The issue of political equality
By Syed Imad-ud-Din Asad
Sunday, 02 Aug, 2009


TO western public and legal scholarship, Islamic law is still much like a closed book. Islamic constitutional law is one of its most confusing and most misunderstood subject. One of the main reasons for this perception can be found in the practice of Islamic constitutional law itself: there is a variety of contradictory approaches in different Muslim countries regarding nature of government, separation of powers, fundamental rights, rule of law, welfare state, and rights of non-Muslims.

Various Muslim regimes often enact laws and commit acts that are inconsistent not only with western notions of equity and justice, but, more importantly, also with provisions given in the basic Islamic texts. Similarly, certain Muslim scholars, having political ambitions and trying to gain quick support of ignorant Muslims, often make statements that are contrary to Islam. All these factors create a bad image of Islam as people generally judge an ideology by looking at the conduct of its leading practitioners.

Unfortunately, Muslims having access to western academic circles usually lack the knowledge to explain the correct Islamic view on these matters. Consequently, they either make no attempt at all or simply fail to explain the actual Islamic stance.

Regarding the status of non-Muslims in an Islamic state, the issue of political equality is one of the frequently discussed topics. Political equality refers to all citizens having an equal control over governmental decisions. In an Islamic state, except the right to political equality, non-Muslim have same rights as Muslims. This lack of political equality between Muslims and non-Muslims is viewed as a huge deficiency in Islamic constitutional law.

Though Islamic and western legal systems share a lot of values, there are certain major differences in their nature and scope. Whereas western legal systems are secular, Islamic law originates from Divine revelation, which is available in the form of the Quran and the Sunnah. As Islam governs all spheres of human activity, state affairs are also regulated by Islam. Thus, an Islamic state can be defined as a state that functions in accordance with the principles laid down in the Quran and the Sunnah.

Naturally, a state based on a particular ideology, like Islam, should be governed by people who strictly adhere to its principles. In other words, owing to its ideological nature, a non-Muslim cannot become the head of an Islamic state or its government. However, non-Muslims can become members of the legislature. In the legislature, their activities are restricted to the general affairs of the state and the affairs of their own communities.

Regarding administration of the state, principal positions that are related to the formulation and implementation of state policies cannot be given to non-Muslims as they do not believe in the state’s ideology. However, they can be appointed to other positions and can be consulted on different matters. History shows that competent non-Muslims were often employed as ministers, envoys, secretaries, etc.

In fact, Muslims need not be apologetic about this lack of political equality. Like other systems, Islam has its own unique features, standards, and requirements. Political inequality, in one way or another, exists in some other countries as well. For instance, in the United Kingdom, the Act of Settlement ensures that the monarch has Protestant beliefs. Other pieces of legislation that ensure ‘Protestant’ succession include the Bill of Rights 1688, the Coronation Oaths Act 1688, the Crown in Parliament Act 1689, the Act of Union 1706, and the Royal Marriages Act 1772. Not only does the Act of Settlement put a ban on Roman Catholics ascending the throne, but the monarch is also prohibited from marrying a Roman Catholic.

Similarly, in the United States, the Constitution declares that only natural born citizens are eligible for the presidency. And if we go back a bit, in the former U.S.S.R., which was an explicitly ideological state, one had to be a communist in order to hold a principal office.

Simply speaking, religion and ideology are not that different from each other. Therefore, the requirement of allegiance to Islam is the same as the requirement that an American, in order to hold a public office, undertake an oath to a fundamentally bourgeois constitution. Just as the Shari’a signifies certain values, the constitution signifies certain values.

In the West, people are generally against the idea of an Islamic state. Interestingly, they have not come to this conclusion after studying the primary sources of Islamic law. It is their own experience with religion that has caused them to view all religion-based political structures with suspicion and to have a lower view of religion than ideology. It is important that westerners, when commenting on the status and rights of non-Muslims in Islam, must make sure that they do so being aware of the principles described in the Quran and the Sunnah. Also, they should avoid confusing the despicable conduct of misguided Muslims with real Islam. For example, if a Jew steals or kills, it would be outrageous to say that Judaism makes thieves and murderers. Similarly, it would be utterly incorrect to say that the Spanish Inquisition was conducted because it was so instructed by Jesus.

The writer is a graduate of Harvard Law School and a lawyer based in Lahore.

syed_asad@post.harvard.edu

A turning point in the judicial history
By Hussain H. Zaidi
Sunday, 02 Aug, 2009


FOURTEEN-ME AMBER bench of the Supreme Court, in a unanimous short order, has declared the November 3, 2007 proclamation of emergency by the then President and Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Pervez Musharraf unconstitutional. The proclamation had suspended the constitution, enforced a provisional constitutional order (PCO) and sacked some sixty members of the superior judiciary including the Chief Justice of Pakistan (CJP).

According to the apex court’s July 31, 2009 verdict, the appointment of Justice Abdul Hamid Dogar as CJP and that of new judges in the Supreme Court and the High Courts as well as the establishment of the Islamabad High Court under the PCO was also unconstitutional and of no legal effect.

Hence, these judges have ceased to hold their office with immediate effect. As for the members of the superior judiciary who took fresh oath under the PCO, their cases shall be referred to the Supreme Judicial Council (SCJ) under Article 209 of the constitution. The dismissal of the judges of the superior courts, who were subsequently reinstated, under the November 3, 2009 proclamation of emergency has also been declared unconstitutional.

The instant judgement of the Supreme Court is comparable with the apex court’s decision in Asma Jilani versus the Government of the Punjab (PLD 1972 SC 139), wherein it was held: “A person who destroys the national legal order in an illegitimate manner cannot be regarded as [a] valid source of law-making. May be, that on account of his holding the coercive apparatus of the State, the people and the Courts are silenced temporarily, but let it be laid down firmly that the order which the usurper imposes will remain illegal and Courts will not recognise its rule and act upon them as de jure.”

Pakistan is a country where the abrogation or suspension of the constitution is not a rare event. On several occasions, the constitution has been abrogated or suspended (1958, 1969, 1977, 1999 and 2007). However, the November 3, 2007 suspension of the constitution differed from such previous acts in at least two respects: One, for the first time judicial activism was cited as a reason (in fact the major reason) for an extra-constitutional step.

The text of the emergency proclamation specifically alleged “increasing interference by some members of the judiciary in government policy, adversely affecting economic growth, in particular.” “Some judges”, the proclamation maintained, “by overstepping the limits of judicial authority have taken over the executive and legislative functions.”

Two, making a complete break with the past, the proclamation was immediately set aside by a seven-member bench of the Supreme Court. However, that landmark order could not be implemented as the members of the bench were among the deposed judges. Later a newly constituted apex court, comprising judges who were sworn in under the PCO, upheld the proclamation of emergency and removal of the judges invoking yet again the doctrine of necessity and the principle of past and closed transactions. One wonders whether those PCO judges could have decided otherwise.

The proclamation of emergency was clearly mala fide, because it was made at a time when the Supreme Court was hearing a petition challenging the eligibility of President Musharaf for re-election. Suspecting that the apex court might reject his candidature, Musharraf subverted the constitution.

The declaration of emergency, suspension of the constitution, proclamation of the PCO and removal of the members of superior judiciary were unconstitutional acts, simply because they were in conflict with the relevant constitutional provisions. To begin with, the constitution does not authorise the COAS to clamp emergency; that power is vested only in the president (to be exercised on the advice of the prime minister). Secondly, the proclamation of emergency cannot hold the constitution in abeyance. Thirdly, no person or body including parliament can suspend the constitution. Fourthly, since the constitution cannot be suspended, a provisional constitutional arrangement is also unconstitutional. Finally, superior court judges can be removed only by president on the recommendations of the Supreme Judicial Council (SCJ) in accordance with Article 209 of the constitution.

Let’s admit for the sake of argument that parliament can validate unconstitutional acts as it did on previous occasions. But even in this case, the November 3rd proclamation of emergency and subsequent amendments to the constitution can be validated only if approved by parliament by a two-third majority in accordance with Article 239. They shall remain invalid as long as parliament does not validate them. But it will be absurd to infer from this that a constitutional amendment is also needed not to validate such acts.

In fact subversion of the basic law, as done on November 3, 2007, is so heinous an act that it has been made an act of high treason, not merely treason, under Article 6 of the constitution in these words: “Any person who abrogates or attempts or conspires to abrogate, subverts or attempts or conspires to subvert the constitution by use of force or show of force or by other unconstitutional means shall be guilty of high treason. Any person aiding or abetting these acts is likewise guilty of high treason.” The High Treason (Punishment) Act, 1973 provides that high treason is punishable with death penalty or life imprisonment.

Article 6 defines high treason in a broad sense. Not only abrogation or subversion of the constitution but also any attempt to do so also constitutes high treason. Likewise, abetment to abrogate or subvert the constitution is also an act of high treason. When for instance the constitution is held in abeyance, a favourite parlance for military dictators in Pakistan, it also amounts to subversion of the constitution and thus constitutes an act of high treason. Likewise what happened on November 3rd, 2007 was also subversion of the constitution, as it upset the existing constitutional order.

In Pakistan, the practice is that suspension of the constitution is followed by promulgation of an interim or provisional constitutional order (PCO), which serves as the supreme law of the land. Members of the superior judiciary are required to owe allegiance to the PCO or face the exit. Later the very judges who owe their office to the PCO, validate the subversion of the constitution by invoking the doctrine of necessity and allow the army chief to amend the constitution.

When the constitution is restored, parliament indemnifies all orders and laws made by the military dictator including amendments to the constitution. It was only on November 3, 2007 that a departure from that practice was made when the Supreme Court invalidated the promulgation of emergency. But that decision was overturned, as expected, by a larger bench of the apex court comprising those judges who were sworn in under the PCO.

Article 6 is an innovation of the 1973 Constitution. The previous two constitutions of 1956 and 1962 did not contain any such provision. Having the memories of abrogation of the constitution twice (in 1958 and 1969), the authors of the 1973 Constitution believed that provision of a constitutional safeguard against abrogation or subversion of the constitution would deter generals from overthrowing the constitution.

However, subsequent events confuted them. On July 5, 1977 and later on October 12, 1999, and on November 3, 2007, the constitution was subverted. This means that incorporation of Article 6 into the constitution has not made any difference. This is because constitutional provisions, though exceedingly important, are not in themselves an effective bulwark against martial laws.

The only effective bulwark against unconstitutional steps is strong and stable democratic institutions. Building such institutions is a difficult and drawn-out process and requires politicians to subordinate their personal or party interests to those of democratic institutions and strengthen these institutions rather than their own positions.

However, it does not mean that those guilty of subverting the constitution should be allowed to go scot-free in the name of national reconciliation or for any other reason.

To conclude, the July 31 decision of the Supreme Court, by

setting aside manifestly unconstitutional actions and decisions, affirms the need to uphold the supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law—without which the country cannot survive much less thrive.

hussainhzaidi@gmail.com

The alarmist lobby in Pakistan has sounded the siren for calamity and the Indian press has loudly trumpeted the fact as a strategic victory over Pakistan and a means to an entry to the top table in international relations on par with US, UK, China, USSR and France. Somewhere along the line the professional expertise to separate the wheat from the chaff has been conspicuously absent.

This article is meant to highlight only the facts of the event and leave the comments to follow from it, to analyse the situation rather than to “situate the analysis”.

Firstly, nuclear submarines are those submarines which are nuclear powered and do not necessarily carry nuclear weapons. Nuclear submarines can be classified into three categories:

1. Those carrying ballistic missiles and classed as SSBNs, the primary mission is to provide nuclear deterrence from a platform which has a second strike capability in a nuclear war (A third leg of the triad of airborne and silo-based ballistic missile platforms)

2. Those designated Attack submarines (SSN) which specialise in combat with other naval vessels (including enemy submarines and merchant shipping).

3. Those designated Cruise Missile submarines (SSGN) designed to attack capital warships and tactical targets on land.

Because of the differing types of missions, the warload of the three types varies considerably. The ballistic missiles of the Nato countries carry up to 24 Trident I C4 missiles each with up to 8 MIRV (multiple independent re-entry) with a range of 4000-4500 miles.

The attack submarines and cruise missile subs carry cruise missiles and surface-to-surface missiles and torpedoes.

In modern US subs the preferred cruise missile is the Tomahawk missile launched vertically from tubes on the top of the hull rather than through torpedo tubes in the bows and stern.

From the tonnage (50,000 tons for a SSBN vs 6000 tons for a SSN) and size it is clear that the Indian Navy sub is not a ballistic missile submarine.

Nor does it appear to have vertical launch tubes on its hull, and it is not clear whether the present inventory of missiles in India can fit vertically in the sub, and if not, will require development of a new missile or a modification of existing inventory. Surface-to-surface missiles like the Harpoon can be fired through torpedo tubes.

Secondly, the advantage a nuclear sub has over its conventional powered cousin is that of range and speed underwater and the ability to stay at sea for long periods, limited only by the endurance of the crew.

A modern conventional submarine stays at sea for 50 to 60 days only including transit to and from area of patrol.

For a nation committed to no-first use of nuclear weapons this allows one to disperse nuclear weapons deep into the oceans and seas and retain a second strike capability when silos and airfields on land have been obliterated by first wave of nuclear strikes.

The cold war stance between Nato and Warsaw Pact where the major adversaries were the US and the USSR was a major factor in the concept, and production of nuclear subs.

In the India-Pakistan scenario where we stand eyeball to eyeball with sensors deep into each other’s territory and very short flight times the ball game is very different, especially as both countries have enough long range missiles based on rail/road platforms to reach deep into each other’s territory.

Coming now to the event itself this must also be put in perspective. The launch of Arihant meant that it made contact with water when the dry dock was flooded. It is at the moment a hull which has to be tested in harbour and then at sea. The nuclear reactor has yet to be fitted, and a bigger question is when it goes critical.

Sanjeev Mighlani reports that for Manmohan Singh to say that this completes India’s third nuclear triad based on missiles, aircraft and underwater strike capability is jumping many years ahead.

A former Indian Naval commander has this to say about the event “For the present, years are needed to prove the platform and its systems, first on the surface in harbour, then on surface at sea and finally underwater, at progressively increasing depths.

All along there will be need for corrections and modifications”. India’s record on its indigenous defence production of tanks, aircraft and submarines points to difficult road ahead.

An idea of timelines on ship construction can be gained by the fact that India was licensed by France in 2005 to produce Scorpene subs and work started in 2006.

The first sub was to be delivered in 2012 (now delayed for two years). China took 12 years to induct nuclear subs.

This week the Indian public spending watchdog focussing on the refit of the old Russian aircraft carrier Adm Gorshkov has called it the “biggest defence mess-up” stopping short of calling it a “scam”, when India will spend almost $2 billion more than the initial expected cost of £974 million to refit the carrier — 60% more than a new one (according to them).

Having said that, the fact remains that the Indian Navy (IN) has embarked on the long road to nuclear underwater technology. And Pakistan has to assess how and to what extent it affects the quantum of threat.

As has been stated earlier the threat by Indian medium and long range missiles based on road/rail/aerial platforms to land-based targets in Pakistan existed long before Arihant. Similarly Pakistan also has the capability to hit back at India if so attacked.

It could be said that the Pakistani missile programme has largely been effective in providing a credible deterrence in this regard.

As regards the threat by Attack (SSN) and Guided Missile (SSGN) submarines at sea, the situation is not totally different from the status quo.

Indian Navy submarine, surface and aerial platforms pose a credible threat to PN ships and merchant vessels in Pakistan’s area of interest, even without nuclear platforms.

However, it must be noted that nuclear submarines prefer to operate in unrestricted and deep oceans. It would appear from this that the Indian nuclear submarine is meant for other targets and declaration of intent.

The usual criticism of the IN is that it is not a blue water Navy, only a coastal one. The nuclear sub will, when it is operational in significant numbers, help it to achieve that ambition as it can offer the IN deployment even in the Atlantic. Deployment in the Arabian Sea does not utilise the full potential of nuclear subs. This leads us to ask what should our response be to Arihant’s launch. A red herring when comparing Indian and Pakistani Orbats (order of battle) is to bring in the Israeli element possibly to make the threat more sinister.

A commentator has mentioned the IN exercising with the Israeli Navy Scorpene subs to gain knowledge of firing nuclear weapons from those platforms.

The fact is that the Indian Navy (IN) has contracted for the construction of six Scorpene class subs from France having evaluated them before contracting for purchase, and the practicality of firing of nuclear missiles from these platforms is yet to be confirmed.

Pakistan’s options must also take into account cost factors. In times when even the Royal Navy and the UK Government have to consider scaling down its sea-based deterrent because of costs, one must cut the coat according to the cloth.

The Indian Navy Scorpene project will cost $3.9 billion just for the subs, with almost double that for the infrastructure and spares etc.

Allied to the cost of other platforms, the cost of achieving modernisation for the military machine is expected to hike the defence budget to $28.4 billion. This will be in addition to the cost of 126 aircraft it intends to acquire for the airforce.

For Pakistan with its economy in the doldrums, its military attention focussed on the militant threat, such enormous costs cannot be even imaginable.

With defence costs escalating annually, an optimist may hope that the Arihant project may have to be scaled down, with the modernisation/refit of the ex-Russian Navy’s Adm Gorshkov already being called a white elephant.

Coming now to what Pakistan should do, the answer seems to be:

1. Do not enter into an arms race to acquire nuclear submarines. The threat IN nuclear subs pose for the present and the foreseeable future is marginally more than what it is today. Pakistan is a continental power with a large land border with India, and has its own missile arsenal as an effective deterrent to the threat, including as the final option the nuclear deterrent.

2. Develop tactics to maximise the effectiveness of its excellent naval surveillance platforms to seek and destroy intrusions in waters of our interest. The submarine depends on being undetected so as to carry out its mission. The PN’s modern aerial surveillance units with stand off missile capability are a potent threat to such intrusions not only by subs but surface units as well.

The IN has in the Arihant a capital and prestigious unit which will not be risked in attacking targets less costly than itself, especially when the IN has enough conventional subs which have the capability to carry out the task.

Besides, the area of interest is not conducive to nuclear sub operations as they prefer to operate in open and deep waters to maximise their potential of speed and endurance.

Finally, a thought about the larger picture. We have a land border with India of about 1500 miles, while our coast line is a third of this, of which only a part is under threat.

Even though India has a large coastline, its land borders are equally large with borders with Pakistan, Bangladesh, China and Nepal. It has to understand that a continental power like it cannot be expected to be a maritime power as well.

C S Gray writing in Seapower and Strategy has this to say: “ Seapower can be decisive in itself when it is applied against a .. seapower or a maritime dependent coalition. Seapower, on the other hand, can never be decisive against a continental power or coalition, which is why sea powers throughout history have sought continental allies”.

In this lies a lesson which both countries should heed.

POLICE as an institution is responsible for maintaining public order and safety, enforcing law and preventing, detecting, and investigating criminal activities. But Pakistan’s police, in addition to meeting the traditional challenges, has also to fight the menace of terrorism.

A weak police means a weak state. The police uniform is a symbol of the state. That is why the militants have made police personnel their prime target. In 2008 alone, more than 258 policemen and officers laid their lives in the line of their duty (in terrorist attacks only) and another 700 injured. The very nature of duties of police makes the personnel vulnerable to attacks.

The recent terrorist attacks on Rescue 15 centres in Lahore and Islamabad, on Manawan police school earlier and a horrific attack on Sri Lankan cricket team showed that neither the scope of terrorism is restricted to the NWFP, nor is the police capable enough to face the sudden and blunt terrorist attacks. So, every one wants to know why the performance of police is so poor.

If one looks into the past record, it is evident that the performance of police, with meager wages, hectic working hours, insufficient training and decades-old equipment, has not been satisfactory. Yet , there is no denying the fact that to meet the growing challenges of fast deteriorating law and order situation there is dire need on the part of high-ups to plan and execute a comprehensive strategy to build an efficient, competent and disciplined police force.

There is need for acknowledging the mistakes, neglect and short-sightedness committed by the successive governments in raising the vital institution. Comprehension of the gravity of the situation is another pre-requisite for proper planning.

The increasing number of attacks on the police and growing concern of security throughout the country should work as wake up call for the policymakers. Our policymakers must give up their indifference and grasp the linkages between the adequate security mechanism and socioeconomic development.

As a satisfactory state of law and order situation is directly related to how we treat our police in respect of wages and basic facilities, therefore the policymakers need to devise workable strategies in place of patchworks and myopic schemes. Hopelessness and pessimism are no solution. Here are certain suggestions to turn inefficient and clumsy sitting ducks of he police into vigorous, brave and efficient fighters.

Firstly, we should have full confidence in the police. The police with their sister agencies should be given the primary responsibility of internal security by considering them as the only saviours against any threat within the borders.

The numerical strength of the personnel should be increased, and the rangers and other paramilitary organisations should be withdrawn from internal security functions, to be replaced by the police.

Secondly, a force with a high morale copes with challenges in a better way. This can be done by increasing their salaries, particularly of those at the bottom of the hierarchy. It is an irony that the salary of the policemen is no match to the services they are required to render.

The allocation of more funds for improving facilities and the welfare of the rank and file and their families, and ensuring that increased allocations are spent on their housing and transport facilities, rather than the well-being of senior officers; and providing adequate pensions to the families of police officers killed in the line of duty and publicly recognising their acts of bravery.

Thirdly, transparently recruited, well-trained police equipped with state-of-the-art weapons can do wonders. Provision of modern skill-oriented training based on watch and ward tactics, counter-terrorism techniques along with skill development in legal procedures.

There should be frequent refresher courses for the serving personnel besides the routine promotion courses. The criminals carry lethal and sophisticated weapons to outperform the police. Modern technology has opened new avenues of skill development.

The latest, reliable and effective modern weaponry and scientific equipment should be provided to the police. The latest surveillance technology, forensic science kits and electronic devices helpful in detection and investigation may also be provided along with relevant training.

Fourthly, accountability within a discipline force is primary requisite for successful performance. The goal may be achieved by setting up a parliamentary subcommittee on police role under the National Assembly’s standing committee on the interior; empowering the public safety commissions having transparently inducted unbiased members and separating police complaints authorities from public safety commissions, thus enabling them to perform their distinct roles.

Such a mechanism shall not only help the police department to get rid of its black sheep but will also infuse new spirit in the performance of the police.

Fifthly, there is a demand for beefing up the tactical and fighting capabilities of our police to fight the menace of terrorism. Once normalcy returns to the troubled areas in the NWFP the police must be prepared to handle the situation to prevent the extremist elements from returning to these areas.

The task might not be easy but is not impossible if planned strategically and executed enthusiastically. The history of terrorist attacks in Pakistan reveals that the prime focus of the attackers has always been the national and provincial capitals.

Therefore it would be necessary to create special counter-terrorism units (ECU) comprising the best youth out of field fighters and veterans from provincial Police, FIA, especial branch, elite force, CID and other agencies. There should be well-defined standard operating procedure (SOP) for the anti-terrorist squad with the actual availability of latest weapons, surveillance equipment, purpose-oriented vehicles and most important of all the moral support from the general.

Sixthly, fairness, honesty and cooperation are the natural expectations from the police personnel everywhere. Therefore, beyond reiterating the common problems of police, it would be unjust if the erratic acts of police were not blamed for many wrongs to the seekers of justice, honesty and cooperation.

It is high time for the police to change its attitude towards the common people so that there are no more such allegations in future. To ensure a better working, politically connected, corrupt and inefficient officers from the high administrative positions in the department should be replaced with just, honest and hardworking officers.

Lastly, it is a fact that a government with weak, unjust and undisciplined police force can neither maintain its writ nor can it fulfil the promises made during election campaign regarding peace, justice and protection to all.

Therefore, at least a democratically elected government should not leave any stone unturned to maintain its image by establishing public friendly police though we are currently standing far away from the dream.

Dreams are bound to turn in to realities if those at the helm of power are determined to do so. Let us end up the culture of political victimisation. Let us promote the heroic acts of our police. Let us create a strong and efficient police.

We can succeed in the face of adversity if and only we create a role-model police in Pakistan. True, the conventional police and civilian intelligence agencies are far more appropriate for counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations than a military trained to combat external enemies.

The police and the intelligence agencies under police control must be given the resources needed to tackle internal threats and crime. The international community, particularly the US and the European Union should realise that helping the police and civilian intelligence agencies with training and technical assistance would pay counter-terrorism dividends.

However, the Pakistan government should not just increase financial support and numerical strength but also bring about tangible organisational and political reforms.

The police should be provided with state-of-the-art weaponry and modern scientific equipment so that the criminals are unable outplay the policemen easily. Political appointments must end; postings, transfers, recruitment and promotions must be made on merit alone; the recommendations of police managerial bodies must be given due weight, and emphasis placed on the police serving and protecting citizens.

The writer is chief patrolling officer in Punjab Highway Patrol and doing PhD in Plasma Physics.

PAKISTAN will be sixty-two years old this week. As usual, the leaders will extend their customary homage to Mr M.A. Jinnah, the founder of the country, and Quaid-i-Azam to the people. Unlike the past, more questions are being asked what has gone wrong in relation to the hopes that were shared by all in 1947. The tradition of democracy has remained fragile, terrorism in the name of Islam is rampant, corruption is on the rise, and some centrifugal tendencies have emerged.

It is natural, therefore, to point a finger at the ruling class which has provided leadership to the country for the last six decades, their mode of governance and their failure to build a sustained institutional framework for the country. There has been a remarkable continuity among those who have served as movers and shakers in the political regimes, both pseudo-democratic and those based on military rule. We need to focus our attention, therefore, on the nature of the social formation that has dominated the country.

Recently, a collection of short stories was published under the title In other Rooms, Other Wonders (Norton, 2009), written by Daniyal Mueenuddin, a Pakistan-American, who has returned to Pakistan as an aspiring writer, but also to manage the estate (as he calls it) in southern Punjab, owned by his father, a well-known senior civil servant with distinguished record in the earlier political administrations.

With a novelist’s insight and a seasoned writer’s pen, he portrays the hidden world of feudal masters, their servants, hangers on.

The women in the stories use their devices to prey upon men, the ones from the upper class to keep their status, and those from the lower class trying to climb the ladder, only to be pushed back in the battle of the gender. Among his other characters are corrupt farm managers, and spoiled children of the wealthy landlords.

In a recent interview published in the New York Times (Sabrina Tavernice, July 25, 2009) he claims not to act as a landlord, and he treats his workers fairly. In general, he suggests, that the cast of characters is changing.

Powerful servants, for example, are becoming part of politics; sons of spiritual leaders take over district administration. And religious groups are emerging, with mullahs and fundamentalist Deobandis in the forefront. Meanwhile poverty is becoming endemic.

The question that arises from these stories and his other writings is why a small elite controls vast areas of land more than sixty years after Pakistan was established.

How it all came about has now been confirmed in several scholarly works. Early in the twentieth century, for example, “hereditary proprietors” were added to the definition of ‘zamindara’ by the colonial officers. The Land Alienation Act in this context contributed directly to the promotion of the privileged land class. Then, there was settlement of new irrigated lands in Punjab; all these factors directly impinged on politics and the economy in the later years.

What constraints were then faced by Pakistan after independence on its ability to institute a meaningful land reform in the country? It is an important question as it has direct bearing on how the country’s governance has been affected by this fact. This question prompts us to revisit the Pakistan Movement.

When Mr Jinnah was persuaded in 1934 to return to India by Mr Liaquat Ali Khan, Muslim League was still a gentlemen’s club, and its conventions could not muster even a quorum to conduct its business. The situation changed completely in 1937, when as a result of the Act of 1935, as a step towards self-

government, provincial legislatures were elected in the country. The Unionist Party ruled over Punjab, but in most other provinces including the NWFP the Indian National Congress was able to form ministries. With regard to the agenda of the Hindu-dominated provincial governments, a clash of cultures and language developed, especially between the elite groups of the two communities in the province of UP. The perceived and real grievances of Muslims gave a boost to the Muslim League, and paved the way to Lahore Resolution in 1940.

The urban middle classes in the areas which were to form part of north-west and north-east autonomous states as envisaged in the Lahore Resolution had started to rally, to borrow the phrase from Ayesha Jalal, behind the sole spokesman for a separate Muslim nation. It was essential, however, to win the province of Punjab completely in order to accomplish this goal. The controversial Sikandar-Jinnah pact (Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan was premier of Punjab) had made an attempt to pave the way for support from the landed interests in the province. More effective campaign was needed, however, to make Muslim League victory possible.

David Gilmartin of North Carolina State University and Ian A. Talbot, a British historian, have thrown some light on how the strategy for the victory was mobilised. Professor Gilmartin in his remarks made recently at an event organised by the Pakistan Study Centre, Punjab University, quoted to have said that the Movement had emphasised unity of Islam transcending biradari and locality. In his earlier detailed study (Religious leadership and the Pakistan Movement in the Punjab, Modern Asian Studies, 1979, reprinted in Mushirul Hasan’s, India’s Partition, 2001) he explains succinctly how religious support for the Movement was organised in Punjab.

It was to win over the sajjada nashins to the cause. They had developed religious influence centred on the shrines. And they had ambivalent feelings towards secular tendencies of the Unionist Party

With the emergence of Muslim League, sajjada nashins saw the opportunity to put rural politics on a more solid religious foundation. The sweeping victory gained by the Muslim League in 1946 elections vindicated the efforts made by the League high command in this regard. This victory was, however, a call for a new religious order by them, not for any repudiation of the landed aristocracy.

But it did leave the important question un-answered: how to define this new religious system, and about the future of landlordism.

While Gilmartin’s analysis gives a glimpse about social structure in southern Punjab, the emphasis placed by Talbot (The growth of the Muslim League in the Punjab, 1937-46, Journal of Commonwealth and Contemporary Politics, 1982) explains the crucial part played by landlords and pirs, and the related kinship groups to mobilise support for the League. The momentum gained by the Muslim League during this period had convinced many landlords that if they did not join, they would lose the last opportunity to maintain their access to patronage and power. He concludes: ‘The Punjab Muslim League’s success demonstrates how much more important ‘traditional’ social and religious networks may be in mobilisation of political support than has been recognised by existing theories.’

Punjab now was ready to move forward with new names in the landed-aristocracy such as Daultanas and Mamdots, leaving behind Khizr Hayat Tiwana, and the legacy of Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan. In the context of the situation, the Punjab Muslim League was confronted with Hobson’s choice, to face the reality concerning the social structure in the area. But there was rapport between the Quaid and the masses, never witnessed before, even though he could speak but little vernacular; this is how this writer remembers the mood as a student activist during 1945-47. The north-west India was part of what Hamza Alvi calls the colonial legacy of the British rule. The objective was to extract maximum revenue from land, to promote local interests who would strengthen defence considerations of the rule and, as Mustafa Kamal Pasha has suggested in his writings, the backwardness of the region facilitated colonial capitalism. With Presidencies of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay becoming centres of industrial and financial development, Sindh and the Punjab became agricultural hinterland.

The main question then is why feudalistic pattern has remained frozen in the rural life of Pakistan for the last six decades, as delineated by Daniyal Mueenuddin, profoundly affecting the political economy of the country.

Z.A. Bhutto with a solid rural base was able to build his new People’s Party with the help of his urban colleagues and a balance had developed in the focus of the party regarding the problems of Pakistan until he started to lean more heavily towards waderas and sajjada nasheens. He nevertheless made an effort to introduce modest land reform but it became entangled in court challenges and fatwas until General Ziaul Haq closed that chapter.

THIS Independence Day, August 14, can, quite easily, go down as the most critical birthday of Pakistan in its 62 years of sovereign existence. The nation has been off balance for a fairly long time. But at this particular moment in our national life we are, literally, caught at a tangent with at least two grey areas of critical import staring us all in our face.

One is whether Pakistan’s ‘enemy number one,’ the notorious Tehrik-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan chief, Baitullah Mehsood is really dead and buried or is his reported death a figment of some fertile imaginations in Washington and Islamabad.

The second question is whether former President Pervez Musharraf, now safely ensconced in London, should be tried for treason under Article 6 of the same Pakistan Constitution that he so brazenly flouted and breached on myriad occasions, most recently and notably on November 3, 2007.

At stake in both questions is the credibility of the government, a sine qua non for good governance.

It has become axiomatic in Pakistan to moan the declining standards of governance and jarring failures of successive regimes, civilian or military. This incumbent government, now in the saddle for more than a year, has touched a new low, not only in governance but also in its appalling failure to convince the populace that it has the capability to alter course and improve. Its harrowing paralysis of governance haunts and hurts all the more at occasions like marking the birthday of Pakistan.

It will not be too long before the reality or falsehood of the claim that Baitullah Mehsud has been killed unravels itself. Rehamn Malik will then either bask in the sunshine of solid achievement or end up with a lot of fresh egg on his face. The death of the notorious outlaw, if proved, should effectively be the first passing grade for the nouveau rulers who have yet to allay fears about their capacity to rule, much less know what good governance is all about.

If the end result of the ongoing flight of fancy comes out to be a case of just that, flight of fancy, its blowback will simply be devastating for the ruling elite. It will convince the people that what they have bargained for in return for democracy is a pack of liars and bully boys whose sole competence—or lack of it—is anchored in how dutifully they can take orders from Washington and then clumsily ram it down the throats of Pakistan’s befuddled people.

The case of Pervez Musharraf is, at once, simple and complex. A simple case of executive action looks complex because it drags into debate a plethora of ground realities, accumulated over the past 50 years in which Pakistan has mostly been on a roller-coaster of bewildering twists and turns. Many, nay most, of these realities are inconvenient.

The most inconvenient and jarring truth or ground reality is that governance in Pakistan has been hijacked on four occasions, at least, by Bonapartes, of enormous ambition, masquerading as ‘saviours’ of the country and its people. Invariably all of them have flouted and made a mockery of the constitution but none has ever been hauled in a court of law and made accountable for his misdeeds and breaches of law.

Another inconvenient truth is that at least five, legally elected, civilian governments, three of those of PPP and two by PML-N have shared space, intermittently, with the ‘boots’ on the political stage but none has had the courage or will to make the military dictators and soldiers of fortune accountable for treating the law of the country with utter contempt.

The current dispensation is the 6th legally constituted civilian government of the last 50 years but it also happens to be the most incompetent and pusillanimous. Doesn’t it have any iota of self-respect to bell the cat which, in any case, has fled Pakistan and sought refuge where he thought his former mentors would be able to shield him the best? The sad answer is that it doesn’t.

On the face of it, those holding Pakistan in their thrall at this critical moment show neither the will nor the gumption it takes to make a major leap to put Musharraf in the dock. Zardari is in power because of Musharraf. He wouldn’t be where he is had Musharraf not taken all the stops out of his way by coming up with that petrifying clap-trap of the National Reconciliation Order (NRO). Obviously, Zardari would be the last to see the cushion pulled out from under his seat.

So the government, on cue from him, no doubt, has taken the line of least resistance by referring the issue to the National Assembly. Prime Minister Gilani has injected chicanery of his own into the debate by insisting that the parliament must come up with a ‘consensus’ in favour of Musharraf’s trial. Consensus? And that too from a parliament where scores of its members owe their pelf and power to the former dictator? They are votaries of his, especially those sitting there under the banners of MQM and PML-Q. They would be loath to jettison their mentor because of fear of being swept aside like detritus after a storm if Musharraf was found guilty of the crimes he’s accused of. Why should anyone expect them to commit hara-kiri?

Premier Gilani has been thoroughly disingenuous in passing the buck to a moribund parliament and, thus, virtually endowing each one of its mostly dysfunctional members with a veto. Strange are the ways of this ruling cabal. It doesn’t flinch from using presidential ordinances to impose taxes summarily—an exclusive preserve of the parliament—caring two hoots for the clueless elected men and women. But where simple executive action would clinch the deal on Musharraf’s trial it lobs the ball into the parliament’s court. What a twisted sense of proportion it has. It’s exactly a mirror image of the way it has been dragging its feet on throwing out the obnoxious 17th amendment, a handiwork of Musharraf.

The real reason for executive paralysis is that this government has got so used to taking its orders on issues of substance from Washington that it’s simply petrified taking any initiative on Musharraf without a hint or a signal from its mentors.

But Washington has no more interest in Musharraf. He was a valuable ‘asset’, to use a favourite American jargon, to Bush and served his master well at the cost of Pakistan. But the Obama administration has no brief for him now that there’s a more supine servant in Zardari to do Washington’s bidding without question. Washington doesn’t care a damn what happens to its former puppet-on-a-string: they’d rather have Islamabad squaring this circle on its own. So what options do the people of Pakistan have if those coming to power with their consent, and shouting from their roof-tops of their popular mandate, would betray their trust with a straight face?

The only option for the people is to wage another campaign, on the model of the successful struggle to have the top judiciary restored to its status. This, incidentally, is the only option left to the people to honour the legacy of the Quaid. He was their ‘great leader’ and not of those who hijacked his Pakistan within years of his demise and have never, to date, relaxed their chokehold.

The Pakistan the Quaid envisioned was to have three basic sources for its guiding light.
One, a secular Pakistan where there would be no room for religious extremism and where minorities would live in safety and enjoy equal rights with the majority. The recent mayhem at Gojra is the latest reminder that Quaid’s Pakistan isn’t safe for minorities. The unstinted backing of the people for army action against the archaic Taliban is evidence of a hankering for a Pakistan free of extremism in the name of religion.

Clean and efficient governance was the second on the Quaid’s list of a progressive Pakistan. Clean governance isn’t only one without corruption of any kind but also one where everyone is accountable for their deeds, in particular the denizens of power and authority. Musharraf was corrupt in more ways than one and must be held accountable for his shenanigans.

That brings in the third pod of the Quaid’s healthy Pakistan. For accountability a system of clean and prompt justice is ineluctable. For the first time in Pakistan we have a free and independent judiciary committed to upholding the rule of law that the Quaid cherished for his state. This is one feather already in the people’s cap.

And, like perfect icing on the cake, there’s a vibrant and dynamic news media eager to serve the people and bare the closets of skeletons of the ruling elite. Minister Khurshid Shah’s phlegmatic outburst against a private TV channel’s talkshow host in the parliament, on the issue of independent power producers, speaks volumes of the nervousness of the ruling class at the media’s crusade for clarity in governance. Let the party begin.

Let there be a crystal-clear people’s initiative to lift the deep fog and allow the sun to shine on Baba’s Pakistan. We owe it to him.

IN 1940 came the Muslim League’s Lahore Resolution with all its ambiguities and contradictions demanding that the geographically contiguous areas in which the Muslims were in majority (the northwest and the east) should be grouped together to constitute independent states in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign.

In 1946 the Muslim League agreed to the cabinet mission plan which proposed to put Muslims into two autonomous regions within the Indian federation but this plan did not materialise. A month before leaving Delhi for sovereign Pakistan its founder Mohammad Ali Jinnah dismissed a suggestion that the new country should be a theocracy. The purpose of the creation of Pakistan, he said, was not to create a theocratic and monolithic state but to safeguard the social, economic, and political rights of Indian Muslims. Once Pakistan was created the rights of even non-Muslims were to be protected as equal citizens.

The current crisis has its origin in large measure to a dogmatic view propagated by some politicians that ‘ideology’ of Pakistan was Islam. But the Quaid-i-Azam never made any mention in his speeches and conversations nor used the term of Ideology of Pakistan. Instead, he made it clear that his ideal was to create a democratic state for Indian Muslims where faith would be a personal matter of each individual.

For fifteen years after the establishment of Pakistan, nobody used the term ideology of Pakistan nor was it known to anybody. In 1962, a member of Jamaat-i-Islami, Maulvi Abdul Bari of Lyallpur (now Faisalabad) used this term for the first time when the political parties bill was under discussion. Chaudhry Fazal Ilahi, who later became president of Pakistan, objected to this construct and asked what he meant by this. On this the member who had moved the bill said, “Ideology of Pakistan is Islam.” Nobody raised any question or sought explanation and the bill was passed.

The Quaid-i-Azam’s vision was as clear as crystal and his guidance superb. His utterances in public and private did not leave any one with the slightest doubt that he was a forward-looking, progressive and rational man and wanted a secular Pakistan.

Now the question arises, can we subordinate the acquisition of knowledge to any ideology? The answer is that we cannot do so. If we subordinate the acquisition of knowledge to any ideology, we reduce the field of knowledge to what the ideology teaches us because the ideology has to run through a groove or a defined channel and does not let us go out of it. It was a Christian dogma for centuries that the centre of the planetary system is earth. Copernicus showed that the centre of that system is not earth but the sun and the earth revolves round it. Galileo further illustrated this theory. For this he was placed before an inquisition tribunal for having expounded a theory which was opposed to the Christian ideology.

We cannot subordinate education to any ideology. The object of education is to acquire knowledge, knowledge of everything, of universe, the remotest nebula, the knowledge of light travelling at the speed of 186,000 per second. The knowledge of the mightiest galaxies is within our reach. Knowledge of everything which exists in the universe is not beyond our reach. Knowledge has no limits. There are a number of branches of knowledge. Now if we subordinate the acquisition of knowledge to any ideology, political, economic, or religious, we reduce the field of knowledge because it imposes limitations on human intellect and on our activities.

Education being imparted in madressahs (seminaries) is subordinated to an ideology and therefore does not inculcate quest for knowledge among students there. Apart from inculcation of a dispassionate quest for truth in them the seminaries fail to enable students to take some socially useful profession in life. They are taught that only their creed is based on truth and that other faiths and creeds are incarnation of evil. The attempt to mould the minds of the young through education started in early 1980 with the political agenda of the Islamisation of the state.

The curriculum was redesigned and textbooks were rewritten to promote the ideology of Pakistan and create a monolithic image of Pakistan as an Islamic state and only the Muslims were the citizens of Pakistan. Pakistan is a multi-lingual, multi-ethnic and multi religious society. Non-Muslims are an integral part of it. Many of them have contributed to the image, stature and wellbeing of the country.

The term globalisation was coined towards the end of the 20th century. This term highly speaks of the wonders of the present century. With the invention of the most modern means of transportation and the most sophisticated means of communication world has shrunk into a global village. The world is contracting and the foreigner is becoming my brother. He cannot live without me and I cannot live without him. We both cannot hate each other. If I lose somebody due to hatred then I lose myself. My country can only expand in peace, the peace that is born of dialogue between peoples.

It is extremely dangerous and lethal to establish a monolithic society. In a monolithic society different creeds cannot co-exist peacefully. All diversity should be forced into unity. We live in a pluralistic society where different religion co –exist peacefully. The most important thing in a pluralistic society is to accept unity in diversity.

We must know full well that Pakistan was created not in the name of Islam but in the name of enabling the Muslims of the subcontinent to live according to their cultural practices, religious values and age-old customs. So, Pakistan was not meant to be a theocratic and monolithic state. It was created to safeguard the social, economic and political rights of Indian Muslims and also treat the non-Muslims as equal citizens.

The architect-founder of Pakistan Mohammad Ali Jinnah told the new nation in his historic address to the Constituent Assembly on August 11, 1947, that “You are free to go to your temples, your are free to go to your mosques, or to any other place of worship in the state of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed that has nothing to do with the business of the state. I think that we should keep this in front of us as our ideal and you will find that in course of time Hindus will cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense because that is the personal faith of each individual.”

This excerpt of the speech of the founder of Pakistan clearly speaks about pluralistic society in which full freedom of religion would be given to all communities and there would not be any discrimination on the basis of caste or creed and cultural diversity would be recognised and respected to promote national unity. As a prudent politician and statesman, Jinnah knew full well that in a multicultural society like Pakistan discrimination on the basis of religion could impede communal harmony and hinder economic development process.

Pluralism is the root of democracy which stipulates that all the people irrespective of their caste, colour, creed and ethnic affiliation should be given equal rights and affiliation. Some politicians assert that democracy is a multi-valued notion and not a single-valued one and it should be shared rather than monopolised.

The message of the founder of Pakistan to the nation was unity, faith and discipline. His speeches clearly outline the kind of unity he envisioned to make Pakistan a progressive state. He stood for unity in diversity. Progress, prosperity, solidarity and integrity of Pakistan lies in the successful practice of the democratic system. This must also be borne in mind that religion is not for the state but it is for the people who live in the state.

After sixty two years Pakistan still remains in the list of backward countries. The people of Pakistan are at the mercy of the unjust social system or the criminals and terrorists. Nobody is safe at home or out of home. The poor are becoming poorer and the rich are becoming richer.

The Quaid-i-Azam set an example for the others. When he was the governor-general of Pakistan his salary was rupee one only. At this moment Pakistan is completely in the grip of crises and our rulers are enjoying life. Let us seek the solution of all our problems by keeping in mind the principles the founder of Pakistan upheld.

POLITICAL reforms in the administration of Federally Administered Tribal Area (Fata) recently announced by the Zardari government are likely to promote the status quo in the area, with some superficial ‘improvements’. The questions about the future progress of the region, therefore, will remain unresolved.

In light of the results of the February 2008 general elections in Pakistan which were held under the framework of the Musharraf’s provisional constitutional order (PCO), the people had voted for restoration of democracy. The Pakistan People’s Party won a comfortable majority and formed the new civilian government. With the ultimate departure of General Musharraf, it was reasonable to be hopeful about beginning of new democratic era, to correct the imbalances which the country had suffered during military and pseudo-democratic regimes.

The party inherited, therefore, the legacy of neglect and dilatory manoeuvres in the framework of poor quality of governance on issues of great importance for the country. To meet this enormous challenge, the government should have used its brain trust, reviewed the situation thoroughly and prepared an agenda in the form of the legislative list of business for consideration of the parliament. They have failed to respond to this challenge, almost a year since they came to power. It seems that cobbling up a coalition of parties with disparate or even conflicting ideologies (e.g. from MQM to JUI-F!) cannot promote a clear goal for the Zardari government.

In establishing its agenda, the government would have noticed that the future status of the tribal areas would be among the priority issues facing the country. The constitution gives special powers to the president about the administration of the areas, but undoubtedly the nation as a whole has a stake in it.

The tribal territory between settled areas and Afghan border began under the shadows of the Durand Line in 1947. Later, the territory was divided into Fata and Pata for management purposes. The colonial policy of agency system and responsibility for law and order under the Frontier Crimes Regulation was continued. This arrangement had a purpose for the British rulers, to give the tribal people autonomy on a limited scale in exchange for assurance against anti-state activity.

This colonial policy was an anachronism for an independent Pakistan but the government adopted a status quo attitude, perhaps in the context of the threat of Pakhtoonistan. Many observers disagreed, holding the view that the situation in fact called for a policy to establish clear presence of the state in the region. There was a need to lift the economic status of the people from their ‘tribal’ backward state and to enable them to become full citizens of the new country. The First Five-Year Plan, 1955-60, for example, took note of the economic problems of the areas and made recommendations for their development, for dispensing with the old policy of ‘keeping peace through the loose-reigned agency administration and plentiful bribes’.

Notwithstanding these warnings, the masterly inactivity was continued. The vast territory was later ready to be used as a suitable location for US strategy during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Further, it was to serve as a ‘strategic depth’ for Pakistani intelligence policy. The people in the tribal areas, nevertheless, remained poor in the fundamental sense, with no sustained source of income, only bounties from war and conflict. And the events have become more intense since 9/11 and growth of the religious militancy in the areas as well other

regions of Pakistan. And Pakistan still does not have its presence firmly in place in the areas, with extension neither of the constitution, nor the legal, political and economic institution of the country.

One does not need to be endowed with special insights to understand that the areas need to be an integral part of Pakistan, and to identify the measures that would make it possible to gradually move towards that goal.

The far-reaching Fata reforms, as the media reports described them, unveiled last week to mark the 63rd Independence Day, fall far short of this goal. These reforms may be a modest small step forward, but are two steps back from the coveted objective. These measures will neither extricate the tribal people from a century of bondage and servitude, nor usher them into the mainstream of national life, as claimed by the president in announcing the reforms.

The agency system, for example, will remain intact, only with a proviso to have their accounts subject to audit. Then it is claimed that the Frontier Crimes Regulation will be more responsive to human rights, with reference to the position of women and children, and that arbitrary arrest and detention without the right to bail will be ‘curtailed’.

The system will remain intact, as a whole. Given the fact that customs and tradition are deeply rooted among the tribal people, these steps are not likely to make a dent in the system. Also, the rights are easier to define in law but difficult to implement them when the state is not present in the areas, only the agency system is. After all, even in mainstream Pakistan, keeping vigilance on legal rights is not an easy task. The package of reform does envisage setting up of Fata Tribunal with powers similar to those of the high courts. It is a well-known paradigm, however, that wherever institutions are established which claim to be ‘similar to’ — they are in fact not equal simply because they are separate, especially when they are transplanted out of context with the cultural milieu.

As reported in the media, the reforms have extended the Political Parties Order 2002 to the tribal areas. Normally, any steps taken to encourage growth of political parties should be most welcome. Democratically run political parties are a sine quo non for a healthy democracy. Political parties in Pakistan are as a rule family affairs, or one-man show. And the fact is that the Order in its present form does not promote intra-party democracy at all. How the business of the party is conducted, how the leader is elected/selected/proclaimed depends on the constitution of the party. No mention is made about any possible party convention, about rules for leadership review, and about tenure of office of the leader. All this is rendered unnecessary because the underlying requirement is to have just the document called party constitution, a copy of which is to be deposited with the election commission. It may be said that by its total silence on this issue, the Order gives no importance to this principle. A leader may become a leader by means not specifically noted in the party constitution, including nomination by the outgoing leader, or through a will.

It would have been a good opportunity for the government to review this Order with a view to strengthening democracy in political parties. In its present form, the extension of this haphazard improvisation would not serve the cause of democracy in the country.

The news about the FCR reforms indicates that if the Zardari government wants to act promptly on a matter which it considers important, no joint-committee need be appointed, no public opinion need be solicited, no other such dilatory tactics need be adopted; just have a sub-committee of the cabinet consider the issue, submit it to the president and presto! The matter is settled.

The question then is what suitable measures can be taken to meet the challenge to integrate the tribal persons as full citizens of Pakistan, with all the rights and obligations which at least are theoretically expected from Pakistanis. The answer in fact is quite simple, the constitution must be extended without delay. Also, they need the same attention from the government as others in the country, except that as the First Five-Year Plan in 1955 suggested, they deserve greater support, and more urgently: universal primary education, suitable assistance for the poor and for the sick, easier access to higher education, and jobs.

The barrenness of the areas presents a serious limitation, but it also offers an opportunity to conduct geological surveys identifying potential resources, including water, underneath the dry peaks and valleys. They are long over-due. And Hindukush range is not that far. Soon, water will also require attention in the Indus region. It is the primary source of our sustenance; it has to be conserved, to be treated as a precious gift from nature.

WHETHER Israel will follow up on its threat to attack Iran, having declared that “Iran will not be allowed to become a nuclear power,” is a possibility that has been discussed and speculated by the international media and strategic analysts for quite some time.

The subject, however, has attracted greater attention and concern with the advent of hardliner Ahmedinijad elected in 2004 as president of Iran and his reelection last month for another four-year term.

The return of Netanyahu’s ultra-right government in Israel in March has raised this level of concern to apprehension and fear. A flurry of statements from Washington indirectly encouraging Israel towards a unilateral military strike against Iran’s nuclear installations have raised tensions higher and made the prospect of Israel’s unilateral aerial attack on Iran more plausible.

General David Petraeus who heads the US Central Command told the US Senate Armed Services Committee that “the Israeli government may ultimately see itself so threatened by the prospects of an Iranian nuclear weapon that it would take pre-emptive military action to derail or delay it.”

This statement was of particular significance as Netanyahu has repeatedly urged that President Obama must act quickly to stop Iran from getting a nuclear bomb or Israel might be compelled to attack Iranian nuclear facilities.

Analysts concur that both the US and Israel have a common agenda to frustrate Iran’s nuclear ambitions. General Patraeus in his testimony spelt out the US’s reasons for stressing that Iran has pursued policies that “frustrated US goals” in the region, which include providing “material, financial and political” support to the Islamic militant movements — Hamas in the Gaza Strip and Hezbollah in Lebanon.

President Bush had termed the Iranian nuclear program “a threat to global security” and vowed that “Iran will not be allowed to become a nuclear power.” On Iran’s nuclear ambitions, both the U.S. and Israel have pursued threats and ultimatums. An attack on Iran by Israel is thus a common agenda.

It is against this background that the world capitals received with some dismay the statement of Vice-President Joe Biden deemed as giving a green signal to Israel for a military strike against Iran.Biden told ABC’s This Week in an interview broadcast on July 13: “Whether we agree or not, they’re entitled to do that . . If the Netanyahu government decides to take a course of action different that the one being pursued now, that is their sovereign right to do that. That is not our choice.”

Though President Obama has tried to calm international concern that Joe Biden’s statement amounted to a green signal to Israel, his subsequent statements have however been consistent in conveying US’s undiluted opposition to Iran’s nuclear programme.

Iran’s repeated assurances that its nuclear programme is entirely peaceful and limited to civilian use to meet growing energy needs has been dismissed by the US and EU, and Iran has been subjugated to further sanctions by the UN Security Council. Obama has followed Bush’s coercive policy towards Iran and has tried to develop consensus amongst the world’s powerful nations — G8 at the July Summit in Italy — but had only partial success.

He found limited support for his call for tougher sanctions against Iran due to Russian opposition. Instead the joint communiqué called for a negotiated resolution over Tehran’s nuclear programme giving it until September’s G20 summit.Explaining the declaration, Obama maintained that “the international community has said ‘here is a door you can walk through. . . . ’ “If Iran chooses not to walk through that door then you have on record the G8 to begin with.”Before we discuss the probability of a preemptive strike by Israel, the Russian policy towards Iran bears examination. Both Moscow and Tehran have followed pragmatic policies over the nuclear issue. Moscow’s support to the UNSC sanctions against Iran is fully understood in Tehran. The financial impact of these sanctions had been largely negated by increasing oil prices until last year. Russia has not only increased trade and investment activity in Iran, it has also continued to supply technical assistance for its Bushehr nuclear plant.

Moscow’s support to Iran is another factor explaining why the US is exploring direct negotiations with Iran to move forward. The hectoring element in policies towards Tehran is to nudge it to the negotiating table. Tehran would, however, treat any policy of even limited contacts with utmost caution and circumspection. It is well known that the US through the CIA and Mossad has tried to destabilise Iran. Indeed the US Congress has passed a bill authorising regime change in Iran and recently provided 20 million dollars for reviving radio services in Farsi and to counter jamming of foreign broadcasts by Iranian government.

The US is contemplating all options to deal with a “nuclear Iran,” including giving the green signal to Israel as it did earlier on Israel’s aerial strike on Iraq’s nuclear installations at Osirak on June 6, 1981. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has simultaneously proposed a defence umbrella to Gulf states to neutralise a nuclear Iran. In an interview with Thai TV last month, Clinton cautioned Iran that with a US defence umbrella over the region, Iran “won’t be able to intimidate and dominate as they apparently believe they can once they have a nuclear weapon.”

The statement has been received with unease and concern in Tel Aviv as it is interpreted to imply that Obama has opted for a policy of containment if Iran succeeds in acquiring a nuclear warhead. The new US doctrine of nuclear Iran containment could be a spur to a paranoid Israel for a blitzkrieg attack against Iran’s nuclear installations which in its assessment would have limited and acceptable costs and consequences.

For Israel, the June 1981 aerial attack that destroyed Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor provides an ideal precedence. On that day, eight F-16s Falcon aircrafts escorted by six F-15 Eagles carried out a pre-emptive strike against Iraq’s nuclear facility at Osirak, dropping 16 2000-pound iron bombs on the facility.

The condemnation of the attack, as expected, was universal. UNSC passed Resolution 487 condemning the attack as the violation of UN Charter, but no punitive sanctions were imposed on Israel.

Israel justified its action as one of self-defence, stating that “under no circumstances would we allow the enemy to develop weapons of mass destruction against our nation. We will defend Israel’s citizens with all the means at our disposal.”

The three major reasons cited by Israel in an official report were 1) imminent realisation of Iraq’s plans to acquire a military nuclear capability; 2) Iraq’s declared maintenance of a state of war with Israel and its persistent denial of Israel’s right to exist; 3) failure of international efforts to stop the completion of nuclear programme.

Israel thus laid its case on the self-defence as enshrined in the UN Charter. It cited Article 51, which grants each member state “the unilateral right of individual or collective self-defence in the event of an armed attack.”

Seen in the context of increasing Israeli threats and the ill-advised statements of Iran’s leadership on the Holocaust and denial of Israel’s right to exist provide a perfect parallel to the circumstances obtaining before Osirak attack. These bellicose statements will be exploited to establish justification for Israel’s aggression as an act of self-defence.

How real are the prospects of an Israeli aerial strike against Iran? A recent story in The Guardian claimed that on May 14 last year, Olmert had asked Bush for a green light to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities but Bush refused. However, as former British Foreign Secretary David Owen observed, “It is, however, improbable that Israel abandoned its option to take unilateral action.”

Obama is also likely to follow Bush. However, as David Owen reminded, the circumstances surrounding Georgia’s decision to attack South Ossitia are worth remembering. The Georgian President was advised by Condoleeza Rice not to attack but there were powerful voices in Washington that, with a nod and a wink, were encouraging action, so that the Georgian government felt confident in going ahead. Statements by General Petraeus and Joe Biden, most analysts agree, have given an amber, if not green, light to Israel.

Israel’s attack on Iran’s nuclear installations would be a catastrophe radically transforming the entire economic and political global landscape with undeterminable consequences. For Pakistan, such a development would be equally grave and critical. Its nuclear programme and the safety of its nuclear weapons are already a source of great anxiety and concern to the West and the US.

An Israeli attack will irreversibly change the dynamics of nuclear politics and put Pakistan under extreme pressure either to renounce its weapons programme or agree to international control of its nuclear facilities and sign the NPT. Our nuclear establishment must address these concerns and prepare appropriate strategies to secure our national assets.

The writer is a former Ambassador

MR Jaswant Singh, a former foreign minister of India, has been expelled from BJP for writing a book on architect-founder of Pakistan Mohammad Ali Jinnah and describing him a secular person. He was a senior leader of the BJP and has been associated with it for long.

He was known for being an independent-minded leader. Mr Jaswant Singh has thrown responsibility for partition on Jawaharlal Nehru.

Earlier Mr. L. K. Advani, another senior leader of the BJP, had also described Jinnah a secular leader while visiting Jinnah’s mausoleum in Karachi and had paid heavy price for his remark as there erupted a controversy on his status in the party and RSS asked him to resign as president of BJP. However, the matter was settled after Advani’s explanation which convinced the leadership.

No doubt Jinnah is a highly controversial figure in India. He is greatly admired and is father of the nation in Pakistan. He is often referred to as Baba-e-Qaum by Pakistanis. But he is hated by many in India and is considered mainly responsible for creation of Pakistan and hence a villain of the piece. Such extremes can never adequately define a person, let alone being understood adequately.

The motives for describing Jinnah as secular by two top BJP leaders may be different but there is an element of truth in what they say.

Shri Advani was speaking as a politician during his visit and may be he tried to please his hosts in Pakistan. Mr. Jaswant Singh is under no such obligation and is speaking as a scholar as he is known to be of fairly independent mind and would not be much concerned about what RSS and BJP leaders would say.

It is not only in India that Jinnah is subject to various interpretations, some hate him for dividing India while others absolve him of total responsibility for partition. He is also presented in different lights in Pakistan itself where some moderate and liberal Muslims describe him as secular and often quote his speech in the Constituent Assembly as a proof of his secularism. The conservatives and orthodox Muslims, on the other hand, project him as a believer in two-nation theory and a true Muslim who created Pakistan for Islam and Muslims.

We have the same problem with Mahatma Gandhi in India. Some Dalit and RSS leaders hate him but for different reasons. Dalits do so for he was an upper caste Hindu leader who upheld the concept of caste, if not of untouchability.

And RSS leaders hate him, though they may not take such a position publicly for obvious reasons. They hate him as they consider Gandhi as betrayer of Hindu cause and supporter of Muslims. They even indulge in propaganda that Gandhiji was responsible for partition of the country.

Many people hold Nehru responsible for partition and among them are all types of people — secular as well as communal. The question arises who is really responsible? It is interesting to note that Indians and Pakistanis while holding their leaders responsible have completely exonerated the British rulers of their responsibility in partition.

Though secular elements at times do refer to the role of the British, communal forces in both the countries have completely absolved the British. In RSS perception main culprits are Muslims led by Jinnah while in Pakistani propaganda it is Hindus led by Gandhi who are mainly responsible for partition. If one studies the complex developments carefully which took place in mid-fifties it is difficult to fix total responsibility on any one person or party. Different actors played different roles adding up to partition of the country.

First, let us see the role of Jinnah since he is at the centre-stage of partition issue. Before this we will also have to look at him whether he was a secular or communal. It must be noted that we cannot go by western definition of secular and communal.

We have accepted these terms in our own sense and in our own context. Gandhiji was secular despite being highly religious in his attitude. Nehru, of course, was secular more in western sense than in Indian sense.

Similarly, Jinnah was also secular more in western sense. Both Nehru and Jinnah were never as much religious as Gandhi and Maulana Azad were. Nehru was closer to Jinnah than to Gandhiji and Maulana Azad was closer to Gandhiji than to Jinnah. Maulana Azad was also a deeply religious person like Gandhiji though he was more liberal in religious matters than Gandhiji.

Jinnah was a thoroughly westernised person right from his younger days. He never had any religious training. He did not strictly avoid things that were deemed as taboos in Islam. He never observed religious rituals.

He even disagreed with Gandhiji about involving Ulema in politics and he opposed Gandhiji’s idea of taking up Khilafat question. He believed in separation of politics from religion. He was described as Muslim Gokhale by friends. Gokhale was liberal and so was Jinnah.

Jinnah was certainly a secular leader in this sense. Until 1935, he described himself as Indian first and then Muslim. And, until 1937 he had never thought of partition even in his dreams. He even entered into an informal understanding with the Congress in 1937 elections in UP. His differences with Indian National Congress had begun from 1928 onwards when his demands were rejected by the Nehru committee set up by the Congress to solve communal problem. He had even ridiculed the concept of Pakistan initially propounded by Rahmat Ali, a Cambridge University student.

The two-nation theory was deeply flawed and Jinnah had formulated it as a sort of political revenge against the Congress leaders like Nehru who refused to take two Muslim League nominees in the UP cabinet after Muslim League lost 1937 elections and Nehru was responsible for this.

Maulana Azad tried to persuade Nehru to take the two nominees but unfortunately Nehru did not budge. Some scholars suggest that Rafi Ahmed Kidwai, an influential Congress leader from UP, prompted Nehru. Whatever the reason, politically it was unwise not to take the two Muslim League nominees in the cabinet. Maulana Azad has pointed this out and has criticised Nehru on this count in his political biography India Wins Freedom.

Jinnah took it as an outright betrayal and he decisively turned against Congress and gradually this attitude of Nehru led Jinnah to propound the two-nation theory. Thus, the two-nation theory was a politically contingent proposition rather than any religiously grounded proposition.

Had Nehru shown some political sagacity this theory would not have come into existence at all. And in no sense of the word Jinnah ever wanted to establish an Islamic state in Pakistan. He would not have even approved of Pakistan having Islam as its official religion.

That was not his bent of mind. If one goes by Jinnah’s speech in the Pakistan Constituent Assembly it is doubtful if he wanted even a Muslim state, let alone an Islamic state. He was all for a secular state in Pakistan.

Then if we call Jinnah communal in what sense can he be described as one? Or can he be? In those days when we were fighting for freedom of our country communalism was not opposite of secularism, but of nationalism. Anyone who was anti-national was described as communal. Thus, if at all Jinnah could be described as communal it is in this sense. And as pointed out above, Jinnah opted for partition not as part of his conviction but as a result of political contingency.

Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru was responsible in a way as he was not very happy with the Cabinet Mission Plan which he though would have resulted in a weak centre and that ex

cept defence, foreign policy and communication all residuary powers would have rested with the federating states.

Both Nehru and Sardar Patel were not happy with this scheme. And as Azad has pointed out in his book Nehru, on being elected as president of the Congress in 1946, gave a statement that Cabinet Mission Plan could be, if necessary, changed. This infuriated Jinnah as Muslim League had accepted the Plan and a composite government was formed after 1946 elections.

This finally drove Jinnah to accept nothing less than partition. The greatest culprit were British rulers as they also wanted India divided so that they could easily establish intelligence and military base in Pakistan to stem the tide of revolution which by then had become a certainty in China. Nehru government would have never allowed such bases in United India. Lord Mountbatten got Nehru, through his wife Advina to endorse the partition plan.

Thus it would be seen that apart from Jinnah the British and Nehru were also responsible for partition of the country. In my opinion the greatest responsibility of partition lay on the British shoulders. They cleverly manoeuvred the complex situation in a way to make partition a reality. Partition, as Maulana Azad also pointed out, was neither in the interest of India nor in the interest of Muslims themselves.

The ultimate result of partition is that Muslims of Indian subcontinent stand divided into three units and Kashmir problem is also an offshoot of this event. And both the countries are spending billions of rupees on their armies and now such powerful interests have developed in keeping conflict between the two countries alive that all efforts to hold peace talks are not succeeding.

If European countries could form a viable union despite the fact that they were at each other’s throats until late forties why can’t we in South Asia?

The writer is an Indian scholar and also chairman of Centre for Study of Society and Secularism, Mumbai.