In the name of narratives

“THIS is a war of narratives ... there is a dire need to come up with counter-narratives ... the menace of terrorism cannot be dealt with without countering the extremist, militant ideologies.”

These are some of the statements which have been echoing in our ears for the last several years. In particular, whenever some tragic terrorist incident takes place, such voices become louder in the public discourse. Apparently, the debate on extremism has been stuck somewhere in the fold of narratives.

The list of terms such as ‘narrative’, ‘counter-narrative’, and ‘ideological response’ has become so extensive that at times people wittily demand that the state must establish an authority to control narratives. However, the government has in fact assigned the National Counter-Terrorism Authority (Nacta) the task of developing counter-narratives. One can imagine how the bureaucracy will deal with the issue.

No doubt the challenge of militancy is a complex one and the state is in a hurry to fix it. The state wants to immediately address terrorism and extremism, but at the same time does not want to disturb the socio-religious and political structures of the state. Basically, the state’s perception of narratives is simplistic and not only the government but also a part of the intelligentsia believe that narratives can be produced ‘to order’. When a set of narratives expires or becomes counterproductive, replace it immediately with another set of narratives. Apparently it is as simple as that.

Pakistan has two major paradigms which nurture narratives. First is strictly religious and the state has not only owned it but also considers itself the custodian of this domain. The second is secular — also tagged as the alternative paradigm — which entails the establishment of a modern and progressive society. The whole paraphernalia of extremism has been built on state-owned narratives.

But now the state wants to clean the troubling narratives and appears accommodative to alternative narratives. It will not mind if the secular intelligentsia provides a remedy to get rid of terrorism. However, this should not be conceived as a paradigm shift.

Interestingly, the secular intelligentsia suggests a long-term solution, which ranges from curriculum reforms to spaces for cultural expression and transformation of state-society relations. Obviously, this is not going to address the immediate issue of terrorism. Perhaps this is why the state falls back on its religious-ideological allies for help in the ‘war of narratives’.

Narratives are neither slogans nor jingles; they reflect the mindset of a nation.
Having become part of the power elite, the clergy offers its services. However, the religious leadership has failed to offer a concrete solution. Mere ‘condemnation’ of acts of terrorism and calling the culprits ‘misguided’ is not going to serve the purpose. Nor is it going to build an effective counter-narrative to reduce the appeal of extremist ideologies.

The real strength of religious extremists is their ideological framework, which has been built on religious arguments and strengthened by political arguments. In this context, this is not merely a war of superficial narratives but is deeply linked to religious arguments or interpretation of Islamic precepts. The religious elite is either not ready or incapable of coming up with counter arguments. A rational framework for countering the militancy challenge is missing.

Are there any alternative solutions to counter terrorism? The answer is yes and the state is already employing some. The military operations are one of the effective responses to address the insurgency part of the problem. The National Action Plan was another solution to address a few immediate issues and to institutionalise the responses.

However, though the military operations weakened terrorist networks, NAP has not effectively backed up the military responses. For one, the security institutions remained confused about banned militant groups, which have become sources of recruitment for international terrorist organisations including the militant Islamic State.

Secondly, the government rightly or wrongly conceived NAP’s point of curbing hate speech as an alternative to counter-extremism measures. However, the mother of all problems remains the lack of trust and coordination within the law-enforcement agencies. Nacta was created to fill this gap, but the authority prefers the job of controlling narratives rather than leading the war on terrorism from the front.

Usually, the lack of cooperation from powerful security and law-enforcement agencies is blamed for the ineffectiveness of Nacta, but the government itself has not provided the proper resources and support which could make the counterterrorism body functional and effective. Interestingly, Nacta chooses the most difficult task for itself erroneously thinking that it will not face any resistance from any institution while creating counter-narratives.

Narratives are neither slogans nor jingles. They reflect the larger consensus as well as the mindset of a nation. They are deep-rooted in culture and the behaviour of individuals and society, but most importantly are based on a rational framework. This framework entails certain values that, when followed, guide and shape behaviour. The state has an important role in such practices but with the consent and consensus of society.

The state can facilitate a process where different segments of society — with diverse shades of opinion and different cultural, social and intellectual backgrounds — can engage in dialogue. The government can establish a national dialogue forum. It can serve as a platform for scholars, academicians, political and religious leaders and policymakers to bring all key challenges to the discussion table to understand each other’s viewpoints.

Only an argument can counter an argument. Thus, sharp and rational arguments will be created and effective counter-narratives nurtured.

However, arguments cannot provide immediate relief from terrorism. Purely from the security perspective, the government needs to sharpen its operational edge as well. The focus should not remain on military operations alone. Instead, provincial counterterrorism bodies must share more responsibilities. For this purpose, counterterrorism departments will require more human resources, funds, training and above all cooperation from other law-enforcement agencies.

But this is the dilemma the state has been facing for the last one-and-a-half decade — believing that narra**tives can fill the void of operational coordination.

The writer is a security analyst.

Source: In the name of narratives
Published in Dawn, January 31st, 2016

A NOTIFICATION issued by the Punjab government has banned preaching activities on university campuses. However, the notification does not provide enough reason for the government’s decision to put restrictions on the activities of the Tableeghi Jamaat on university campuses and its members’ stay in hostels.

Apparently, the decision has been taken from a security perspective. The Tableeghi Jamaat has easy access to university campuses and mosques attached to hostels. The law-enforcement agencies suspect that terrorists could use the Tableeghi Jamaat’s loose organisational structure to facilitate their operational mobility on university campuses. The provincial government’s decision is, therefore, an important initiative in the context of militants’ onslaught on educational institutions.

The religious and rightist parties’ reaction was expected. They criticised the decision on the basis of their belief that the Tableeghi Jamaat had no links with terrorism. As always, they saw a Western conspiracy behind this decision and deemed it tantamount to the banning of the preaching of Islam.

Apart from the internal discourse of the Tableeghi Jamaat, which is peaceful and influenced by the Sufi traditions of the subcontinent, the group has sectarian undercurrents. Indeed, it has been an important tool for the promotion of the Deobandi school of thought in the country, which also raises some critical questions. For one, why would the government allow the organisation of a particular sect to preach in educational campuses and not others? Should the government also allow members or groups of marginalised Muslim sects to preach on campuses?

Those who are familiar with the Tableeghi Jamaat’s preaching practices know that its members go into classrooms with the cooperation of the administration of a school, college or university. The administration fears that non-cooperation would be used to tag it as anti-religion. Is the same ‘right’ to disturb academic activities at educational campuses available to preaching organisations of any other sect or religion? The group once had specific times to go door to door and invite people to mosques but this is a new practice — its delegations have now started visiting offices and schools during work hours.

The Tableeghi Jamaat has expanded its outreach and influence in sections of Pakistani society to the extent that its delegations are sometimes invited to cabinet meetings and important state functions. Millions participate in its congregations in Pakistan, Bangladesh and India. The growth of participants in its annual congregation is exponential. This makes it necessary to review the group’s policy, discipline, impact, and more importantly, the reason why people are attracted to it.

Critics raise many objections to the methodology of the group, especially the time of its preaching visits, schedules, emphasis on its six principles and its way of administering the oath of allegiance. These acts are labelled impermissible innovations in religion. Western scholarship has criticised the Tableeghi Jamaat for its potential links to jihad, terrorism and political Islam. On the contrary, religious circles in Pakistan, particularly religious scholars, who are also engaged in politics, criticise the Tableeghi Jamaat for pushing the people away from jihad and politics.

It is interesting to note that the founder of the Tableeghi Jamaat, Maulana Mohammed Ilyas, initially established educational institutions along the lines of convents where common folk would come for a limited time. They were given basic knowledge of Islam and worship. However, as its influence and numbers grew, its approach and methods of preaching changed.

When setting up educational institutions on a large scale to attract Muslims to religion became difficult, mosques were brought into use as schools and affiliations were forged with educational institutions. However, the preaching model remained that of the Sufi mystics.

Sermons based on scholarly arguments were avoided. The basic principle named taleem was: “those who have a higher knowledge of Islam should share it with others and those who have little should learn from others”. The method was derived from the one practised by the As’haab-i-Suffa (Companions of the Prophet [PBUH] dedicated to teaching Islam in the Prophet’s mosque in Madina).

Despite its simplistic message, the Tableeghi Jamaat has failed to shed its sectarian image. Traditionally, it has used mosques belonging to the Deobandi sect for taleem and other activities. Never has a Shia mosque been used. The Tableeghi Jamaat does not believe in charismatic leaders. They are to be respected and venerated which again is part of the Sufi mystic tradition. Maulana Tariq Jameel is an exception and reportedly the elders of the Tableeghi Jamaat have reservations about his way of reaching out to celebrities and the ruling elite. However, their displeasure cannot stop Maulana Tariq from continuing his ways because he himself has become a celebrity. From a security angle, there’s no evidence that the group is directly involved in militancy. But the possibility of individual members getting involved has never been ruled out.

The possibility of Tableeghi Jamaat-associated youth moving towards extremism is also there. Many of those associated with jihad and violent sectarian groups have been linked to it at certain times. The Tableeghi Jamaat attracts the youth and brings them to the mosque, but it cannot control them. In the mosque, people associated with jihad and sectarian groups are also present. The loose organisational structure of the group is viewed as the biggest threat as it makes it easy for militant entities to penetrate ostensibly for recruiting new members and hiding from law-enforcement agencies. The latter claim that many terrorist groups have hidden themselves in the Tableeghi Jamaat to avoid arrests, and, sometimes to carry out terrorist activities.

Despite the fact that the terrorist threat is increasing, the Tableeghi Jamaat seems unwilling to change its organisational structure. That is partly because some of its elders believe that developing it on the style of a formal party will damage the organisation’s preaching image and appeal. If Tableeghi Jamaat elders are not sensitive to the penetration of militant elements, the state should also not compromise on its role to ensure security both in mosques and on campuses.

Published in Dawn, February 14th, 2016
http://www.dawn.com/news/1239420/tab...at-on-campuses

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"The greatest glory in living lies not in never falling ,but in rising every time we fall". (Nelson Mandela)

PAKISTAN’S security indicators have been improving lately, mainly due to the state’s enhanced counterterrorism efforts. Government and security officials highlight gains on the counterterrorism front; statistics support their claims. However, that does not mean we have won the war. We still need to develop effective ideological and political responses to broaden and strengthen the ongoing counterterrorism campaign. During the last two weeks, the security and lawenforcement agencies claimed some significant successes. ISPR chief Lt Gen Asim Bajwa revealed that a network of Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) and the Lashkari-Jhangvi (LJ) had been busted in Karachi.

Karachi police and the Sindh Counterterrorism Department claimed the killing of some wanted terrorists and the arrest of Asif Chotu, head of the Lashkar-i-Jhangvi Al Almi, who reorganised the violent sectarian group, from Dera Ghazi Khan. Several other alleged terrorists have been either killed or arrested across the country in recent weeks. That indicates that the law-enforcement agencies have stepped up their campaign to dismantle terror networks in urban areas.

Most of the militants arrested in recent weeks and months belong to the LeJ. It seems that the law enforcers are focusing more on sectarian terrorist outfits and their allies. Definitely, it will contribute to further decreasing sectarian-related terrorist attacks in Pakistan. The year 2015 saw a 60pc decrease in such attacks compared with 2014. These efforts will also weaken sectarian groups’ nexus with different Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) factions and the latter’s support networks in Pakistan. However, Pakistan’s militant landscape is very diverse with multiple actors of instability at work. Sectarian terrorist groups are only one pillar of the existing terrorism infrastructure, which will take time to perish. Though a few other groups have also been weakened, their support bases and operational capabilities remain intact.

A review of the statistics of 2015 suggests that the TTP remained the major actor of instability, carrying out 212 terrorist attacks across the country. The group also managed to carry out 12 cross-border attacks from Afghanistan. The TTP splinter group Jamaatul Ahrar further fuelled instability by carrying out 28 terrorist attacks. Another tribal areas-based group, the Lashkar-i-Islam, was involved in 27 attacks in Khyber Agency and the suburbs of Peshawar. The small militant groups in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Fata, described as the local Taliban, carried out 56 terrorist attacks in 2015. Meanwhile, while LJ was involved in 33 attacks in 2015; the Shia sectarian group Sipah-i-Mohammad Pakistan also remained active during the year, mainly in Karachi, Quetta and IslamabadRawalpindi, and carried out 19 targeted killings. Baloch separatist groups were another key actor of instability, mainly in Balochistan.

In recent years, new actors have been emerging and some old groups are taking advantage of the changes. Affiliates of the militant Islamic State (IS) group accepted responsibility for three attacks, while Jundullah managed four high-intensity attacks in different parts of the country. AQIS also absorbed the human resource of weakening militant groups; it was involved in abduction cases in Pakistan. In this context, the responses of the law-enforcement agencies need a dedicated platform to scientifically monitor the changing behaviours, trends, and emerging operational patterns of groups involved in terrorism. This initiative will help them broaden their threat perception and evolve effective responses.

So far, it has been difficult for the security and lawenforcement agencies to think beyond established threats. Pakistan is a frontline state in the war against terrorism, but Al Qaeda has never been on its threat-perception radar. Instead, the group was always considered part of a global problem, which resulted in the emerging threats being deemed insignificant. The same is proving true for the IS, which is now transforming local terrorist groups. It is a real and emerging threat for Pakistan. Understanding the dynamics, including the erosion of conventional militant groups like the Jamaatud Dawa (JuD) and the banned Jaishe-Mohammad is also a difficult task. ‹ Interestingly, Interior Minister Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan, while denying the presence of IS in Pakistan, has claimed that banned groups like JuD are using the name of Daesh (Arabic acronym of IS) to mask their activities. The minister has always been reluctant to include the group on the list of banned outfits and his new statement indicates the confusion which persists within the security establishment about the status of certain militant groups. The problem with the government is that it does not consider a group a threat unless it is involved in terrorist activities inside the country.

But at least it has been acknowledged that banned militant groups have become recruiting bases for international terrorist organisations, including Al Qaeda and the IS.

The successes of law-enforcement agencies deserve commendation, but it has been seen in the past that the elimination of a terrorist group’s leadership did not completely crush the group. After a while, the group reorganised and nurtured a new leadership. It happened more than twice in the case of the LJ. The killing of LJ leaders, including its founder Riaz Basra in 2002, provided a brief lull in sectarian killings. But in 2004, a new wave started which receded in 2008 when its new leaders were killed. Yet again, a sudden rise in sectarian killings was observed in 2010 when a new leadership, including Asif Chotu and Naeem Bukhari, took over the group. This leadership proved more lethal, as it had not only expanded the group’s geographical outreach to interior Sindh but also found new targets, including the Hazara and Ismaili communities, and the Bohra community in Karachi. The relief in statistics provides an opportunity to the government and law-enforcement agencies to review their responses and recompose their operational strategies. The most important aspect is linked to how to intervene in the spaces that continue breeding new generations of terrorists. Both the politico-ideological and operational perspectives are important and need collaborative efforts. The actors of instability use ideological and political spaces to survive, which automatically create the spaces for their operational activities.

Published in Dawn, February 28th, 2016
http://www.dawn.com/news/1242368/actors-of-instability

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"The greatest glory in living lies not in never falling ,but in rising every time we fall". (Nelson Mandela)

A new direction for IS?
Source

THE Brussels terrorist attacks have made it evident that the militant Islamic State group (IS) is transforming into a global terrorist network. The group’s weakening territorial control in Iraq and Syria could be one reason for this transformation. But the most important factor is that the group is losing its attraction among Islamist militant movements mainly due to its ultra-violent sectarian credentials.

The so-called Khorasan chapter of IS also appears to be on the retreat in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In Afghanistan, its affiliates and supporters have suffered heavy military losses at the hands of the Afghan Taliban, and in drone attacks and operations by the Afghan security forces. Similarly in Pakistan, extensive surveillance and intelligence-based operations have helped law enforcers bust many terrorist cells established by individuals who were either affiliated with or inspired by IS.

Importantly, the group is losing its appeal and credibility among most militant groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan because of its extremely narrow sectarian views. Even the Deobandi militant groups — who largely control the militant discourse and infrastructure in the region — find it hard to reconcile with IS’s criteria of ‘righteousness’.

Many analysts are surprised at what they see as an early and fast deterioration of the group. Others, however, interpret it as a process of reconstruction which is transforming the group from a local Islamist militant movement to a global terrorist group. As a terrorist group, IS will pose a bigger threat to global security as compared to Al Qaeda, due to abundant human resources and the strong logistical support base it enjoys, especially in the West, from where the group has taken thousands of youths into its fold.

IS may be losing its appeal among militant groups in Pakistan but the danger remains.
Bruce Hoffman, a renowned expert on terrorism, was quoted in a recent international publication as saying that even if IS dispatches only 10pc of foreign fighters to their native lands, we would see the foundation of a potentially highly effective terrorist cell and support network. Another expert, Andrew Watkins, believes that although IS has set up a unit dedicated to international attack plotting, the threat which can come from IS affiliates, loosely organised supporters, or those inspired online, would be more challenging as such cells may not be fully under the control of the IS central command.

There is another aspect of this IS transformation. Al Qaeda affiliates in different regions can take a weakening IS as an opportunity to attract its disillusioned members and engage them in terrorist operations. That would mean that it could also provide a lifeline to weakening terrorist movements, in a similar way when in 2014 Al Qaeda chapters and allies were not satisfied with the central leadership and felt attracted towards IS.

It can also be seen in another context. An ideologically inspired movement can divide into factions representing different tendencies and shades, but at a stage, these factions start complementing each other. This is not a new story in the South Asian context, where militant movements are in a constant state of evolution.

The Muslim countries cannot take this as ‘someone else’s problem’ as their youth are engaged with IS, which can at any time trigger a wave of violence in their native countries. Turkey, Tunisia and other North African Muslim nations have already started to suffer at the hands of IS-inspired militants. This should be taken as a serious warning by Muslim countries that already have an active militant infrastructure.

The situation in Pakistan and Afghanistan is yet more complex. IS has challenged the theological framework of the Deobandi brand of Islam in the region and also questioned the ideological basis of the Taliban movement. The group tagged the Taliban movement as a nationalist one, which it believes does not qualify as a ‘caliphate’ movement.

In the beginning, IS had received an overwhelming response from militant groups in the region but could not sustain it because of its obsession with ‘correcting’ the religious practices of these groups and converting them to Salafism. IS distributed many religious decrees against Deobandi Islam, but a publication titled Risalatul fil Deoband (A Book for Deoband) created real resentment against IS.

The Taliban commanders, who were feeling attracted to the newly emerged movement, started reconsidering their decisions. The Central Asian groups, descendants of Hizb-i-Islami and Salafi Taliban from Kunar and Nuristan regions of Afghanistan, were already inclined towards Salafi tendencies and took over the leadership of IS in some parts of Afghanistan. But these groups, mainly the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, faced hard resistance from the Afghan Taliban.

This has stopped the IS advance for a while, but the group has already transformed the militant character of the region. The young Taliban commanders feel more attracted to establishing an Islamic ‘caliphate’ and their belief that they can take over Afghanistan is becoming firmer.

Obviously, this transformation will have a negative impact on the reconciliation process in Afghanistan. The central Taliban leadership and senior commanders, who see an advantage in the political process, will face resistance from this young lot.

As far as Pakistani Taliban groups are concerned, IS had provided them ideological and political support when they were facing internal challenges and military operations by Pakistani security forces. Jamaatul Ahrar, which showed an inclination towards the Middle Eastern group and modified its organisational and operational framework along IS lines, has emerged as a new threat to Pakistan’s security. The group has claimed responsibility for most of the terrorist attacks in Pakistan over the past few months. The group had never formally joined the IS. At present, it has developed a nexus with Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, which is another beneficiary of a weakening IS in the region.

That does not mean that the days of IS are numbered in the world and in our region. The group can review its strategies to regain its lost attraction. At the same time, the group still remains an inspiration for militants as well as religious segments of society with Salafi inclinations, small but highly motivated Islamist groups, and politically charged youth in cyberspace.

The threat is not going away but taking a new turn.

The writer is a security analyst.

Published in Dawn, March 27th, 2016

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Or do you think that the Fellows of the Cave and the Inscription were of Our Signs wonderful?

MANY look upon militants as irrational creatures, criminals, or a mere bunch of thugs. The story of Ali Haider Gilani, however, offers a different perspective. In his three years of internment by Al Qaeda, Gilani seems to have realised that militants have ideological motives, and that their real strength lies in their politico-ideological narratives.

By contrast, the tale Shahbaz Taseer tells endorses a more commonplace description of militants. The latter brutally tortured him during his confinement. Taseer was kidnapped for ransom, unlike Gilani, who was purportedly kidnapped by militants as leverage to have their colleagues released from Pakistani jails. The self-described accounts given by both young men show two different sides of the Islamist militants. Their contrasting experiences in confinement have social value too. Their stories help us understand the character of militants operating in our region. Two different groups, Al Qaeda and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), had respectively abducted Ali Haider Gilani, son of former prime minister Yousuf Raza Gilani, and Shahbaz Taseer, son of assassinated governor of Punjab Salmaan Taseer. While both groups have foreign origins, the former has strong links with local militants. Shahbaz Taseer’s abductor, IMU, is a Central Asian militant group, and has always retained its independent identity while operating in parts of Pakistan’s tribal areas.

Notorious for its brutality, IMU did not get along well with most Pakistani militant groups, and some even resisted it. For instance, the then Taliban commander Mullah Nazir expelled IMU militants from South Waziristan in 2007. Recently, the Afghan Taliban, perceiving the group as troublesome, launched a large operation against it in the Zabul province of Afghanistan. The fighting reportedly led to Shahbaz Taseer’s freedom.


The impression one gets is that the long periods of confinement have had some impact on the characters of both these young men but to varying degrees and in different ways. Taseer’s recently published article in The New York Times, and his interview with the BBC, basically narrate the five years of his sufferings — during which solitary confinement, loneliness, doubt, and anxiety triggered an internal conflict. Religion came to his rescue in the form of spiritual healing. His confinement became a journey of self-consciousness and self-discovery. Ali Haider received better treatment from his Al Qaeda captors, and was even allowed to debate with them on different issues. The story he reported to the media explains the ideological context of Al Qaeda’s involvement in militancy. Going by his statements, he appears to understand the character of the militants and their aspirations for the enforcement of Sharia.

However, he disagrees with their approach to achieving this purpose through violent means — instead, he believes that it is incumbent on people to incorporate Sharia in their personal capacity through their own will. His captivity has enhanced his religious, political and social understanding in the context of social change. Mainly, his journey has been to explore the outside world. Both perspectives are important, as these help us understand how different narratives influence the minds of ordinary men and shape their behaviour. Importantly, their experiences could be used to understand how extremist narratives and tendencies are impacting Pakistan’s educated youth.

The state, power elites and clergy have created such a complex web of narratives, that it is hard to breach them with ‘alternative’ narratives. In Pakistan, a variety of ideological models, entrenched in religious tendencies, are available. These offer models of socio-political change in society, ranging from non-violent to violent options. Ordinary men, especially younger ones, have to choose between such models for their socio-political connection with society. Many confuse different models, and many are vulnerable to choosing the more extreme models. Gilani interacted with the sort of men who chose an extreme model, but he thinks non-violent options have not yet been fully exploited. Gilani’s understanding of the militant groups is also commendable as he can differentiate among various groups. He endorses the perception that the TTP and Jamaatul Ahrar are part of the ‘bad Taliban’, with the former already on India’s payroll and the latter still in the process of making a deal. He himself was kidnapped by the Sajna group, once counted among the ‘good Taliban’, to secure the release of Al Qaeda prisoners.

One important revelation made by Gilani is that the Taliban’s jihad movement is transforming into a nationalist movement and that militants are turning against Punjab, inspired by the notion of Pakhtun nationalism. However, militants’ publications and other open sources do not indicate that they have been divided along ethnic lines.

Yet, they do have grievances against Punjab, as they think the establishment comes mainly from this province. Gilani also cautioned that Al Qaeda’s sleeper cells are still active in south Punjab, while the group has its subcontinental headquarters in Karachi. Most importantly, he conveyed that militant narratives still remain attractive in Pakistan. While Shahbaz Taseer also hails from a political family, his confinement experiences sound completely different. It seems that he experienced things from a spiritual perspective, with little political or social nuance. His experience might be noteworthy in the context of the argument that Islam’s political appeal is increasing even as its spiritual appeal is decreasing. Religious discourse has been extensively transformed in South Asia, especially in Pakistan.

Groups and parties have taken over such discourse for political purposes, including those who tag themselves as spiritual leaders. The custodians of so-called Sufi traditions have become part of social and political elites. Hyper-urbanisation is also conducive to religiosity, with the latter’s social value that could provide some meaning to one’s daily life and connectivity with other social groups. It is interesting that those religious movements which provide broader connectivity are more popular in the country, such as Tableeghi Jamaat, Dawat-i-Islami, Al Huda, etc. The social connectivity that these groups provide, leans more towards ideological and political exposure than spiritual.

In an atmosphere where the practice of religion is increasingly taking on political and ideological overtones, the Sufi tradition is being undermined, and spiritual experiences are no longer able to generate a counter response to extremism.

Published in Dawn, May 22nd, 2016

http://www.dawn.com/news/1259881/con...ng-experiences

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"The greatest glory in living lies not in never falling ,but in rising every time we fall". (Nelson Mandela)

THE power of an image is immense. It can induce in one a sense of guilt or superiority. Here are two comments from a photography website that might explain the potentially manipulative nature of the image; how images play with individuals and, in many cases, with societies too. “Why do I look good in the mirror but bad in photos?” asks the first comment. And the second reads like this: “could a photo[graph] of a mirror act like a mirror?” Narcissism can be traced easily in the first quote, but the second one is trickier. All humans have varying tendencies towards narcissism but, sometimes, it reaches a level where the distinction between a photograph and a mirror is blurred. But a photograph cannot act like or become a mirror.

This is neither too complex nor too philosophical to understand, provided we are aware of this tendency, in the context of public debates in Pakistan. Reflections of such debates can be seen in all forms of media, from electronic to print to social. Debates on the ‘image’ of the women, rights of non-Muslims and ‘lesser’ Muslims, socio-religious values, etc
reflect anger and frustration regarding the ‘bad’ image or photograph. The same is happening on larger scales, on political and regional fronts. The people blame cameras or mirrors for distorting their image.

A blunt social scientist would call this condition an ‘immense collective narcissistic disorder’. Although there is no dearth of terms in the social sciences to describe such a condition, a combination of ‘social disorder’ and ‘social phobia’ may aptly serve the purpose. The urban dictionary defines ‘social disorder’ as “a condition of society that causes other disorderly and immoral things to occur”, including phenomena such as “negative peer pressure, traumatic experiences, social prejudices, and propaganda”. ‘Social phobia’ is defined as “a strong fear of being judged by others and of being embarrassed”. The latter partakes of the individual while the former of individuals acting as a society at large.


Political scientists tend to call this ‘social decay’, a situation “where people are generalised into a generic group called ‘strangers’ and the only time strangers interact with each other is when one stranger offers another stranger a service or something that the other stranger needs or wants”. Doesn’t this definition hold a mirror up to our society? Religiosity versus secularism, right wing versus liberal, pro-democracy versus pro-establishment, and other such debates can all be seen in this context.

In psychological terms, such conditions may cause depressive disorders that can compromise one’s sanity. As far as other impacts are concerned, a recent article published in Dawn revealed that Pakistan ranked 113th in the Social Progress Index (SPI) for 2016 — behind India and Bangladesh, which ranked 98th and 101st, respectively. ‹ The writer also mentioned that Pakistan has practically the worst ranking for tolerance and inclusion — coming in second last place, 132nd out of 133 countries. In 2014, Pakistan was one of the most unpopular countries in the world according to the Good Country Index, coming in 111th place out of 163 countries; far from perfect in methodology that index mapping has stopped in subsequent years. Let’s also have a look at the internal strength of our state and society, which appear without bulwarks and unable to pull the country out of its listing as one of the most fragile states in the current global scenario. Pakistan is ranked as the 14th most fragile state in 2016. Its position marginally improved — mainly because of worsening conditions in Syria and Yemen — which pushed Pakistan from 12th to 14th position.

The Fund for Peace, the organisation which issues the ranking of fragile states, uses six indicators to determine the status of fragile states: demographic pressures, group grievances, refugees and internally displaced people, human flight and brain drain, uneven economic development, and poverty and economic decline. It can be claimed that Pakistan is making headway in some areas, which may provide some cause for optimism.

All these factors have a cause and effect relationship with one another and form a vicious cycle. Even if one or two indicators show some progress it wouldn’t make much difference; other factors could ruin these gains. For instance, ‘group grievances’ includes all forms of violence — including violence on
religious, sectarian and other minorities. ‹ Statistically, Pakistan’s internal security situation has improved in the last few years, with a comparative decrease in the number of violent incidents. But discrimination and extremism on a societal level show no signs of abating. Sometimes, a vicious cycle that becomes so hard to break needs concerted and consolidated efforts, both from the state and society.

The Fragile States Index shows that two factors are important for states to improve their image: first, internal stability, followed by good relationships with neighbouring states. Internal stability does not come through eliminating incidents of crime and terrorism alone but by curtailing their root causes. These root causes are not only entrenched in state policies but are also deeply embedded in Pakistani society’s behaviour. The common person is under the impression that their extremist views are not abnormal, and the state also does not recognise this problem; both have developed a milieu where narcissism is a primary value.

Second, the nature of relationships with neighbours determines the economic potential, and the political and strategic stability of the state. Apparently, it seems paradoxical that Pakistan does not enjoy good relations with its three immediate neighbours — with whom it shares common civilisations and histories, and religious, cultural and social values. With China, however, Pakistan has evolved common economic and strategic interests, despite diverse cultures. This contrasting nature of relationships with neighbouring states is not only a political or strategic question, it also reveals the quest of a nation attempting to establish an independent identity within other nations that share common characteristics. In this struggle, it is borrowing cultural influences out of its regional domains. Pakistan cannot become ‘Al-Bakistan’, but in this quest for an ‘image’ both state and society are falling deeper into delusions — goodness knows what we will find there.


Published in Dawn, July 3rd, 2016

http://www.dawn.com/news/1268807/thr...ng-glass/print

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"The greatest glory in living lies not in never falling ,but in rising every time we fall". (Nelson Mandela)

Common confusions

THE Quetta attack, and subsequent statements and analyses, have once again revealed that issues of national security remain mired in confusion. This confusion largely springs from our obsession with internal delusions, and our externalisation of even this country’ existential threats. While ‘externalisation’ provides an excuse for incompetence and failure, ‘internal delusions’ all concern swollen-headed authority that, supposedly, can magic away all our problems.

Every major terrorist attack triggers a series of responses from different state institutions. Nonetheless, many question these institutions’ preventive responses despite frequently issued early warnings. Public debates usually remain rhetorical and one-dimensional, ultimately reaching the same conclusions, identifying the same problems and suggesting identical solutions.

Part of the debate tries to explore who should be held responsible for what has happened to Pakistan’s internal and regional security over the last four decades. Was it the mistake of one institution, a policy error, or is the whole system guilty of creating this ‘security crisis’ in Pakistan? Some may argue that there is no security crisis in the country. They have evidence to support their claim: there has been a visible decline in the number of terrorist attacks inside the country. But does this decline bring the security guards down to normal?

This does not mean that military operations against terrorists in tribal areas were not successful. Nor does this mean that other security and law enforcement institutions are doing nothing to eradicate the menace of terrorism in the country.

Sometimes, mere statistics do not help to remove ambiguities. People demand substantial testimonies.
The military operations in Fata have certainly weakened terrorist networks and hampered militants’ capacity to operate freely. A series of military operations, especially the 2009 Swat operation and the ongoing Zarb-i-Azb, have contributed significantly to damaging local terrorist infrastructures.

A recent media briefing by the national coordinator of the National Counter-Terrorism Authority on the implementation of the National Action Plan reflects on the successes of law-enforcement agencies. He stated that since the launch of NAP in early 2015, 122,772 combing and 2,000,000 stop-and-search operations were conducted across Pakistan — in which 1,400,000 suspects were arrested, most among those arrested were released after preliminary investigations. About 126 bank accounts linked to financing terrorism were closed and more than one billion rupees seized.

As many as 4,230 intelligence-based operations were also conducted against militants. Highlighting some other NAP successes, the head of Nacta claimed that over 400 people were convicted, including 380 from Punjab, 18 from Sindh, six from KP, five from Balochistan and two from AJK.

After the recent terrorist attack in Quetta, the government has also decided to set up a high-level task force to monitor implementation on NAP. Although the exact structure of the proposed body is not known, one can hope that this initiative will not face the same fate as that of the Joint Intelligence Directorate, which has yet to materialise despite many announcements made by the interior minister.

No doubt, these successes and responses are real and visible. However, the problem is that the common man is still confused. He is confused because he sees that, despite such dedicated responses, new terrorists are still coming from somewhere, breaching security structures and carrying out major attacks.

Part of this confusion could be due to the public’s and media’s perceptions that the threat of terrorism is over and normalcy is just one step away. However, the continuing activities of militants in different parts of the country show that the threat is still far from over. Fata and KP remain vulnerable to terrorism even though most militants there have either fled to Afghanistan or relocated to other areas within Pakistan. For instance, of reported terrorists attacks in Pakistan this July, 22 out of 39, or 56pc, were concentrated in KP and Fata.

Jamaatul Ahrar is a new offshoot of the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan, which has reorganised some of its factions and commanders since the launch of Zarb-i-Azb. The JuA has managed to carry out some 66 terrorist attacks in Pakistan since its inception in 2014. The group launched about half of these attacks in 2016, which included the deadly attacks on Gulshan-i-Iqbal Park in Lahore, the Shabqadar sessions court, and a Nadra office in Mardan.

Sometimes, mere statistics do not help to remove ambiguities — people demand substantial testimonies. That puts pressure on those who sit in parliament and represent the people. In the aftermath of the Quetta blast, some among the opposition parties and government allies in parliament have shown bitterness towards the security establishment. Maulana Sherani of JUI-F and PkMAP’s Mehmood Khan Achakzai strongly criticised the security institutions for their ‘inability’ to check the menace of terrorism. Maulana Sherani was even blunter, stating that our enemies are from within, not without.

Although the interior minister rejected the criticism, one cannot ignore the presence of networks of banned militant groups operating across the country. Most assessments on Pakistan’s security threats agree that these banned organisations — whether they attack Pakistan or not — are the recruitment bases for lethal anti-Pakistan militant groups and international terrorist organisations, including Islamic State and Al Qaeda.

In that context, recent criticisms cannot be easily skimmed over. Many banned militant groups have taken refuge behind anti-Indian rhetoric. The recent summer unrest in India-held Kashmir provided the opportunity for banned militant groups to organise rallies across the country and openly collect funds for their violent agendas. State institutions have not even bothered to categorically disown these groups, which once again confuses the ordinary Pakistani citizen.

Externalising a problem is considered the easiest, scapegoat policy of shunning such criticism. Shifting blame on to external factors provides only temporary relief. It’s effective too, because many Pakistanis believe in this ‘externalisation’ narrative.

One might recall that both state and society took more than a decade to finally address the delusion of externalisation before launching the Swat operation in 2009. Now, we are once again trying to externalise what is visibly knocking us from the inside. An overemphasis on externalisation will further compound the existing confusion in people’s minds.

The writer is a security analyst.

Source: Common Confusions

Published in Dawn, August 14th, 2016

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The world is changed by your example, not by your opinion !

The myth of soft targets

WHY do terrorists choose to strike soft targets? The conventional answer would be because they feel hitting hard targets is becoming increasingly difficult. So what constitutes a ‘soft target’?

Security experts are trying to understand the issue of soft targets from a variety of perspectives. There are still many unanswered questions. For instance, do terrorists really consider it a soft target — as described by the state? Do they randomly hit so-called soft targets, with less strategic thinking and planning? And, most importantly, how do terrorists define their enemies or attack targets?

These are genuine queries for both practitioners and academics. But it appears as if the state and its security institutions are deliberately manoeuvring the ‘myth’ of soft targets to cover up their weak responses. As they have done before, after the recent attack on lawyers in Quetta, the government and security establishment came up with the excuse that terrorists are on the run and therefore are now choosing soft targets. The fact of the matter is that, even after the Army Public School, Peshawar, attack in 2014, terrorists have been successful in carrying out large-scale and well-planned attacks across the country — although the frequency of such attacks has decreased compared to previous years.

Usually, non-combatants, civilians and unarmed individuals, groups and communities are considered ‘soft targets’. The recent spate of terrorist attacks across the world indicates a disturbing trend of a visible increase in attacks targeting non-combatants. Many experts link this increase to the emergence of the militant Islamic State group, its affiliates or inspired groups, which are innovative in their strategies and tactics, and are expanding the range of their targets. The terrorist attack on crowds celebrating Bastille Day in Nice, the suicide attack on a Kurdish wedding ceremony, and the suicide attack in Madina, are just some examples of terrorists expanding the range of their targets.

Weaknesses of the government and security establishment are the terrorists’ strength.
At the same time, militants are exploiting security gaps to execute tested terrorist strategies. Taking people hostage and mass shootings are dangerous practices that they have applied in many operations, including in the attack on a café in Dhaka and on Kabul’s American University a few days ago.

Many security experts assume that terrorists target non-combatants to divert the attention of security institutions from conventional security targets. Then, an attack on civilians increases the impact of terrorism and puts states on the defensive due to public pressure. However, if we look at the patterns of attacks, terrorists continuously target specific non-combatant individuals and groups. With little variations in different regions, terrorists mainly target sectarian and religious minorities, intellectuals and sociopolitical elites and other groups that hold divergent views from those held by them.

Terrorists consider these segments their enemies. But in most cases, security institutions prioritise securing state infrastructure and power elites. Militants take the same amount of time in planning and executing their operations to hit both ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ targets. The state and its security institutions may have an excuse that they lack human resources, logistics, and even capabilities, but terrorists exploit these same weaknesses.

Collateral damage is another myth directly linked to the notion of a soft target. While counterterrorism operations might cause collateral damage, terrorists are also least concerned about the casualties of ‘neutrals’ and even, in some cases, their sympathisers. A recent report by Action on Armed Violence revealed that during the last five years, 77pc of the total number of deaths and injuries (145,565) recorded in armed conflicts were ordinary people going about their daily business. According to the report Iraq, Syria, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Yemen were the countries that saw the highest levels of civilian harm in this period. These figures include both ‘collateral damage’ and non-combatants who have been deliberately targeted.

However, terrorists always prioritise important strategic security installations and targets that have national and international significance — ranging from diplomatic missions to religious and cultural heritage sites. Although they continuously focus on their non-combatant enemies, their prime objective remains to hit hard and cause maximum casualties. Globally, attacks on non-combatants constitute 30pc of all terrorist attacks, but these attacks cause more human losses compared to others.

Similar patterns can be witnessed in Pakistan. According to open-source databases, different perpetrators including the TTP, other Al Qaeda-inspired groups, sectarian militants and nationalist insurgents in Balochistan have managed to carry out 7,311 terrorist attacks in Pakistan from January 2011 to mid-August 2016. These attacks claimed 9,689 lives and left 18,812 others injured. Fatalities among security forces personnel, including paramilitary forces and police, were 2,672.

In the incidents of violence recorded during this period, fatalities among civilians were 38pc, security forces 12pc, and among the militants 50pc. Police fatalities were almost 40pc of the total fatalities among security and law enforcement personnel.

Of the 30pc of attacks directly targeting non-combatants, these included attacks on sectarian and religious minorities, political parties and workers of secular parties and alternative voices (such as those recently targeted in Quetta). The percentage of collateral damage is quite high in Pakistan; approximately, it contributes more than 55pc in non-combatant deaths.

In many cases, the perception of state and society about militants — that they are not rational actors — complicates the situation. People get confused when terrorists target segments of a society holding views different from that of a country’s establishment. This happened recently when IS attacked a Kurdish wedding ceremony in Turkey.

The recent terrorist attack in Quetta — and other attacks in the past that target political leaders, nationalist political workers and religious scholars, who hold views contrary to the terrorists’ — triggered anger against the government and the establishment. In such situations, it becomes difficult for the victims to rationally analyse the situation. This is a war on another level, where terrorists can trigger anger potentially more explosive than the physical sort.

The security institutions’ weaknesses are the strength of the terrorists. The government and establishment should not expect that the mantra of ‘soft targets’ will absolve them of their responsibility to protect the people.

The writer is a security analyst.

Source: The myth of soft targets
Published in Dawn, August 28th, 2016

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The world is changed by your example, not by your opinion !

The enemy’s identity

‘THEY are not us, they are them.’ These days, this is the narrative in vogue in Pakistan. But, suddenly, the interior minister evoked an outdated narrative, drawing comparisons that blur the line between our enemy and us: ‘The enemy looks like us.’

Pakistan’s Senate echoed with this phrase after the minister uttered it once again in his concluding remarks in a debate on the country’s recent security turmoil. He was explaining the reasons behind the slow progress on investigations into last month’s suicide attack in Quetta. By saying that the enemy looks likes us and lives within us, he perhaps wanted to explain that even the enemy eats and sleeps like us. However, he failed to impress the enraged opposition leaders, who understood similarities between ‘us’ and the ‘enemy’ in their own way.

Until a few years ago, we strongly believed the argument that it is hard to battle terrorists who are well entrenched in our society. Then we defeated the terrorists in the tribal areas and in Karachi. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) came as a blessing that many thought would only be possible if we achieved victory in the war against terrorism. Operation Zarb-i-Azb has cleared Fata of local and foreign terrorists, including those belonging to the East Turkistan Islamic Movement. Many, therefore, do not find it difficult to believe that the sporadic terrorist attacks occurring today are the handiwork of an external ‘hidden hand’.

At a time when the state is fighting for its survival, its practices must be open to democratic review.
The identity of the enemy is a critical issue in Pakistan, one that haunts political analysts’ discourse. There are many versions of the enemy — ranging from external to internal, strategic to political and social to ideological — but the narratives and definitions crafted by the establishment are considered more legitimate. Although explicitly defined, these narratives are difficult to explain. An effort to deconstruct them would suggest that their definitional contours are both vast and fluid, and can be extended as required. Ultimately, the establishment has the exclusive right to identify an adversary. Those who challenge or attempt to reinterpret this could fall into a gray area that is more serious than being labelled an enemy. It requires only common sense to identify oneself in the range of categories we confront. Let’s first explore the dimensions of this concept.

Usually, the enemy is divided into four broad categories. Obviously, being the mother of all ills, the ‘super enemy’ comes first. Everybody knows who this is. It has also remained constant because we don’t have the choice of changing neighbourhoods. It is everywhere and has extensive networks. It’s constantly engaged in conspiring against us and also using our other neighbours for that purpose.

The second enemy is the ‘enemy alien’. This is a category with a legal basis and is well defined under the Protection of Pakistan Act. An enemy alien is defined as a ‘militant’ whose identity is unascertainable as a Pakistani citizen. It is interesting to note that it was only in Punjab that 67 cases were registered under PoPA in the last two years — none were alien or unascertainable, all were Pakistani nationals.

There is another dangerous category, that of the ‘low enemy’, perceived in asymmetric terms: members of a society who have ‘lost identity’ in an opposite order and are eventually considered delusional and obsessed with certain kinds of idealism. The worst enemy of the status quo has always been idealism. The low enemy is entrenched in the country’s socio-political discourse. This is why it is difficult to identify and isolate a low enemy, covertly sheltered within the thought patterns of many communities. Usually, they are tested through different rubrics such as morally, financially or ideologically corrupt.

The last category consists of ‘potential enemies’ that includes supporters or facilitators of the first three types of enemies. Supposedly providing logistics and human resources to all kinds of enemies, this is also a dangerous category.

An argument can be made that, as they are all enemies, they would have links with each other. Their interests would and should align. They include all shades of enemies — from lethal to non-lethal, political to non-political and militants to the corrupt — which is how the correlation between terrorism and corruption can be found. The most dangerous conclusion of this argument is that the ‘super enemy’ is controlling all other shades of enemies.

Nonetheless, those who are not enemies are ‘patriots’. One should not confuse these patriots with those patriots of the PPP who were purified of corruption through political dry-cleaning by Gen Musharraf. A patriot cannot be corrupt and he always tries to be apolitical while being political. He hates the super enemy even more and fights its local allies in parliament, on television and wherever he finds an opportunity. He is immune to being labelled an ‘enemy’; nor is he approached or influenced by the super (or any other) enemy.

These patriots are above criticism and those who criticise them in the garb of the Constitution, transparency, rule of law, freedom of expression, etc are traitors. They are superior and derive their strengths from morality — a morality that is always above everything, including the Constitution. The religious have the right to challenge the moral right and that is obviously how powerful stakeholders develop a nexus within certain religious groups, which not only protect their moral right but counter all sorts of enemies.

This perspective could be made simpler or, contrarily, more complex but it clearly indicates the trust deficit between the establishment and different segments of society. It is also evident that the establishment wants to control and shape the national narrative, and it expresses displeasure when parliament attempts to do so.

At a time when the state is fighting a war for its survival against terrorism and multi-layered extremism, there is a need for continuous review of the approaches and practices of the state to make its response most effective. This is a job for parliament, but the establishment seems to be in a self-righteous mood.

Source: The enemy’s identity
Published in Dawn September 11th, 2016

__________________
The world is changed by your example, not by your opinion !

Geopolitical wranglings

Global politics is a complex web where one development can lead to many others, and one intervention to mitigate a conflict can expose the fissures of many other dormant conflicts. However, it always remains a hard task to find some direct relation between two distant and different conflicts and international interventions in those conflicts such as in Afghanistan and Iraq. Many authors have critically analysed and found some major flaws in the strategies adopted by the US and the West towards the Middle East and Afghanistan, which caused huge human sufferings and triggered multiple conflicts in both regions. The recently released Chilcot report, comprising the findings of the UK’s Iraq war inquiry, has discussed at length Tony Blair’s strategic ambitions about Iraq and how he manipulated Afghan invasion for another war in Iraq.

Hasan M. Sadiq in his book The End of the Great Game has tried to trace a direct link between these two wars. He thinks that these were part of a great game played out by the US whose real target was Pakistan.

A Pakistani-American and computer programmer by profession, Sadiq has tried to analyse a host of very complex issues including the Kashmir conflict, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the nuclear race between India and Pakistan, and pre- and post-9/11 relations between Pakistan and the US in his maiden publication comprising 16 chapters. He has attempted to connect the dots around his basic thesis that the US wanted to control the Middle East to ensure global hegemony, and Pakistan military and nuclear arsenal were major hurdles in achieving this objective; China entered the scene a bit later, distracting the US from its major goal.

Hasan M. Sadiq offers his perspective on the US’s global politics and policies towards Pakistan
He argues that since the first Gulf War, the US has been trying to ‘manage’ Pakistan with a view to ensure that it would not be able to provide military assistance to the Gulf states, in case of any conflict there. A new alliance of China, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan emerged in the region, which has become a hurdle in the way of the US great design. According to Sadiq, this alliance is gradually neutralising American influence not only in the Middle Eastern and South Asian regions but also in the rest of the world. To regain its influence, the US wanted to denuclearise Pakistan and to contain Pakistani defence spending. He also sees the conflict in Afghanistan, which he calls ‘war’ as part of the US strategy. He believes that “the main goal of the US war in Afghanistan, which has now lasted over 14 years, was to degrade Pakistan’s expanding nuclear program, which otherwise has the potential to threaten US hegemony over this vital energy-rich region of the world.”

Sadiq considers the US and Pakistan as vital actors in the regional chessboard and China as an emerging actor, which is also challenging the US hegemony in the region. The last chapter, which depicts the title of the book, provides an interesting viewpoint on what the author calls ‘the great game’. He points out that the US dependence on Middle Eastern oil and energy resources is decreasing but it still wants to control the Middle Eastern oil for geostrategic reasons, which include to prevent the Russians from gaining control of these reserves; control its own installed dictators in the Middle East; fuel the economies of the West by receiving cheap oil; deplete the energy resources of the Arabs to preserve its own energy resources; and bring to market its own energy resources and continue to control the geopolitics of the world from its own shores. Sadiq thinks the larger threat to these US policies in the Middle East is the increasing arsenal of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. He sees all international attempts for reduction of nuclear arms, as part of the US efforts to contain Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities, including the 2010 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty knows as New START signed by the US President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev.

“In May 2001, China and Pakistan publicly announced the joint development of Gwadar port in southwest Pakistan. Gwadar, adjoining the Iranian sea border lies strategically on the waters of the Persian Gulf, also known as the Straits of Hormuz. It is across this strategic access from where most of the Middle East oil is supplied to the West, Japan, and China. If left unchecked by the U.S. this development can undermine its power not only in south Asia, but also in the Middle East. In addition, if U.S. intentions remain on track to control all the Middle East oil, as per my theory, then China with the help of Pakistan could position itself to fight against a U.S. imposed oil blockade from Gwadar port. China already knows how the US reacted when the Soviets marched into Afghanistan in 1979. Being the second largest consumer of oil, is China worried that the US plans to occupy all the Middle East oilfields? If indeed this is the reason why China has entered Gwadar, then there could be some truth to this worry.” — Excerpt from the book
One finds a frequent argument made in the book that Saudi Arabia and China are partners of Pakistan in order to subjugate the US efforts. This is the reason, the author argues, that Saudi Arabia always comes forth to support Pakistan when financial restrictions are imposed on it. Although the Saudis’ Afghanistan policy always remained mysterious and even difficult to predict, the author alludes to a speech made by Prince Turki al-Faisal in 2010 in which he said that Saudis do not want to give up on the Taliban. They will continue to support the interests of the Pakistanis against the Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras, who form the Northern Alliance group and are supported by the US and India. Hence, he concludes that “it is highly unlikely that Pakistan would support any peace deal between the Taliban and the US, which denies the Taliban its full representation in any future Afghan government.”

As far as China is concerned in this equation, the author has put in Zbigniew Brzezinski’s words that China appears to be driven by its own interest of consolidating Pakistan “as a counterweight to India and to gain through it a more proximate and safer access to the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf.” Of course, this is not in the interest of the US which sees China’s growing economic, military power and partnership with Pakistan as a threat to its hegemony in the region. The writer sees proxy wars in Afghanistan and pressure on Pakistan’s western borders as a tactic to build pressure on Pakistan.

The book is a very frank commentary based on the feelings of a Pakistani expat in America. The author is not an academic by practice but he has tried to offer his analysis of the US’s global politics and policies towards Pakistan.

The reviewer is a security analyst. He is the Director of Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), Islamabad.

The End of the Great Game
(POLITICS)
By Hasan M. Sadiq
ISBN: 978-9692308809
HMS Books, Pakistan
374pp.

Source: Geopolitical wranglings
Published in Dawn, Books & Authors, September 18th, 2016

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The world is changed by your example, not by your opinion !