going for a win-win situation, all parties to the problem, desire to have a lion’s share from these negotiations. Each one of them wants to be at the victory stand all alone. United States wants to talk to the Taliban from the standpoint of a victorious power, projecting them (Taliban) as the defeated party of the conflict. The demand and perception is against the ground realities and unacceptable to Taliban. Then there is a misconstrued contemplation of good and bad Taliban in the minds of US strategists. Whereas the fact is that, Taliban have presented them as a united force, without surrendering to US military might in last over eleven years.

In the negotiation process, President Hamid Karazai wants to be at driving seat. Owing to his growing differences with US, he wants negotiations between Afghan Government and the Taliban without involvement of any third party, especially United States. Like many others in Afghanistan, Karazai too think that, any understanding between US and Taliban would mean the former would get latter’s support for making a future Government and US would have Taliban’s consent for a long-term stay in Afghanistan, which otherwise could not have been possible. This entire exercise would have reduced the importance of President Karazai, who wants to secure the future for himself and his party. Though he cannot contest election for the third time, yet, desires guarantees from the Taliban for his nominee/appointee in the 2014 elections of Afghanistan. He too wants Taliban to talk to them within the ambit of Afghan Constitution. He too wants Taliban to talk to him from the position of weakness; both conditions are unacceptable to Taliban. On their part, Taliban wants complete pull out of foreign forces and a new set up where they have the domination. After all, they claim to defeat the super power and its coalition partners besides, the incumbent Afghan Administration.

The current Afghan situation is indeed a complex proposition seems to be a bit complicated, as none of the party accepts for itself the position of a being runner-up. The deadlock and mutual antagonism is not making headway. The status quo indicates a perilous scenario in the making. For a peace and stable Afghanistan, it is extremely essential that a positive breakthrough is achieved through a win-win situation. A peaceful and all-inclusive solution of Afghanistan, keeping the interests of Afghan masses at the centre stage would be a durable solution to the problem.

Therefore, the peace process in Afghanistan should be Afghan led and Afghan owned. But, who in Afghanistan would be lead the process, is the real question. Neither Hamid Karazai nor Mullah Omar has the consensus approval of all Afghan factions/ groups. Moreover, none from Northern Alliance or Pashtun dominated areas has the confidence of Afghan masses and groups.

The regional countries too are not on the same page. Should the country pushed to experience another bloody civil war, the international community and Afghan neighbours will have to pay a heavy price. Then what about the 30 million Afghan masses, whose future is always decided by few none representatives, mostly away from their homeland. At this decisive phase of Afghan conflict, Hamid Karazai needs to demonstrate wisdom and try to secure the interests of Afghanistan, rather his personal interests. Rather annoying his neighbours who want to support peace and stability in Afghanistan, Karazai should seek their help and incorporate the neglected groups for a broader peace in the country. Indeed, it is high time that, Karazai should recognize the friends and foes.

(The writer is Islamabad based analyst of International Relations)


http://www.thefrontierpost.com/category/40/

While the NATO and the United States are all set to pack up from Afghanistan by 2014, the security situation is far from being conducive. Indeed, it is as uncertain as it was in 2005-06. Most of the areas in southern and eastern Afghanistan are still under the influence of Taliban.

According to New York Times, “Taliban insurgents dealt a serious blow to one of the Afghan Army’s most highly regarded units on Friday (April 5, 2013), killing 13 soldiers and overrunning their remote outpost in eastern Afghanistan.” This attack was on the Third Battalion of the Second Brigade, which was rated by US commanders as the only a handful of Afghan Army battalions which can operate independently; indeed the best trained and equipped with most sophisticated weapons and equipment. This and many other such like attacks by Taliban have created alarms, whether Afghan Security Forces, would be able to control the Afghanistan in the post 2014 scenario. Besides, during the two recently launched military operations in Wardak and Kunar provinces, the fighting and ground holding capabilities of elite Afghan forces were found to be much below the desired standard. Afghan forces even could not hold the ground, temporarily vacated by Taliban. Afghan elites units had to call the support of US forces for air operation in the Kunar province, where they were unable to soften up the Taliban resistance. It is worth mentioning that, over 80% security responsibilities have already been transferred to Afghan Security Forces and remaining 20% responsibilities are going to be transferred to them in next few months.

As per the ISAF spokesperson, Colonel Thomas, “We know the enemy’s going to come out hard this summer, so the numbers are going to go up.” Indeed, as per Afghan Government in 2012, only, Afghan army lost 1000 soldiers and Afghan police lost 1800 men. Afghan Army spokesperson Gen. Mohammad Zahir Azimi, told NATO Headquarters that, “110 soldiers and 200 policemen were dying each month.” In the last over, 11 years of military engagement in Afghanistan, United States and its allies have lost over 3100 soldiers besides over 18000 wounded. The number of Afghan civilian who lost their lives in the post US invasion is still unsure. Financially, US alone has expended over $527 billion, besides, the allies have spent $73 billion as aid to Afghanistan, without bringing any positive change in the lives of Afghan masses.

With all these realities, has United States and its allies attained the strategic objectives of the war. More than this had this super power brought any positive change in the lives of Afghan people, as portrayed initially and now claimed. With the available facts and figures, there is a broad consensus that, “After 12 years of bloody conflict in Afghanistan, US could not attained its objectives.” Whereas, Al-Qaeda might have scattered world over, the Taliban has become stronger and active as compared to 2002-2005. It is a considered view that, Afghan Security Forces are unlikely to sustain the Taliban offensive in the post 2014 scenario, after US drawdown.

The envisaged situation would not be very different from the post Soviet withdrawal; a factional fighting and civil war for the racing to take control of Kabul. This would mean that all that has occurred and invested in the last over twelve years have gone waste. As per the Telegraph article of April 11, 2013, the writer Con Coughlin writes, “Britain’s Afghan war is over - but there is still no sign of peace.” The paper foresees that unless a deal is brokered between Taliban and Hamid Karazai, “there may well be another civil war.” Should this be allowed to happen once again; as a destiny of the Afghan people, who suffered ever since 1979, Soviet invasion, indeed, in the clash of major powers over their strategic interests. As revealed by the former British ambassadors to Afghanistan, negotiations with Taliban are most important for the security and stability in that country in the post 2014 Afghanistan. He also pointed out to British Government that despite over a decade of military operation, there is a little understanding among NATO troops about Taliban. He also indicated that, “corruption and abuse of power was intrinsic in Afghan society and that the country’s economy depended heavily on the drugs trade.”

The fragmented and isolated dialogue process-taking place between United States and Taliban has not yielded any promising outcome as yet. A similar exercise between Afghan incumbent Government and some Taliban groups could not made headway, despite Karazai’s visit to Qatar, where there is Taliban office established under the host Government. Had there been any such breakthrough, Taliban could have restrained their offensive, at least against own fellow citizens and so could have been done by Afghan security forces. The emerging trends are contrary to reach a consensus situation.

The problems perhaps lie in the perception and mindset of all those involved in this complex process. Rather going for a win-win situation, all parties to the problem, desire to have a lion’s share from these negotiations. Each one of them wants to be at the victory stand all alone. United States wants to talk to the Taliban from the standpoint of a victorious power, projecting them (Taliban) as the defeated party of the conflict. The demand and perception is against the ground realities and unacceptable to Taliban. Then there is a misconstrued contemplation of good and bad Taliban in the minds of US strategists. Whereas the fact is that, Taliban have presented them as a united force, without surrendering to US military might in last over eleven years.

In the negotiation process, President Hamid Karazai wants to be at driving seat. Owing to his growing differences with US, he wants negotiations between Afghan Government and the Taliban without involvement of any third party, especially United States. Like many others in Afghanistan, Karazai too think that, any understanding between US and Taliban would mean the former would get latter’s support for making a future Government and US would have Taliban’s consent for a long-term stay in Afghanistan, which otherwise could not have been possible. This entire exercise would have reduced the importance of President Karazai, who wants to secure the future for himself and his party. Though he cannot contest election for the third time, yet, desires guarantees from the Taliban for his nominee/appointee in the 2014 elections of Afghanistan. He too wants Taliban to talk to them within the ambit of Afghan Constitution. He too wants Taliban to talk to him from the position of weakness; both conditions are unacceptable to Taliban. On their part, Taliban wants complete pull out of foreign forces and a new set up where they have the domination. After all, they claim to defeat the super power and its coalition partners besides, the incumbent Afghan Administration.

The current Afghan situation is indeed a complex proposition seems to be a bit complicated, as none of the party accepts for itself the position of a being runner-up. The deadlock and mutual antagonism is not making headway. The status quo indicates a perilous scenario in the making. For a peace and stable Afghanistan, it is extremely essential that a positive breakthrough is achieved through a win-win situation. A peaceful and all-inclusive solution of Afghanistan, keeping the interests of Afghan masses at the centre stage would be a durable solution to the problem.

Therefore, the peace process in Afghanistan should be Afghan led and Afghan owned. But, who in Afghanistan would be lead the process, is the real question. Neither Hamid Karazai nor Mullah Omar has the consensus approval of all Afghan factions/ groups. Moreover, none from Northern Alliance or Pashtun dominated areas has the confidence of Afghan masses and groups.

The regional countries too are not on the same page. Should the country pushed to experience another bloody civil war, the international community and Afghan neighbours will have to pay a heavy price. Then what about the 30 million Afghan masses, whose future is always decided by few none representatives, mostly away from their homeland. At this decisive phase of Afghan conflict, Hamid Karazai needs to demonstrate wisdom and try to secure the interests of Afghanistan, rather his personal interests. Rather annoying his neighbours who want to support peace and stability in Afghanistan, Karazai should seek their help and incorporate the neglected groups for a broader peace in the country. Indeed, it is high time that, Karazai should recognize the friends and foes.

(The writer is Islamabad based analyst of International Relations)

http://www.thefrontierpost.com/category/40/

Through a pre-emptive strategy, India is trying to convince the world in general and Afghan neighbors in particular that, its collaboration with the later aims at securing its soil from foreign invasions and attacks, which have taken place historically.

In this context, the statement of Indian external Affairs Ministry spokesperson is very evident once he said, “There is a history of Afghan soil being used for terror attacks on India. We can’t have that again.” While recounting the historical facts, the statement has credence. It was all Indian Territory east of Afghan soil, as there was no intervening country in-between. Since those attacks and invasions, the geopolitics of the region has changed largely. There is a new country, a new geographical reality, with the name of Pakistan ever since 1947. Now Islamabad has taken over the status of former Delhi, having a geographical contiguity with Afghanistan, which India lost in 1947. Thus, the New Delhi-Kabul nexus in practical term shifted to Islamabad-Kabul nexus. Now there cannot be attack on India directly from the Afghan soil. Therefore, the Indian assertion for its influence on Kabul for the sake of its security may not be a valid argument.

Historical relationships between Delhi and Kabul were because of Muslim rulers in India and because of Pakhtun population and inhabitants of the same tribes on either side of the Indo-Afghan border. Both factors now have been changed in physical terms. India however, maintained its relationship with the successive Afghan rulers from Zahir Shah to Hamid Karazai, except for the brief sway of Taliban regime from 1996 to 2001. The postcolonial New Delhi-Kabul nexus have mostly been driven by the common enmity of both against the State of Pakistan. Again, this antagonism was Indian driven, rather Afghan originated, indeed, to undo the very foundation of Pakistan, which then India leaders took as a great setback, since they never desired Indian partition.

In the process, India has truly followed the strategy of its ancient military strategist, Kautilya who believed that, “immediate neighbours are considered as enemies, but any state on the other side of a neighbouring state is regarded as an ally”. Pakistan indeed is experiencing the unfolding of this strategy of Kautilya by his modern Indian followers ever since. Initially, India provoked the Kingdom in Kabul to create a new Pashtun state through the balkanization of Pakistan; merger of KPK and FATA, in a bid to cut the Pakistani in size. Failure to that, it successfully disintegrated Pakistan by creating insurgency and later through a physical attack on the East Pakistan, now Bangladesh. India has not given up its grand strategy of further destabilizing and disintegrating Pakistan even today.

For the implementation of its reprehensible designs, India with the help of the United States has created for itself sufficient space in Afghanistan, sequel to the incident of 9/11. Being among the top few donors, India has invested over $2 billion in the garb of Afghan reconstruction in last 11 years. It has created a lot of good will among the political lot, most of whom are India graduate and it is funded too. India is providing military training to 200 Afghan military officers on yearly basis. It has contributed a lot towards training of Afghan intelligence services. How can one expect that, Indian trained military officers and intelligence services would be friendly to Pakistan? Then, Indian Embassy and its consulates in Afghanistan are hub of its intelligence agency; RAW.

Indian agents are harboring, funding and providing arms and ammunition to militants in Balochistan, FATA and even KPK. After all, this is what Kautilya’s philosophy is all about. Otherwise, even a layman can visualize that what love affairs India has with the people of Afghanistan. While keeping its own over 35% population below the poverty line, how can India justify investment in Afghanistan? Besides, India has interests in the mineral resources of Afghanistan and its neighbourhood; the Central Asian states, through the concept of extended neighbourhood.

While the US and NATO forces will leave Afghanistan by the end of 2014, the situation in Afghanistan is becoming uncertain. India is considering for itself the role of successor state of the United States. It intends controlling Afghanistan or at least influencing it politically, economically and security wise. The scenario would be unacceptable for the Afghan neighbours, especially Pakistan. Besides domestic factors, the growing uncertainty may create a situation in the country that plunge the country into a regional conflict. Very recently, the British historian and writer William Dalrymple has warned that Afghanistan could be ‘second Kashmir’ once the US forces pull out of the landlocked country. Based on his historical knowledge, he predicted that, “there might be another proxy war between India and Pakistan.”

If United States continues following its current policy of status-quo and the Afghan Government remains irresolute, there are simmering conflicts in the post 2014 Afghanistan. The infuriation includes both domestic and external factors. Domestically, President Hamid Karazai has failed to persuade and bring together, Taliban and other opponents groups including warlords. He is trying to explore and work for the options, which keeps him relevant during and after 2014 elections, as well as, in the post US drawdown. He foresees an Afghanistan where his interests are better served, rather the interests of Afghan people. Northern Alliances and minority groups are looking for their interests. However, despite their unison, there has to be a Pashtun led Afghan Government as a result of the 2014 elections for its minimum acceptability to the majority population.

Whereas, US pursues its own interests, by quietly handing over the security responsibilities to Afghan national security forces, not fully geared up yet. The superpower is undertaking a fragmented negotiation with selected Taliban and other militants directly and indirectly. The strategy would achieve for the US and NATO a clean break, while maintaining a smart contingent of its special forces, at the strategic bases in Afghanistan, built and strengthened in last twelve years utilizing 80% of its total expenses in that country. Externally, all Afghan neighbours would like to secure their interests, thus paving way for an intrusion by the neighbours. The major powers would like their dominance through a setup that at least is not threatening their strategic interests. Russia supported the US and the NATO in Afghanistan for fight out militancy in its Muslim majority republics, who wanted independence. It would like a moderate setup in Afghanistan to replace Hamid Karazai. China would like to secure guarantees from the future Afghan setup for not supporting East Turkistan Islamic Movement in its autonomous region, Xinjiang. India would try to find for itself the role of a successor state after US. Pakistan however would make all-out efforts to have a friendly setup in Afghanistan, for the obvious reasons of its security. It would like to pursue the US and the future Afghan Government to minimize Indian role, which indeed create a security dilemma for Pakistan along its western borders.

It is therefore, in the supreme interest of Afghanistan that, that before drawdown of the NATO and the US forces, a consensus is developed among all Afghan factions and groups including Taliban. Besides, for a long-term peace, the United States has to make sure that; Indian role in Afghanistan is minimized within the ambit of its diplomatic norms. Afghan Government must ensure that its soil is not being used against its neighbours either by its own intelligence agencies or by any other. Furthermore, Afghans should be the masters of their own destiny. They should decide future of their country by incorporating all the ethnic and sectarian groups. All stakeholders should ensure independence, sovereignty and integrity of Afghanistan. An all-inclusive political set up, chosen by the people of Afghanistan will be a win-win situation for all. Whereas Afghan neighbours must guarantee non-interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. Afghan Government too needs to guarantee its neighbours that, it neither would provide sanctuaries to the terrorists from other countries nor would allow its militants to operate in the territories of neighbouring countries.

(The writer is Islamabad based analyst of international relations)


http://www.thefrontierpost.com/category/40/

For nearly three years Obama administration lost opportunities to work for a negotiated peace in Afghanistan. It relied more on war than on diplomacy while Obama concentrated on accommodating partisan political concerns. Rejecting the idea that talks could go along with fighting, the US president preferred to negotiate from a superior position after thoroughly demolishing the Taliban. In December 2011, Washington first seemed to respond positively to the Taliban leadership’s offer for talks in return for the release of its prisoners from Guantanamo but then it retreated. This made the Taliban suspicious of Washington’s motives. While a Taliban office was set up in Qatar, there were no negotiations. Washington has now lost hope of winning what was once Obama’s war of choice. The Boston bombings were a grim reminder to the West that as long as there are unresolved conflicts in the world ignited by it directly or indirectly, no firewall can provide it security. The use of drone attacks as a weapon of choice is bound to add to the US headaches as it would increase the number of extremists and suicide bombers. In case the US decides to simply wash its hands off the Afghan conflict and depart from the region, as it did in 1986, the extremists would follow it like nemesis.

There is a need to fully concentrate on intra-Afghan talks now. The Taliban have to be persuaded to cut off ties with Al-Qaeda and disown groups associated with it. This should not be difficult because the liaison with the terrorists having a global agenda led to the unraveling of the Taliban rule while it inflicted suffering on the entire country. The Taliban’s willingness to hold talks indicates that they realise it was a blunder to continue to host the Al-Qaeda. As things stand the Taliban are unwilling to talk to Karzai who is considered to be an unpopular and corrupt US puppet. It is however not possible to bypass Karzai who remains the head of the government and state. The extremist agenda pursued by the Taliban, when they were in power, was, and is, out of sync with the times. The suppression of minorities led to the creation of the Northern Alliance. There is a need on the part of the religious militia to revise its policies.

Pakistan needs to help in the reconciliation process. The talks have, however, to be led by the Afghans themselves. The belated arrival of a high powered US delegation to discuss the Afghan peace process indicates that Washington agrees with settling the matters through talks. A peaceful Afghanistan means a stable and prosperous Pakistan and a secure and economically integrated region. There is a need, therefore, for the US, Afghanistan and Pakistan to jointly encourage the Afghan Taliban to the negotiating table.

- See more at: http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2013....VAml1zUV.dpuf

A high-powered US delegation had a detailed meeting with the COAS General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani and other officials including foreign Secretary Jalil Abbas Jillani and discussed Afghan peace dialogue. Pakistan and the United States reiterated their commitment to take the ongoing Afghan reconciliation process forward through meaningful dialogue and by addressing concerns of all major stakeholders, including the Taliban.

The two sides were deeply concerned about what they called unpredictable nature of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, who in the past has been unnecessarily criticizing US and Pakistan. In February 2013, President Asif Zardari, President Hamid Karzai and British Prime Minister David Cameron had supported the opening of a Taliban office in Qatar for negotiations with them. But the Taliban has not changed their stance that they consider the Karzai regime as mere puppet of the western powers and worth not talking with. It is the United States they hold as the real power in Kabul that should be engaged with for a peace settlement in Afghanistan.

President Karzai on the other hand is suspicious of the western powers that they want to keep him out of the peace settlement process. At the London moot he may have only reluctantly lent his support to the opening of a Taliban Doha office, which he has been opposing tooth and nail.

There is yet another cleavage that apparently stays out of the world’s view. It is the opposition of the Northern Alliance conglomerate to any Taliban presence in an Afghan government after the withdrawal of the occupation armies, which its leaders said publicly. They would accept some compromised Pakhtuns who have made fortunes out of the occupation to give a wider national character to a post-withdrawal regime, but they would not accept the Taliban in any event. Realizing the ground realities, the Taliban however had made overtures to accommodate their opponents in any settlement. In his message on last Eid, Mullah Omer had stated that the Taliban did not intend to monopolize power in post-withdrawal Afghanistan, thus opening up a window on possible rendezvous with the Northern alliance entities.

Perhaps the biggest problem seems to be the utter chaos in the ranks of the occupiers themselves on how to go about with the peace process. Despite 11 years of occupation, they seem to have learnt no lessons and remain as ignored and uninformed of the Afghan realities as they were when they blindly descended on Afghanistan. Disparate characters are involved in the Afghan peace process and disparate agendas and approaches are being pursued.

The NATO hierarchy is in it; so is Britain and Turkey; so is Japan and lately France has also jumped in. Given these conditions, the goal of peace settlement may not be achievable in the near future. The real answer to the Afghan problem is the grand national reconciliation, which cannot be achieved if the US continues to monopolize the process, especially when Pakhtuns, Hamid Karzai and even Pakistan do not trust it. Nevertheless, durable peace can be achieved if countries of the region bordering Afghanistan i.e. China, Russia and Iran play their role in promoting Afghan peace dialogue.

Secretary of State John Kerry said on Monday that he would host a meeting of top Afghan and Pakistani officials this week in Brussels to discuss reconciliation with the Taliban and other issues. Afghan President Hamid Karzai and his defense minister, along with Pakistan’s military chief and foreign secretary, will attend the meeting, Kerry said. “I will be meeting with President Karzai and General (Ashfaq Parvez) Kayani and the civilian foreign minister from Pakistan while I am here,” Kerry told reporters. He was mistaken when he said that foreign civilian minister, as Foreign Secretary Jalil Abbas Jillani is visiting Brussels with COAS General Kayani. Anyhow, Kerry said the goal was to advance the peace process in the simplest most, most cooperative, most cogent way so that we wind up with both Pakistan’s and Afghanistan’s interests being satisfied but most importantly with a peaceful and stable Afghanistan, which is worth the expenditure and the treasure and effort of these last years.”

Karzai has repeatedly said that any reconciliation cannot take place without the involvement of Pakistan, whose security services have close ties to the Taliban. Earlier this month, Afghanistan had accused Pakistan of placing unacceptable conditions on efforts to bring peace to the country after nearly 12 years of war, the latest in a series of barbed exchanges that has sunk relations between the two neighbors to a new low. Afghanistan and its international backers consider Pakistan a critical player in bringing the Taliban and other militant groups into peace talks.

The Afghan side was less supportive of Pakistan’s role so far, with a Karzai spokesman noting that the Pakistanis have taken no practical steps yet. “As you know there have been many talks and negotiations between Afghanistan and Pakistan, but I must say unless Pakistan does not act honestly and take practical steps to what they are saying, it will be very difficult to have any progress in the peace process or fight against terrorism and extremism”, Karzai spokesman Aimal Faizi said.

Last month, addressing a ceremony on the occasion of International Women Day in Kabul, Afghan President Hamid Karzai had said the Taliban were holding talks with the US in Europe and the Gulf but were conducting blasts in Kabul and Khost. At the same time, he said that the Taliban were not his enemy, and that the people of Afghanistan had been tortured in the name of Taliban. It is difficult to make sense of his confused outpourings. President Karzai appears to be sour for being kept of the loop; he had expected to be at the centre of peace talks and lead the negotiations. As a result of Karzai’s remarks, a joint press conference of President Hamid Karzai and US Secretary of Defence Chuck Hagel was cancelled. In September 2012 President Karzai had stated: ‘the US-led war on terror has not been fought the way it should have been and has brought only misfortune and grief to Afghanistan’. If President Karzai wants peace in Afghanistan, he should stop scathing criticism of Pakistan and his benefactor America.


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In terms of content, the Army chief Gen Ashfaq Kayani’s speech on the occasion of passing out parade at Pakistan’s premier military academy, Kakul, is not much different from his last few speeches: the emphasis on Islam and Pakistan, the sacrosanctity of ideology of Pakistan and vows to make Pakistan an ideal Islamic welfare state. This time the speech has pointed towards the provocative statements from the neighboring countries and a sentence about focusing on the internal threats. But the emphasis on the ideology of Pakistan has flustered some quarters that were all praise for the speech last year on the eve of Independence Day, when General Kayani had a speech at the same venue after witnessing the ‘Azadi parade’ on August 14.

In that speech, Gen Kayani had discussed the threat of religious terrorism in detail, challenging their interpretation of Islam while contesting anyone’s claims to be the sole interpreter of Islam and using violence to impose it over others. Gen Kayani ordained a fight against the forces of extremism and terrorism, insisting it as our own war and warned against a civil war situation if cobwebs persisted in the minds on the complexity of this crucial issue.

Though in that speech too, Gen Kayani didn’t forget to remind us that how Islam was the basis for the foundation of Pakistan and had the same pledge of making Pakistan an ideal Islamic welfare state and society based on the golden principles of Islam. The speech came after fresh settlements with United States post-Salala affair over allowing NATO supplies and other issues, it was considered as building environment for an offensive in North Waziristan, so the weary parts of the speech were brushed aside.

But now, what has perturbed many is the omission of the resolve against those misinterpreting Islam for political means and trying to impose it upon others by use of violence. While the speech kept reiterating its emphasis on the Pakistan ideology and the inseparable relation of Islam and Pakistan, hence putting his weight in favour of those elements that have made a particular interpretation of Ideology of Pakistan a Procrustes bed for the political forces to stretch or hack them off to fit that standards.

More dreadful is the fact that, Taliban have attained an unvanquishable status due to the cobwebs of confusion around them in the national narrative led by the security establishment for its changing preferences. Lack of sufficient action against them and allowing them to prescribe their terms for the upcoming elections to the people on who should be supported or alienated in their electoral campaigns.

The focus on the internal security should have prioritized measures against active networks of terrorism across the country and their sleeping cells in the Punjab. For peaceful elections and providing level playing field to the political parties who have actively supported army offensives against the Taliban and extolled them for their glorified Swat and Malakand operations, kept a close eye over and defended them against harsh criticism by the human right organisations over detentions and extra-judicial killings of the suspected militants, dumping the bullet riddled bodies or throwing them into river Swat or handing them over to their relatives after their deaths in detention due to some mysterious illness.

During these years, Taliban’s physical control over some territories may have diluted but virtually they still have the powers to strike in those areas against security forces or civilian gatherings. Also their virtual control has been extended manifold to new areas and territories. Their ability to acquire or manufacture arms and explosives, generating finances via different sources and reinforcements through recruitments of certain types of warfare experts or ordinary fighters has not been forestalled.

What has been required in the mean time is to interdict their terror operations of hitting at the targets of their choice. Putting strict security measures to secure possible targets can deter their power to achieve specific targets. But it is possible only if these orgqanisations have been attacked in their dens and militarization points, before they start out by going through their plans. But this all can be done through effective intelligence measures and well coordinated plans to hinder networks of terror of their plans and tactics as well as admonishing the impression of indomitability of these groups in society and among the fearful and disconcerted populace.

The exulting right wing religio-political groups over the conjectural US military setback in Afghanistan have started speaking out loudly against those political forces that have opposed Taliban or have supported military offences against them, especially in Pakistan. It has also reinforced a rather flawed argument of dealing violent groups politically by acceding to some of their demands. It has been testified through the turbulent history and the last few years of this country that ceding political space to those employing deliberate violence to attain ideological objectives will not stop at a desired point but it eventually results in conceding turf to these forces.

The reemergence of state-friendly Jihadi organisations or the so-called good Taliban too bears witness to the same false assertions around the endgame narrative in Afghanistan. If one desires that these Jihadi locomotives of us will drag the good and bad Jihadi militants out of Pakistan to aid their ideological counterparts in Afghanistan, it should be kept in mind that Pakistani Taliban have its network of support and reinforcement existing across Pakistan, it is highly unlikely that it will be unrolled or sent back packing to their perceived buffer zones.

The external threat narrative around neigbouring countries and the ideological foes has bucked up jingoism, at the same time projecting conspiracy theories. All this while the persisting threat of the Taliban and their ideological allies has given rise to a sense of haplessness in the people directly hit by terror. And it has been transforming society drastically pushing it towards adopting more radical traits and losing its traditional attributes of tolerance and pluralism.

Ali Arqam is a journalist and researcher based in Karachi. He can be contacted ataliarqam@hotmail.com or interacted on twitter at @aliarqam

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Pakistan and its neighbour to the west, Afghanistan, haven’t had a relation that can be described as warm, much less ideal, in the past few weeks. A trust deficit has put a wedge between the two nations. However, with the US and NATO forces preparing to leave Afghanistan by the end of next year, rocky relations between the two would benefit no one. In this context, the tripartite meeting held at Brussels between the three Ks – Kerry, Karzai and Kayani – could certainly pave the way for a relation based on trust, instead of the blame game that goes on unabatedly.

Any tension between the two is going to hurt them both, for it’s the militants that would cash in on the rift and thwart attempts at peace talks that are so important for the region and the world at large. The Karzai government blames Islamabad of building a new gate on the border between the two nations. Pakistan issues a strong denial, and says that it is merely a renovation and repairs work at an already present one. The rift somehow escalated and the Afghan government severed military ties with Pakistan and held protests in its country. While ideally there should be no such issues between the two neighbours who have so much to lose if peace doesn’t return to the region. However, dwelling on one point or the other won’t solve them; they have to sit together and thrash out their differences before their tiff can cause trouble to more than just their egos. And, that’s exactly what US Secretary of State, John Kerry, seems to have succeeded in accomplishing. And the two leaders, Hamid Karzai and Gen Ashfaq Kayani, both appeared relaxed in their body language after their three-hour meeting in Brussels.

Their meeting, on the face of it, hasn’t produced any result though what the three came out of it with is better than nothing at all. As John Kerry said, “We’re not going to raise expectations or promise results that can’t be delivered… We’re all going to go home and do our homework.” This is good news as it means peace stands a chance and that Pakistan and Afghanistan have come to some sort of an understanding that it is up to them, and in their interests, to have peaceful relations and focus their energies in solving much bigger problems than a gate at the border. Both of them can influence the Taliban to come to the negotiating table to discuss peace, a direction now the US agrees with too. The sooner they agree to do so, the better the chances to weed out terrorism from the region, thus eliminating a threat to world peace as well.

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Another round of trilateral meetings between Afghanistan, Pakistan and US have started. After the latest get together in Brussels last Wednesday, John Kerry commented, “It’s fair to say that there is a good feeling among all of us that we made progress in this dialogue. But we have all agreed that results are what will tell the story, not statements at a press conference.”

Speaking to the media a day earlier, Kerry had reiterated the future US role: “The mission (of US) will be to support, advise and train the Afghan military on an ongoing basis as well as to engage in counterterrorism activity.”

The success of this mission is dependent on good ties between Karzai and Islamabad, to jointly keep a tab on the extremists. The challenge being, ties between Pakistan and Afghanistan keep swinging between amicable to really tense, and Karzai’s relations with US are faced with pretty much the same unpredictability.

The truth is that the regional approach to Afghan conflict has now morphed into a global one. And too many cooks is a recipe for failure. For example, in addition to the three core parties, discussions on Afghanistan have also recently taken pace between Pakistan, India, China and Russia. The most interesting track being the India-China bilateral discussions. The latest round was held on April 18th, which stressed, “working with regional countries and the international community to help Afghanistan achieve objectives of peace and stability, independence and development”.

To think that Russia, China and India are simply trying to help the international community, or NATO more precisely, would be naïve. The correct wording is perhaps that they are seeking to protect their own interests in Afghanistan that may or may not rhyme with the other players.

At a fundamental level, even the interests of the three principals are still misaligned. On the one hand, Karzai keeps blaming US for civilian deaths, but on the other hand, the country wants NATO forces to stay longer. Every time Afghan Security Forces are criticised for poor performance, the nation starts blaming Pakistan. In fact, there is a danger the border skirmishes between the two countries may transform into something larger, especially if Karzai decides to exploit the nationalistic sentiments. Until these incongruities are addressed, progress will be hard to come by, and no matter how many players are involved, finding a common ground will be difficult.

The basic question is what the Afghan government would gain from a speedy reconciliation. The answer is not much. While the US is striving for a quick withdrawal from Afghanistan, this will put the onus of fighting on the Afghan Security Forces. Despite the hype, doubts about the fighting capabilities of Afghan forces on its own persist. Its commitment to carry on the fight against Taliban will really be tested once NATO forces leave. The interests of Karzai government are best served by keeping NATO forces engaged while stoking up nationalism, and blaming US and Pakistan for what ails the country.

While Afghanistan has generally projected Pakistan as the villain in the whole affair, the longer the conflict sticks around, the steeper the price for its neighbour. Accelerated political reconciliation in Afghanistan will have a direct impact on improving the security and economic situation of the country, including regional trade. In this, the US and Pakistan’s interests are more aligned.

As the reconciliation process drags on, the responsibility for bringing the Afghan Taliban to the table may squarely fall on the shoulders of Pakistan, if it has not already, while it is also being blamed for maintaining ties with them. On the other hand, Pakistani officials have repeatedly claimed that while it can assist in bringing various warring Taliban factions to the table, the country cannot ensure a certain outcome. The challenge boils down to if Afghan Taliban think they are wining, why would they want to reconcile with Karzai, or listen to Pakistan for that matter?

As far as Afghan Taliban are concerned, they have questioned the credibility of the Karzai government, claiming it to be a puppet of the West. At least publicly, the Taliban have even refused to talk with Karzai, who wants to control the political talks. President Karzai has also accused US of holding direct talks with Taliban, while keeping him in the dark. Furthermore, while Afghan government is insisting on keeping some level of US and NATO presence in Afghanistan, the Taliban want a complete withdrawal of foreign forces.

This raises the most elementary question of all: who has the upper hand? The answer to this query is linked with the reasons why the principals to the conflict decided to seek a political solution. The anomaly being the military campaign to resolve the conflict has continued as well.

Big powers have global repute to protect. Accepting weakness or failure in one part of the world has direct implication for interests in other regions. This particular aspect has created unique challenges for both NATO and US. In addition, the assessment of Afghan policy has included what is achievable and what goals are simply beyond reach. The war there has dragged on for too long, at a huge cost, and it is simply not possible economically to continue the course.

While Afghan Taliban have been difficult to manage, reports suggest the threat from Al-Qaeda, in this part of the region, has been contained for the most part. This premise provides the basis for an exit strategy.

Ironically, the Afghan government may only get serious about reconciliation, if US sticks to its timeline for withdrawal. Jumpstarting the political talks may require a temporary cessation of a military campaign; with the commitment that Taliban will enter a serious dialogue with the Afghan government. The stipulation of removing foreign forces could be conditioned to Taliban terminating ties with Al-Qaeda, agreeing not to attack Afghan and coalition forces, and respect other international human right conventions. In other words, an interim peace accord leading to a permanent cessation.

The writer is chief analyst at PoliTact, a Washington based futurist advisory firm (www.PoliTact.com and http:twitter.com/politact) and can be reached at aansar@politact.com

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The departure of the US led NATO troops from Afghanistan is causing different kinds of concerns among countries in the region. After satisfying itself that it had taken revenge of the Vietnam defeat from the Soviet Union, the US simply abandoned the region in 1989, leaving Pakistan to deal with the militant groups that CIA had earlier financed, armed and launched inside Afghanistan. The US is once more leaving Afghanistan without achieving any of the aims variously defined at different times during the last 12 years and which included, democracy, reconstruction and defeat of the militants. Pakistan is keen to see a stable neighbouring country with a friendly government. Having invested millions of dollars hoping that the government in Kabul would help it in pursuits of its regional aims, India is worried over Islamabad being called upon to play a crucial role in the post NATO scenario. India would like some of the foreign troops to continue to stay till the Afghan Taliban are either eliminated or made to establish good ties with New Delhi. Both Russia and China however want a terrorist free Afghanistan but are concerned about the proposed presence of some of the US led NATO troops after 2014.

All these concerns found expression at the Almaty moot which was a part of the Istanbul Process, launched by Turkey and Afghanistan in November 2011. Fourteen ministerial and high-level delegations from the Asian countries including Pakistan, India, Tajikistan, Iran, Azerbaijan and China met on Friday to issue a declaration. There is a need on the part of Afghanistan and Pakistan to evolve a common strategy to deal with the situation after the departure of NATO troops. Relations between the two countries however reached another nadir during the last few months. Among other things Karzai’s verbal offensive against Pakistan added fuel to the fire. Hopefully the meeting between Gen Kayani, President Karzai and Foreign Secretary Kerry in Brussels last week would change the attitude.

Pakistan stands by its commitment to support Afghan-owned and Afghan-driven solution of the issue. When the Afghan Taliban were willing to talk to the US under certain conditions, Obama preferred to escalate military operations. The Taliban are now waiting for the departure of the NATO troops and the outcome of the Afghan elections next year. They know that despite the Afghan security forces being double the size of the foreign troops, they lack the crucial air cover and modern defence related gadgetry. All sides must realise that unless there is a negotiated settlement Afghanistan may pass through another civil war which would inflict new miseries on the Afghans besides having a destabilizing effect on the region.

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