PUNJAB-BASHING (with a focus mainly on central Punjab) is an old pastime of some Pakistani politicians. When Mr Asif Ali Zardari was seeking to become president of Pakistan, he decried desperately that the ‘majority of people across the expanse of our nation have been ignored and even subjugated by Pakistan’s establishment, ‘the elite oligarchy’, located exclusively in a region stretching between Lahore and Rawalpindi-Islamabad’ (an article published in Washington Post under his name, September 4, 2008).

Now it is the turn of the Makhdooms, Legharis and Abbasis et al. to join the chorus, on behalf of the Seraiki-speaking region of the province. This southern area of the province with about 37 million people is relatively poor, albeit with endowment of fertile land but mainly under the ownership of feudalistic absentee-landlords. Among the recent stakeholders in agriculture has been the commercial wing of the military. The area has also been in spotlight for being the base for some of the terrorist organisations in the country. There is more in this latest development, therefore, than meets the eye.

There is no grass-roots movement for autonomy; people are too busy to cope with their challenge of deprivation and injustices, related directly to the social formation of the region. The present boundaries of the provinces including Punjab are the product of the historical factors as well as the terms of the Partition. In India, the Nehru government with Vallabhbhai Patel as the minister of interior had devised a comprehensive plan to establish the writ for independent India. This process included the integration of the princely states, as well as adjustment of boundaries on linguistic lines. In Pakistan, no such development took place. In 1947, when Punjab was partitioned, it also lost a part of its central region including important districts of Amritsar (Muslim majority but Sikh centre), Gurdaspur (another with Muslim majority districts) and Jullundar.

In Balochistan, the princely state of Kalat became part of the province (how its fate was determined is still a matter of dispute), and Khairpur became part of Sindh. When the province of West Pakistan was created and then disbanded, the princely state of Bahawalpur became part of Punjab (by pure administrative fiat). Also the federally administered areas were divided into Pata and Fata, but places such as Swat, Dir, and Gilgit continued as autonomous entities. Unlike India, establishing writ of the state and of reconciling boundaries has been an ad hoc phenomenon in Pakistan.

As a consequence, Punjab was left as a province with the largest concentration of population, with the Balochistan with the largest geographic area. How would such an unbalanced configuration affect the health of the confederation? One can take a static view or a look at the situation in dynamic terms. A province dominating the others? It is a difficult question but it is not insoluble. Looking at the experience of Australia and Canada as confederations, one gets the picture of the possible inter-provincial trajectory in a growing economy.

In Canada, for example, the province of Ontario dominated the economy and the political system of the country when the Dominion of Canada was established and has continued to hold the position until recent times. Expansion of Western Canada and development of natural resources, especially in Alberta, has now turned the situation the other way round. An important feature of Canadian confederation is what is called equalisation payments (the richer provinces transferring funds according to a formula to the poorer provinces (equivalent but not quite the same as NFC awards in Pakistan). Ontario no longer dominates the picture.

There have been changes in Pakistan as well. The discovery of natural gas in Balochistan should have put the province on a path to accelerated development but the process failed, partly because of the tribal social formation in the province and partly owing to unfair arrangement for compensation to the province. Southern Sindh, Southern Punjab and Bahawalpur have remained underdeveloped under the burden of their agrarian culture.

Now if Punjab were to be divided into two parts (or three!), will it be a step in the right direction from the point of view of central Punjab, the new Seraiki province and the country as a whole? To the extent that this division would change the structure of representation in the Senate and the National Assembly, the major beneficiary would probably be a tactician such as president Zardari. In this chess game, the

people in the new province, more so than in central Punjab, would probably have not much to gain, but could be the net losers.

There are two inter-related reasons which relate to the social formation in the Seraiki region: first, the absentee landlordism, with tenants at the mercy of the master, who would also become the political master with all the powers and perks that go with it. Land reform is an obvious solution for this problem; but the prospects are quite slim for such a move.

The second reason is what the economists call cumulative causation. Central Punjab, because of historical factors, and with its cluster of people in artisan pursuits, entrepreneurial activities, administrative positions, peasant proprietorship, and services, would continue to attract people from other regions including Seraiki in search of better opportunities. As the current budget of the province indicates, the cost-benefit situation would not require a major adjustment for central Punjab from the loss of revenue from the proposed division.

At the time of formation of the new country, Lahore and surrounding areas had an exclusive distinction to be the pole of activity attracting manpower from less developed areas. Karachi soon developed as a metropolis and became a competing pole parallel to central Punjab, and there should be more.

This process should be facilitated by democracy, but it meets with obstacles. An important hurdle is presented by the current phase of transitional democracy prevailing in Pakistan. The framework of this democracy is of course party politics. But there is a difference. Emphasis is on leadership, not representation, and is founded on personality.

In some other countries, family name does matter but the candidate goes through a cumbersome party convention. In Pakistan this ritual is considered superfluous (e.g., the will of Benazir Bhutto nominating her successors), and there can be as many parties as there may be aspirants, to partake in the process. More ambitious among them would seek a provincial administrative base which would provide them with an opportunity to exercise power.

It can be argued that this is what democracy is all about. The problem, however, is with the transitional democracy and its limitations.

As democracy evolved in Europe, for example, the middle class as defined in its conventional form became the backbone of the system. In Pakistan there is no middle class in the true sense of the term. In Europe this class had a stake in democracy as it was the product of what is called public goods: public health infrastructure, social insurance, public education, public transportation facilities, leaving sufficient disposable income for decent living.

In Pakistan the most appropriate proxy for this phenomenon is the middle income group, consisting of diverse categories from office workers to professionals. As the discussions in the media about the latest budget have shown, it is this class that bears the major burden of financing government expenditure, through indirect taxes. In the transitional democracy then, there is a wide gap between the elite and the rest. The men at the top enjoy the power and perks and the rest largely pay for them.

In this framework, creating new provinces would only spread the disease, common people may remain where they are, or things might get worse for them.

Far more important than tinkering with provincial boundaries is the urgency for improving the quality of governance in the country, and not use this issue as a diversionary tactic. The other top priorities should be to meet the challenge of terrorism, and to bring the people in the frontier region into the fold of full citizenship.

An important prerequisite for streamlining provincial boundaries is to introduce a comprehensive land reform. Ayub Khan played with a token scheme. The reform in its next phase, introduced by Z.A. Bhutto, received a fatal blow from its politically-motivated thrust. And it did lot of harm to the cause. Whatever was left of it, the pamphleteer Abul A’la Maudoodi, and Council of Islamic Ideology, performed the final rites for its burial by declaring it un-Islamic.

This unholy alliance between the mullah and the landlord should now be exposed.

Email: izzud-din.pal@videotron.ca

When Atal Bihari Vajpayee for the first time unfurled the national flag from the ramparts of the Red Fort in New Delhi, he promised to turn the infamous Kalahandi hunger belt in western Orissa into a food bowl. If only Vajpayee had made a serious attempt to wipe out hunger from Kalahandi, and follow it up with a nationwide programme to feed the hungry millions, the BJP wouldn’t have been in a pitiable condition.

And when President Pratibha Patil reiterated her government’s resolve to bring in a National Food Security Act in a bid to provide every hungry family with 25 kg of food grains priced at Rs3 a kilo, I certainly felt excited. After all, 62 years after Independence, the government finally makes a promise to feed the hungry nation. For the 320 million who are officially categorised as hungry, nothing could be more heartening. And for another 600 million, who are able to spend less than Rs20 a day, there appears to be some hope.

Barely in saddle, have mandarins in the Food and Agriculture Ministry and in the Planning Commission swung into action, working overtime to give shape to the promise made by Congress in its election manifesto. And if what I read in the newspapers is any indication, I have all the reasons to be worried. I think there is little hope for the hungry. They must live and die in hunger.

Modelled along the lines of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS), the proposed National Food Security Act does not see beyond rights. While the success of the NREGS is still debatable, and we all know is mired in corruption and large-scale siphoning-off of the funds designated for the unemployed poor, the proposed National Food Security Act too is drawn more or less on the pattern of an equally corrupt and ineffective Public Distribution System (PDS). And this is where ends the promise of feeding a hungry nation.

Home to the world’s largest hungry population, India’s record on hunger is worse than that of nearly 25 sub-Saharan African countries. Ranked 66th among 88 vulnerable countries in the Global Hunger Index prepared by the International Food Policy Research Institute, none of the states is categorised under ‘low hunger’ or ‘moderate hunger category’. Let us not forget, the abysmally low ranking of India in the Global Hunger Index is despite the PDS, which is supposed to act as a safety net for the vulnerable sections of society.

In fact, if the PDS had been even partially effective, there is no reason why Punjab and for that matter Kerala, the best performing states in terms of hunger, should be ranked below Gabon, Honduras and Vietnam. Extending the same PDS or introducing a revamped PDS to meet the objectives of the National Food Security Act is therefore unlikely to make any meaningful difference to the plight of the hungry and malnourished.

At present, the government provides 35 kg of food grains, including wheat and rice, to 65.2 million families classified as living below the poverty line (BPL). These subsidised rations are made available at a price of Rs4.15 per kg for wheat and Rs5.65 per kg for rice. For the 24.3 million families classified under the Antyodya scheme (also part of the BPL category), the price of grains is reduced to Rs2 for wheat and Rs3 for rice.

Now let us look at the situation with above the poverty line (APL) families. There are roughly 115.2 million APL card holders. They get wheat at Rs6.10 and rice at Rs8.30 per kg, respectively. I am not sure what kind of tinkering the government is likely to do when it comes to the monthly ration for the APL families, the fact remains that food grains are being made available at a price much lower than the market price.

The public distribution system caters to 115.2 million APL families and another 65.2 million BPL families. In others words, subsidised food is being made available to a total of 180.4 million families. If you consider each family to consist, on an average, of five persons, the PDS on paper meets the food requirement of 900 million people. If this is true, I see no reason why the country should have the largest population of hungry in the world.

The National Food Security Act would, therefore, entail less burden on the government. The food requirement would be drastically reduced from the existing 27 million tonnes to about 20 million tonnes, and the annual subsidy outgo would also be lowered by an estimated Rs5000 crore. It surely is a win-win situation for the government. What happens to the poor and hungry is a different question.

Since hunger proliferates, and malnourishment thrives extensively, any effort to extend the PDS is not less than a crime. I don’t know what objective the National Food Security Act would achieve by revamping the existing system. Whether it is by better targeting or by cash transfer to the vulnerable section of the population, Sonia Gandhi’s desire to provide food to the hungry millions would remain a dream. Feeding the vulnerable sections, and that too in a sustained manner on long-term basis, is only possible if the political leadership demonstrates a vision by (1) reviving agriculture on the lines of sustainability by restoring soil health and the natural resource base by bringing in low-external input sustainable farming practices, and (2) providinmg farmers with a fixed monthly income, incorporating the minimum support price.

The writer is a New Delhi-based trade analyst.

The current crisis precipitated by the disputed presidential election of the incumbent Mr Ahmadinejad for the second term is essentially an expression of the conflict between the clergy, who spearheaded the spectacular struggle of the Iranian nation against absolute monarchy, and reformists. The clergy want to preserve the existing politico-religious institutions, whereas the reformists, though in no way wanting to uproot them, are keen to make them less authoritarian, more democratic, more accountable to the people and their elected representatives, and progressive in tune with the moment and the milieu. To understand this conflict, it is important to look at the political system of Iran.

The three fundamental principles of the Iranian constitution are Islam, republicanism and separation of powers. Islam is the state religion and the Shariah the fundamental law of the land. Logically, all laws have to be in conformity with Islam and any law which is not compatible with the Shariah is invalid. As for republicanism, the greatest contribution of the Islamic revolution is the abolition of monarchy in Iran. “There is no place for monarchy in Islam”, categorically declared Ayatullah Khomeini, the leader of the Iranian revolution. Therefore, republicanism had to be a fundamental feature of the post-revolution Iran. Under the Iranian constitution, both president and parliament (called the Majlis) are popularly elected. Not only that, republicanism goes down to the grassroots level as provinces, divisions, districts and villages are administered by directly elected councils.

The third principle is the separation of powers, which makes the Iranian system akin more to the American than to the British system. As in the USA, president is the chief executive and, along with his ministers, is responsible for running the country’s administration. The Majlis is the law making body. The Majlis cannot vote out the president, though it can impeach him. Nor can the president dissolve the Majlis. As in case of the USA, ministers appointed by the president have to be approved and all international agreements and treaties ratified by Congress.

The separation of powers principle however breaks down in the office of the Rahbar (the Supreme Leader), who holds a unique position in the Iranian political system. The Rahbar is the guardian of the revolution, the custodian of the constitution and the overall supervisor of the system. He has the power to appoint and dismiss the head of the judiciary, the armed forces, and the religious members of a powerful Guardian Council. Yet, he is not regarded infallible. He can be dismissed by a directly elected Council of Experts — which also elects him — if he becomes incapable of performing his constitutional duties.

Another important component of the system is the Guardian Council, which interprets the constitution and determines the constitutionality of laws passed by the Majlis. The Council comprises 12 members half of which are appointed by the Rahbar and half elected by the Majlis. It also supervises the elections for the office of the president, the Majlis and the Council of Experts, which includes determining suitability of the candidates.

The power of judicial review whereby a court determines the validity of laws passed by the legislature exists in a number of countries. It is thus not the Guardian Council’s power of judicial review that is open to dispute. Rather it is the way the power is exercised that has invited much of the criticism. The Council by virtue of its conservative composition has not been well disposed towards progressive legislation and the candidates having a reformist agenda or mindset.

In the past on several occasions, particularly, when reformist Mohammed Khatami was president (1997-2005), the Council struck down legislation for allegedly being in conflict with revolutionary ideals or the Islamic character of the constitution. By the same token, candidates suspected of being “too liberal or progressive” have been disqualified.

The post-revolution Iran has thus witnessed relentless struggle of reformists against hardliners, especially as a new generation sprang up, for more openness and democracy. However, hardliners because of their greater power and influence have remained a tough nut. The reformists secured their first major win in the landslide victory of Mr Khatami as president in 1997, when he defeated the then conservative powerful speaker of the Majlis Mr Natiq Nori.

Then in 2000, the conservatives were defeated in parliamentary elections by reformists. Mr Khatami’s re-election in 2001 by an overwhelming majority again underlined the need for reforms. However that did not much curtail the influence of the conservatives who continued to assert themselves through powerful institutions like the Guardian Council and the judiciary.

Under Mr Khatami there were two power poles in Iran: One comprised the president and the Majlis representing the popular will. The other was the clergy-dominated establishment staunchly believing in controlled democracy. Hence, despite his efforts, Mr Khatami was not successful in getting his reformist agenda implemented even when the Majlis was on his side.

Under the Iranian constitution, no one can hold the office of the president for more than two consecutive terms. Hence, after the completion Mr Khatami’s two terms, reformists put their weight behind former president Mr Ali Akbar Hashmi Rafsanjani in 2005 presidential elections. However, contrary to most of the predictions, Mr Ahmadinijad, mayor of Iran, won the elections. Mr Ahmadinijad comes from a modest family and is known for his simple lifestyle and popular streak. Though himself not a cleric, he has enjoyed the support of the conservatives including the Supreme Leader Mr Khemenei. Mr Ahmadinijad also commands the respect of the people for defying the West on the nuclear issue.

Though Mr Ahmadinijad’s re-election was always on the cards, the margin of victory (67 per cent of the total votes) has made his victory disputable. The opposition led by defeated presidential candidate and former prime minister Hossein Mousavi (who secured 22 per cent of the popular vote) alleges that the presidential election was massively rigged and wants them to be annulled. However, the Guardian Council brushed aside those allegations and now declared Mr Ahmadinijad officially re-elected after partial recounting of the votes. The Rahbar, the arbiter of the last resort, has also put his weight behind Mr Ahmadinijad’s electoral victory and called for an end to protests.

Though for the time being the reformists may be silenced and the victory of Mr Ahmadinijad may be treated as a past and closed transaction, the struggle between the reformists and conservatives will continue and the establishment in Iran will have to allow some opening of the system.

The call for change is always an expression of discontent with existing institutions and policies. The discontent of Iranians however is moderate. There are few voices for changing the basic character of the constitution or for counter-revolution. All notable forces agree that Iran should continue to be an Islamic republic. Nor is there any demand of note for abolishing any of the existing institutions including the controversial Guardian Council. Only reform of the existing institutions is being sought

to ensure greater personal freedoms and respect for human rights and rule of law, and a greater accountability of those wielding power to the people.

The real force behind the call for reforms is the youth who make up nearly two-thirds of the Iranian population. Their commitment to revolutionary ideals is not as sweeping as that of the earlier generation. With all their respect for the revolution, what they want above all is greater freedom of expression and association, better standard of living and more job opportunities.

GENERAL Yahya Khan announced the dismantling of the One Unit Plan on July 1, 1970. He restored four administrative units with added territories which were previously part of the princely states — Khairpur was added to Sindh, Balochistan States Union to Balochistan, Bahawalpur to Punjab while Swat, Buner, Amb and Dir were made part of the NWFP. To him and his associates the ethnic question was probably solved through this measure. Though it was a dictator’s decision, the political parties endorsed it by unanimously signing the constitution of 1973.

In Pakistan it does not matter whether the political system is democratic or dictatorial, it is the mindset that makes a difference. Why in a land of ethno-cultural diversity, only four nationalities were recognised? Why additional population was added to Punjab when it was already a heavily populated province? The same questions can be raised about other provinces as well.

Why One Unit plan was conceived and implemented appears to be a very intriguing matter for those who are up in sleeves to protect the legacy of Sikh rule in Punjab as the country struggles against extremists with the support of the US and its western allies. Behind the scheme were certainly the status-quo forces that had determined the fate of the people since colonial era.

The One Unit plan was a move to counter the majority ethnic group, the Bengalis, who were poised to dominate the decision-making process of the state lest democracy guided its affairs. The plan was an open confession that Pakistan is a pluralist society; the authors of the plan definitely saw country’s existence beyond the communal divide of South Asia.

The One Unit plan offered West Pakistan more than it deserved. It could now have equal number of representatives in the legislative assembly and could claim due share in jobs and development expenditure. So when this riddle was solved, the task of constitution making that had been unusually delayed was completed within one year of the implementation of the plan. The country had actually moved towards more centralisation; the provinces and a dozen of princely states were abolished and a single unit was created in West Pakistan.

However, the elections that were due after the making of new constitution were never held. Martial Law was imposed in 1958 to the utter disappointment of the non-Punjabi leadership who would blame Punjab for the wrong done against what they termed a consensus constitution.

The Bengalis separated their ways and became independent after a fierce struggle that pitted them against the Pak Army. Though all the four provinces of West Pakistan, when restored in 1970, got due share in the distribution of the areas previously under the jurisdiction of princely states, the ethno-nationalism that the martial law gave birth to had not died down.

Punjab has now become the target of resentment for the intelligentsia of the smaller provinces. In colleges and universities, the nationalists are convincing the youth that the underdevelopment of their provinces is due to the dominance of Punjab in the decision making process of the state. It outnumbers the others in terms of population; it takes away most of the jobs and development funds.

Even within Punjab the southern belt is up in sleeves against Central Punjab and the MPs of the PPP and the PML-F are demanding exceptional treatment for their area. Some have even threatened on the flour of the Punjab Assembly to launch a movement for the division of Punjab as a measure to end woes of the people they represent.

Outside Punjab there is a common sentiment among the regional parties against the dominance of Punjab in the federation. The best way to end this is considered the division of the province at least into two parts. This will bring about not only much-needed balance in the centre-province relations but will also introduce harmony of interest in the ethnic groups of the country. Seraiki movement is one factor that has emerged as a result; South Punjab identity has been constructed to neutralise the effects of rising wave of ethno-nationalism there.

The PPP, which has formed its government at the Centre and in two provinces, has ethno-nationalist parties like ANP, MQM and the BNP (Mengal) as its partners who have developed an urge to divide Punjab to ensure smooth working of the federation. If a Seraiki province is not possible, the provincial status of Bahawalpur can be restored. It is what the PML-F legislators from Rahimyarkhan and senator of the PML-Q is suggesting.

Ethno-nationalism is essentially a negative force and needs to be suppressed with the military muscle like we did in the case of East Bengal. In an ethnically diverse society like Pakistan, those who are denied due share in country’s resources are bound to see the affluence of the others with suspicion and mistrust. That is why Sindhis oppose the Kalabagh Dam and see the rising influence of the MQM and ANP as a sign of alien forces getting stronger in, what they term, their homeland.

Not only Punjab but other provinces as well are experiencing a change due to the introduction of the local government system as well as the opening of private TV channels. The conservatives have been opposing the idea of devolving power to the district levels because it hurt their ethno-nationalist interests. But the groups formerly marginalised on political front welcomed the move of bringing the government to people’s doorsteps.

In Sindh the very talk of wrapping up the system has angered the MQM while in Punjab the demand for dividing the province is getting stronger. The political leadership of Hazara division in the NWFP has not appreciated the idea of changing the name of the province to Pukhtoonkhawah; such is the case with DI Khan where Seraiki is the dominant language.

It is unfortunate that the country is sandwiched between the two divisive ideologies of ethno-nationalism and sectarianism. The blame goes to none but the vested interests that, to serve their own ends, have kept Pakistan politically unstable by promoting hatred among the people who have lived side by side for centuries; the land from Khyber to Sindh has been subject to foreign invasions and anarchy for last one thousand years. The nations in the neighbourhood and beyond have seen their interests served only by introducing divisions among the people of the area comprising Pakistan, say, the Indus-Hakra Valley.

If Punjab stays democratic and sees martial law a threat to the survival of the country, it would certainly improve its image in the eyes of the people from smaller provinces. Another way is to cut its size unilaterally or demand the federation to lay down a principle that should also apply to the other provinces as well.

If the politics of the four provinces creates deadlocks, then the creation of more provinces will certainly benefit the Centre. If ethnicity is not to work as a guide, good governance can be a principle.

TWO accords were reached a couple of weeks ago, each bearing significant importance for Pakistan. The first concerns India-Pakistan relations, which was announced at the end of the meeting of Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani with Prime Minister of India Manmohan Singh on July 17. The second was issued on July 19 and was the result of a four-hour long meeting between Mr Nawaz Sharif and President Asif Ali Sardari.

Both accords dealt with parallel issues but the contrast between them is quite striking. Both meetings were conducted in a cordial and a constructive atmosphere. Mr Gilani had a very difficult task to try to re-establish a composite dialogue with his counterpart which had been broken off as a result of the Mumbai attack. Its shadows are still hovering over the relations between the two countries. Both agreed, however, that dialogue was the only reasonable course of action available to the two countries. It was a definite departure from the original position of India not to reopen any talks until the threat of terrorism from Pakistan had been resolved to their satisfaction.

Given this context, the meeting did open a small window of opportunity to break the deadlock by carrying their understanding forward through their respective foreign secretaries who would meet ‘as often as necessary’ and report about their progress to the foreign ministers at the next UN meeting.

Even this ‘concession’ by Manmohan Singh, as the Indian press called it, was not welcome in his country. The explanation he offered after returning from Egypt did seem as if he was back-tracking from the original position. What has been agreed, however, seems to be a definite move forward, albeit a modest step, involving the respective foreign secretaries.

An important point in the joint statement is the reconfirmation of the need to promote regional cooperation in South Asia. There is a pressing need, especially in Pakistan to focus on its economic relations with India and other South Asian countries, as well as the disputes concerning the Indus Water Treaty.

Trade with India is a complex issue. The country has been faced with a relatively poor performance in this sector in recent years. In preparing a trajectory for improved performance of Pakistani goods in foreign markets, should Pakistan look mainly to developed countries, especially USA, as some commentaries seem to suggest, because there is not much scope in expanding regional trade? It is a controversial issue. The weights of theoretical arguments and of empirical studies seem to suggest that the possibilities of developing significant opportunities in regional trade cannot be minimised.

The potential of trade relations as against the actual situation is not a reliable guide because Saarc has never been given a chance to work according to the rules established to promote its objectives. India-Pakistan relations have been a factor. Given the history of trade policies pursued by the US and other developed countries, exports from developing countries usually face a variety of barriers, for both classification of goods, complimentary and competitive. And studies concerning US free trade agreements with developing countries do not give an assurance that this partnership would necessarily work to their advantage.

From Gilani-Manmohan Singh meeting to coming together of President Zardari and Mr Nawaz Sharif may seem to be a big leap from one topic to another but it is not. To build a healthy and dynamic trade sector will depend on the economy and a substantial improvement in the quality of governance in the country. Pakistan was conceived as a federation of autonomous constituent units, and through its sixty years of history has turned into what may be called the crisis of confederation, because federation is incompatible with a centralised system of government and puts strain on the economy.

The general elections of February 18, 2008 were held under the framework of General Musharraf’s legal framework order. The voters, however, gave their clear verdict in favour of democracy. When Mr Zardari took office of the president, there was expectation that the PPP government would remove military-sponsored mutilations made in the constitution, including Section 52(b). The Charter of Democracy prepared jointly by Ms Benazir Bhutto and Mr Nawaz Sharif had delineated the necessary steps to clean up these distortions and to move the country back to parliamentary democracy. This goal has not yet come to pass and is currently under consideration of a parliamentary committee. Mr Zardari is reported to be holding the view that any amendments to the constitution should maintain ‘a balance’ among parliament, prime minister and president and not return to the 1973 document.

In a joint statement, President Zardari and Mr Nawaz Sharif have reaffirmed the principles but seem to have made no progress to set a timetable for introducing the necessary changes in the constitution. Further, Mr Zardari has informed his host that ANP and MQM would not support the repeal of the 17th amendment until their demands were met e.g., renaming of the NWFP and repeal of the section dealing with the concurrent list in the constitution.

Each of these two issues is important for the country, but to tie them with the much-needed amendments is very unfortunate. The two parties are in alliance with the PPP at the centre, and the status quo resulting from this move would certainly work in favour of President Zardari.

The government at all three levels seems to be in a state of flux. The concurrent list defining shared powers between the federation and the provinces has been a controversial issue and in spite of promises made in the past nothing has ever been done to resolve it. The demand has now reappeared with a greater force. Similarly, the place of local self-government was changed in the Musharraf era through the national reconstruction bureau, to strengthen his position. There was no meaningful debate among the elements involved, especially about the no-party elections and the role of the nazims. Same haste is being used now to bring the main features of the old system back into operation.

Concerning the ANP demand, the acronym describing the frontier province is the legacy of the colonial days. When the matter was raised in parliament a few months ago, some members did not seem inclined to support the proposed change in the name from the NWFP to Pakhtunkhwa, perhaps keeping in view the concerns of the non-Pakhtun population of the province. There seems to be no reason why this matter cannot be resolved through negotiation.

The PPP-led coalition government has been in power long enough and could have established a short list of important matters and set priorities for legislative business. After all, the lawmakers do not seem to be very busy people and parliamentary sessions are short and sparsely attended. By streamlining its business it would have been prepared not only to attend to the needs of the federation but also be in a better position to handle militancy.

The real problem is that power is centralised at the top. The prime minister may be able to exercise his executive authority, but he cannot interact meaningfully with his cabinet in the usual parliamentary tradition, for the number of ministers is reaching close to one hundred. Whatever justification Mr Zardari may offer for this anomaly, other democracies seem to manage quite well with smaller cabinets. Whether planned or not, the cabinet of this size has worked in his favour, under the present circumstances.

The ‘heavy mandate’ used by Mr Nawaz Sharif in his previous stint as prime minister is often mentioned in the context of dangers to democracies, and rightly so. The present system used by Mr Zardari is more invidious and carries much greater dangers with it. To keep the political office as head of the PPP along with his position as president (appointed by party-affiliated voters in six legislatures, and within General Musharraf’s legal framework) is the worst form of concentration of power. And, as the examples of Marcos (Philippines) and Suharto (Indonesia) indicate, several times referred to in this space, the pseudo-imperial arrangement made with collaboration of ruling elite can cause tectonic upheavals in society. General Musharraf is also waiting for a second miracle.

Those who are focusing on the next general elections to resolve this issue should keep a watching brief on the situation.

Recent efforts under the Education Sector Reforms of the Musharraf government (2000-2008) made strides in updating the curricula of school subjects; initiating a new textbook policy based on the learning outcomes of the new curricula; a private examination board offering a transparent and quality secondary/ higher secondary examination within Pakistan; and, uplifting Higher Education in the country.

However, despite $75 million USAID grant for the pre-service STEP programme as well as World Bank expertise to provide assistance and research for upgrading the system in a number of areas, the effect in teacher education has been minimal and isolated.

The problem to address simultaneously is curriculum improvement and teacher education. Will the teachers be cognizant of the changes to the new pedagogy of the curriculum or will the brand new curriculum goals continue to be taught in the same old way of rote learning? Yes, one hears of ‘active learning’ approaches and workshops being held sporadically to highlight these. Instructions are given to teachers about the ‘new methodology’ in the workshops. Moreover, ‘teacher training’ is now also being offered privately by individuals or organizations as well as under World Bank initiatives and community based projects.

A Directorate of Staff Development was established under the ‘Parha Likha Punjab’ campaign for teacher development. The same workshop concept was applied and teachers brought in, given presentations on new aspects of teaching and then were allowed to go back. Later, it seems that there was no monitoring of these teachers to gauge how they were applying the workshop experience in the classroom.

There are a number of reasons for the continued impasse in this crucial area of teacher education for improving the quality of education in the country. I would like to quote a Pakistani in Australia, Shoaib Munim, describing an intervention by the University of Sydney for a Pakistani University:-

“Yet things can change if an effort is made to change 'mindsets'. I presume that while preparing this document, the University of Sydney quite naturally though, took it for granted that universities are places where knowledge is created and nourished, while the Pakistani university system assumes that universities are places where knowledge is imported and then transferred on to the next generation. This gives rise to a culture of passive learning, where students take lectures religiously. Cross questioning and challenging of concepts is rare and in some cases even forbidden. All what the students are interested in is getting high scores. For this purpose 'passive learning' comes in handy. Mediocrity breeds mediocrity, and that is exactly what’s happening to our entire education system.”

The International Reading Association’s 2008 report on the “State of Teacher Education in the Asia-Pacific Region” takes just three pages to reveal the statistics and areas of teacher education in Pakistan whereas even a country like Afghanistan takes up nine pages.

The minimal extent of 120 public and 21 private teacher education colleges still being run on colonial lines is all Pakistan has to show for educating its teachers.

However, the report describes the state of teacher education in Pakistan in these points:-

1. The teacher training institutes are facing budgetary and financial constraints. They face an acute shortage of facilities such as buildings, equipment, furniture, learning aids, library books, and other reading materials.

2. The examination system is highly defective. Teacher absenteeism, defective management, lack of supervision and accountability practices are some of the major issues that need to be appropriately addressed in teacher education programmes.

What then, should be Pakistan’s vision for its teacher education? First of all, mindset will have to be changed from a passive learning mode to an active learning mode. In terms of pedagogy, it has been observed that teachers, like students, learn best in an active manner especially in professional development programmes. The teachers must be given the chance to experiment, process, reflect, discover and construct their own expert knowledge.

In terms of making the change to a relevant 21st Century pedagogy, the baseline is relatively easy and basic. The main descriptors of a quality education are students who can demonstrate academic achievement with strong personal growth.

A research study shows that teachers whose students meet these criteria have certain characteristics in common.

These include knowledge of the relevant subject matter; use of a range of pedagogies appropriate for the content; competence in the language of instruction; recognition and response to the needs and interests of their students, and development of a strong sense of ethics and professionalism and commitment to teaching.

Pakistan faces a multiple challenge in the case of teacher education. It needs quality teachers and the sooner the better. The teacher force already in service is trained to teach in the tradition of knowledge accumulation through rote learning of facts which are then regurgitated in examinations. This approach has to change but training workshops and outdated teacher education syllabi are not making much of a difference.

Higher Education Commission’s (HEC) proposition of a 4 year BS Ed is going to take time to produce the teachers in a new mould. Also, those who wish to enter the job market will not wish to take such a long route. A strategy has to be evolved that in a year or so a concerted effort is made to upgrade the number of teachers in service as well as bringing up a new crop of teachers.

This can be done in the following way:-

*While the new teacher education is being done in a pre-service, hopefully, compulsory certification course over one year, the same can be offered to in service teachers in afternoon/evening classes and during the summer break. In this way the whole system will be acquiring the new methodology of teaching.

*The more academically and professional minded can take the 4 year BS Ed and M.Ed classes for positions higher up the ladder i.e Civil Service (Education Depart-ment) and leadership and management of schools and colleges.

*The curriculum for a pre-service course of one year can be made using the new parameters with a theoretical and a practical component. It should include sound language acquisition, sound conceptual subject knowledge, learner centred pedagogy, reflection as a tool to better teaching and a supportive “teamwork/collaborative” culture to raise morale and commitment to this profession.

*The ‘learning by doing’ pedagogy must apply to teacher education and assessment should be done through observation and critical appraisal. If at all a four year B Ed is contemplated, then in Pakistan’s context, the first two years must lay an all round foundation in critical thinking skills through study of core subjects before the upcoming teachers are introduced to educational subjects in the third and fourth years.

*Under General Musha-rraf’s government, nine universities were being set up by foreign countries under HEC (Pakistan was to bear the expenses) but the security situation prevented foreign faculty to come and work in Pakistan. Some of the infrastructure was set up but then the funds were withdrawn. Nine or ten universities like these must be put to good use for the important task of teacher training.

One hopes that with the promise of a five year commitment of 1.5 billion dollar US aid to Pakistan per annum, a suitable amount will be spent in the next five years to structure and execute a feasible approach to modify teacher education.

A strong political commitment is necessary for education to be

treated on an emergency basis so that Pakistan becomes one of the civilised nations of the world. n

The writer is an educational consultant based in Lahore.

Our first war against India was to protect a dictator whose dwindling legitimacy had generated resentment against ‘One Unit’ imposed on the provinces in West Pakistan and denial of autonomy and democratic rights to East Pakistan or East Bengal. Similarly, India struck again when the military rulers were striving hard to protect the highly centralised structure of governance which had alienated the people of East Pakistan on one hand and three provinces on the other. The latter had been unlawfully merged into the so-called West Pakistan province.

The basic reason for refusing to honour the mandate of Awami League to form a government in Islamabad was to salvage the core interests of the civil-military combine even if it meant break-up of the country. This policy didn’t stop in post-1971 era and even after unanimously adopting a new constitution in 1973 which clearly committed to provide autonomy to the provinces. The result is that the country continues to suffer more and more internal and external conflicts because its ruling elite is not ready to decentralise the governance structure and give provinces their legitimate powers. Instead, it is always eager to further strengthen the strong centre and weaken the already weak federating units.

The constitution of 1973, was an effort to restore balance and cut to size both civil and military bureaucracy. However, the powers seized during 1955-1970 period when the country was under “one unit” were not returned to the provinces after its abolition. The military struck the country twice in 1977 and 1999 to protect its class interests.

Since then, civil-military bureaucracy has undertaken several initiatives to protect centralisation of the governance structure in which now they have a huge stake. Undemocratic rule or proxy civilian governments are a ruse to protect this policy. They are just the means; the end is centralisation.

The present government has been talking eloquent about provincial autonomy. The PPP signed a charter of democracy with the PML-N in order to abolish concurrent list and establish Federal Constitutional Court having equal representation of the four provinces. Now both shy away from mentioning this, though they have comfortable majority in parliament to bring about this great change in the centre-province relationship. No doubt, principles change overnight when power is attained. Before the government takes any new initiative on provincial autonomy, they must start devolving powers to the provinces already guaranteed in the constitution of 1973.

The constitution creates cabinet and Council of Common Interests (CCI) in order to administer the subjects enumerated in Federal Legislative List Part I and part II respectively. However, to the chagrin of the provinces, the executive authority over Federal Legislative List Part II subjects is being exercised by the Federal cabinet which is in direct conflict with Article 154 of the constitution.

It clearly says that the CCI will formulate and regulate policies regarding the subjects of Federal Legislative List part II and exercise supervision and control over these subjects. Instead of CCI, cabinet exercises full control over important subjects of water, power, gas, minerals, oil, Railways, heavy industries and Wapda. It also formulates policies concerning these subjects which is in clear disregard of the constitution. The CCI has never grown into a permanent constitutional body like cabinet to control these subjects. It exists on paper.

Similarly, the subjects not enumerated in both Federal as well as concurrent legislative lists solely belong to the provinces under article 142 of the constitution but cabinet unlawfully exercises executive authority over them. The subjects of education, health, public order, local government, Railway Police, electricity distribution, tariff and consumption tax within the provinces, GST on services, sports, Federal land Commission, agriculture, food, housing, minority affairs, special education, youth affairs, investment, interior, rural development, industries and production and various corporations and bodies working under them solely are provincial subjects.

These subjects were being administered by the West Pakistan administration under 1956 and 1962 constitutions but were now supposed to be transferred to the provinces after abolition of West Pakistan Order 1970. They are being retained by the centre even after the promulgation of 1973 constitution.

Before announcing abolition of concurrent list in his first speech to the parliament, the prime minister should have abolished all these ministries at the centre which would have cut to size the federal bureaucracy but this legacy of the West Pakistan province is being retained by the Federal bureaucracy.

The resultant military coups against civilian power are possible because of this highly unconstitutional role of central bureaucracy which wants promotions and positions and so retains provincial subjects. Consequently, NFC awards are managed on the pretext of expenses of federal government and major portion is awarded to non-productive sectors.

Undemocratic or weak civilian governments which promote or maintain centralisation of the governance heavily rely on two factors: outside support of big powers and regional conflicts in order to give legitimacy to their rule. Afghan wars, Taliban phenomenon, jihad in Kashmir can be seen in this context. The policy of centralisation has bred wars, regional conflicts and international interference in the country. Huge resources are spent on these conflicts which only buffer the role of military and bureaucracy.

The writer is a barrister-at-law based at Karachi.

A brief review of history will be in order to understand the current hostile attitude of the people towards the current political set-up in Gilgit-Baltistan. The British left the Gilgit Agency on July 31, 1947, two weeks before the independence of the subcontinent. On October 27, 1947 the people of Gilgit-Baltistan defeated the forces of Gansara Singh (Dogra Raj) and achieved independence to celebrate their own ‘Yaum-e-Azadi’ on November 1 and founded a new country ‘Islamic Republic of Gilgit’.

However, the people of Gilgit-Baltistan wanted to be part of the newly-born Pakistan. During the transitional period the ‘Islamic Republic of Gilgit’ approached the founder of Pakistan, Quid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah with a plea to join Pakistan. As a corollary, on November 16, 1947 Pakistan established its administration in the area. But until today the region has not become the legal and political part of Pakistan. Many people in the region think that their efforts and sacrifices of their ancestors have gone waste.

The result is that during recent years opposition groups in the region have boycotted the ‘youm-i-Azadi’ celebrations since they think that they are now under the colonial rule of Pakistani Administration. Nothing has changed during the British, Kashmiri and Pakistani rule. The Pakistani administration first ruled through the local Mirs and Rajas but when people turned against them the process of reforms began under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto regime, which did away with oppressive systems of Begar, Hukumi Kharid, Rajigi, ending Miri systems and restoring people’s human rights. The most revered change was considered to be the abolition of Miri system (A kind of feudal system). After the reforms of 1974 Gilgit-Baltistan was at the verge of becoming a fifth province of Pakistan. However, the coup by General Zial-ul-Haq stopped the process of reforms in the region. But since 1980s with the end of Zia’s martial law, the political movement has started again and its momentum is getting stronger every day.

From the beginning, none of the Pakistani governments has taken any significant step to restore the true democratic and basic human rights of the people of Gilgit-Baltistan. In its report of 1995, American State Department states that, “the political status of the Northern Areas — Hunza, Gilgit, and Baltistan — is not resolved... The area is administered by an appointed civil servant. While there is an elected Northern Areas Council, this body serves in an advisory capacity to the Federal Government and has no authority to change laws or raise and spend revenue”.

The International Crisis Group stated in its report that: “Almost six decades after Pakistan’s independence, the constitutional status of the Federally Administered Northern Areas (Gilgit and Baltistan), once part of the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir and now under Pakistani control, remains undetermined, with political autonomy a distant dream. The region’s inhabitants are embittered by Islamabad’s unwillingness to devolve powers in real terms to its elected representatives, and a nationalist movement, which seeks independence, is gaining ground. The rise of sectarian extremism is an alarming consequence of this denial of basic political rights”.

A provocative sense of nationalism is getting stronger in Gilgit-Baltistan. The very same people who had an unflinching loyalty towards the state of Pakistan and were considering themselves as Pakistanis are now talking about separation, freedom and a separate nation of Gilgit-Baltistan. The rhetoric of Muslim unity is no longer in vogue.

This should be a highly alarming situation for the government of Pakistan which must take immediate steps to address the genuine grievances of the people of Gilgit-Baltistan in its own interests.

The idea of self-governance, which motivated the people of this region for independence from Dogra Raj, now has turned against Pakistan. Many people say that they have sacrificed their lives for the protection and security of Pakistan in all the three wars with India, at Siachin, Kargil and other fronts and their Jawans are continuously sacrificing their lives, and in the recent war of Kargil, thousands of people have died but in return they got nothing other than repression and deprivation of fundamental human rights.

In recent months, again there has been talk about a constitutional package for Gilgit-Baltistan by the present government. People have this time high expectation of a genuine package under which the true political, legislative and administrative power should be transferred to the people of Gilgit-Baltistan, rather than playing another tactic to keep the powers with Kashmir and Northern Areas Affairs (KANA) in Islamabad.

It is in the interest of both Pakistan and the people of Gilgit-Baltistan to immediately give the rights of self-rule to the people of this area, establish an assembly, reform the administration and justice departments where the elected Assembly of the Gilgit-Baltistan should be the supreme authority. This assembly should be responsible for all legislative and executive matters of the area, except currency, foreign affairs and defence could be handled by Pakistan.

Finally, a policy approach towards the political, economic, human rights based on liberty, justice, with minimum interference of the government of Pakistan can secure loyalty and trust of the people.

In defence of LG system
By Sajid Mansoor Qaisrani
Sunday, 02 Aug, 2009


THE local government system introduced under the Devolution of Power Programme was one of the best things that could happen to this country. Under this system, judiciary was separated from executive, (a constitutional requirement that governments failed to fulfil till 2001), police was taken away from the executive control and placed under public scrutiny, public representatives were made part of the decision-making process at the district level and women given a 33 per cent representation in the governance matters.

Actually it was Pakistan People’s Party which during its election campaign in 1993 had promised to give people “district governments and a new social contract”. It is an irony that the promise was to be fulfilled by the military government of Pervez Musharraf and its last rites to be performed by the PPP government.

Prior to this system, the federal and provincial governments used to run the districts. Pakistani democracy meant that the people were allowed to elect once in every 3 to 5 years their representatives to sit in the legislatures who, after being elected, would disappear from their home districts and stay in the federal or provincial capitals. People had no say in the affairs of their towns and were at the mercy of petty officials. The plunder of the districts’ resources went unhindered. The state machinery was brazenly used to dole out favours to supporters and victimise opponents.

The districts in the smaller provinces were mostly and normally run by Punjabi bureaucrats from the federal civil services. So when the devolution scheme came, there was much noise against it. Bureaucracy decided to resist the new system.

However, as promised, political decentralisation was not followed by adequate administrative and fiscal decentralisation to ensure quality service delivery to the public. Key positions at the district level (such as DCO) were held by officers appointed by the provinces and who remained primarily accountable to the provinces. Provincial control over the hiring, firing and transfers of senior district staff, senior teachers and health workers undermined the managerial powers of district government officials and impeded efficient governance. The deadline for the adoption of the new district cadre which was December 31, 2005 passed without the creation of such a cadre.

Fiscal decentralisation did not take place at the district level, with district governments remaining dependent on provincial governments for fiscal transfers. Funding for health and education services continued to be provided by the provincial government in the form of grants to the district governments. District governments were asked to deposit all user fees collected from health facilities and schools (for children’s school leaving certificates) in the provincial account. The funds were then distributed among the districts according to the PFC award formula, rather than in proportion to the actual amount collected in each district.

Monitoring Committees remained powerless. This led local officials to ignore their authority and instead look to provincial officials who could help them in their careers. Even after eight years the system is not fully operational to date and its important instruments like District Mohtasib and public safety commissions remain non-functional.

Keeping in view all this mess, provincial officials claim that the local government system has failed to deliver. The question to ask is when has it been allowed to function?

Gen Pervez Musharraf, during the referendum campaign, came to realise that he had committed a blunder when the district Nazim of Multan (now foreign minister) Shah Mehmood Qureshi refused to receive him at the airport and contribute funds towards his campaign. It was the same in Sindh where about a dozen district Nazims cold-shouldered him, forcing him to cancel his tour.

The general then started making changes in his system or weakening the system by introducing amendments in it in 2005. Local government elections of 2005 were massively rigged and mostly puppets were declared winners. The public had no confidence in them.

The federal government has abandoned Musharraf’s LG system and has left its future in the hands of provincial governments but none of them is willing to keep it alive. One has the feeling that behind this move the hidden agenda is to further dispossess the already dispossessed people in the country. (MQM is the only political party which understands this and is opposing the government move).

The end of devolution system also means that Civil Service officers, mostly from Punjab, will again be ruling the districts and divisions of the NWFP, Balochistan and Sindh without any local check on their deeds. The politicians in an effort to take everything under their control are in fact making bureaucracy more powerful. The PPP, being a grassroots party, should have opted to retain and improve this system rather than disband it. All the western democracies have very strong local government institutions. It was very much functional in the subcontinent under the British rule. However, in Pakistan the system was wound up soon after independence.

Time to be pragmatic in relations with India
By Karamatullah K. Ghori
Sunday, 02 Aug, 2009


THE carefully choreographed and well-televised July 16 meeting between Prime Minsters Gilani and Manmohan Singh, on the sidelines of the Non-Aligned Summit, at Sharm-al Sheikh was a landmark encounter in more ways than one.

For one, its sheer timing was superbly calibrated to send a loud and clear signal to a watchful world, tense since last November’s mayhem in Mumbai, that the two arch-rivals and neighbours were intent on turning a corner. To a world already saddled with the prickly issue of combating the global menace of terrorism, an India-Pakistan stand-off could only add to nervous tension. There were howls of concern, mostly knee-jerk, in the wake of Mumbai that the two nuclear-armed states were that close to triggering a nuclear holocaust.

For another, the two leaders seemed alive to the need of not letting the plethora of their complicated relations remain mired in the bog of one over-arching issue; Kashmir, in the case of Pakistan, and terrorism, in that of India. The joint communiqué issued at the end of the meeting was quite categorical that the two countries will not allow the broad-spectrum of their relations become hostage to terrorism.

Manmohan Singh’s readiness to not impale the broad range of India-Pakistan relations on the nettlesome stake of terrorism instantly became a cause célèbre for those pundits of the news media and intelligentsia feeling uneasy at the prospect of détente between traditional and hostile rivals. They went to town angrily remonstrating and protesting that Manmohan had squandered the chips in his

hands for nothing in return from his interlocutor. But these shrieks of angst were largely an expression of innate enmity against Pakistan than anything else. Manmohan Singh showed great maturity in refusing to remain a prisoner to the chimera of terrorism.

To the Pakistani pundits, it was a refreshing sight to see PM Gilani in the limelight of global attention. They have been worried about Gilani being regularly overshadowed by President Zardari on the global stage. Their concerns have a legitimacy of their own. Zardari has been sidelining Gilani in foreign affairs, a domain belonging to the PM under the constitution.

Gilani is also a better choice for putting a new accent on relations with India. Soft-spoken and unassuming, just like his Indian opposite number, the two of them make an ideal pair to tackle the daunting task of repairing their badly bruised relations. Temperament of the interlocutors plays a crucial role in tackling tough issues and a suave Gilani steals a huge march over Zardari, who, no matter how unctuous he may look, still can’t hide his rough edges. Gilani’s image of a Mr Clean is a blessing compared to the smirks the very mention of Zardari’s name spawns, universally.

However, the elephant in the room at the meeting between Gilani and Manmohan was the US, which undoubtedly played the role of a great facilitator.

There is no secret in Washington being overly concerned with the dipping curve of relations between Delhi and Islamabad as a consequence of the Mumbai melodrama. It’s not altruistic, for sure. The Obama administration has put Afghanistan on the front burner of its global concern and priority. And Afghanistan’s chestnut can’t be pulled out of the fire without Pakistan’s help. And for Pakistan to be properly prodded into focusing its primary attention on Afghanistan it’s ineluctable that its concerns about India and Indian intentions be put at rest. Hence the unavoidable need to iron out as many kinks from India-Pakistan relations as possible.

That Manmohan Singh relented on taking the sting on terrorism out of the main agenda in relations with Pakistan speaks volumes of the success of US diplomacy. Ever since Obama has entered the White House, his minions have been at work behind the scene to lower the temperature in both Islamabad and Delhi. One of Hillary Clinton’s team of whiz kids at the State Department, William Burns, has spent a considerable time and effort in Delhi to convince the Indian mandarins of the logic that Pakistan could never be expected to put its heart, with singular concern, into combating the menace of Al Qaeda and the Taliban unless it felt its back secure against India. The super-charged and emotionally unstable ambience had to be cooled and the Obama-Clinton team focused on reaching that target.

The Pakistanis may feel impelled — for entirely home-consumption — to congratulate themselves that they managed to pin down Manmohan on the Indian RAW provocatively bankrolling the Balochistan Liberation Movement and also larding its arsenal with weapons. The Americans have also been conscious of these Indian shenanigans in the Karzai-ruled Afghanistan where Indian consulates have mushroomed since the Taliban were ousted. These consulates have been up to their eye-balls doing everything other than consular work, according to independent think tanks in the US. Pakistan has had a genuine concern about the nefarious activities of these Indian spy dens focused on de-stabilising Pakistan.

But notwithstanding the self-serving concern in both Delhi and Islamabad to score Brownie points with an eye on domestic audience the importance to both countries of combating terrorism in all its forms cannot be over-emphasised. And that was the main effort apparently invested by both PMs at Sharm al-Sheikh. That Manmohan Singh realises the gravity of the matter much more than BJP chauvinists — to whom Pakistan is the sole villain responsible for everything going wrong in India — or narcissistic gurus of the Indian intelligentsia to whom Pakistan is much too fossilised to be taken seriously as an equal interlocutor, is a measure of his sagacity and political savvy, for which PM Gilani’s cabinet has, rightly, complimented him.

The obvious message out of Sharm al-Sheikh is that American effort in calibrating — if not exactly choreographing — a new culture of soft diplomacy between India and Pakistan — otherwise, usually, given to rambunctious and loud-mouthed rhetoric — is making inroads into India-Pakistan relations. That should be welcome to both long-estranged, neighbours, albeit Washington’s own stake in the new chessboard is quite noticeable.

Prime Minister Gilani has, no doubt, added a feather in his cap by being seen as an equal to his Indian counterpart at what deserves to be hailed as a watershed meeting. But Pakistan, while claiming kudos for standing firm on issues concerning the Indian-abetted threat to its security from terrorists in Afghanistan, needs, and needs most urgently, to review and revamp its entire culture of dealing with India.

It has gone on for far too long that Pakistan has adamantly insisted that it be treated at par with India by the outside world, especially by the West where Pakistan has invested the bulk of its diplomatic effort over the past more than half a century. The West, especially the US, which has always had a special place in Pakistan’s foreign policy orientation, obliged us on this account only because its Cold War interests were better served by taking a hyphenated approach to its relations with the two biggies of South Asia.

But the Cold War has long been dead and with it Washington’s interest in our part of the world has taken on different colours altogether. Pakistan is no longer in India’s league in Washington’s calculus, or that of any other country in the world. The twains are no longer on the same page with anyone. India is seen as a progressive and truly democratic country while Pakistan is unable to cast off its caricature of a violence-prone, military-dominated, feudal society with only pale pretensions of being democratic.

Let us accept the harsh reality that we aren’t the equals of India. We are a middling state compared to an India entitled, on the strength of its potentials, to becoming a world class power. Accepting one’s limitations isn’t something to be ashamed of. Our insistence on parity with India has only spawned an elitist culture in which the privileged and the powerful have thrived while the masses have suffered. The end of this obsession is the prerequisite for transforming the overall atmospherics in South Asia.

A new and pragmatic basis of relations with India will not only take the induced heat out of the equation but actually result in the empowerment of the people. A democratic culture, something we should be importing as an item of priority from India, would bring down the elite to the ground level and raise the people to the status they should rightly deserve in a democratic polity.

Engaging India against this new perspective will release latent forces that have not been allowed, to date, to come into play. A new, out-of-the-box thinking on relations with India will be the first step in a journey of thousand miles, which ought to commence now when the Pakistani people are hankering for a new dawn of democracy and an open and democratic society where their voice and interests would reign supreme.

K_K_ghori@yahoo.com