May 9, 2012
Farooq Hameed Khan

While Pakistan terms drone attacks illegal, counterproductive and in violation of its sovereignty, White House counterterrorism adviser John Brennan recently declared that the use of drones was “ethical, legal, just and proportional,” in full accordance with US and international law.

The world may ask if it was ethical to protect the lives of Americans by taking the lives of innocent Pakistanis. Exactly which international law allows a licence to kill without accountability? According to the Conflict Monitoring Centre, an Islamabad-based research organisation, around 317 recorded drone attacks since 2004 resulted in 2,759 fatalities. Of these fifty-odd were Al-Qaeda militants, the remaining victims being civilians.

If the US announces a moratorium on drone attacks, during the period of moratorium the PAF’s F16s could be used to attack jointly approved targets (such as Al-Qaeda and the TTP) in Waziristan.

If the US is not prepared to transfer the drones campaign to Pakistan then it should agree to substantial Pakistani participation and control over drone strikes against mutually agreed targets. Also, if the US is unwilling to meet Pakistan’s long-standing demand for acquisition of Predator drones, then it should consider transfer of technology to equip PAF surveillance drones with weapons systems.

Has the government failed in its diplomatic efforts to break the Pakistan-US impasse? Is the foreign office managing the country’s relations with the United States adequately? Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar’s recent remark that the US was not listening to Pakistani demands that it halt drone attacks was an admission that the foreign office team has not made the desired impact in the just concluded rounds of talks with US special representative Marc Grossman.

Both the foreign minister and our ambassador to Washington lacked the experience and shrewdness to conduct skilful diplomacy. The newly appointed foreign secretary, who served as counsellor in Washington in the late nineties was still in the settling phase.

Ambassadors are called for critical consultation back home, but not as often as Ambassador Sherry Rehman who seems to be spending more time in Islamabad than in Washington ever since she took up her assignment. She should concentrate on proactively projecting Pakistan’s viewpoint and concerns by engaging US lawmakers and reactivating a pro-Pakistan caucus on Capitol Hill, coordinating with Washington’s think tanks and Pakistani-American organisations.

One way to overcome this diplomatic handicap would be to augment foreign office efforts by utilising expertise of successful former ambassadors to the US, including Dr Maleeha Lodhi, who served twice in Washington. In the past Track II initiatives on issues related to F-16s deliveries have worked out well for the improvement of stalled Pakistan-US relations.

Pakistan missed an opportunity when it reportedly asked the US to postpone the apology until after parliament’s resolution on resetting Pakistan-US ties. In the meantime, President Obama’s unconditional apology to Afghanistan on the Quran’s desecration and the killing of 16 Afghans by a US sergeant left little room for another such White House gesture towards Pakistan. President Obama, too, missed a chance to break the deadlock. Had he hopped over to Islamabad from Kabul just for a few hours and offered formal regrets over the Salala massacre, he would have generated enough goodwill to pacify the angry Pakistani nation to a great extent.

This act of statesmanship and large-heartedness could have produced a positive change, even a breakthrough, in Pakistan-US relations.

In the absence of a formal White House apology over Salala and the continued drone attacks, will Pakistan resume normal bilateral ties with US? If the US imposes unacceptable preconditions for inviting Pakistan to attend the upcoming Chicago summit, should Pakistan boycott this conference?

It is unlikely that the government will retreat from its principled position on these critical issues until it achieves a favourable agreement on the political and diplomatic front that respects parliament’s resolutions and soothes public sentiments. Fears of Pakistan’s international isolation, its diminishing role in the Afghan peace process and greater Indian involvement in the post-2014 scenario are being created in certain quarters in an effort to push Pakistan towards immediate resumption of Nato ground supplies to earn a place at the Chicago summit.

The US understands fully well that Pakistan holds the key to facilitating a breakthrough in US peace negotiations with the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network, which will ensure a safe and honourable withdrawal process of foreign forces in 2013-14.

The recent US-Afghan strategic partnership agreement may not be welcomed by Afghanistan’s neighbours, including Pakistan, and other regional stakeholders. While the US declared that it does not seek permanent military bases in Afghanistan, US personnel will be allowed to use Afghan facilities beyond 2014.

The agreement also allows US the possibility of keeping troops in Afghanistan till 2024 for purposes of training Afghan forces and targeting Al-Qaeda. From the Pakistani perspective any US military presence in Afghanistan beyond 2014 could keep the region destabilised, especially if the Afghan Taliban and other Mujahideen groups reject this strategic agreement and keep up their attacks on US troops.

With a convicted prime minister clinging to office in Pakistan, the ruling party’s defiance of the Supreme Court, the rising political instability due to warnings of protests by opposition parties and growing public unrest over price hikes and power outages, Pakistan may find the going difficult in negotiating an agreement with the Americans. There is no option but to aggressively pursue a detente with the USA while defending our core interests.

The writer is a retired brigadier. Email: fhkhan 54@gmail.com
-The News

May 9, 2012
By: Mohammad Jamil
Exclusive Article

Despite Pakistan’s vociferous demand to end drone strikes, eight suspected militants were reportedly killed in a U.S. drone attack on Saturday in Dre Nishtar area of Shawal valley. As if to add salt to injury, US Defence Secretary Leon Panetta in an interview said the same day that the US will continue to launch drone strikes against militants in Pakistan even if the Pakistani government opposes it. During an interview to PBS news, Panetta said: “The United States is going to defend itself under any circumstances.” Pakistan’s Foreign Office condemning the drone attack in North Waziristan stated: “It is our considered view that the strategic disadvantages of such attacks far outweigh their tactical advantages, and are therefore, totally counterproductive.” The nation has been listening to the foreign office vows and resolve for a severe response to any alien transgression into Pakistani territory; however in case of the super power Pakistan appears to be helpless since it is confronted with challenges such as fiscal and trade deficits, apart from lack of unity in the nation and disharmony in the institutions.

Since the recommendations of Parliamentary Committee for Defence and Security have been adopted by the Parliament, it is up to the government to either convince the US for the infecundity of the drone attacks or consider measures to stop the drone attacks. In any case, fundamental issues pertaining to national security have to be decided by the political leadership, not by military commanders or diplomatic corps. And that is where the citizenry stands so distraught and disenchanted by our leadership’s act. The ruling elites cannot even imagine how deeply has this American adventurism hurt the nation in its psyche on May 2nd and 26th November 2011, showing up their nuclear state even worse than a banana republic? On 2nd May, as the American president and his core security and administration team was huddled up together in the situation room watching the raid live on our territory, our own ruling elites were blissfully asleep, that had left the nation in an unbearable psychological shock.

On 6th May 2012, Defence Minister Chaudhry Ahmed Mukhtar addressed a press conference and dwelt various issues. When asked about Pak-US defence deals, he said Pakistan had asked the US for ‘joint’ and ‘coordinated’ drone attacks, but Washington refused to accept this demand. To another question, he said if the supply of Nato containers is not restored it would be violation of the international law. On one hand he expressed helplessness on the issue of drone attacks, and on the other hand he in his wisdom invoked the international law, which even the US and Nato have never referred to. It is true that Pakistan cannot afford to fight the super power; and needs its support for keeping the economy afloat. But why was that hullabaloo of reviewing the foreign policy? There is no denying that the US and Pakistan need each other; therefore both sides must realize the core requirement and remove mistrust by accommodating each other’s interests. The situation demands mutual trust and confidence among the stakeholders including US, Afghan Government, Taliban and Pakistan.

According to a press report, Pakistan and the United States are working quietly on an acceptable text for a US apology for the Nato air strike on 26th November that resulted in the martyrdom of 25 soldiers of the Pakistan Army at the Salala check post. About 20 soldiers were seriously injured in the gory incident which came from the so-called ‘allied’ forces. The draft is being worked out and discussed between the top diplomats of the two countries as Pakistan’s Ambassador to the United States Sherry Rehman has been tasked to choreograph a mutually acceptable text for the purpose; of course which could provide face saving both for Pakistan and the US. Such a breakthrough will help restoration of supplies to Nato forces in Afghanistan. Reportedly, the senior diplomats stationed in Islamabad are in constant contact with the ambassador who has been staying in Islamabad for more than ten days and has come here for the third time since her posting to Washington in December.

Pakistan’s economy is in dire straits, and is feeling the financial crunch because of the fiscal and trade deficits. The government has to go through the ritual of the budget next month, and the current financial year also being the election year, the government has to showcase its care for the masses. But it is only by resolving the issues with the US that the much needed financial assistance from the United States, reimbursement of under Coalition Support Fund and clearance of dues under various heads would be possible. At the same time, disposition from the world fiscal institutions, rescheduling of debt or new debt to pay back the old debt would be available to Pakistan. Nevertheless, Pakistan seems to be uncomfortable about the strategic agreement between Afghanistan and United States inked by Presidents Obama and Karzai in Kabul on the first death anniversary of Osama bin Laden. Islamabad is studying the agreement and formulating its formal reaction.

The bitter truth is that the country’s political leadership across the spectrum is congenitally unfit and incapable to taking quick and right decisions. The very shrill, that this leadership raised over the reformulation of the country’s foreign policy by the parliament speaks volumes of its immaturity and superficiality. Nowhere in the world is foreign policy formulated by the legislature, although it may decide the issues of war and peace or settle a foreign policy matter referred to it by the executive branch. All over the world, it is the prerogative of the executive to formulate foreign policy; of course military and intelligence agencies give briefings and advice on the threat perceptions to the security of the country. Indeed foreign policy is changeable keeping in view the changing political landscape of the world. However, the immutable are only the nation’s sovereignty, its security and its territorial integrity, which are non-negotiable in any case and cannot be compromised in any conditions.

- The writer is a senior journalist and freelance columnist.

Email: mjamil1938@hotmail.com

By Ejaz Haider
Published: May 10, 2012

The writer is a senior journalist and has held several editorial positions including most recently at The Friday Times. He was a Ford Scholar at UIUC and a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution

“There are several significant [al Qaeda] leaders still on the run. (Ayman al) Zawahiri who inherited the leadership from (Osama) bin Laden is somewhere, we believe, in Pakistan. So we are intent upon going after those who are trying to keep al Qaeda operational and inspirational.” Thus spake the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to an Indian channel in Kolkata just before departing for New Delhi.

We responded by saying that if the US has any information on the whereabouts of Zawahiri, it should share that intelligence with us. Sounds rational, except there’s a slight problem: the US will share nothing with Pakistan. If and when it has triangulated Zawahiri’s presence somewhere in Pakistan, depending on the operational requirement, and choosing the modus operandi on that basis, it will move in and take him out — unilaterally. Period.
What about Pakistan’s sovereignty, international law and the UN charter? Pakistan can put all of it in a pipe and smoke it.

What about GLOC (ground line of communication)? The US wants Pakistan to open it. The closure does create problems for it but it doesn’t bring the US-Nato-ISAF operations inside Afghanistan to a halt. There’s the ALOC, air line of communication, expensive, tedious and long. But deeper pockets can take care of that. The US and allies would still need the GLOC for carrying equipment back but hopefully by then Pakistan will have been coerced into opening it.

This was Pakistan’s trump. Pakistan has played it even though in any game of brinkmanship one should never play one’s trump. The trump has been trumped, no value added, and Pakistan has pushed itself into a corner in its relations with the United States.

Pakistan has a litany of complaints against the US; the US has an equally long list of complaints against Pakistan. In such a situation, the more powerful side carries the narrative and makes it stick. That’s exactly what has happened. The US complaints get a world audience; the US is leading a pack of nations; most, if not all, also share its concerns and threat perceptions. Even those who might not always support its approach agree on two things: there is a terrorist threat that needs to be neutralised and the epicentre of it is in Pakistan’s ‘badlands’.

Pakistan can beat its chest and lament about how unfairly it is being treated by the US but that narrative dies down within Pakistan, and in any case, is mostly pooh-poohed outside Pakistan. Even within, the civil-military divide ensures that no one believes a word of what the army or the ISI says. Add to this other troubles, most significant being the non-acceptance of the state of Pakistan itself by many Pakistanis and we have a situation ideally suited for external forces to exploit.

It should surprise no one that the US is now pursuing a policy of making Pakistan irrelevant to an Afghan settlement and, if need be, bringing the war more actively to Pakistan. The trajectory has taken Pakistan from being a US ally to frenemy and, if the current situation continues to deteriorate, would possibly see it become an overt enemy.

The US has also, over the years, put in place an elaborate spy network in Pakistan. It has been conducting special operations and has upstaged Pakistani intelligence agencies, including the ISI, in their own backyard. It was quite pathetic how an unnamed ISI official was trying to act hurt by the fact that while it was the ISI that gave the lead on Bin Laden to the CIA, the Americans kept the ISI out of the loop. Tough luck fella.

The Americans learn even when they learn the hard way. But when they do, they do a pretty thorough job of it. As the most powerful state in the world which will retain that position in the foreseeable future, America should be expected to do whatever it can to protect both its core and peripheral interests. And it will strike back too when it finds any state or non-state entity trying to thwart its plans.

In statecraft this is legitimate. If a state wants to stand up to a bigger, more powerful state, it should either have equally strong backing or it should acquire the wherewithal for such a contest itself. Pakistan has neither. The deeper irony is that while Pakistan relied all these decades on American largesse — civil and military — to stand up to India, it is today in an unenviable position of trying to normalise with India just as its relations with the US are nosediving.

But woe betide anyone who thinks that India will let go of this opportunity.
Just like the US, India too wants a pliable Pakistan. A Pakistan that resolves all the existing disputes on India’s terms, whose military cannot challenge India, and which offers India the space the latter requires to project its soft and hard power in the region and beyond. Yes, beyond, because it is in the nature of power to project itself and India is no exception to that rule.
So, while India is happy to see Pakistan normalising relations with it, it will continue to exert pressure, in tandem with the US and the rest of the world, to shape Pakistan. This too, as statecraft goes, is legitimate.

What are Pakistan’s choices? Near-zero. The state’s legitimacy is challenged from inside; the state’s ability to influence events in the region has dwindled to almost nothing; the state has no capacity to project its narrative; the rightwing is working against it by isolating it from the rest of the world; the left-liberals consider it a security state that needs to be reshaped in line with the narrative that comes from the outside.

And now, the commitment trap. If the US doesn’t apologise, GLOC won’t be opened. The US won’t. Pakistan won’t get invited to the Chicago summit. Neither side wants it to get worse. Both are committed to their courses of action. The US has more choices. It can now go solo in Afghanistan and also coerce Pakistan. Pakistan’s strategic assets, geography etcetera, are now its liabilities.

The ball’s in Pakistan’s court.

-The Express Tribune

May 13, 2012
By Abdus Sattar Ghazali

With majority of Pakistanis skeptical about the assassination of Osama Ben Laden in the US military operation of May 2, 2011 on a compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan’s judicial commission entrusted to probe the Osama episode has failed to complete its investigation till now.

The government named a five-member commission of inquiry in June last year headed by a supreme court judge to pin point the responsibility for the negligence of civil and military authorities that permitted the US military operation possible.

The commission questioned over a 100 witnesses, including military and security officials, former foreign secretaries and ministers, police and intelligence officials, bin Laden’s family, neighbors, and media personnel in Islamabad and from Abbottabad, former Pakistani ambassador to US, Husain Haqqani who, along with President Zardari, was allegedly privy to the US operation.

Publication of the commission’s findings, originally scheduled for December 2011, has been repeatedly postponed, and critics of the government smell political pressure to tone down its findings. The Express Tribune reported on February 16 that the commission is in a fix over the question of fixing responsibility.

According to the newspaper officials privy to the inquiry attributed the delay to the explosive question of naming and blaming those who were at the helm of affairs in secret agencies during the years Bin Laden was allegedly living in his safe house. At least four generals, including incumbent military chief Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, served as head of the country’s premier spy agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), from 2003 and 2011 — during Bin Laden’s supposed years in Abbottabad.

Osama’s Widows deported to Saudi Arabia

Apparently, the US client Pakistani government is seemed more interested in moving on than seeking answers. Not surprisingly, on the night of Feb. 25, 2012 the local authorities in Abbottabad sent bulldozers to demolish Bin Laden’s house after nightfall, erasing a painful symbol of an embarrassing episode involving the government in Islamabad.

On the other hand, on April 26, Pakistan deported the family of Osama bin Laden to Saudi Arabia. Osama’s three widows and 11 children were found at the compound on May 2, 2011.

Two Saudi women, Siham Sharif and Kharia Hussain Sabir, were among the widows, according to court documents cited by the Express-Tribune and other Pakistani newspapers. Bin Laden’s third wife in Pakistan was Amal Ahmad Abdul Fateh, a citizen of Yemen.

They were interrogated by Pakistani intelligence agents and eventually charged in March with illegally entering and living in the country. The three wives and two adult daughters were convicted and sentenced to 45 days in prison. Their prison term, which was spent at a well-guarded house in Islamabad, ended earlier last month.

Pakistan snubs US over Osama informer

In a another twist to the Osama episode, Pakistan has reportedly turned down a demand by United States Defense Secretary Leon Panetta to release a Pakistani physician who faces treason charges for helping the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the Abbottabad operation.

Pakistan’s political and military leaders discussed at length Panetta’s demand and decided the alleged informer, Dr Shakil Afridi, should not be given leeway, according Asia Times. The snub was made in light of a recommendation from the Abbottabad Judicial Commission to register a treason case against him.

Dr. Afridi, who the commission has declared a “national criminal”, has been charged with conspiring against the state by collaborating with a foreign spy agency, but not yet with treason – a charge that would carry the death penalty. The doctor was arrested by Pakistani security agencies at his house in Hayatabad, Peshawar, 20 days after Bin Laden’s alleged death. In his appearance before the commission, Afridi confessed to having set up a vaccination campaign in Abbottabad aimed at collecting DNA samples to establish the whereabouts of Bin Laden and his family.

Dr. Afridi confessed to conducting a fake polio vaccination drive in the Bilal Town area of Abbottabad from March 15-18 and April 21-23, 2011 to try and get DNA samples from the residents of the compound in which Bin Laden was allegedly hiding.

Amir Mir of the Asia Time reported that well-informed diplomats in Islamabad believe the orders to initiate a treason trial against Afridi must have something to do with the apparent refusal of the CIA to provide any information to the commission after it had been sent a detailed questionnaire last year through the Pakistani Foreign Office. Pakistani security agencies continue to interrogate Afridi in a bid to ascertain how the CIA recruited him and several other civilians who have been under interrogation since the Abbottabad raid. This would help them expose the American’s recruitment network in Pakistan, the Asia Times said.

Coming from a humble background, Afridi graduated from the Khyber Medical College in Peshawar in 1990 and was working as the doctor in-charge of Khyber Agency of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The doctor’s close aides say the whereabouts of his family remains unknown.

The US Defense Secretary Panetta admitted in his January 28 interview that Dr. Afridi had been working for the Americans and had provided information to the CIA about Osama. Based on this information, US Navy Seals raided his hideout.

In a related development, a group of US congressmen has introduced a legislation in the House of Representatives seeking citizenship for Dr. Afridi. “Today, I have introduced legislation to grant American citizenship to Shakeel Afridi, the Pakistan medical doctor who risked his life to identify Osama bin Laden and help US military forces bring him to justice. If convicted, he could be executed,” said congressman from California Dana Rohrabacher on February 4.

“My bill would grant him US citizenship and send a direct and powerful message to those in the Pakistani government and military who protected the mastermind of 9/11 for all those years and who are now seeking retribution on those who helped to execute Osama bin Laden,” Rohrabacher said in the House.

The citizenship bill has been endorsed by more than a dozen top congressmen, including Bill Posey and Roscoe Bartlett. “This bill shows the world that America does not abandon its friends,” Rohrabacher said.

Pakistanis remain skeptial about Osama’s killing

Not surprisingly, in an article titled, One year after his death, OBL lives, the Daily Dawn said a year after that operation, there are no signs of decline in the theory that Osama bin Laden was not killed that day or that he was a “martyr,” not a terrorist.

It may be recalled that a survey conducted by YouGov in association with Polis at Cambridge University two days after the Osama’s alleged killing revealed that 66 per cent of urban Pakistanis did not believe that Bin Laden had been killed at the Abbottabad compound on May 2.

Tellingly, this skepticism is not uncommon. In an article titled “SKEPTICISM: The Agendas Behind the Bin Laden News Event… When the Lie Becomes the Truth…” Dr. Paul Craig Roberts wrote:

“The US government’s bin Laden story was so poorly crafted that it did not last 48 hours before being fundamentally altered. There is no doubt that the US is sufficiently incompetent to have needlessly killed bin Laden instead of capturing him. But who can believe that the US would quickly dispose of the evidence that bin Laden had been terminated? The government’s story is not believable that the government dumped the proof of its success into the ocean, but has some photos that might be released, someday.”

One reader wrote to Roberts in an email: “What is really alarming is the increasingly arrogant sloppiness of these lies, as though the government has become so profoundly confident of their ability to deceive people that they make virtually no effort to even appear credible.”

Source: countercurrents

May 14, 2012
By: Jalees Hazir

The United States decided to go all out, gunning for a non-compliant Pakistan last week. The drone attacks in the North Waziristan Agency were supplemented by the ballistic missile launched by Hillary Clinton from India claiming that the new al-Qaeda Chief, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, was hiding in Pakistan. All the assorted tactics of badgering a demonised ally honed over time, including the holding back of assistance and threatening direct action against militants on Pakistani soil, were employed simultaneously with a renewed vigour. While the superpower mounts pressure on the government to resume Nato supplies and use the Pakistan armed forces as an unquestioning implementation agency for the US gameplan in Afghanistan, it would not hear of ending the criminal drone strikes or tendering an apology for killing Pakistani soldiers at Salala. Is our government capable of warding off this concerted attack?

Going by the statements of important members of the government, it is not even thinking about it. In fact, it seems more interested in strengthening the case for giving in to the arm-twisting tactics of the global bully. Our Defence Minister Chaudhry Ahmad Mukhtar told us that Pakistan may have to face economic sanctions if it continued to hold Nato supplies for an extended period of time. According to him, if the Nato containers were not given safe passage through the country, it would be a violation of international conventions to which Pakistan was a signatory. He expressed his helplessness in ending drone strikes that have killed innocent Pakistani citizens. More than somebody charged with the defence of Pakistan, he sounded like a spokesperson for Nato, convincing us that the only option open for Pakistan was to submit to the demands, commands and needs of the US-led military alliance that has occupied Afghanistan for more than a decade.

In the same vein, our Finance Minister Hafeez Sheikh came up with his own two bits to put the fear of the sole superpower in our hearts. He informed us that the next budget could not be prepared if the American demands were not accepted. He would also like us to submit to these demands, no matter how detrimental they are to the security and stability of the country, to ensure the release of funds that he has been trained to depend upon. To make a budget without the crumbs of loans and aid is obviously not a part of his brief. In the face of the concentrated belligerence by the US, other important members of the government were also reported to be advising restraint and realism, terms that essentially translate into bowing before the financial and military might of a rogue superpower. The question is: Will things get any better if we take their pessimistic advice, fall in line and do as we are told? Not really!

The spurious war on terror narrative aside, the issue at hand is essentially not that complicated. The US and its allies would like us to act as accomplices and foot soldiers in their war against the Afghan people, a trillion-dollar war that is getting more and more unpopular in their home countries and one that seems to be going nowhere despite the large-scale misery, death and destruction that it has caused in the occupied country and despite its dangerous fallout that is affecting the entire region. No sugar-coating of al-Qaeda, democracy or human rights could camouflage the bitter truth about the war in Afghanistan and its catastrophic consequences for the Afghan people. After all, Afghanistan is not an isolated case and the record of US intervention in countries around the world is too voluminous and naked to ignore. It would be stupid to shut our eyes to the aggression at work next door.

The Zardari-led government and the liberal intelligentsia, both patronised by the empire, are happy to parrot a devious narrative that projects the US as protecting us from the barbaric militants waiting in the wings to terrorise us with their medieval and misguided version of Islam. They scare us with the inevitability of a Taliban takeover the moment their saviour, the US, decides to leave Afghanistan. The only way they know of fighting militant extremism is to hide behind the back of a meddlesome and unscrupulous superpower and to do its bidding. Anyone suggesting a different course is labelled as a Taliban sympathiser. In awe of the military might of the US, they believe that our salvation lies in staying on the right side of the super-duper power. And of course, they are convinced that our survival depends on crumbs of financial assistance thrown our way for doing the needful.

This simplistic discourse ignores the fact that those fighting the foreign occupation forces in Afghanistan are not all card-holding members of Taliban. Besides, the criticism of the US role in the world is not restricted to the perspective of the Islamists or of those being occupied and killed. Sane and conscientious voices from around the world have been putting together, bit by bit, the pieces of a scary puzzle that is now as good as complete, exposing to us all the machinations of a modern-day empire bent upon exercising total domination. Many Americans and Western writers have contributed to this understanding, and they are making sense to more and more people in their home countries. They are critical of an economy sustained by wars, fought with the taxpayers’ money to promote the interests of big corporations. They have laid bare the devious working of the international financial establishment designed to enrich a small minority to the detriment of 99 percent of citizens. These critics of the empire are not Islamist militants out to destroy their own civilisation.

The choice before us is actually quite simple. We could either become a tool in the hands of a predatory empire out to capture the entire bounty that our planet offers for the benefit of a few, killing and terrorising those who resist it abroad and at home, or we could end our cooperation in this barbaric project. We could allow ourselves to be bullied and arm-twisted by a greedy superpower into following its violent diktat, or find the courage to resist it. We could either help perpetuate an unholy war or we could help end it by saying no to the US. If we really think about it, there is actually no choice!

The writer is a freelance columnist.

Email: hazirjalees@hotmail.com
-The Nation

May 14, 2012
By: Momin Iftikhar

Ever since the occurrence of 9/11 in 2001, the Indians have been quick to exploit the terror card in turning the screw on Pakistan; particularly, in equating the freedom struggle in Kashmir with a terrorist movement and foisting terrorism as the top agenda item in bilateral negotiations. With the attack on the Indian Parliament following the Twin Tower attack in New York by two months, the Indians created a 12/13 of their own to justify the ordering of the biggest ever mobilisation of forces against Pakistan, which was ultimately rolled back after 10 months following a hair-raising standoff bearing nuclear overtones. Without any substantive evidence, the Indian military formations were on the roll towards Pakistan’s western borders within 10 days of the attack; and yet after five years when the Indian Supreme Court delivered the final verdict there was no mention of Pakistan’s involvement in the event.

A well established pattern points to the fact that the Indians – and the US, of late – have repeatedly blamed Pakistan for the incidents of terrorism without solid grounds and exploited these incidents to gain leverage in pursuance of their coercive agenda. Following the rollback of Operation Parakram in 2002, India has repeatedly brandished the spurious terror card in order to set the pace of the composite dialogue process to its convenience and painting Pakistan red with the unsubstantiated and trumped up charges of sponsorship of terrorism.

In a dangerous development, the US, with eyes on the pullout of forces planned for 2014, have opted for the much repeated Indian model of pushing Pakistan into a corner. It is in this context that the declaration of $10 million head money on Hafiz Saeed for his alleged involvement in planning the Mumbai terror attack on November 26, 2008, poignantly points to the US-India collaboration to arm-twist Pakistan.

From another perspective, it reveals the US failure in finding a smoking gun – evidence capable of holding out in a court of law – to indict Hafiz Saeed; vindicating Pakistani position that the Indians, despite exchanging half a dozen dossiers on Mumbai attacks, have passed nothing of substance and the US, despite interrogating David Headley, have come across no tangible leads to confront Pakistan.

The Indian leadership, following the Mumbai terror attack in November 2008, went into an overdrive in castigating Pakistan over ‘cross border terrorism’; even of state implication, without providing any tangible evidence that could positively guide Pakistani investigators. The tirade was built around involvement of the banned Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) under the patronage of Pakistani agencies and leading to demand for the extradition of Saeed and his fictitious collaborators. India promised to provide supporting evidence in the shape of dossiers, and in quick time, but as they say there are many a slip betwixt the cup and the lip.

Notwithstanding a high-pitched rhetoric, the first ‘dossier’ on the Mumbai attacks arrived 40 days after the incident and carried little of substance; providing ‘information’ rather than any ‘intelligence’ to act upon. As many as half a dozen dossiers have been exchanged since, but little evidence has emerged to pursue the cases in courts of law against those accused, including Hafiz Saeed. It stands out as a measure of the casual attitude of the Indian authorities that in the list of DNA reports of 10 terrorists given to Pakistan on March 13, 2009, in the second ‘dossier’, two different DNA reports were attributed to the same person.

Another dossier mentioned the statement of Ajmal Kasab as an enclosure, but none was to be found due to what was later claimed to be a clerical error; only after Pakistan indicated to the laughable gaffe. These lapses serve to underscore the lukewarm earnestness in which the ‘intelligence’ related to the Mumbai incident is being shared with Pakistan; despite India’s unceasing demands, duly backed by the USA, for higher levels and faster pace of cooperation.

The timing of the State Department’s imposition of the bounty on Hafiz Saeed – exactly a day after the announcement of President Asif Zardari’s private visit to India on April 8 and the Indian platform from which it was declared – has only served to intensify the impression that there is an Indo-US collusion of interests. The US Undersecretary of State, Wendy Sherman, announced placing Hafiz Saeed and Taiba’s co-founder Hafiz Abdul Rehman Makki on the State Department’s Rewards for Justice listing on April 2 during a four-day visit to India. The following day, State Department spokesperson Victoria Nuland said that the bounty on the two men “had everything to do with Mumbai.” These unsubstantiated accusations have been sealed by Hillary Clinton’s recent assertions, while departing from New Delhi, that Islamabad was providing “a launching pad” for terrorists; adding that al-Qaeda Chief Ayman al-Zawahiri was hiding in Pakistan.

Saeed has been repeatedly nominated by India as the mastermind behind all major incidents of terror without providing relevant evidence and the US seems to be in cahoots. He was there in the Indian Parliament attack case only to be exonerated through absence of any reference to him in the final Indian Supreme Court verdict in 2004. He was placed under house arrest after the 2006 Mumbai bombings of commuter trains, which caused a carnage even larger in scale than the terror incident in 2008 – only to be released months later when it was established that the Indian Mujahedeen, rather than the LeT was involved. He was again arrested following the Mumbai massacre in 2008 and was released seven months later after the Lahore High Court freed him for lack of any evidence.

Now the State Department has finally provided the vindication for Pakistan, and Saeed by issuing a clarification that the reward money – at par with Mullah Omar – was not for locating him, but providing actionable evidence that can withstand legal scrutiny. This has bared the hollowness of the Indo-US claims. Both the US and India want to frame him and through brazen blackmail on his account harness Pakistan’s unquestioned support to Washington’s orchestrated scenario in South Asia in years to come. No one in Pakistan has sympathy for anyone dipping his hands in innocent blood on whatever account or ideology, yet no man should go to the gallows for uncommitted crimes either!

The writer is a freelance columnist.
-The Nation

May 16, 2012
By Tariq Fatemi

It has been nearly five months since that fateful night when the Nato/ISAF attack on the Salala outpost left over a dozen soldiers dead. While Pakistan’s anger was genuine and its demand for a US apology justified, both sides have remained mired in an unfortunate cycle of accusations and recriminations that have left their bilateral relations in a crisis, unprecedented even by their chequered history of earlier spats and separations. It would be no exaggeration to state that their rigidity and intransigence has become increasingly self-defeating. Here, the government abandoned any pretence at ownership of its primary foreign policy responsibility, surrendering sobriety to soaring rhetoric which may have boosted our spirits but instead made us lose focus on core issues.

The Americans have not been helpful either. Not only has Washington refused to provide an apology which it ritually offers to others but it also hardened its public utterances. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s warning to Pakistan while in India was needlessly provocative and her choice of location inexplicable, especially for someone viewed as a friend.

Soon thereafter, the Obama Administration decided to drop legislation regarding the Reconstruction Opportunity Zones. This confirmed dwindling interest in initiatives relating to Pakistan, even if geared to weaning the youth in the tribal areas away from extremism and into gainful economic employment. The US Congress’s current mood of belligerence towards Pakistan was further confirmed when influential committees of the White House introduced fresh legislation to tighten the conditions on provision of assistance to Pakistan, including one that would make US aid subject to reopening of land routes to Nato, while another would place military and intelligence under greater scrutiny. Even the Chicago Nato Summit invitation has been turned into an instrument to pressure Pakistan to adopt a cooperative attitude, especially on the opening of supply routes.

Diplomatic and military representatives are currently engaged in hectic efforts to resolve this issue prior to the summit, whose invitation is being dangled before our leadership, making Pakistan’s eagerness to be invited inelegantly obvious. The announcement of the DCC meeting and Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar’s remarks are signals of the government’s readiness to approve compromises that have already been finalised. Having made the mistake of boycotting the Bonn Conference, which was of greater relevance to us, we do not want to miss out on the Chicago Summit, which is to discuss Nato’s role in Afghanistan, post-2014.

Pakistan’s leadership would, however, do well to remember that while the US may agree to pay more for the supply routes and its resumption might bring us the Chicago invitation, it will only be a temporary respite, papering over the symptoms while leaving the ailment unattended. In other words, the absence of trust and lack of understanding on issues of fundamental importance to Pakistan has become a festering wound that will continue to bleed. While improving ties with India has been welcomed by stakeholders in Pakistan, it is long-term US objectives in Afghanistan that raise questions in Pakistan.

Of course, Pakistan’s primary interest should be in ensuring a full and orderly withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan. However, while the Strategic Partnership Agreement signed by Presidents Hamid Karzai and Barack Obama on May 1 lacks specifics, it does confirm US intentions to remain involved in the country far beyond 2014 with access to bases under the cover of “joint facilities”. The US/Nato indefinite presence will not only cause concern to Pakistan but to China, Iran and Russia as well. In such a situation, it is incumbent on us to work with our neighbours and other interested parties to help evolve an intra-Afghan political settlement that can facilitate the complete withdrawal of all foreign forces. Therein lies a genuine prospect of peace in Afghanistan and the region.

The Express Tribune

May 17, 2012
Zafar Hilaly

It took the American helicopters a full two hours to kill the 24 Pakistani soldiers at the Salala (military) outpost near the Afghan border. We read they were picked off one by one inside the battered outpost by the hovering helicopters. Hence, when the subsequent American ‘inquiry’ claimed that it was the result of a mistake, no one paid any attention. Perhaps Obama too discovered the truth and hence did not apologise because that would have only compounded the evil. But he could, and did, express ‘regret,’ but that was so devoid of remorse that it savoured of hypocrisy.

Obama’s grudging response is a part of the policy of ‘Let-them-hate-us-so-long-as-they-fear-us,’ pursued by hyper- powers when dealing with weaker states. Lucius Accius drew attention to it (in the words quoted above) when describing Rome’s policy in 100 BC. The Persians and the Mongols under Genghis Khan, in particular, practiced it with bloody abandon. The erstwhile Soviet Union indulged in it gleefully on occasions and today America, the sole hyper power, has few qualms in following suit. The bullying is often wrapped in words that has little or nothing to do with reality; nor with laws, norms and ethics. It’s simply the strong doing what it wants, when it wants, to whom it wants and may the devil take the hindmost.

While the outrage that Salala engendered in Pakistan was understandable, the fact is that the Americans had made no secret of their intention of teaching us a lesson for our coddling of the Haqqani Taliban. Mullen, Petraeus, et al were furious that Americans had perished at the hands of those we were sheltering and they were determined to strike back whenever the pretext arose, which they conjured up at Salala.

I recall a conversation with Benazir Bhutto (BB) on October 23, 2007. Referring to the situation in Swat she had remarked, “If the Americans think we cannot or won’t stop the Taliban (in Swat) they intend to come in and do the job.”

“The Americans in Swat”? I asked, looking puzzled.

“Yes”, she replied, “and the sooner we wake up to that danger the better”.

BB went on to explain why that was a possibility and why that may not be such a bad thing. “We cannot hack it alone”, she said. In this war America’s military and financial backing are indispensable and without that we will flounder. And rather than let that happen, BB was prepared to accept US help and also use the financial assistance that would be forthcoming to rejuvenate the economy even if it meant being branded an American collaborator (which is why they killed her).

A strong economy, providing jobs, education, health, et al, would help greatly to undermine extremism and militancy. Moreover, as America was eager to play the role of Pakistan’s benefactor, it made no sense to spurn the offer or to carp and cavil about aid conditionalities. There was no such thing as a free lunch and it was better to accommodate the Americans than to delude ourselves that we could handle the military challenges and the economic meltdown stemming from massive insecurity that had brought business and development activity in the country to a standstill. Such bravado, in BB’s view, was foolhardy.

But as we waited for Ambassador Ann Patterson to arrive at Bilawal House in Karachi, I recall muttering that Pakistan had changed greatly during her decade-long exile and given the anti-Americanism that was rife an alliance with the US would be politically impossible for a government. BB brushed aside my comment, saying, ‘the military should not have any problems; they will still get their toys which should keep them happy and off our backs’.

Zardari, who inherited her mantle, would have happily done that, if left to himself. But only BB with her stature and broader influence could have carried it off considering the stiff resistance she would have faced not only from her opponents but also the establishment. Given his weaknesses and unpopularity Zardari hardly stood a chance and he understood that, so he settled for a complicated game to cling to power as long as possible.

From the start, Zardari chose ‘the middle way’ focusing more on his survival than playing a risky game with the establishment. That ‘middle way’ meant muddling through and making his and his party’s grip on office his top priority. The mouth-watering prospect of attaining power must have acted as a spur. Never lacking in self- confidence, Zardari genuinely believed he could simultaneously do what the military wanted of him and whatever was required to keep the Americans on his side. But that proved too much even for a political Houdini like him. Besides, BB’s killing had restored the establishment’s grip on sensitive issues and Nawaz Sharif’s inscrutable games also made Zardari’s situation more dangerous and difficult.

Of course, the establishment, confident as always about its ability to handle matters, believed it could carry on as before – that is, nourishing traditional notions of strategic depth by keeping on the right side of the Afghan Taliban; appeasing their vicious local counterparts the TTP in Swat and staying above the political fray within the country and in Afghanistan. Moreover, by continuing to cooperate with the Americans, to eliminate Al-Qaeda and its foreign affiliates in Pakistan, the establishment ensured that its annual stipend, in the form of direct US military assistance, would continue uninterrupted – in other words, it could have its cake and eat it too.

That worked for a while. When the TTP showed its real face in Swat, they were sorted out. But then a string of unfortunate events began to unravel the relationship. That started with CIA contractor Raymond Davis shooting and killing two Pakistanis in broad daylight, which was followed by the Bin Laden fiasco. Then came the 22 hour Haqqani network’s assault on the US Embassy and Nato headquarters in Kabul and the Nato attack on Salala in November, followed by the suspension of Nato supply lines through Pakistan, which ‘threw the relationship into an irrecoverable tail spin’.

To be fair to Zardari, had he persisted on the course of action that BB had resolved on, namely, allowing a large American military footprint in Pakistan, there would have been hell to pay. There was simply too much opposition to it.

So, finding himself between a rock and a hard place, Zardari fudged the issue which led to considerable double- speak between Washington and Islamabad. And when the Americans insisted that Islamabad attack the Afghan Taliban they held secret meetings with their representatives and kept Pakistan out of the loop, the little trust which existed began to erode quickly. The result is that today, after the most recent attack on Nato premises in Kabul and the continued suspension of the Nato supply line through Pakistan, mutual trust has evaporated. Its likely restoration under duress of sorts, because Pakistan is helpless, will only add to the ill feeling that is fairly pervasive here.

A bright US scholar, Shahzad Qazi, believes that the US-Pak relationship needs ‘creative rethinking’ because the US ‘can scarcely afford a minimalist relationship with Pakistan.’ But given the spontaneous aversion we have developed for each other to maintain even that is going to be difficult. Hence, there is much talk in Congress of ‘disengaging’, ‘sidelining’, and even ‘dumping’ Pakistan. And on our side it’s much the same which is hardly surprising given the current mood.

Indeed, America and Pakistan are on divergent paths, and our interests are more competitive than common. Nevertheless, withdrawing from an alliance sometimes requires as much, if not more skill, than forging it, lest the harm caused in the sensitive disentangling process hurtful and dangerous. So, as they go about the job, our leaders should exercise caution. The Americans are understandably jumpy. They have built themselves a throne of bayonets in Kabul on which neither they nor their stooges can sit on comfortably and that’s not a nice feeling.
Email: charles123it@hotmail.com

May 18, 2012
By Syed Talat Hussain

This is the season to count the blessings of ‘positive engagement’ with the US, the hallmark of which is the opening of Ground Lines of Communication (G-LOCS, an American coinage). The Defence Committee of the Cabinet (DCC), the highest decision-making body in crisis situations, fell just short of declaring a national holiday to emphatically send the message to Washington about how relieved it was to be proposing a new beginning in bilateral relations. The DCC’s authorisation to different heads of departments to prepare the finer details of the agreement to unblock the stalled supplies to Afghanistan is being made to look like a well-considered and a painfully-arrived-at decision from a responsible state that wants to avoid the disastrous course of confrontation with a large group of very important states.

The facts of this particular matter are, however, wholly different. The entire rigmarole of holding marathon meetings and burning the midnight oil to smooth over complex policy creases had nothing to do with the 40-plus ‘important countries of the world’; nor was it a master stroke of fine diplomacy born of genius. While scripted differently, at heart it was an unconditional apology by all Pakistani decision-makers tendered to Washington for their act of closing the Nato supplies six months ago. And this apology had to be made under duress created primarily by a string of miscalculations by the country’s army high command and the political elite.

The more prominent of these miscalculations was the assumption that the hurried act of closing the gates of supplies to Nato and the US forces through Pakistan’s land would, in turn, make the world sit up and take note of the mood at the General Headquarters following Salala.

It was meant to be more than just a profound protest. In fact, Pakistan’s second miscalculation was that it perceived this as an opportunity to re-design its relations with the US in a manner that would secure Islamabad’s core interests in a deal publicly accepted to be between equals and sealed with guarantees of declared respect for Pakistan’s territorial sovereignty. This was an important point to make at the time as Salala came on the heels of the OBL raid. Since the army high command could not retaliate in kind, nor could it sit back and take these repeated hits, it chose the middle way of fighting it out on the table of hard bargains with Washington.

The political elite played along this strategy, but for different reasons. A weak-kneed government had to resort to the crutches of parliament to sustain the policy of cold confrontation with Washington in the hope that the collective will of the people’s representatives would add strength to this posture and help it cut a popular deal with the US. The parliament, never a brooding forum of high-rolling intellectuals, took the mandate with open arms, stretched it according to the aspirations of the people and returned the government a document that would be hard to implement even by the strongest of countries. What was meant to be a source of strength for the government thus became its biggest weakness: the parliament’s wish list could not be turned into a command for the world to obey. Certainly, not by a government that was consumed by its power play with the judiciary.

Thus, hemmed in by gross miscalculations, the Pakistani decision-making machinery went into hasty retreat trampling on itself. The army high command started to blame the politicians for creating a mess in parliament over a fine and delicate manoeuvre to get the best deal with Washington. The civilians in power quietly began to shift responsibility towards the generals for playing populist cards and landing the government in an impossible situation, leading to the blocking of Nato supplies. An empty kitty forced further gloom and doom upon a directionless policy-making apparatus.

The saga that started after the Salala attack is a sad and worrying testimony of how matters of extreme national importance are decided. Knee-jerk reactions have replaced long-term planning in every sphere and no collective wisdom seems to inform — much less set the direction of — the debate about Pakistan’s abiding interests. In the most precarious of times, the country is in the most fickle of hands.

The Express Tribune

May 20, 2012
By:Arif Nizami

Suddenly it has dawned upon our policymakers, civilian and khaki, that it is time to ‘move on’ beyond Salala. The Defence Committee of the Cabinet (DCC) in its meeting chaired by President Zardari, with the COAS General Kayani and the PM in attendance, has decided to reopen the land routes for NATO supplies suspended for almost six months.

The foreign minister Hina Rabbani Khar has underscored the need for closure on the impasse with Washington. Although Prime Minister Gilani has claimed that the invitation for Zardari to attend the NATO summit in Chicago is unconditional, it is obvious that the formal announcement from Brussels came only after Islamabad had agreed in principle to let NATO supplies pass through its territory.

Surely, it’s time to restore a modicum of normality to ties with Washington. And it is welcome news that Islamabad has taken a decision to move in that direction. Better late than never.

Whatever the reasons behind this sudden about-face, its redeeming feature is that the civilian and military leadership are on the same page on the issue. Perhaps, there is a belated realisation that foreign policy and security decisions should be taken not merely on misplaced emotional considerations but on the basis of hard-nosed realities and enlightened self-interest.

Since the Salala incident, in which Pakistan lost 24 of its soldiers in an unprovoked attack, Islamabad had repeatedly asked for an unqualified apology from the US. Till such an apology came, NATO supplies were to remain suspended. Added to this was the demand for an end to drone attacks in Pakistani tribal areas.

Islamabad in the immediate aftermath of the Salala episode made US personnel vacate the Shaheen Airbase. Interestingly, before this, it had always been officially denied that Islamabad was facilitating drone attacks on its own territory by providing a base to the US.

Although it has been decided in principle to resume supplies, none of our demands have been met. A spokesman of the Pentagon has reiterated that the US had already expressed ‘deep regret’ and offered condolences to the Pakistani government, the people and the affected families over the incident, and that was sufficient.

It is generally claimed that Washington was willing to proffer an apology at one stage, but changed its mind after last month’s attack on Kabul by the Haqqani group allegedly launched from N Waziristan.

In the last few months, Washington has visibly hardened its position towards Pakistan. Apart from increasing hostility being expressed towards Pakistan by various Congressmen and scathing criticism in the media and academia, Pakistan is increasingly being considered as part of the problem in Afghanistan rather than the solution.

Since 9/11, Islamabad had been considered a friend, but of late was being referred to as a ‘frenemy’. But after Osama bin Laden was discovered and killed in Abbottabad a year ago, Pakistan graduated to the status of a virtual enemy.

The past few weeks have been singularly detrimental to Islamabad’s strategic and economic interests. The State Department (as opposed to the Pentagon and US lawmakers on both sides of the divide), even in the worst of times, had kept Islamabad engaged. Of late, even Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has been losing patience with Islamabad.

Clinton’s recent visit to Bangladesh and India, while bypassing Pakistan, was a deliberate snub to Islamabad. While in India, her scathing criticism of Islamabad’s alleged complicity with Al-Qaeda and the Taliban and its harbouring of Hafiz Saeed proved to be a bit much for the already strained relationship.

Moreover, President Obama’s sudden dash to Kabul on the eve of the first anniversary of Osama’s killing and signing of a ten-year strategic partnership agreement with Karzai was another indicator that events were overtaking Pakistan.

Thanks to a flawed and jaundiced strategic paradigm based on a misplaced and disproportionate sense of strategic importance in the region, Islamabad has become increasingly isolated. Our policy makers have now been forced to change course. If the purpose of our ostensible hurt from the US was to keep India out of Afghanistan, our policies have achieved just the opposite.

Not only a budding strategic partnership with regional designs is flourishing between New Delhi and Washington, Kabul has also been assured that it will not be left at the mercy of Islamabad after ISAF eventually withdraws from Afghanistan in 2014.

On the flip side, Pakistan has legitimate security concerns and outstanding issues with the US. Billions of dollars (according to Islamabad’s reckoning) under the Coalition Support Fund (CSF) remain stuck.

Despite the acknowledgement that most terrorists including Osama bin Laden could not have been eliminated without the support from Pakistan, there is widespread opposition amongst US lawmakers to approve the $2.4 billion aid package. On top of this, military assistance and cooperation also remain suspended.

Apart from the predictable adverse comments from the likes of Imran Khan and Munawar Hassan of Jamaat-e-Islami, the reaction to the agreement on restoration of NATO supplies has been relatively muted. The mainstream opposition headed by Nawaz Sharif has criticised the government for buckling under pressure. But despite his criticism, Nawaz knows exactly where the shoe hurts.

As prime minister in July 1999, Sharif was made to dash to Washington to request President Clinton for a ceasefire in Kargil. The disastrous insurgency started by Musharraf turned out to be a fiasco and had spiralled out of control. Nawaz was pivotal in extracting a withdrawal deal courtesy Clinton. However, the military accused him of capitulation only a few months later and showed him the door.

It is perhaps the first time in the chequered history of civil-military relations in Pakistan that the government has been cautious enough not to be negotiating terms of engagement with the US without visibly taking all the stakeholders on board. This includes not only the military leadership but the parliament as well. Hence, the past pattern when civilians were made to fall on their own swords by the ubiquitous establishment will not be repeated.

The restoration of the NATO supplies could be beneficial for Islamabad once the ISAF withdrawal process starts. If relations are not as frayed as they are today, the military could successfully negotiate to use much of the military equipment used by the NATO forces. But for that to happen, the present trust deficit will have to be reduced.

President Zardari will have to play a crucial role at the Chicago summit this weekend to bring back Pakistan into the critical negotiations for the endgame in Afghanistan.

The writer is Editor, Pakistan Today
-Pakistan Today